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Abstract 
This thesis critiques particular aspects of the employment discrimination protection 
afforded in the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 and Ireland' s Employment Equality 
Act 1998. It addresses specific problems with regard to the operation of the disability non-
discrimination system, and it utilises the social model of disability to expose the limitations 
arising when non-discrimination is adopted as the primary principle of justice and inclusion. 
The basic premise of the social model of disability, developed from the 1960s, is 
that disability is a form of oppression imposed upon people with impairments in the way 
they are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from participation in mainstream society. It 
refutes the dominance of the medical, individual-limitation construction of disability, which 
evolved in concert with the welfare state from the nineteenth century. 
The work begins by tracing the historical development of the category disability as 
western society moved from feudal ties to a wage-labour capitalist economy. This 
prompted the establishment of a parallel universe for a large number of disabled 
individuals. Challenging the hegemony of their displaced existence, the disability 
movement developed a radical social theory, which shifted the locus of the problem away 
from impaired bodies and towards the institutional, exclusionary and unchallenged practices 
of society. ln response to rising inequalities and the political agitation of minority groups, a 
wave of non-discrimination legislative protections pertaining to disability have been 
introduced. The concepts of equality and non-discrimination adopted within legal discourse 
are discussed in order to provide a backdrop against which subsequent analysis of the 
specifics of the disability non-discrimination system is assessed. The analysis also extends 
to the constitutional plane and considers the constitutional obstacles to the refonnulated 
view of disability suggested by social model of disability within disability discourse. Here, 
the barriers raised by orthodox constitutional reasoning and tradition to the introduction of 
disability discrimination protection, are addressed. An examination of each jurisdiction's 
approach to the distinct and thorny issue of proving disability for the purposes of statutory 
protection illustrates bow the non-discrimination paradigm continues to sustain and 
perpetuate the individual, functional-limitation approach to disability-based exclusion. 
Finally, the reasonable accommodation duty is examined, both as a form oflegal equality 
and as a tool which "gestures" towards substantive ideals of equality. The discussion 
vi 
considers that anti-discrimination law's reasonable accommodation duties are less extensive 
than may originally have been conceived. 
Despite their inclusion of the more expansive equality norm of reasonable 
accommodation, the limitations that inhere in the disability non-discrimination paradigms, 
as represented by the ADA and the EEA, provide support for the development of a new 
synthesis between social model conceptions of disadvantage and equality rights. 
Vll 
Introduction 
" the particular form of poverty principally associated with physical 
impairment is caused by our exclusion from the ability to earn a living on a par 
with our able bodied peers due to the way employment is organized. This 
exclusion is linked with our exclusion from participation in the social activities 
and provisions that make general employment possible"1 
This statement draws attention to the exclusionary forces built into the organisation of 
employment and how they disproportionately affect people with impairn1ents. It places 
disabled people as a distinct social grouping defined in terms of stigma, neglect, 
prejudice and stereotyping. This is contrary to the view traditionally held, in which 
society bas seen the exclusion of disabled people as a natural consequence of the 
impaired body. 
Despite this pervasive construction of the disability phenomenon, civil society 
worldwide2 has begun to re-examine the social disadvantage of disabled people by using 
the framework of equality and discrimination Jaw? Chapter one considers the 
significance of this development against the backdrop of historically entrenched 
attitudes to disability. It traces the origins of the exclusion of disabled people from 
mainstream structures following the emergence of capitalist economies. It further 
considers the subsequent social construction of disability in terms of dependency, 
inferiority and exclusion. 
Originally, the construction of equality expressed through the equal treatment 
principle seemed wholly inapplicable to individuals with impairments who, because of 
those impairments, appeared to be naturally unequal.4 The official state response was 
based on the philosophy that pertained during the institutionalisation era. Since 
disabled people lacked independence and autonomy, the role of government was in the 
repair and rehabilitation of their damaged bodies, and in providing financial support to 
1 Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation, Fundamental Principles of Disability 
(London, UPlAS, 1976) p.l4. 
2 For a useful review of disability discrimination legislation, see T. Degener "Disability 
Discrimination Law: A Global Comparative Perspective•· in C. Gooding and A. Lawson (eds.) 
Disability Rights in Europe: From The01y to Practice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005) p.87. 
3 For an account of thjs gradual transition in the US context, see R. K. Scotch, From Goodwill to 
Civil Rights Transfonning Federal Disability Policy (2"d ed.) (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 200 I). On the case for disability equality rights in the UK, see C. Barnes, Disabled 
People in Britain and Discrimination (London: Hurst and Company, 1991) and for discussion in 
a comparative US-UK context, C. Gooding, Disabling Law, Enabling Acts Disability Rights in 
Britain and America (London Pluto Press 1994). 
4 See chapter two. 
this otherwise deserving group. The phenomenon of discrimination was not originally 
conceived as contributing to the exclusion of disabled people. Rather, their exclusion -
caused by their inability to work and otherwise participate in society- was simply a 
natural by-product of their functional impairments. Theoretical discourse around the 
meaning and construction of disability, as well as around notions of equality, 
discrimination and exclusion, laid a challenge to this one-dimensional view of the 
disabled.5 In chapter one, I aim to contextualise the dramatic sea-change that came with 
viewing disabled people as rights-holders and as citizens entitled to equal treatment. 
On the back of prolific successes achieved by the civil liberties movement, a 
campaign of reform, initially spearheaded by disabled war veterans in the United States, 
adopted the language of equality to tackle the oppression of disabled people. The 
foundation of this new approach is that disabled people cannot be reduced to the sum of 
their clinical conditions. Instead, disabled people are a minority group denied equal 
rights.6 This minority group analysis of disability, introduced in chapter one, pursues a 
political strategy advocating the application of equality and non-discrimination 
guarantees to disabled people. It is predicated on the belief that disabled people endure 
disproportionate levels of stigma, prejudice and overt animus, which can be tackled 
through guaranteeing disabled people the basic equal rights enjoyed by others. The 
minority group model shares the reconstructed view of disability developed under what 
can loosely be termed the social model of disability.' 
The social model of disability emerged from social science discourse in the UK 
in the late 1960s. Social model theorists reject the individualised, medical and personal 
tragedy model of disability that has dominated disability-based policy. Their 
refonnulation is based on a distinction between impaim1ent and disability, which is 
further outlined in chapter one. The distinction suggests that disability is not an 
attribute of the individual, but a complex collection of conditions, activities and 
relationships created by the social and political environment. In short, disability is a 
social construct imposed through a myriad of exclusionary social barriers. It is a 
50n the reconstruction of disability, see R. K. Scotch, "Models of Disability and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act" (2000) 21 Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law 213. On the 
values promoted by a truly substantive conception of equality, seeS. Fredman, The Future of 
Equality in Britain (Manchester, EOC, 2002). 
6 The most influential proponent of the minority group model is US political scientist, Harlan 
Hahn. See H. Hahn, "Civil Rights for Disabled Americans: The Foundation of a Political 
Agenda" in A. Gartner and T. Joe (eds.) Images of the Disabled, Disabling Images (New York: 
Praeger Publishing, 1987). 
7 For an overview of social model theory, see C. Tregaskis, "Social Model Theory: The Story so 
far ... " (2002) 17 Disability and Society 457. 
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"sophisticated form of social oppression".8 Consequently, social model perspectives on 
disability demand a comprehensive and transformative societal response to the 
exclusion experienced by disabled people. 
From this, it can be stated that the disability movement 's strategy for inclusion 
can be divided into two broad camps. First, the minority group model which places faith 
in legal institutions to found, protect and promote the equal rights of disabled people. 
Second, the social model of disability, with its more ambitious aims.9 The latter model 
does not subscribe to rights-based responses to disability because the same exclusionary 
barriers which contribute to the exclusion of disabled people, it is argued, permeate the 
institutional structures of the legal system itself. 10 The reliance upon legal strategies, 
according to social model reasoning, misconceives the nature of disability-based 
exclusion for two reasons. First, the legal system generally adheres to the dominant 
medical constructs of disability; and second, the legal system's ability to capture the 
institutional forms of discrimination which create disability is, at best, ad-hoc. 11 
Though there is discord within the disability movement over the effectiveness 
of a legal rights strategy, many view the promise held out by disability equality rights as 
beneficial to the political aims of the movement. 12 Indeed, despite this thesis's criticisms 
of a number of limitations to the non-discrimination system, it would be churlish not to 
acknowledge the benefits that attach to this shift in emphasis on disability status. In the 
first instance, the application of discrimination norms to disability challenges the 
dominant welfarist construct of disabled people and elevates disabled people to subjects 
and rights-holders in their own right. The extension of the non-discrimination rule in 
employment to cover disabled people "deconstructs the expectation that . .. disabled 
8 See M. Oliver, The Politics of Disablement (London: Macmillan, 1990) 
9 Included in this general umbrella theory is the universalist view of disability which is discussed 
in chapter six. 
10 M. Oliver, supra n.8 p.1 05-6. 
11 See V. Finklestein, "The Social Model ofDisability Repossessed" Paper delivered at 
Manchester Coalition of Disabled People December 1, 2001 . Available at Centre for Disability 
Studies Resources Web page:< http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-
studies/archiveuk/archframe.htm > Finklestein argues that "the social model of disability has to 
do with the creation of a society which enables us to be "human" - not just access our "rights" 
within an existing competitive market society .... Our society is built on a competitive market 
foundation and it is this social system that disabled us. From this point of view disabled people 
are forced to live in a social prison. While no one can object to campaigning for "rights" so that 
the prison in which we live is made more human, it is only a political buffoon who believes that 
exploring prisoner experiences can lead to emancipation.". At p.4. 
12 See generally, G. Quinn, "Rethinking the Place of Difference in Civil Society - the Role of 
Anti-Discrimination Law in the Next Century" in R. Byrne and W. Duncan, Developments in 
Discrimination Law in Ireland and Europe (Dublin: ICEL, 1997) p.65. 
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[people] do not work". 13 One cannot deny the magnitude of this development in the 
historical treatment of disabled people, particularly since they have been confined to a 
class that was exempt from both contributing to collective structures and benefiting 
from them. 14 The symbolic effect of extending non-discrimination law to disabled 
people is, therefore, immense. Legal recognition that people with physical, sensory and 
cognitive impainnents are the subjects of invidious forms of discrimination supports the 
proposition that such treatment is as destructive as race or gender-based discrimination. 
On a positive level, it provides them with a tangible invitation to become full members 
of the social polity. It signals a clear message regarding their full citizenship and 
encourages disabled people to invest in their talent bank with fresh confidence. 
Consequently, I do not argue that equality and non-discrimination law 
principles have no place in the disability context. Instead, my argument is based on the 
proposition that the response to disability-based inequality cannot be limited to current 
non-discrimination norms. In this sense, I utilise social model reasoning and 
perspectives to critique the limitations of the non-discrimination system. However, this 
thesis parts company with social model reasoning at a critical juncture. It will be argued 
that the social model 's rejection of discrimination legal norms is based on a restrictively 
narrow view of the range and possibility of discrimination law. This is particularly the 
case in light of emerging developments under the banner of so-called "fourth 
generation" equality initiatives.15 Further, it will be argued that the minority group 
model and the social model need not be viewed as inherently antagonistic. This will 
particularly be the case if the current strategy of non-discrimination is developed and 
"flanked" by more expansive equality norms than those which currently persist. 
The provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 (hereafter the 
ADA) and Ireland's Employment Equality Act 1998- 2004 (hereafter the EEA) 16 
provide the framework for the analysis. Also included in the discussion is the European 
Union's (hereafter the EU) approach to disability discrimination under the Framework 
Directive.17 It concludes that these statutory protections remain an insufficient use of the 
equality norm in the disability context. It bases this discussion around two core and 
related concepts -disability and discrimination - within the specific context of anti-
13 A. Silvers, "Formal Justice" in A Silvers, D. Wasserman and M. Howard, Disability, 
Difference, Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998) 13 p.l32. 
14 A. Silvers, "Introduction" Ibid. p.3. 
15 This point is developed in chapter six 
16 The Employment Equality Act 1998 was recently amended by the terms ofthe Equality Act 
2004, implementing the provisions of the Framework Directive. 
17 Framework Directive 2000178 OJ [2000] L303/ 16. 
4 
discrimination employment law. Reference is also made to the practice of other 
jurisdictions, including Canada and South Africa. 
The choice of the United States' disability discrimination regime as the 
comparative focal point has been made for a number of reasons. By adopting the duty to 
make reasonable accommodation in the disability context, the ADA provided the 
pioneering model for legislation worldwide. As noted earlier, the requirement for 
reasonable accommodation is key to modem disability discrimination legislation. 
Reasonable accommodation is a tool of public policy that recognises the myriad ways 
through which the built and social environment favours the needs and requirements of 
non-disabled individuals. It requires reasonable alterations in particular circumstances in 
order to lessen the exclusionary impact of 'ordinary' practices on disabled people. In the 
employment context, reasonable accommodation refers to the need to adapt or adjust the 
workplace, its policies and its structures in order to enable a disabled person "to have 
access to, participate in, or advance in employment".18 The ADA's reasonable 
accommodation provision has generated a body of case law and prompted extensive 
academic research across many disciplines. There is, therefore, considerable scope to 
draw out some points of contrast and concern in the discussion of the two statutory 
approaches. Further, as chapter three discusses, there were initially constitutional 
barriers to the introduction of the equality norm by way of reasonable accommodation 
in Ireland in the late 1990s.19 Chapter three discusses bow established modes of 
constitutional reasoning can affect the introduction of expanded concepts of disability 
and meanings of equality. Given that both jurisdictions share the tradition of a written 
constitution, the United States perspective was a useful starting point in assessing the 
relationship between the equality principle in the context of disability and more 
substantive prior rights, such as property rights. Since the ADA initially enjoyed a 
positiou of constitutional security, the comparative discussion critically assesses the 
reasoning process of the Irish Supreme Court. However, as is also discussed in chapter 
three, the ADA's constitutional position has begun to erode following a recent decision 
of the United States Supreme Court. 2° Chapter three also contrasts the constitutional 
climate in the US with the interpretation of the Canadian Charter's equality guarantee in 
the context of disability. This discussion illustrates the weaknesses both in formal 
18 Article 5 oftbe Framework Directive. 
19 In Ire land, the original reasonable accommodation provision in the Employment Equality Bill 
of I 996 was found to amount to an unconstitutional interference with employers' property rights. 
Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Employment Equality Bill 1996 (1997] 2 IR 321. 
20 See the decision in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garrett 53 I U.S. 356 
(200 I) discussed in detail in chapter three of this work. 
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constitutional equality guarantees and in the senior judiciary's understanding of 
disability based-inequality. Ireland 's reasonable accommodation duty was eventually 
strengthened as a consequence of the State's membership of the European Union. 
However, since the disability equality agenda in Ireland derives little or no support from 
the formal equality guarantee under the Irish Constitution, it remains devoid of 
institutional support in areas outside of the European Union's competence.21 Provisions 
within the ADA and the EEA have faced particular difficulties on the constitutional 
plane because of conflicts between weak equality guarantees and more "substantive" 
rights. Where constitutions do not specifically endorse transformative objectives -
through, for example, interpretive clauses and substantive equality guarantees- the legal 
system can end up preserving the status quo?2 This point is underlined by the contrast 
between the US and Irish constitutional orders and that operating in the Canadian 
context. 
This thesis also discusses the approaches to the pursuit of equality through 
orthodox, non-discrimination frameworks. It will be argued that in spite of the potential 
of the reasonable accommodation duty, there remain limitations in the disability context. 
The disability anti-discrimination project relies on the equal treatment and equal 
opportunities principles, though there are occasional, imperfect "gestures" towards 
substantive equality?3 To this end, chapter two addresses the core non-discrimination 
tools, namely the prohibition on direct discrimination and indirect discrimination, and it 
assesses their utility and effectiveness in the disability context. It points out that the 
direct discrimination principle plays a useful, yet often overlooked role in the context of 
disability-based discrimination. The Supreme Court of Canada recently stated that 
indirect discrimination is the most pervasive form of discrimination endured by disabled 
people?4 However, chapter two questions the operation of the indirect discrimination 
principle within Ireland's EEA, particularly in the context of its ability to unpack 
unnecessary job qualifications. It also points out the unclear relationship between 
indirect discrimination, the justification defence and the duty to make reasonable 
21 Indeed, the Irish disability equality agenda has experienced a considerable constitutional 
battering in the context of education. See Sinnott v Minister for Education [200 1] 2 IR 545 and 
C. O 'Mahony, "The Right to Education and 'Constitutionally Appropriate' Provisions" (2006) 
28 Dublin University Law Journal (forthcoming). 
22 J. Baker et al. Equality From The01y to Action (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 
g .I37. 
3 S. Fredman, "Disability Equality: A Challenge to the Existing Anti-Discrimination Paradigm" 
in A. Lawson and C. Gooding (eds.) Disability Rights in Europe: From Theo1y to Practice 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) 199, 213 . 
24 Eldridge v British Columbia ( 1997) 3 SCR 624. 
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accommodation. At EU level, in particular, this relationship remains unsatisfactory.25 
Chapter four takes on the definition of disability and clearly indicates the EEA's 
superiority over the ADA in this context. It argues that despite initial misgivings within 
the disability movement, the EEA's approach represents the best attempt at defining the 
characteristic which receives the benefit of discrimination protection. The definition for 
the most part ensures that the focus of the statute remains on the alJeged act of 
discrimination. This stands in marked contrast to the position under the ADA, where 
the characteristics of the individual, as opposed to the treatment of the individual, 
receive undue focus. 
Thereafter, the thesis considers the duty to make reasonable accommodation. 
This discussion takes place at a number of levels. 
Chapter five compares and contrasts the specific operation of the duty under the 
pioneering ADA and under the EEA as amended by the European Union's Framework 
Directive. Also discussed are issues such as the "reasonableness" of an accommodation, 
and the interaction, if any, between an accommodation's "reasonableness" and the 
defences available to employers. The scope of the mandate in terms of its ability to 
enable an individual perform a job's essential functions is set out. 
Chapter six considers the conceptual boundaries of the reasonable 
accommodation duty by means of a comparison with positive action programs. This 
chapter also surveys the relevant literature and concludes that reasonable 
accommodation and positive action are distinct concepts and, for both practical and 
political reasons, should remain distinct. While the reasonable accommodation duty 
embraces some aspects of an equality of results formu lation, it is argued that both the 
ADA and EEA fail to adequately embrace a truly "substantive" fonn of equality. At this 
stage, the considerable body of interrelated difficulties with the antidiscrimination legal 
system begin to build up. In this sense, the thesis queries the transformative impact 
commonly accorded to this form of anti-discrimination intervention. It also argues that 
the dominant mode of equality conceived by the anti-discrimination project is 
insufficient to address the patterns of inequality that result in the discrimination and 
exclusion of disabled people. Some improvements to the existing system, in line with 
developments in other jurisdictions, are canvassed. For example, the thesis suggests that 
the individualism of the reasonable accommodation duty could be offset through 
equality tools already built into the EEA. However, it shows that these tools -including 
25 See Article 2(2)(b) of the Framework Directive. 
7 
equality reviews, audits and action plans - have yet to be viewed as core to the 
legislation 's operation. 
Chapter six also details the reformulation of the equality norm suggested by 
Fredman, which seeks to offset the traditional liberal and individualised construct of the 
current anti-discrimination paradigm.26 This involves a reconfiguration of the 
substantive equality norm through the formation of a new synthesis between non-
discrimination and positive duties and non-discrimination and social rights.27 Measures 
include the introduction of public sector duties to promote equality in the disability 
context recently agreed to in the UK.28 Equality policy is moving in similar directions in 
Ireland. 29 In this sense, chapter six provides a response to the social model's rejection of 
legal strategies. 
26 See generally, S. Fredman, supra n.23 and chapter six. 
27 S. Fredman, supra n 23 pp.211-217. 
28 See the Disability Discrimination Act 2005. 
29 See S. Mullally and 0. Smith, Equality Proofing (Dublin Government Stationery Office, 2000) 
and S. Mullally, "Mainstreaming Equality in Ireland: A Fair and Inclusive Accommodation for 
All? (2001) Legal Studies 99. 
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Chapter One 
The Origins and Development of the Category, Concept(s) of and 
Response to Disability 
Introduction 
By tracing the historical treatment of disability within private and public structures, this 
chapter surveys the advances in thinking that prompted the introduction of disability 
discrimination law. During the emergence of capitalist production modes in the 18th 
century, the category of disability provided an administrative means of ascribing 
' legitimate' reasons for non-participation in the workforce. The chapter sketches the 
disabled identity that resulted from the growth of capitalist industry. What emerged 
from this era was an economic and medically-determined construct of disability that 
focused on the impairments of the individual. The values and principles of the new 
workplace (speed, maximisation of profit, waged labour, individualism, competitiveness 
among workers) meant that work was defined in a way that was (and still is) presumed 
exclusionary to many disabled people. The exclusion of disabled people from 
mainstream pursuits was deemed a natural result of their impairments. As a result, 
social institutions - including employment and public services -were designed 
exclusively for the needs of the non-disabled. 
The view that physical and mental impairments do not automatically impair 
individuals from work or from participating in society began to filter into mainstream 
consciousness during the 1980s. The view does not imply that disabled people are 
without physical or mental impairments. Rather, it recognises that aspects of our social 
environment can be reconfigured, and attitudinal barriers can be challenged, in order to 
make mainstream participation possible.1 A recent mechanism purporting to support this 
new understanding of disability is the employment non-discrimination legal framework, 
which was first introduced in the United States. However, this development took place 
within a long-established social policy framework which viewed individual impairment 
as the main cause of disablement and exclusion. This bas had significant ramifications 
for the interpretation and scope of the non-discrimination mandate in the disability 
context. The chapter shows that this individual construction of disability- which 
underpins rehabilitative service provision and state benefits for disabled individuals -
1 R.K. Scotch, "Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act" (2000) 21 
Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law 213. 
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has become embedded in societal structures and in the mainstream psyche. 
Consequently, it has had particular ramifications for the interpretation and reach of the 
non-discrimination mandate in the disability context. These include the tensions 
surrounding the legislative definition of disability status for the purposes of non-
discrimination rights? 
The aim of the chapter is not to provide a comprehensive account of the fixtures 
of the modern welfare state as applicable to disability. Its ambitions are instead directed 
towards an understanding of how the historical construction of disability has impacted 
on the emerging equality and non-discrimination law discourse. This chapter goes on to 
contrast the traditional medical construct with the socio-political view of disablement. It 
places the introduction of the disability discrimination legal framework against the 
backdrop of an institutional setting which views disability as an inherently individual 
problem. It goes on to query the emancipatory promise held out by non-discrimination 
rights, described in terms of the "equality of opportunity" doctrine, which is discussed 
generally in chapter two and in more specific terms in subsequent chapters. 
Historical Background: From the Poor Laws to the Welfare State 
The modern meanings of disability can be traced back to its construction as an 
administrative category in early social policy. Although the term "disability" was never 
used, modern perceptions of disability derived from categories designed for the relief of 
poverty, established during the reign of Elizabeth 1 in England. The Poor Relief Act of 
160 I built upon a series of earlier laws designed to deal with the social problems caused 
by vagrancy and begging in the English countryside at a time of massive social change 
in the period 1500-1700.3 The feudal ties between labourer and master had faded, 
leaving labourers free to move about the countryside from parish to parish in search of 
work and higher wages. Begging was at this time a critical means of ensuring survival 
during periods of unemployment. It is not possible to describe the historical 
development of the disability category in social policy without reference to its perceived 
relationship with vagrancy at this time. While the relationship may appear tenuous at 
first, both concepts - as Stone pointed out- raised an issue which dominated the 
2 See L. Waddington and M. Diller, "Tensions and Coherence in Disability Policy: The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Social Welfare and Civil Rights Models of Disability in American, 
European and Lntemational Employment Law" Paper presented at An International Disability 
Law and Policy Symposium, From Principles to Practice October 22-26 2000 available at: 
http://ww.v.dredf.org/symposium/waddington.htmllast accessed November 04, 2002. 
3 See D. Stone, The Disabled State (London: Macmillan, 1985), chapter two. 
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thinking of poor law administrators and early welfare reformers': the ability to feign 
their position to procure alms or relief from the public system or private charity.4 This 
issue of delineating disability from 'able-bodiness' persists today, both in social welfare 
and non-discrimination structures.5 
Contributing to the rise in the number of beggars was the prevailing social 
backdrop. In Ireland, this backdrop was of a strict feudalist order moving towards a 
system of capitalist agriculture and in England, towards capitalist industry based on 
wage-labour. The gaps opened by a system in transition exposed the precarious position 
of many individuals with impairments. However, the wholescale exclusion of disabled 
persons from working structures had not always been the case. In pre-industrial society, 
when the economy consisted of co-operatively organised agriculture and small scale 
crafts, many disabled people contributed to the production process.6 At that time, 
disability was considered the responsibility of the famil/ and the local community. This 
responsibility was discharged to the point where the particular poverty of disability was 
no more pressing than the affliction of poverty in general.8 With the breakdown that 
followed feudalism's demise, families increasingly struggled to provide for their 
dependent members. Their difficulty was exacerbated by increased urban migration 
(particularly in England), migration for seasonal work, periodic bad harvests and sharp 
rises in food prices. Subsequently, the State was gradually forced to assume a greater 
role. In Ireland, state intervention came later. This was due to the absence of an 
4 D. Stone, supra.n. 3 p.29 and generally chapter two. While many disabled people posed as 
beggars, many non-disabled beggars feigned disability in order to evoke greater sympathy and 
increased donations. 
5 On the delineation process in the anti-discrimination framework, see chapter four. 
6 In the earlier rural economic base which was founded upon very different organising principles 
(community, interdependence, necessity) many disabled people contributed to production 
process. According to Topliss "[d)eafuess, while working alone at agricultural tasks that all 
children learned by observation with little formal schooling, did not limit the capacity for 
employment too severely. Blindness was less of a hazard in uncongested familiar rural 
surroundings, and routine tasks involving repetitive tactile skills could be learned and practised 
by many of the blind without special training." Topliss (1979) p.1 1 cited in M. Oliver, The 
Politics of Disablement (London: Macmillan, 1990) p.27. 
7 See the early Brehon Laws in Ireland discussed in F. Kelly, A Guide to Early Irish Law (Dublin: 
Institution for Advanced Studies, 1988) pp. 91-95. That said, disabled people hardly had a 
central role in an idyllic rural community. Life within the family did not necessarily mean 
benign treatment for disabled people. A. Scull, Museums of Madness (London: Allen 
Lane/Penguin, 1979) pp.250-253. 
8 There is a process of oversimplification inherent in the description of a generally benign state 
of play for disabled people prior to the capitalist onslaught. Disabled people certainly did not 
live in an idealised community, thought it seems to be the case that many acceptable social roles 
and positions disappeared at this time which directly affected disabled people. The history of the 
experience of disability, whether positive or negative, is difficult to assess, largely because 
history is silent on this issue. M. Oliver, supra n.6 p.28. 
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industrial revolution, such as had swept through the English economy, and also the role 
of Irish religious organisations and charities in dealing with the poor. 
It is important to appreciate the basis for the State's intervention at this time. 
There was increasing unease among administrators about the effects on the lower 
classes of indiscriminate alms giving. Of particular concern was the perceived risk of 
encouraging idleness and indolence, and the knock-on effect this might have on the 
emerging wage-labour system.9 In the first instance, the authorities intervened to curb 
the growing numbers of vagrants and beggars. 10 The rationale for intervention was 
prioritising the new labour-wage distribution system and supplanting the threat to the 
proper development of that system posed by idle vagrants. The assumed capacity of 
vagrants and beggars for deception 11 , meant that greater transparency within a 
secondary distribution system for helping people in straitened circumstances was 
required. This was so the "truly needy" could be properly identified and the primacy of 
the wage-labour system maintained. These objectives were cumulatively laid out in the 
Poor Relief Act 1601, which refmed and codified basic principles regarding vagrancy 
and poor relief originally established in the 14th century.12 
As mentioned earlier, the welfare scheme established by the Old Poor Law 
contained no general category of ' disability' . It pioneered relief for the "lame, impotent, 
old and blind, and such other being poor, and not able to work" .13 Its programmes 
stipulated that provision would be made only for those legitimately exempted from 
participation in the work-based distribution system. The accepted basis for such 
exemption was the presence of a number of exclusionary characteristics: all labelled 
individuals were automatically deemed incapable of providing for their own needs. 
Need - measured as "danger from perishing" - was detennined in terms of an inability to 
apply oneself to honest labour as a result of certain allowable misfortunes or failings in 
life. Those defined as needy - widows with large families, orphans, the elderly and the 
sick - were groups that were synonymous with dependence and inability to work. The 
connection between withholding of aid and the compulsion to work was firmly laid 
down on the premise that the secondary distributive system - the need system - would 
operate at so low a level as to automatically prioritise the emerging wage labour system. 
9 D. Stone, supra n.3 p.l5. 
10 On these earlier initiatives, see D. Stone, ibid. pp.34-36. 
11 D. Stone, ibid. p.35. 
12 Ibid. p.30. 
13 "And to set to work the able-bodied without occupation, to apprentice or find work for 
children who had no one to care for them, and to establish places of habitation, for the impotent 
poor." 
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There was an immediate correlation between the needy and assumed absence of 
possibilities for gainful employment. Such traditional categories, which were later 
expanded, formed the basis for culturally-acceptable reasons for non-participation in the 
labour market. 
The New Poor Law 
Major reform underpinned the Poor Law (Amendment) Act 1834, which was spurred by 
the Poor Law Commission report that preceded it. The Poor Law Commission Report 
argued that relief should only be provided on proof of destitution. Credible proof of 
destitution was "willingness to enter the workhouse where, as protection against 
'fraudulent rapacity and perjury', the standard of maintenance should be less eligible 
than that of the independent labourer of the lowest class". 14 This became known as the 
principle of"less eligibility". Accordingly, the main reform of the 1834 Act was the 
prohibition of outside relief: while workhouses for the poor were established before the 
1834 Act, relief was now supposed to be only available within the workhouse.15 One of 
the effects of the workhouse system was the subdivision of a previously generalised 
group -the poor- into several distinct categories: the sick; the insane; defectives; 
children; and the aged and infirm. 16 These groups subsequently became "the means of 
defming who was able-bodied; if a person didn't fall into one of them, he was able-
bodied by default". 17 However, a problem with the new policy was that it relied heavily 
on the foundations of the 1601 Act and failed to consider the ramifications of "the new 
industrial urban society that was coming into existence with problems markedly 
different from those of its rural precursor". 18 Topliss describes the developments in the 
following terms: 
"By the 1890s, the population of Britain was increasingly urban and the 
employment of the majority was industrial, rather than rural. The blind and the 
deaf growing up in slowly scattered rural communities had more easily been 
absorbed into the work and life of those societies without the need for special 
provision. . . . The environment of an industrial society was different. 19 
14 Ibidp.?. 
15 The idea obviously being that the workhouse was to be so unattractive that no one who could 
possibly work would choose to enter it 
16 See D. Stone, supra n.3 pp.41-51 for a detailed account of the process of defining each of 
these categories for the purposes of Poor Law relief 
17 Ibid. p.40. 
18 M. Bruce (ed.), The Rise and Fall of the Welfare State (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1973) p.9. 
19 Topliss (1979) p. 11 cited in M. Oliver, supra n.6 p.27. 
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As the forces and requirements of the capitalist economy took hold, more and more 
individuals with impairments were expelled from the workforce. The character of 
employment under the organising principles of the capitalist economy had moved away 
from the necessity and interdependence of subsistence farming and towards pure profit 
production. This depended on narrow margins and workers with the ability to function 
like machines. 
In summary, the problems of the emerging industrial age appeared so 
overwhelming that there was an urgent need to identify, classify and control the 
growing numbers of the poor. Disability played a pivotal role in this classification 
process because of its implied social status: legitimate differentiation was made between 
those defined as unable to work as opposed to those who are unwilling to do so. This 
over-classification allowed the establishment of primary systems of production and 
distribution that were designed without consideration to an entire section of society. 
However, the disabled category became increasingly problematic in an era where the 
secondary need system placed increasing strain on the primary wage-labour system, due 
to the difficulties of classification. As Oliver points out, this process became more 
sophisticated " requiring access to medical and paramedical professions" and "hence the 
simple 181h century dichotomy [gave] way to a whole new range of definitions based 
upon clinical criteria or functionallimitation"?0 
Medicalisation 
The emergence of the early welfare state corresponded with a period of rapid 
development in the medical sciences and experimentation. As Stone pointed out above, 
disability was a particularly problematic category, as an individual might feign physical 
or mental impairments in order to access the secondary distributive system. 
Developments in medical knowledge meant that a ' scientific' medical opinion was 
regarded as the most effective device to tackle the problem of distinguishing those able 
to work from those genuinely unable to do so.21 
The medical approach locates disability against bio-medical norms of human 
functioning, positioning disabled people as less able, unable, or as "abnormal objects" 
with functional limitations. This state of being requires either rehabilitation in order to 
realign the individual with society's practices or, where that fails, it will require social 
20 M. Oliver, supra n. 6 p.3. 
21 See D. Stone, supra n. 3, especially chapter 3. 
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assistance with daily living. The rise in power of medicine, with its putative scientific 
base,22 and its place at the core of the welfare state, helped to legitimise the segregation 
of the physically and mentally impaired. The lives of disabled people became subject to 
medical power. Sullivan succinctly describes the effect of this process: 
... medical professionals were authorised by the State to gatekeep welfare 
disbursements to [disabled] people. Doctors ... became involved in the 
allocation of benefits, in assessing individuals for specialised equipment ... in 
deciding educational needs and measuring work capabilities. To receive 
statutory provision, disabled people were required to have their 'condition' 
validated ... a particular perception of disability and disabled people became 
entrenched in the public mind. The medicalising of disability was complete.23 
Notwithstanding the obvious benefits from the advances in medical treatment,24 the rise 
and dominance of medical knowledge during a period of industrial and social upheaval 
facilitated the medical profession's ability to impose social order through medicine. The 
presumption has always been that medical judgements and interventions are 
progressive, beneficial and warranted. 
However, the assumed superiority of medical knowledge, and the dominance of 
the medical profession within emerging bureaucracies, helped to marginalise the 
disabled into a specially created social role: individually disabled, institutionally 
segregated and economically dependent on society. The parallel track for those deemed 
unable to work in a conventional way included the construction of special institutions 
for housing disabled people. This departure was widely advocated by the medical 
profession and sanctioned by the welfare state?5 The result was segregation. The 
justification for these institutions reflected the paternalistic view of government at the 
time: disabled people needed "protection" from society. The rise of the eugenicist 
movement in the early twentieth century turned the tables: hence, society needed 
"protection" from the disabled. The effect of this process is wider than the personal 
22 L. Doyal with I. PenniU, The Political Economy of Health (London: Pluto Press, 1979) p.l2. 
"The way medicine is presented and society's acceptance of its claims to authority and resources, 
rest to a considerable extent on its definition ofitselfas a natural science ... Hence it is usually 
believed that medicine, because it is scientific, can produce an unchallengable and autonomous 
body of knowledge which is not tainted by ·wider social and economic considerations." Ibid. 
23 M. O'Sullivan, "From Personal Tragedy to Social Oppression: The Medical Model and Social 
Theories of Disability' ' (199 J) 16 New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations 255, 257. 
24 For example, the fact of increased survival rates and life expectancies for disabled people. 
25 The early nineteenth century moved towards the segregation of those with infectious diseases 
and was soon followed by the development of facilities for "lunatics and idiots". Those mostly 
institutionalised were labelled 'insane'. Many individuals with cognitive impairments and 
individuals with no impainnents were labelled insane or defective and incarcerated as a result. 
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experiences of disabled people; it has been a powerfully destructive form of social 
control as 
... confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities 
of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options, 
economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.26 
The effects of institutional ghettoisation are enormous and ongoing. Not only does 
institutionalisation still persist, but the remnant perceptions of that era have had a 
powerful influence on how contemporary society views disabled people. Segregation 
has undoubtedly "contribute[ d) to the fear, embarrassment and powerful stereotypes 
which ... characterise able-bodied people's reactions to disabled people"?7 Bowe, 
writing in the American context, powerfully describes the lingering consequences of the 
phenomenon of segregation: 
For 200 years we have designed a nation for the average, normal, able bodied 
majority, little realising that millions cannot enter many of our buildings, ride 
our subways and our buses, enjoy our educational and recreational programs 
and facilities and use our communication systems ... We have said for 200 
years and say anew that we do not want to see disabled people ... We do not 
wish to be reminded of their needs or their desires to Jive in the world. We 
prefer these people to be sequestered safely in secluded institutions - and they 
have been. Most of all we stubbornly refuse to recognise that the problems that 
disabled people face are not theirs alone ... Disabled people have been out of 
mainstream ... life for [hundreds of] years and these years have seen the 
construction of modem ... society. So that now when they are coming back 
into our society the barriers that they face are enormous."28 
In short, a system of disability apartheid sprang up. 
A Note on Stigma 
As with the signification that resulted from the Poor Law, the label 'disability' carried 
with it particular connotations that operated on numerous levels. Social forces applied a 
stigmatising label to those with differences that were labelled "disabilities". Goffman 
pointed out that stigmas were originally inflicted through marking or branding 
individuals who had transgressed the norms or values of a particular society.29 Stigma 
occurs when prevailing social practices treat particular "undesirable" traits as 
26 Justice Ginsburg in Olmstead v LC 119 S.Ct. 2176, 2187 (1999). 
27 C. Gooding, Disabling Laws: Enabling Acts Disability Rights in Britain and America 
(London: Pluto Press, 1994) p.l7. 
28 F. Bowe, Handicapping America (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1978) p.l70. 
29 E. Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity ( 1963) cited in S. 
Bagenstos, "Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability" (2000) 86 Virginia Law Review 397, 437. 
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universally discrediting.30 The social meaning of disability that has come to be accepted 
is based on a strict division between individuals can carry out set functions and those 
who cannot. The latter have been stigmatised as unworthy of equivalent levels of 
concern and respect. 
The stigma of disability is a clear marker of a particular identity. It is 
associated with non-productivity, and deviance. It inspires fear among non-disabled 
individuals. It evokes discomfort and prompts tactics of avoidance. An individual's 
impairment could almost be viewed as contagious- functional impairments were [and 
remain] something from which the non-disabled majority were not safe. This is what 
Hahn describes as "existential anxiety", the fear among the majority that they too could 
be stricken down with disability.31 In order to control such fear, disabled people were 
sectioned off from mainstream society and kept in institutions. Even where physical 
differences present little or no reduction in functioning- as in facial disfigurements- the 
fact of physical deviance could cause "aesthetic anxiety" and prompt avoidance of the 
"other".32 This process of attributing undesirable attributes to the disabled relies on 
stigmatisation inspired by prejudice, stereotyping and neglect. It adds up to a process of 
endemic social exclusion. 
Stigma is endemic: it is as much about social attitudes as about the traits 
themselves. Those with stigmatised traits are not considered among the "average" or 
"normal" for whom society and its institutions are designed. As a result, those with 
'sub-standard' modes of functioning remain outside of the norm in the planning, design 
and operation of the built and structural environment. Even if such individuals are not 
overtly or intentionally excluded, the forces of neglect that surround those with 
stigmatising conditions will ensure that they are simply ignored. 
The Emergence of the Modern Welfare Era 
The discussion above identified the way in which "disability" came to occupy a key role 
in the new economic order. It was used as a validation device to ensure the priority of 
the wage-labour system over tbe needs-based system. This prompted the development 
of a kind of parallel universe for those who bad been labelled disabled. Labour market 
30 S. Bagenstos, ibid. p.437. 
31 H. Hahn, "The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and Discrimination" in M. Nagler, 
(ed.) Perspectives on Disability 2"d.ed. (1993) 37, pp. 39-40. Cited in M. Crossley, "The 
Disability Kaleidoscope" ( 1999) 74 Notre Dame Law Review 621 , 662. 
32 Ibid. 
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participation achieved a role of primacy in society, with the surplus labour suppll3 
relegated to subsist on state-sponsored welfare. The disability paradigm become one of 
the foundations of this secondary system. 
The modem welfare state that emerged from the Poor Law in the early twentieth 
century would perpetuate the practice and ideology of its forerunner in the disability 
context. Protection against the onset of disability- i.e. forced retirement - was built into 
the welfare system, via a social insurance scheme established under the National 
Insurance Act of 1911.34 Under this Act, employees and their employers were required 
to pay contributions to approved societies, who then gave cash benefits to the sick and 
disabled.35 Disabled individuals in Ireland, who had never worked, remained reliant 
upon the Poor Law (renamed Home Assistance) until the introduction of specific 
disability payments in the second half of the century. 36 Most disabled people not living 
at home were cared for under the Poor Law, primarily in the workhouse or in the insane 
asylum.37 
Post-independence, the Irish State began to introduce social policy and legal 
measures aimed at improving the critical situation of the disabled. 38 Theories of 
nonnalization took hold and inspired some movement towards deinstitutionalisation. 
These theories would also influence the State's intervention in the latter half of the 
twentieth century.39 The reasons behind this sea-change can be traced to reports of 
deplorable conditions in many institutions and the escalating costs of running and 
maintaining such institutions.40 However, the systematic institutionalisation of disabled 
33 SeeM. Russell, "Disablement, Oppression, and the Political Economy" (2001) 13 Journal of 
Disability Policy Studies 87. 
34 Though the impact of this measure in Ireland was different from England since Ireland had not 
experienced large-scale industrialisation. The majority of working age men were engaged in 
agriculture other than in an employed capacity, as compared to only 32.5% of manual 
employees. M. Cousins, Social Welfare Law 2nd,ed. (Dublin: Thomson Roundhall, 2002) p 4. 
35 The Department of Social Welfare was established in 194 7 and took over responsibility of 
operating the social insurance scheme. 
3 Post independence, the Poor Law in Ireland was eventually renamed "home assistance" and 
was not formally repealed until 1975. In England, the Poor Law was repealed by the National 
Assistance Act 1948. 
37 S. Quin and B. Redmond, "Moving from Needs to Rights for People with Disability in 
Ireland" inS. Quin et al (eds.) Contemporary Irish Social Policy (Dublin: UCD Press, 1999) 146 
E.l47. 
8 See generally, S. Quin and B. Redmond (eds.) Disability and Social Policy in Ireland (Dublin: 
UCD Press: 2003). 
39 S. Quin and B. Redmond, supra n.37 p.l50. 
40 Govenunent White Paper, The Problem of the Mentally Handicapped (Dublin: Government 
Stationery Office, 1960) and the Report on the Commission of Enquiry on Mental Handicap 
(Dublin: Government Stationery Office, 1965). 
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people in Ireland continued until the 1960s and has not yet been completely phased 
out.4J 
With its "gatekeeping" role fmnJy established, the medical profession remained 
critical of the welfare state's need to delineate the truly disabled from the potentially fit 
worker. Entitlement to social security was based on the criterion of an individual 's 
inability to work. However, inability to work is measured by clinical criteria, and does 
not include any assessment of the employment or training opportuillties that might be 
available to meet a disabled person's needs.42 Inability to work is an over-inclusive 
concept: it does not measure disability in terms of an impairment that might limit an 
individual's employment options, or make work more difficult, as opposed to making it 
impossible. In the main, service provision for disabled people was overseen by the 
Department of Health, and it remained static and largely unchallenged until the mid 
1980s. A separate sphere for disabled people - consisting of segregated schools, 
segregated trainjng programmes, segregated residential centres and a few segregated 
employment outlets - was established. Thls parallel uruverse occupied by disabled 
people was widely endorsed by public bodies, educational authorities, social service 
providers, professionals and, indeed, families. It appeared nom1al. Tltis is crucial, since 
the definers of normality also defme, by default, what is deviant or abnorma1.43 
Voluntary organisations did attempt to fill gaps in the system of service provision, and 
pointed out that the inclusion of disabled persons in society should go beyond the remit 
of the Department of Health. There were piecemeal changes reflecting tlus shift in 
perception. They included the valorisation of independent living; incremental changes to 
the health, social services and benefit systems; closure of some long-stay institutions; 
and a shift towards care in the community. Thus, the manner and context of the State's 
intercession was increasingly challenged from the 1990s. The shift was towards what 
became known as "mainstreaming" service provision. 
While this incremental move away from institutionalisation and segregation was 
beginning to take place in Irish social policy, it should be recognised that the shift in 
approach was still predicated on a construction of disability as an individual problem of 
the person. As an individual problem, the on-set of disability required rehabilitation of 
the body in order to make the individual a better "fit" with tl1e existing structures of 
4 1 There are still almost 400 individuals with learning difficulties incarcerated in institutions for 
the mentally ill. See F. O 'Toole, The Irish Times, January 3'd. 2006. 
42 A. McManus, "Social security and disability" inS. Quin and B. Redmond (eds.) supra n.38 
p.57, 58. 
43 R.F. Drake, Understanding Disability Politics (London: Macmillan, 1999). 
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society. When rehabilitative measures were exhausted, state benefits took over and the 
individual was place in the usual categories. The dominance of the economic and 
medically-determinable view of disability was based on the notion of a "truly" disabled 
state being identifiable. There was the idea that there is, in fact, a category of people 
who, because of their inherent characteristics, can be treated apart from the mainstream. 
The sorting process suffers the burdens of"scientific" fact and reinforces the notion that 
disability is an individualised status. This division has been practically and ideologically 
enforced across the social stratum. 
A movement which first emerged in the United Kingdom began to question this 
conceptualisation of disability. It sought to challenge the medical construct of disability 
and to reconceive the place of disabled people in modem society. This reformulation of 
disability is discussed below. This social construction of disability was subsequently 
adopted by political activists in the United States. These activists favoured the minority 
group model of disability, which asserts rights-based responses to the exclusion of 
disabled people. The policy switch motivated by this civil rights analysis of disability is 
subsequently discussed. 
Challenging the Hegemony: The Social Model of Disability 
Discontent with the construction of social life that was cast upon disabled people by 
medical definitions led a group of disabled theorists and activists to conceptualise 
alternative means of describing their position. 
The movement began in the late 1960s and was led by members of the Union of 
the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) who grappled with different 
interpretations and perspectives of the construct. This form of theorising around 
disability identifies different ways that it can be understood in moral and philosophical 
terms. It aims to illuminate how society views disability and it aims to indicate the 
relevance of thinking about disability to modem social policy.44 Disability theorists do 
not speak with one voice on disability, and there are many variations on the social 
model of disability within disability studies.45 Wbile it is beyond the scope of this work 
to delineate the various interpretations of the socio-political view of disability, I provide 
a general overview in order to illustrate its challenge to the medical model. 
44 SeeM. Crossley, "The Disability Kaleidoscope" (1999) 75 Notre Dame Law Review 621, 649. 
45 For a concise overview of the various strands of social model theorising, see C. Tregaskis, 
"Social Model Theory: the story so far ... " (2002) 17 Disability and Society 457. 
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The rethinking of disability became centred on the place and situation of 
disabled people in society. As Finklestein describes, the members of the UPIAS were 
faced with a crude, but fundamental choice: "[e)ither our tragedy is that the impairments 
we possess make us incapable of social functioning, or our society is constructed by 
people with capabilities for people with capabilities and it is that that makes people with 
impairments capable of functioning." 46 The group finnly rejected the "personal 
tragedy" view of disability imposed upon them by the medical model, which identifies 
them in terms of functional limitations caused by impairment. 
In our view it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability 
is something imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are 
unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society. Disabled 
people are therefore an oppressed group in society.47 
The social model made a vital distinction between impairment and disability. 
Impairment is lacking all or part of a limb or having a defective organ or 
mechanism of the body; and Disability is the disadvantage or restriction of 
activity caused by a mode of social organisation that takes little or no account of 
people who have physical impairments and thus excludes them from 
participation in the mainstream of social activities.48 
In other words, impairment is a description of the body. It is not a description of the 
disadvantages suffered by people with impairments in terms of society's structures. 
The development of the social model by disabled people themselves was 
heralded as an emancipatory event. Its appeal was widespread because the model 
challenges disabled people's "own internalised oppression".49 For the first time, 
disabled people considered disability as more than an individual and personal limitation. 
Disability, instead, was seen as the result of society's failure to take their needs into 
account, and the failure to recognise a wide spectrum in human functioning and 
capacities when planning the built and social environment. Hence, it became an 
46 V. Finklestein, "The Social Model of Disability Repossessed" Paper delivered at Manchester 
Coalition of Disabled People December 1, 2001. Available at Centre for Disability Studies 
Resources Web page:< http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disabilitv-studies/archiveuklarchframe.htm > p.2. 
47 UP I AS, Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation, Fundamental Principles of 
Disability (London, UPIAS, 1976) p.l4. 
48 V. Finklestein, Attitudes and Disabled People: Issues for Discussion (New York: World 
Rehabilitation Fund, 1980) p.3. One of the critiques of the definition of disability formulised by 
social model theorists which was partially adopted by minority group advocates, is the fact that 
the definition as conceived has been argued to not covering many individuals with functional 
limitations, particularly, powerful, well-educated men with late onset functional impairments 
who do not share experiences of the widespread exclusion from participation in mainstream 
activities because of their prior and existing powerful pos itions. 
49 C. Tregask:is, "Social Model Theory: The story so far ... " (2002) 17 Disability and Society 
457. 
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ideological stance to view disability as being comprised of all the facets of life that 
impose unnecessary restrictions on impaired people: individual prejudice and fear, 
institutional discrimination, systemic exclusion, inaccessible transport, segregated 
communities, housing and schooling, and exclusionary working arrangements. 5° 
There are conflicts within social model theorising in disability discourse. For 
instance, from the seminal work of the UP lAS, a number of strains of social model 
theorising have developed which reject the "grand theorizing" of social science in the 
1960s. The most dominant is the materialist social model account, which locates 
disabled people in an oppressed underclass as a consequence of capitalism, 
industrialisation, urbanisation and rigid working practices. The materialist analysis has 
been criticised for its over-emphasis on capitalist economics as the main cause of 
disability. It has been accused of ignoring issues such as the cultural construction of 
disability, as well as the very real disabling effects of some impairments. On this last 
point, certain aspects of social model theorising on disability, if pushed to their logical 
conclusions, can create a rigid dichotomy between impairment and disability to the 
point that the reality of impaired bodies is ignored. Disabled feminists have argued that 
impairment, with its very real limitations and its pain and suffering, is part of daily life 
experience and as such cannot be ignored in social theory or political strategy. 51 While 
that debate within social theory and that limitation is acknowledged, it is not developed 
here. Despite this limitation, its initial force is not lessened as " the social model need 
not deny that some limitations flow directly from impairment in order to argue that 
externally imposed disadvantages should be remedied" . 52 
The Minority Group Model and A Strategy of Rights 
The minority group model has been utilised by various oppressed groups as a political 
strategy to gain legal rights which might overcome the subjugation of their members. In 
the disability context, the minority group analysis is an offshoot of the scholarship and 
political activism that centred on the social model, as discussed above. It took root in the 
political movement that powered the civil rights campaigns in the United States in the 
50 M. Oliver, Understanding Disability From The01y to Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1996) 
p.33. 
51 See generally, S. Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on 
Disability (New York: Routledge, 1996). 
52 M. Crossley, supra n.44 p.658 . 
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1960s and 1970s. The model has laid particular emphasis on legal change, in the form 
of civil rights to political, economic and social participation. 53 
The main advocates of the minority group perspective have argued that the 
analysis applied to the marginalization of racial minorities should be applied to the 
disabled. 54 Disabled people are a minority group because they are denied the advantages 
of full participation in civil life. This is due to the pervasive nature of institutional 
discrimination brought about by prevailing cultural attitudes, environmental barriers, 
institutionalised rules and procedures. Hahn describes the primary postulate of the 
minority group analysis in the following terms: 
" All facets of the environment are moulded by public policy and government 
policies reflect widespread social attitudes or values; as a result, existing 
features of architectural design, job requirements .. . that have a discriminatory 
impact on disabled citizens cannot be merely viewed as happenstance or 
coincidence. On the contrary, they seem to signify conscious or unconscious 
sentiments supporting a hierarchy of dominance and subordination between 
non-disabled and disabled segments of the population that is fundamentally 
incompatible with legal principles of freedom and equality.55 
This perspective underlines how disabled people have historically been excluded from 
social institutions because those institutions have failed to design for, take account of, or 
adapt to the needs of disabled individuals. The extract from Hahn 's passage clearly 
links the minority group perspective to a political strategy that seeks legal equality 
guarantees. It considers inclusion in society's structures and practices as a claim of right 
rather than as a request for special benefits, because society has historically offered an 
inhospitable experience to disabled individuals. As a consequence, political agitation by 
disability groups following the original civil rights movement in the United States 
provided the necessary impetus for legislation such as the Rehabilitation Act 1973 and, 
eventually, the ADA. The minority group analysis in the US believes that the law, more 
than any other political or social institution, stands the best chance of guaranteeing basic 
individual rights to disabled people. 56 
53 Though other strategies have been adopted, including: political activism, language discourse, 
identity politics and cultural affirmation. 
54 See H. Hahn, "Anti-Discrimination Laws and Social Research on Disability: The Minority 
Group Perspective" ( 1996) 14 Behavioral Sciences and Law 41; H. Hahn, "Towards a Politics of 
Disability: Definitions, Disciplines and Policies" (1995) 22 Social Science Journal 87. At the 
same time, a criticism of the minority group analysis bas been this forced analogy with race-
based oppression. 
55 See H. Hahn, ibid. (1996) pp.46-47. 
56 See J. Bickenbach, "Minority Rights or Universal Participation: The Politics of Disablement" 
in M. Jones and L.A. Basser Marks (eds.) Disability, Divers-ability and Legal Change (Kluwer 
International, 2000) 101, p.104. 
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However, the minority group model of disability, as chapter four will further 
illustrate, has been thwarted in its campaign for full legal equality. Particular difficulties 
lie with the federal judiciary's interpretation of the definition of disability. Under the 
ADA, claimants have to rely on a definition of disability that dovetails with the medical 
model, despite the minority model's rejection of medical understandings of disability. 
Moreover, when demands for inclusion are framed wholly within an equal opportunities 
format, divisions are created within the heterogeneous minority group. As is explored 
later in the thesis, this approach can practically only be of assistance to a proportion of 
the targeted class. 57 This is a recognition that political theory and its legal 
implementation can, unfortunately, "essentialise" the disabled experience. In addition, 
particularly for individuals with severe impairments, not all limitations can be offset by 
'reasonable' adjustments to the social environment. By extension, it has been argued 
that the minority group model is based on a rather forced analogy between racial 
minorities and disabled people. Social responses to disabled people, and the vast range 
and impacts of impairments, means that there has been comparatively less trans-
disability solidarity within the disability movement. Moreover, as Bickenbach points 
out, "[ o ]ne does not have to be an anthropologist to observe that the leaders of the 
disability movement have tended to be highly educated, white middle c lass males with 
late on-set physical disabilities and tninimal medical needs, a group that is hardly 
representative of the population of people with disabilities". 58 Indeed, many of the 
original proponents of social model theorising rejected the minority model's enthusiasm 
for legal rights. The minority group model was viewed as reflective of the peculiarly 
American penchant for pigeon-holing social problems in terms of legally enforceable 
individual rights.59 Related to this point is the question of why, given the actual 
operation of anti-disc1imination laws such as the ADA and Ireland's EEA, "anyone 
would want to put their trust in them or expect them to address realistically the social ill 
of discrimination that ... creates the condition of inequality experienced by disabled 
persons."60 However, as chapter six argues, socio-political perspectives on disability 
57 One criticism of the minority group perspective on disability has been this forced analogy with 
race-based oppression, particularly as disability is a far from homogenous group, with the effect 
that, unlike race based movements, there is little commonality with which to forge a sense of 
'disability' as a minority group status in terms of shared experience, self-identification and 
mutual support. 
58 J. Bickenbach, supra n.57 p.l06. 
59 M. Oliver, supra n.4 pp.l 05-6 and 12 1-2. Oliver that argues that disabled people, as an 
oppressed group, cannot expect emancipation by appealing to one of the many social institutions 
that oppresses them. 
60 J. Bickenbach, supra n.56 p.l 06. 
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retain a utility in the legal context, particularly where equality and non-discrimination 
structures can be supplemented by more transformative equality norms. Instead of being 
formulised as inherently antagonistic to rights-based claims, the social model 
perspective can thus be harnessed and used to argue in favour of a reformulation of 
equality and non-discrimination norms. This idea is introduced below and developed in 
chapter six. 
The Non-Discrimination Right as A Form of Disability/Employment 
Policy 
The non-discrimination agenda first took hold in the United States in the 1970s, in the 
context of US federal employment61 , and again in the late 1980s, when the exclusion of 
millions of disabled Americans from mainstream employment was revisited. This was 
due to concerns about escalating disability benefit costs, and to the emergence of the 
disability rights movement in the civil rights climate. The political argument prompting 
civil rights intervention centred on the need to tap into the vast pool of potential labour 
in the disability community. This was previously discounted due to a combination of 
social stereotyping, prejudicial attitudes and the exclusionary nature of the built 
environment. The benefits of anti-discrimination intervention were sold to the political 
right as a means of removing vast numbers of disabled people from the welfare rolls. 
Disabled people were to be transformed into workers, taxpayers, consumers and 
independent contributors to the economic health of the nation.62 In short, the parallel 
track for disabled people was proving expensive. 
Parliamentary materials provide a useful starting point in determining the 
rationale, purposes and expected achievements of the disability discrimination 
regulations. This is particularly so in respect of the ADA, as the United States' Congress 
went so far as to codify an extensive purpose section in its text, setting out goals and 
aspirations.63 What is clear is that the extension of the employment non-discrimination 
rule to disabled individuals entailed a fundamental change in the United States' view on 
disability and exclusion. Historically, the disabled were considered outside equality 
prescriptions, because it was assumed that individual limitations militated against the 
61 The Rehabilitation Act 1973. 
62 C. Feldblum, "Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What 
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About it? (2000) 21 Berkeley Journal of Employment 
and Labor Law 91 
63 42 u.s.c. §12101. 
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principle of treatment as an equal. However, a sea-change was made possible by the 
non-discrimination right of the ADA: the economic dependence, segregation and social 
isolation of the disabled could be brought to an end through the extension of rights 
towards integration into mainstream society. The stated goals of the ADA include 
equality of opportunity, full participation and independent living. 
The purpose section of the ADA clearly indicates a commitment to an 
alternative view of disability. The systematic disadvantage attached to disability is not 
treated as inherent in the disabled person's biological condition. Instead, the purpose 
section points to several social practices that are the source of disadvantage. The ADA 
preamble notes that ' 'the social consequences that have attached to being disabled often 
bear no relationship to the physical or mental limitations imposed by the disability".64 
Stereotypical assumptions about the limitations of disabled people have determined 
their opportunities, rather than any assessment of their actual talents and capabilities. 
The ADA was designed to shift such stereotypical notions by demonstrating that an 
alteration in conditions could allow disabled people to become economic contributors 
and full members of society. The key aspect to the ADA is the innovative "reasonable 
accommodation" duty 65• This requires employers and public service providers to 
consider that the "normal" way of doing thing is not the only way of accomplishing 
business objectives. The reasonable accommodation mandate works against the process 
of exclusion suffered by the disabled by demonstrating that adjustments within the 
workplace can reduce the arbitrary discrimination they endure. 
As chapter two notes, the symbolic impact of disability non-discrimination 
precepts is enormous. However, the thesis goes on to assess whether such purposes are 
belied by the structure in which they are ultimately delivered, notwithstanding the 
purposes laid down in the ADA66. The existing non-discrimination legal template has 
found it difficult to tackle deep-rooted experiences of exclusion that endure in the race 
and gender context: its extension to the disability ground meets similar barriers. Despite 
the broad transfonnative purposes ascribed to the disability non-discrimination 
structure, as mentioned above, questions are raised as to whether the employment 
64 M. Oshige McGowan, "Recons idering the Americans with Disabilities Act" (2000) 35 
Georgia Law Review 27, 46. 
65 See further, chapters three, five and six. 
66 See the equivalent statements in the Oireachtas debates on the introduction of tbe disability 
provisions of the Employment Equality Bill1996. The Oireachtas is the Irish term for the Irish 
law-making body which is made up of the Dail (lower house of Parliament) and the Seanad (the 
upper house). See statements made by the then Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
Dail Debates , October 25, 1996. 
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discrimination system can, in practice, intervene sufficiently against the exclusion 
endured by the disabled. 
As the following chapter discusses, there are many lin1itations to the liberal 
state's "equality of opportunity" model, which underpins employment discrimination 
legislation. Many such limitations remain, despite the advances made by the duty to 
make reasonable accommodation. While this duty has been described as the precursor 
to more substantive equality tools, chapters five and six argue that it merely "gestures" 
towards more positive duties to promote equality.67 Enforcement oftbe disability non-
discrimination nom1 rests entirely with the individual68 : clearly, this holds the problem 
of employment discrimination as an inherent problem of that particular individual in 
that particu lar employment situation. Civil suits pursued by individual victims cannot 
provide the whole scale resolution of the discrimination problem. It is difficult to 
discount the experiences cited by very qualified disabled applicants for employment: 
I am convinced that it is easy for most businesses to tum a candidate down and 
make it look like the disability had nothing to do with it. Potential employers 
often disguised their prejudices about blindness by offering excuses such as 
another applicant had more experience or would do a better job.69 
Conclusion 
Social policy pertaining to disabled people seems restrained by ongoing tension. Early 
welfare policy created and cemented a category of individuals who were removed from 
the obligation to work and compensated for their inability to work. This parallel track is 
so embedded into public consciousness that many people outside of the disability 
movement do not expect disabled people to work.70 This results in a perpetuation of 
67 S. Fredman, "Disability Equality: A Challenge to the Existing Anti-Discrimination Paradigm" 
In A. Lawson and C, Gooding (eds.) Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to Practice 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) 199 p.213. 
68 To file suit under the ADA, a disability ruscrimination complaint must first receive a "right to 
sue" letter from the EEOC which police the process. By 1994 33.000 ADA employment 
complaints had been filed with 11 percent alleging discrimination in the hiring process. The 
EEOC only passed 28 discrimination cases for suit, with only three alleging discrimination in 
hiring. Cited in M. Russell, Beyond Ramps: Disability at the End of the Social Contract 
~Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1998) p. 120. 
9 Cited in M. Russell, supra n.68.pll8. The interviewee continues that it is not discrimination 
to want the best person for the job, but proving that the non-disabled person who was hired had 
fewer qualifications under the ADA, is really tough to do. 
70 R.V. Burkhauser, "An Economic Perspective on ADA Backlash: Comments from the Bell 
Symposium on the Americans with Disabilities Act" (2000) 21 Berkeley Journal of Employment 
and Labor Law 367,368. 
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difficulties, including: the invisible nature of the disabled entity; widespread fear and 
stigmatisation of the disabled state of being; and the entrenchment of stereotypes across 
society's structures. As noted above, the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s witnessed a 
perceptible shift in disability policy from the protectionism of the welfare era to various 
forms of integration into work-based production and other aspects of social life. While 
the range of social support for persons with disabilities in the past served a useful and 
indispensable function, there is little doubt that much of it came at the cost of 
compounding their isolation and reducing their range of choice.71 The legacy of 
segregation still exists in the disability context. It will take time to dissipate, and the role 
of the equality/non-discrimination principle in this regard is considered here. 
One avenue of increasing the work participation rate of disabled people has 
been the employment equality intervention. This regulation presupposes a category of 
disabled people capable of working but who are prevented from doing so because of 
unjustified discrimination. At the same time, tensions within the disability non-
discrimination legal prescription abound. There is the conceived labour-dependency of 
humanity, and the consequent exclusion of the experiences of many disabled persons.72 
In policy discussions around the introduction of the ADA, the legislation was sold to the 
political right as a means to remove vast numbers of individuals from the welfare rolls. 73 
However, this should not be taken to the extreme expectation that all those with 
impairments can be expected to work to an equivalent level as 'nondisabled' 
contemporaries, or that disabled people can or should work in the conventional sense.74 
The expectation to be "productive" placed on individuals with multiple, severe and 
complex impairments is one of the most oppressive aspects of modern society.75 The 
prospects for inclusion of those impaired persons in a system Jess concerned with 
structural as opposed to ad-hoc change appear to be less viable. As Finklestein 
recognises: 
71 G. Quinn, "The European Social Charter and EU Anti-discrimination Law in the Field of 
Disability: Two Gravitational Fields with One Common Purpose" in G. de Burca and B De Witte 
(eds.) Social Rights in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 279 p.282. 
72 See V. Finklestein, supra n.46. 
73 C. Feldblum, supra n.62. 
74 Barnes makes the rather obvious point that work is a social creation. What is considered work 
at one point in time may not be so perceived at another time. C. Barnes, "A Working Social 
Model? Disability, work and disability politics in the 21 st Century" (2000) 20 Critical Social 
Policy 441 , 451. 
75 Ibid. 
28 
A society may be willing and in certain circumstances become eager to absorb a 
portion of its impaired population into the workforce, yet this can have the 
effect of maintaining and perhaps intensifying its exclusion of the remainder.76 
Social policy and disability discourse is caught between a rock and a hard place on this 
point.77 While the anti-discrimination intervention can be viewed as a mechanism 
towards barrier removal, there will always be people who, because of their impairment, 
will never work. This theme, and the notion of a synthesis between an emerging 
reformulation of substantive equality and social rights, is taken up in chapter six. 
The next chapter considers the traditional tools of anti-discrimination 
regulation: namely direct and indirect discrimination. It examines how they operate in 
the disability context, and what concept of equality they pursue. 
76 V. Finklstein, cited in P. Abberlay, "The Significance of Work for the Citizenship of Disabled 
People Paper presented at University College Dublin April, 1999 p.l2. Available at Centre for 
Disability Studies Resources Web page: http://www.leeds.ac.ukldisabilitv-
studieslarchiveuklarchframe.htm last accessed November 18, 2003). 
77 P. Abberlay. "Work, Utopia and Impairment" in L. Barton (ed.) Disability and Society: 
Emerging Issues and Insights (Harlow: Longman, 1996) and T. Shakespeare and N. Watson 
"The social model of disability: an outdated ideology?" 2 Research in Social Science and 
Disability (2002) p.9-28 (also available at Centre for Disability Studies Resources Web page: 




The Traditional Tools of Anti-Discrimination Law 
Introduction 
Tlus chapter considers the equality objectives underpinning anti-discrimination law. It 
outlines the traditional tools of anti-discrimination law, namely direct and indirect 
discrimination, and their operation in the disability context. The discussion flrst 
introduces the idea of equality as a political value and as an organising principle of the 
early liberal state. A particular and limiting constmction of the equality right was 
codifled within liberal legalism and was not thought applicable to disabi lity until quite 
recently. As chapter one pointed out, disability was considered to be the remit of needs-
based social programmes designed to compensate for the exclusionary effect of 
functional limitations. 
Legal theory has made a distinction between formal equality and its more 
substantive conceptions. Issues of symmetry, sameness and similarity are emphasised in 
formal accounts of equality guarantees. Under formal equality, the law treats similarly 
situated people the same, while ignoring the individual and societal differences which 
result in people becoming differently situated.1 Formal equality pursues the principle of 
equal treatment. It is based on the idea that goods should be distributed according to the 
neutral criterion of merit, and that all individuals are able to compete equally if they are 
treated equally. At the constitutional level, it is best encapsulated by the traditional 
guarantees of equality before the law, as exemplified by the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 40.1 of the 
Irish Constitution? These provisions are discussed in chapter three. Forma] equality is 
also captured by the prohibition on direct discrimination within anti-discrimination 
statutes, which requires that individuals be treated without regard to particular 
1 L. Waddington and A. Hendriks, "The Expanding Concept of Employment Discrimination in 
Europe: From Direct and Indirect Discrimination to Reasonable Accommodation 
Discrimination" (2002) 18 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 403, 407. 
2 Discussed further in chapter three. These formal equality guarantees can be contrasted with 
more expansive equality protections such as those set out in Section 15 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms and section 36 of the South African Consti!Uiion. What also differs is 
the judicial approach in Canada and the US in the interpretation of constitutional equality 
guarantees. See A. Mayerson and S. Yee, ' 'The ADA and Models of Equality" Paper presented 
at International Disability Law and Policy Symposium: From Principles to Practice October 22-
26 2000. Available at http://www.dredf.org/symposium/maverson.html . 
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characteristics, such as sex or race, which have been the source of disadvantage in the 
past. 
A more substantive fonnulation of equality moves beyond the procedural 
approach that characterises equal treatment, as the strict application of fonnal equality 
can exacerbate social disadvantages for certain groups. Substantive equality is more 
concerned with constructing the social conditions needed to ensure that people 
experience less inequality. It is generally equated with the ideas of equality of 
opportunity and equality of results.3 It requires a sensitivity to the impact of existing 
differences between groups in society and to the inequalities that can result from the 
application of neutral rules and standards to clearly unequal situations. Substantive 
equality focuses on the recognition of differences, and it demands different treatment in 
order to minimise past imbalances in the relative positions of different groups. While 
the formulations of substantive equality vary- as, consequently, does the usage of the 
term -it is generally justifiable by reference to some distributive principle of equality,4 
as pure equal treatment can obstruct the achievement of a particular outcome. Examples 
of nonns of substantive equality are evident in many declarations in international Jaw. 
International law instruments have moved away from the classic liberal approach to 
equality as seen in the US and Irish Constitutions. For example, Article 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination 
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.5 
The notion of equality at international level is substantive in that it links the enjoyment 
of equality to substantive rights and freedoms within human rights discourse.6 However, 
most of these international provisions are not directly applicable in the domestic laws of 
3 L .Waddington and A. Hendricks, supra o.l p.407. 
4 H. Collins, "Discrimination, Equality and Social loclusion" (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 16, 
17. 
s For a discussion on the discrimination provisions of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, see A. 
McColgan, "Principles of Equality and Protection from Discrimination in International Human 
Rights Law [2002] European Human Rights Law Review 157. 
6 The equality ideal is most obviously emblazoned upon the branch of rights termed civil and 
political-
e.g. the right to vote, due process, freedom of speech and association. For a useful argument on 
the bridge provided by the anti-discrimination principle between civil rights generally and social 
rights, see G. Quinn, "The European Social Charter and EU Anti-Discrimination Law in the 
Field of Disability: Two Gravitational Fields with One Common Purpose" in G. DeBurca and B 
De Witte (eds.) Social Rights in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p.279. 
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the two jurisdictions considered here. At the statutory level, the indirect discrimination 
principle has been described as a more substantive equality tool. This is because it 
recognises the disparate impact which supposedly neutral practices can have on the 
opportunities of particular groups. Additionally, the reasonable accommodation duty is 
substantive because it recognises that a failure to accommodate individuals who face 
structural barriers in accessing opportunities results in a denial of those opportunities. 
However, these tools are not unconditional, but are subject to limitations which are 
discussed throughout this thesis. Indeed, the difficulties in application prompted one 
commentator to conclude that the equality principle underpinning non-discrimination 
Jaw tends to "shrink into [a] formal component when it comes to application by the 
court".7 Whether this comment holds true in the disability discrimination law context is 
a theme which penneates this work as a whole. 
Equality-based justifications have traditionally supported the introduction and 
maintenance of the anti-discrimination legal framework. 8 These justifications include 
the principles of equal treatment, equal opportunity and equality of outcome, as 
discussed below.9 The equal treatment principle provided the foundation for early anti-
discrimination law. Despite its revered place within liberal legalism, there are too many 
deviations from this principle for it to be the sole foundation of anti-discrimination 
Jaw .10 There is considerable evidence that the two jurisdictions considered here have 
adopted equality of opportunity - the narrower form of substantive equality- as a 
primary foundation. At particular points, though, it is possible to show an overlap 
between equality of opportunity and weaker versions of the equality of results theory. 11 
This narrower conception of substantive equality allows movement away from the 
formal equal treatment approach. However, any departures tend to be framed as 
exceptions, due to the ongoing tension between liberalism's adherence to the equal 
7 0. Mjoll Amardonir, Equality and Non-Discrimination under the ECHR (Martinus Nijhoff, 
2002) p.5. 
8 SeeS. Fredman, "The Furure of Equality in Britain" (Manchester, EOC, 2002). Though see 
H.Collins, supra n.4 who argues in favour of a move away from equality-framed justifications 
for anti-discrimination law. He argues that anti-discrimination law should be predicated upon 
the principle of social inclusion. 
9 There are a ranges of terms used to describe the different strands of the equality principle. For 
example, McCrudden has identified five (sometimes-overlapping) conceptions of equality: 
equality as mere rationality; equality as individualised justice; equality as group justice; equality 
as recognition; and equality as participation. See C. McCrudden, "Theorising European Equality 
Law" in C. Costello and E. Barry, Equality in Diversity : The New Equality Directives (Dublin: 
Irish Centre for European Law, 2003) 1. 
10 H. Collins, supra n.4 p. l7. 
11 L. Waddington, Disability, Employment and the European Community (Antwerp: Maklu, 
1995) p.65. Discussed further in chapter six. 
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treatment principle and more substantive conceptions of equality. 12 Thus, the easiest 
approach, according to Collins, has been for anti-discrimination Jaw to pursue this 
limited approach to substantive equality in order to minimise the clashes with the 
primacy of equal treatment.13 Indeed, Barnard and Hepple' s review of the equality 
principle underpinning UK anti-discrimination law queries whether it has moved away 
from liberal notions of non-discrimination and towards an approach based on 
substantive equality. 14 Their discussion concentrates on the concept of indirect 
discrimination and on the scope of permitted positive action in favour of disadvantaged 
groups. Their conclusion is ambivalent when it considers if legal formulas of non-
discrimination have moved in more substantive directions. 15 The ambivalence continues 
in this thesis in the context of disability discrimination law, despite its inclusion of 
measures such as reasonable accommodation, indirect discrimination and positive 
action. The former duty, according to Fredman, "gestures"16 towards more expansive 
substantive equality norms. Moreover, positive action programmes remain an under-
utilised tool under Ireland's EEA. The ADA contains no affirmative action provisions. 
While the reasonable accommodation duty is a potentially useful tool, when this duty is 
individualised, it may remain unable to tackle the underlying sources of disadvantage 
and discrimination. 17 This point shall be taken up again in chapter six. 
Parallel to this discussion, we must also consider the issue of the precise use of 
the term "substantive equality" within current anti-discrimination discourse. In practice, 
substantive equality has been used widely to describe measures beyond the equal 
treatment principle. Its adoption gives widespread legitimacy to statutory measures 
designed to tackle discrimination and exclusion. For example, it is correct to state that 
indirect discrimination moves beyond equal treatment, in that it is concerned with the 
disparate effects of particular practices on members of disadvantaged groups. Despite 
its potential , it does not necessarily move towards substantive changes for members of 
disadvantaged groups in terms of a net reduction in the burden of societal inequalities. 18 
More often than not, this is due to the translation of equality norms into the pre-existing 
12 H. Collins, supra n.4 pp.l7-l8. 
13 Ibid. 
14 C. Barnard and B. Hepple, "Substantive Equality" (2000) 59 Cambridge Law Journal 562 
IS Ibid. pp.583-585. 
16 S. Fredman, "Disability Equality: A Challenge to the Existing Anti-Discrimination Paradigm" 
In A. Lawson and C, Gooding (eds.) Disability Rights in Europe: From The01y to Practice 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) 199 p.213. 
17 See L. Waddington and A.Hendricks, supra n.l for support. 
18 This point is developed below. SeeS. Fredman, "Affirmative Action and the European Court 
of Justice: A Critical Analysis" in J. Shaw (ed.) Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European 
Union (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) 171 p.l88 
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structures of the legal system. For example, the indirect discrimination principle has 
suffered from obtuse and difficult judicial applications. This has been exacerbated by 
the weakness of the negative, individualised enforcement model of anti-discrimination 
law. Yet a truly substantial vision of equality cannot, in my view, be limited by (and to) 
the present anti-discrimination paradigm.19 Fredman bas called for a reconfiguration of 
the substantive equality norm that would involve a new synthesis between non-
discrimination and positive duties, and between non-discrimination and social rights?0 
Measures in the flrst band include the introduction of public sector duties to promote 
equality in the disability context that were recently agreed in the UK? 1 Equality policy 
is moving in similar directions in Ireland.22 Other developments are on-going at the 
level of the European Union, specifically in the context of the European Charter?3 
Despite the pioneering approach of the ADA, it may be that the scope for further 
development is in the Irish context, given the link between its jurisdiction and European 
developments. These points are taken up in chapter six. The conclusion on the 
trans formative potential of current disability discrimination law is reserved until chapter 
six. This is because it is necessary to address all aspects of the disability non-
discrimination system in the two jurisdictions in greater depth before fully considering 
this question. Issues such as judicial attitudes to disability, the impact of constitutional 
equality norms and competing constitutional guarantees, the "reasonableness" of 
accommodations, and the question of disability status, all have an impact on the 
operational effectiveness of the reasonable accommodation matrix. The approach taken 
will be in the form of a building block exercise - the foundations of the argument will be 
laid here. To this end, the traditional provisions of non-discrimination law are set out in 
this chapter. It introduces the models of equality stated above. It also considers the non-
discrimination rules operating within the disability context, specifically the prohibitions 
against direct discrimination, indirect discrimination and the duty to make reasonable 
accommodation.24 This is followed in chapter three by a treatment of the reasonable 
accommodation duty on the constitutional plane. This is necessary as judicial attitudes 
19 C. Barnard and B.Hepple, supra n.l4 p.584. 
20 S. Fredman, supra n.J6 pp.211-217. 
21 See the Disability Discrimination Act 2005. 
22 SeeS. Mullally and 0. Smith, Equality Proofing (Dublin Government Stationery Office, 2000) 
and S. Mullally, "Mainstreaming Equality in Ireland: A Fair and Inclusive Accommodation for 
All? (2001) Legal Studies 99. 
23 See generally G. Quinn, supra n.6. 
24 Protection against disability-based harassment in employment is included in Ireland's 
Employment Equality At 1998-2004 (section 33). Pressures of space prevent discussion of this 
particular phenomenon and its regulation. 
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in the highest courts are of critical importance to how disability equality rights fare 
within legal discourse. 
Foundations : Formal Equality in the Liberal State 
Equality's place at the core of society's organising structures is a relatively modem 
development.25 While the classic articulation of the equality concept dates from 
Aristotle's writings, societies prior to the liberal state did not bold it as a defining 
standpoint. In medieval and feudal periods, hierarchical relations of birth and status 
determined the rank and duties ofindividuals,26 regardless of their innate equal worth.27 
Aristotle's view that "those things that are alike should be treated alike, whereas 
things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unlikeness"28 
would play a more defining role with the demise of the feudal state. As Fredman 
reports, that era of burgeoning trade saw widespread agitation for greater political 
freedoms, and the achievement of many of them.29 Most revered of all was the principle 
of equality in contractual arrangements, which was premised on the notion of equality 
between bargaining parties. The focus at this time was on the need for equality before 
the law - human freedom demanded that government should not intervene beyond its 
minimum obligation, which was to ensure that individuals were not treated with any 
favour or prejudice.30 
Despite the increasing recognition of the inherent freedom, independence and 
equality of all men, the promise of inclusiveness held out by the equality guarantee was 
offset by other core values of the developing liberal state. These other defining 
25 S. Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, Clarendon Law Series: 
2002) p.4. 
26 In Greek and Roman civilization people were traditionally divided in accordance with 
inequality, not equality. SeeR. Singh, "Equality: The Neglected Virtue" (2004) European 
Human Rights Law Review 141. 
27 On the innate worth of human beings, John Locke wrote in 1690: "Men [are] by Nature all 
free, equal and independent." In Two Treatises of Government, para.95 Cited in Fredman, supra 
n.25 p.S 
28 Aristotle, Ethic Nichomanea Book V 11, ll3a-ll3b. 
29 S. Fredman, supra. n.25 p.4. 
30 The idea of human freedom was historically, and still is, linked to the existence and 
maintenance of a hard public/private distinction. The idea of this division was to protect and 
segregate individuals from the overbearing reach of political power and authority, and the 
facilitation of space for the pursuit of private choices in the economic, social or intimate sphere. 
This variant of human freedom, protected by the public -private divide, particularly non-
interference in the private sphere, is key to the resistance to more substantive versions of equality 
theory. See G.Quinn, "Rethinking the place of difference in civil society - the role of anti-
discrimination law in the next century" in R. Byrne and W. Duncan (eds.) Developments in 
Discrimination Law in Ireland and Europe (Dublin: ICEL, 1997) 65, 67. 
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characteristics of the liberal state - rationality, individualism, autonomy, the primacy of 
the contract and the neutrality of the state31 -meant that the equality guarantee had a less 
influential role than was originally conceived. As Fredman notes "[ e ]xclusion was 
achieved by the apparently logical argument that the basic rights to liberty and equality 
only inhered in individuals by virtue of their rationality' '. 32 Dominant political thought 
thus used rationality as an exclusionary tool that denied the benefits of the liberal state 
to the powerless and retained the status quo in favour of the powerfu1.33 
The political philosophy of liberalism presumes that all goods are distributed 
according to the criterion of merit and that individuals, if treated equally, are free to 
compete fairly for society's rewards and benefits. This ideology is based on a rather 
optimistic view of the principles of autonomy and rationality. The manner in which 
individual disparities and the distributions of wealth and power impact on the free 
nature of societal competition are overlooked. Thus, the early liberal social structure 
was organised around a set of essentialist dichotomies designed to establish and retain 
the power structures of those in the ascendancy. Persons were either rational and 
autonomous, or irrational and lacking autonomy. An assumed Jack of capacity for 
rationality and autonomy was imputed to different groups within society and this 
legitimised their inferior status. Those with an impaired sense of rationality, autonomy 
and independence were denied the guarantees and freedoms of the liberal state, 
including the right to treatment as an equal without bias. It was common to attribute 
such reduced faculties to members of minority groups and to justify their inferior social 
position as a natural outcome of biological flaws.34 Paradoxically, it was the equality 
principle itself which legitimated the outcome of this approach. The emphasis within 
equality theory on similarity and on the devaluation of difference explains its relational 
nature. Yet the assignment of the labels of similarity and difference depends on a 
comparative process and, of course, on the position occupied by those assigning the 
labels. The process of assigning labels is ordinarily one which starts with the labelling 
as "normal" the groups to which we belong. This is followed by a comparison with a 
31 SeeS. Fredman, Women and the Lmv, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chapter one 
for discussion of these characteristics, specifically in the context of the position of women in the 
liberal state. 
32 S. Fredman, supra n.25 p.5. 
33 Liberal philosophy introduced a whole new view of the world as compared to the medieval 
world order, laying emphasis on talent and merit. However, one of the great ironies of 
individualism is that despite its radical beginnings, it became over time a means of justifying the 
status quo, of accepting a society supposedly based on individual action. M. Mullard and P. 
Sfickler, Social Policy in a Changing Society (London and New York: Routledge, 1998) p.47 
3 As discussed in chapter one. 
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counter example, which the power holders label "different".35 The right to equal 
treatment was only extended to those who were characterised as similar and therefore 
equal. Thus, differences attributed to certain sectors of the population legitimated their 
"unlike", "unequal" and inferior treatment. For example, women were characterised by 
Aristotle as mutilated males.36 As chapter one outlined, disabled people were 
stigmatised as 'defective' because of their 'innate' bodily and mental differences. 
Gypsies and the poor were viewed as riotous and a threat to the existing social order.37 
These groups and others, including religious minorities, all bore the burden of the 
classification process and would long remain outside the public structures of the liberal 
state. The practical resu lts of this included the sanctioning of slavery, the spread of 
religious persecution, the extermination and institutionalisation of disabled persons and 
the denial of the rights of the liberal state to women. 
Eventually, the central characteristics of liberal theory - rationality and 
autonomy in particular- were utilised by liberal thinkers, including John Stuart Mill and 
Mary Wollenscroft, to argue for the emancipation of many groups previously labelled 
outside the social and political order.38 They advocated the extension of the benefits of 
the liberal state to women as well as men on the basis that the principles of rationality 
and autonomy were inherent in all individuals. This was the basis of the argument that 
the state's lack of neutrality in the manner in which it disenfranchised women was 
contrary to the liberal ideal in the first place.39 As Fredman points out, this discourse 
was first used as a "focus for political activism, rather than as a legal concept'"'0. It 
would take a long, slow process before equality become a real force for attacking the 
bastions of power and privilege, precisely because of the political inequality ofthe 
subordinated groups involved. 
35 A. Hendricks, "The Significance of Equality and Non-Discrimination for the Protection of the 
Rights and Dignity ofDisabled Persons" in T. Degener and A. Koster-Dresse (eds.) Human 
Rights and Disabled Persons: Essays and Relevant Human Rights Instruments (The Hague: 
Martinus NijboffPublishers, 1995) p.40, 44. 
36 Aristotle, "The Generation of Animals" in J. Barnes (ed.) The Complete Works of Aristotle 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
37 See chapter one. 
38 Mary Wollstonecraft, wrote in the Vindication of the Rights of Women "the nature of reason 
must be the same in all". p.l. See Mary Astell, "If all men are born free, why are women born 
slaves?" ( 1700). Cited in S. Fredman, supra n.25 p.5. 
39 This putative neutrality of the state- whereby the state should be neutral as between its 
citizens, favouring no group of citizens above another- is easily challenged. As Fredman points 
out, thjs view depicts the state as separate from society, yet the state play a central role in 
distributing benefits (and burdens) in society. It cannot therefore be truly neutral if it refuses to 
take an active role in reducing disadvantage. S. Fredman, supra n.18 p.l74. 
40 S. Fredman, supra n. 25 p.5. 
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It seemed logical, then, for early political agitators to concentrate on the 
similarities of subordinated groups in order for their members to access the structures of 
the liberal state. The initial use of the "equality before the Jaw" principle was towards 
removing the legal obstacles to the equal citizenship of women. This included the 
removal of overt legal barriers, such as rights in marriage, rights over children, property 
rights, and the right to vote. However, it became clear that equality as "sameness" 
simply privileged the dominant norm: a precondition for inclusion required adapting to 
the norms and standards of the mainstream. The interpretation and application of the 
equality principle in this formal manner was not attuned to the practical needs of those 
who remained different, or dissimilarly situated. Formal equal treatment can simply 
ignore the extent to which opportunities are determined by individuals' social and 
historical status, including their race, their sex or their disability. Moreover, merely 
treating persons similarly in a situation burdened with disadvantage may do no more 
than perpetuate that disadvantage.41 
Many parallels can be drawn between the situation of women in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries and the exclusion of disabled people. Inequalities based on 
gender have traditionally rested on culturally-sanctioned beliefs about impairment or 
disability. The inequality of women was routinely justified by attributing to them 
physical or mental inferiorities.42 Disabled people have thus experienced exclusion and 
discrimination in a way not wholly dissimilar from the manner in which women have 
experienced them, and have likewise been disadvantaged by the ideology, practice, and 
laws of the liberal state.43 The early gender equality movement, however, always sought 
to distance its arguments from those raised by "the truly disabled", and it chose not to 
challenge the assumptions behind the hierarchical justification for disability as a source 
of social and political inequality.44 Despite many shared experiences, there remains 
considerable discord between the feminist movement and the disability movement.45 
~ 1 S. Fredman, "Does disability equality challenge the existing anti-discrimination paradigm?" 
paper presented at Disability Rights in Europe Conference, Leeds, September 25, 2003. p.3. 
Paper on file. 
42 D.C. Baynton, "Bodies and Environments: The Cultural Construction of Disability" in P.D. 
Blanck (ed.) Employment, Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Issues in Law, 
Public Policy and Research (Eavanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 2000) 387, 404. 
43 SeeP. Brandwein and R. K. Scotch, "The Gender Analogy in the Disability Discrimination 
Literature" (200 l) 62 Ohio State Law Journa/465. S. Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist 
Philosophical Perspectives on Disability (New York: Routledge, 1996). 
44 D. Baynton, supra n.42 p. 406. 
45 See J. Morris, Pride Against Prejudice: Transforming Altitudes to Disability (London: 
Women's Press, 1991). 
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A brief history of the exclusion of disabled people has been traced in chapter 
one. It is worth noting here that the displacement of such persons continued in the 
evolving liberal state. These individuals displayed marked or assumed differences from 
the mainstream majority and, it was held that their reduced circumstances and truncated 
rights were a natural consequence of their differences in functioning. The emergence of 
the disability movement in the civil rights era was briefly traced in chapter one. This 
movement rejected the natural exclusion of disabled people. Appealing to ideals such as 
human dignity, human fulfilment, and the universality of social justice as a moral 
entitlement46, political agitation for disability equality rights gathered momentum. The 
translation of these ideals into the structures of the legal system is considered below. 
Equal Treatment 
The principle of equal treatment derives from Aristotle's maxim that likes should be 
treated alike and unalikes treated unalike or differently.47 At first glance, the principle 
appears particularly abstract because of the need to import measurements or substantive 
criteria in order to ascertain who is "equal/like" and "what is meant by equal/like 
treatment?".48 The maxim itself does not broach how such questions are to be 
answered. It is the case, of course, that human beings are broadly similar in a wide 
range of attributes, while they can be said to differ when alternative characteristics are 
utilised. 
The problem with the principle in a legal context is that it involves demarcating 
distinctions and similarities between individuals or groups of individuals and, in 
particular, making distinctions that can be said to violate the equal treatment 
formulation. The principle is only violated if there are no objective reasons for the 
difference in treatment. However, the principle does not itself identify the 
characteristics shared by members of groups that ought to be worthy of its protection. 
However, the statement that different groups should be treated equally (in otherwise 
46 SeeS. Fredman, "Equality: A New Generation?" (2001) 30 Industrial Law Journal145. See 
generally, G. Quinn and T. Degener, "The moral authority for change: human rights values and 
the worldwide process of disability refom1" in G. Quinn and T. Degener (eds.) Human Rights 
and Disability: The Current Use and Future Potential of United Nations Human Rights 
Instruments in the Context of Disability (United Nations, Geneva, 2002). 
47 Supra n.28 
48 The maxim's indeterminacy is proven by showing that answers on its own basis get us 
nowhere. Who is equal? Simply those who should be treated alike. What, then, is equal 
treatment? Simply treatment of those who are equal. 
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similar circumstances) does not describe bow those groups should be composed.49 Thus, 
the principle lacks a determinate view of how to constitute the groups for comparison. 
In practice, in its legal setting, the equal treatment principle is not granted a simple and 
generalised meaning, as any group could claim it is not being treated equally and is 
deserving of protection from the law. What is crucial, it is argued, is that the group can 
plausibly claim that membership of that group puts individuals at such a disadvantage 
that the law should intervene.50 In this sense, the relevance of the criterion on 
differentiation depends on an incidence of disadvantage accruing to a group on the basis 
of a particular ground which has been recognised as invidious, irrational and 
unjustifiable. Thus, the group must be able to point to the fact that group membership 
gives rise to disadvantage. 51 For example, there has been no adopted legislation 
prohibiting discrimination against individuals with blue eyes in employment. This is not 
to say that society would deem discrimination against people with blue eyes as 
acceptable, but rather that the blue-eyed are not perceived as widespread victims of 
unfavourable treatment that requires equal treatment protection.52 Thus, the typical 
starting point in an equal treatment enquiry is whether it can be established that a certain 
group is excluded from the normal practice, or whether it is treated differently and 
worse than would normally be the case. 53 Christensen points out that "what an equal 
treatment prescription, or a prohibition against discrimination amounts to is that the 
group which was the object of differential treatment in an unfavourable sense shall be 
treated in the same manner as the group already covered by the nonn, or at least not 
worse". 54 The group covered by the norm is termed the reference group and the group 
covered by the prohibition against discrimination is termed the protected group. 
However, the equal treatment principle codified within anti-discrimination law typically 
extends its protection in a symmetrical manner, to both the protected group and the 
49 H. Collins, supra n.4 p.27. 
so Ibid. 
51 Ibid. Collins goes on to point out how one effect of the indeterminacy of protected groups 
under the equal treatment principle is that the provenance of anti-discrimination law always 
remains contested. The basis of his argument is that social inclusion provides a more 
determinate criterion for the composition of protected groups. For example, it could include 
single parents. residents in particular post codes, and the educationally disadvantaged. 
52 Though see the statement by Warrington U in Short v Poole [1926) Ch 66 that the court could 
declare an act of a public body to be ultra vires where it was so clearly founded on alien and 
irrelevant grounds as to be outside the authority conferred upon the body. The example be used 
was a teacher dismissed on the grounds of her red hair. Ironically, the case upheld the decision 
to dismiss the claimant, a teacher, because she was a married woman. 
53 A. Christensen, "Structural Aspects of Anti-Discriminatory Legislation and Processes of 
Normative Change" in A. Nurnbauser-Henning (ed.) Legal Perspectives on Equal Treatment and 
Non-Discrimination (Kluwer Law International, 2001) 31 , 32. 
54 Ibid. 
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reference group. This symmetry in anti-discrimination legal rules reflects the ideology 
of the equal treatment principle: the idea is that discrimination against the traditionally 
advantaged groups is as impugned as discrimination against the protected group. In the 
context of this thesis, the norm or reference group is that termed the able-bodied or the 
non-disabled and the protected group refers to disabled people. The sole divergence 
from the traditional symmetry of anti-discrimination law is in the disability context. 
The basis for this exemption is discussed below. 
Limitations to the formal conceptualisation of equal treatment easily build up. 
Particularly problematic is the principle's management of difference. It thrives on the 
identification of similarities between individuals who ought to be treated equally. This 
formulation of equality inheres in consistency.55 Since the equality-as-consistency 
argument addresses the situations of "likes", there is no requirement that persons be 
treated in accordance to their differences. Moreover, consistency can come at a cost. For 
example, if a claim for equal treatment is made based on unequal access to particular 
benefits enjoyed by members of the reference group, the equal treatment prescription 
has, in certain circumstances, been satisfied by removing the benefit from the reference 
group.56 What is known as "levelling down" meets the consistency objective of the 
equal treatment principle, in spite of the unfavourable outcome. 57 Race, sex and other 
protected characteristics are rarely considered relevant to the treatment of individuals.58 
Less favourable treatment on the grounds of such a characteristic will thus constitute a 
breach of the equal treatment principle, unless there is an objective reason unrelated to 
the characteristics for the difference in treatment. However, the equal treatment ignores 
that certain groups have endured widespread disadvantage by virtue of these 
characteristics, and this cannot be offset by deeming such characteristics irrelevant. This 
is problematic not just at the individual level but at the group level, where certain group 
characteristics are equated with inherent disadvantage and innate inferiorities. Further, 
since the principle of equal treatment relies on a comparison between the reference 
group and the protected group, it invariably refers to the nom1s that apply to the 
55 S. Fredman, supra n.25 p.7. 
56 See the decision in Smith v Avdel Systems [1994) ECR I-4435 where the ECJ held that where 
an employer had decided to achieve equality by levelling down (in the context of pensionable 
age), this was compatible with EC law. SeeS. Deakin, "Levelling Down Employee Benefits" 
[1995] Cambridge Law Journa/35 . 
57 The realisation of equality might be expected not to be an equivalence in "equally bad" 
treatment by levelling down. In Defrenne (No.2) [ 1976] ECR 455 the European Court of Justice 
said that in view of the connection between Article 141 and the improvement of working 
conditions, it was not possible to comply with Article 141 by lowering the higher salaries. 
58 See Short v Poole, supra text to n.52. 
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reference group. The problem is that this formal method of equal treatment "masks 
adherence to a particular set of norms [namely] those of dominant groups".59 The 
supposed neutrality of the equal treatment principle is exposed even though members of 
the protected group are in a sense ' abstracted ' from their group identity, and to the 
extent that that aspects of that identity- such as ethnicity or gender - are considered 
irrelevant for fair employment practices. A prevailing tactic is for marginalised 
individuals from minority groups to have to suppress any differences through a policy 
of assimilation in order to benefit from the principle of equal treatment. 
ln the disability context, in particular, there are powerful conformist and 
assimilationist pressures. Disabled people constantly play down the existence, impact 
or effect of their impairment, in order to avoid social stigma and prejudice and to fit into 
existing structures. Thus, many disabled individuals were taught to "overcome" or 
compensate for particular differences in functioning.60 This reinforces the dominant 
attributes of majority groups and, consequently, it can have harmful effects on 
individuals, their personal identity and self-worth. 
Formal Non-Discrimination Rules 
The obligation to treat equal cases equally has been reduced in specific legal situations 
to an obligation not to discriminate. The equal treatment formulation aims to minimise 
legal and social distinctions arising from characteristics which ought not to burden an 
individual's life prospects. The criteria of past and present disadvantage provides 
foundation for the prohibitions against discrimination on grounds such as gender, race, 
religion, disability and sexual orientation. The liberal principle of individualism, 
however, requires that the person be respected without regard to this characteristic and 
be considered on the grounds of his or her individual talents. This formulation, then, is 
equated with an obligation to treat persons equally unless there are other relevant or 
determining considerations. In general, employment equality law in western liberal 
democracies formulates its rules in terms of the prohibition against discrimination 
across an array of grounds and with regard to various stages and aspects of the 
59 I.M.Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990) p.25. 
60 In disability parlance, such individuals are termed "supercrips". See J.C. Drirnmer, "Cripples, 
Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for 
People with Disabilities" (1993) 40 UCLA Law Review 1341. 
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employment relationship.61 In recent years, the number of grounds attracting non-
discrimination protection has begw1 to increase in differentjurisdictions.62 
Direct Discrimination 
Direct discrimination is defmed in terms of the less favourable treatment of an 
individual on the grounds of a protected characteristic63, as compared with another 
individual in circumstances which are not materially different.64 It is a comparative 
concept that requires, for example, in the gender context, a woman to demonstrate less 
favourable treatment compared to a man who is in the same circumstances. In the past, 
the need to locate an actual, similarly situated, comparator hampered greatly the 
practical application of the direct discrimination rule. This was particularly hindering in 
the case of pregnancy-based discrimination. Initially, claims of this nature were 
excluded from the ambit of sex discrimination legislation due to the absence of an 
appropriate comparator.65 The reality of pregnancy-based discrimination was beyond 
the formal legalistic comparator approach. Eventually, pregnancy-based claims were 
allowed to proceed by way of a forced comparison between a pregnant woman and an ill 
man. This line of reasoning held pregnant women and sick men as similarly situated 
because both were temporarily unavailable for work.66 The impact of this odd 
approach67 was eventually tempered as a consequence ofEU Law. The ECJ dismissed 
61 The material scope of the EEA is set out in section 8. 
62 SeeS. Kilcommins, M. McDonagh, S. Mullally and D. Whelan, Extending the Scope of 
Employment Equality Legislation: Comparative Perspectives on the Prohibited Grounds of 
Discrimination (Dublin: Government Stationery Office, 2004). 
63 In Ireland's equality framework, the number of protected grounds totals nine. 
64 See generally section 6 of the EEA as amended, discussed below. 
65 In England, see the EAT decision of Turley v Allder Stores Ltd [ 1980] ICR 66 where the 
dismissal of a woman on grounds of her pregnancy did not constitute unlawful sex 
discrimination contrary to the Sex Discrimination Act as there was no appropriate male 
comparator. Bristow J. reasoned that "[i]n order to see if she has been treated less favourably 
than a man ... you must compare like with like and you cannot. When she is pregnant a woman 
is no longer just a woman. She is a woman ... with child and there is no masculine equivalent". 
At70D. 
66 See the Irish decision of Long v Power Supermarkets, Trading as Quinnsworth ( 1990) Labour 
Court (No Determination Number available). Here the claim of sex discrimination fai led, as the 
Labour Court compared the treatment of the pregnant claimant with another male employee who 
was unable to take up employment at the specified date due to a limb fracture. Since both the 
male employee and the claimant were unavailable for work, they were similarly situated and 
treated in the same way by the employer. The claim of discrimination was, on this reasoning, 
unfounded. 
67 Feminists had particular problems with the nature of the comparison between a sick man and a 
pregnant woman, despite the fact that in the early days, this avenue was the only practical means 
by which a pregnancy discrimination case could proceed. The disadvantages of this approach 
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the comparator concept in this context when it accepted that pregnancy discrimination is 
sex discrimination, as only women have the capacity for pregnancy.68 
One of the defining features of the direct discrimination rule is its adherence to 
the principle of consistency. To tllis end, most legislative provisions of this sort provide 
for a symmetrical approach which allows persons of either sex, any race or any religion 
to mount a claim. Thus, on this approach, sex discrimination legislation deems 
discrimination against a man as invidious as discrimination against a women. In other 
words, discrimination against members of the reference group is deemed as harmful as 
discrimination against members of the disadvantaged group. 
The direct discrimination rule does not guarantee its subjects any positive 
rewards in its field of application - it simply forbids less favourable treatment between 
an applicant and her chosen comparator in terms of access to the economy, its benefits 
and certain goods and services.69 It may not, therefore, be concerned with equality in an 
instrumental sense, i.e. one that results in outcomes of fewer disadvantages. Herein lies 
a major critique of the equal treatment prescription underpinning direct discrimination: 
equality laws are not ends in themselves, but a means to redress the results of a history 
of detrimental treatment based on particular characteristics.70 Moreover, this point is 
supported by the conceptualisation of direct discrimination as a negative right requiring 
individual enforcement by way of litigation. When this avenue is successfully pursued, 
it generally results in compensation for breach of the individual's right, rather than the 
individual being granted the position the discriminatory act had barred her from. 
Consequently, the direct discrimination principle operates in a system that concentrates 
on retrospective faultfinding. This promotes an adversarial approach to the problems of 
inequality and it places considerable burdens on an individual complainant. While 
pursuing a claim is, in theory, open to everyone, the individual grievances approach is 
included unwanted stigmatisation of pregnancy as aberrant and abnormal and, as Fredman points 
out, the sole focus of this approach assumes that the only aspect of pregnancy of concem to 
discrimination law is its effects on an employee's ability to work. This focus ignores the medical 
and social reasons behind pregnany based leave. S. Fredman, supra n.25 p. l 00. See further, S. 
Fredman, "A Difference with Distinction: Pregnancy and Parenthood Reassessed" ( 1994) 110 
Law Quarterly Review 106. 
68 See Dekker v Stichting Vormingscntrum Voor Jonge Volwassen Plus Case C-17/88 [1990] 
ECR I-39 
69 See the scope of the non-discrimination provisions outside the employment context set out in 
Ireland's Equal Status Act 2000. 
70 S. Fredman, supra n.I8 p.l73. 
44 
practically limited by disparities in power, status and resources among potential 
claimants.71 
Direct Discrimination and Disability 
Section 6 oflreland's Employment Equality Act 1998, as amended by the Equality Act 
2004, states that discrimination will be taken to occur "where a person is treated less 
favourably than another person is, has been, or would be treated in a comparable 
situation on any of the [discriminatory grounds] which (i) exists, (ii) existed but no 
longer exists, (iii) may exist in the future, or (iv) is imputed to the person concerned."72 
Section 6(2) sets out the discriminatory grounds: "As between any two persons, the 
discriminatory grounds (and the description of those grounds for the purposes of this 
Act) are -
(g) that one is a person with a disability and the other either is not or is a person 
with a different disability ( ... referred to as the disability ground)." 
Thus, direct discrimination in the disability context arises where a person with a 
disabilit/3 is treated less favourably on the grounds of disability than either a person 
without a disability, or than a person with a different disability is, has been, or would be 
treated in a comparable situation.74 While the comparative approach is again central, 
two approaches are possible here. First, less favourable treatment of a claimant can be 
established through a comparison with the treatment of a person without a disability. 
Alternatively, a less favourable treatment claim can proceed by comparison with the 
treatment of an individual with a different disability.75 Importantly, the traditional 
symmetry of the direct discrimination rule is omitted. The benefit to the disabled 
individual [that is, the right not to be treated less favourably than a non-disabled 
comparator] is designed to offset the effects of stereotyping, negative attitudes and bias 
which they endure because of their disability. Non-disabled people cannot experience 
71 C. Kilpatrick, "Emancipation Through Law or the Emasculation of Law? The Nation State, 
the EU and Gender Equality at Work" in J. Conaghan, R.M. Fischl and K. Klare (eds.) Labour 
Law in an Era of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 489 pp.505-506. Legal 
aid is not available to claimants pursuing employment discrimination cases. 
72 Section 6(l}(a) of the Employment Equality Act 1998-2004. Section 6(l)(b) goes on to outlaw 
discrimination on the grounds of association. 
73 Disability is defined in section 2(1} ofthe 1998 - 2004 Act and is discussed in chapter four. 
74 Section 6(1) and 6 (2)(g) Employment Equality Act 1998 -2004. 
75 This is obviously a recognition that stigma and stereotyping can impact more gravely on 
individuals with certain impairments. For example, compare the social consequences which 
attach to HTV status with those attached to arthritis. 
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less favourable treatment on the disability ground as they do not fall within the 
defmition of disability.76 The only exception to this is in the context of an association 
with a disabled person or where an individual is perceived to be or regarded as a 
disabled person. Here, the EEA, as amended by the Equality Act 2004, extends 
protection to those who are regarded as having a disability - that is, the discriminatory 
ground is imputed to them and they are treated less favourably as a consequence.77 1t 
also extends protection to those who are treated less favourably on one of the protected 
grounds by virtue of an association with another individua1.78 
The Irish legislation recognises that, in certain circumstances, it is insufficient 
for employers to treat the fact of disability as irrelevant and to refuse to take disability 
into account in its treatment and consideration of its employees or applicants for 
employment. Tbis strict adherence to the equal treatment precept would compound the 
inequality and disadvantage shouldered by the disadvantaged individual. This is where 
the reasonable accommodation mandate seeks to further the equality agenda in the 
specific context of disability. Employers are obliged, in certain circumstances, to take an 
individual's disability into account, and to make a reasonable accommodation for it, 
thus allowing an individual to compete for or take-up a particular position. However, the 
legislation disallows non-disabled persons to claim any reasonable accommodation 
afforded to disabled employees or applicants by reason of their disability. 79 
The reasonable accommodation duty is discussed at length in chapters three, 
five and six. At tbis juncture, it is important to emphasise that the direct discrimination 
principle serves an important function in disability employment anti-discrimination 
statutes. The function of the disability direct discrimination principle is often 
overlooked because of the confusion generated in academic and judicial discourse over 
the reach and legal legitimacy of the reasonable accommodation duty.80 In this regard, it 
has been argued that the dynamics of disability-based discrimination do not always 
76 Section 2 of the 1998-2004 Act sets out the definition of disability discussed in this work in 
chapter four. 
77 Section 6(l)(a)iv) EEA as amended. 
78 Section 6(l)(b)(i)-{ii) EEA as amended. 
79 Section 35(3): " Where, by virtue of subsection (I) or (2) [relating to the provision of special 
training regarding vocational training or training or working environment suited to the disability) 
D, as a person with a disability, receives a particular rate of remuneration or, as the case may be, 
special treatment o facilities, C, as a person without a disability, or with a different disability, 
shall not be entitled under this Act to that rate of remuneration, that treatment or those facilities". 
80 See generally chapters five and six of this work. 
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differ significantly from other forms of discriroination.81 Therefore, it is important to 
point out that disabled people suffer the effects of social bias, stigma and exclusion even 
in situations where an impairment has no functional impact on a person's suitability for 
a position, or their job productivity. Any automatic assumptions to the contrary are 
residual impacts of stereotypical notions surrounding the meaning and impact of 
disability. The direct discrimination principle recognises that with regards to the 
determining criteria for a position, a disabled individual may be similarly situated to a 
non-disabled individual82 but may suffer less favourable treatment due to discriminatory 
attitudes and social bias informed by prejudice. In this sense, then, discrimination based 
upon disability resembles other forms of discrimination because of its central feature of 
negative stereotyping or hostile attitudes. An example would be an employer who is 
hostile to a wheelchair user as a potential employee, despite the absence of any barriers 
to that person's job performance, because of discriminatory beliefs it holds regarding 
the general social position and worth of persons who mobilise by means of wheelchairs. 
Other examples include employing disabled persons and paying them significantly less 
than other employees because of misplaced or unsubstantiated assumptions surrounding 
disability and its impact on productivity.83 Many disabled persons are capable of 
adequately performing the duties attached to a position but endure detrimental treatment 
because of the attitudes of decision-makers towards their impairment and towards 
disability in general. The impact of stign1a on the life opporturuties of people with non-
functional or attributed limitations has been well-documented.84 The direct 
discrimination principle is, at least in theory, an important combative tool in this regard. 
Equality of Opportunity 
81 This point has been subject of research on the type oflitigation claims under Canada's 
disability discrimination legislation. See J. Mosoff, "Is the Human Rights Paradigm "Able" to 
Include Disability: Who's In? Who Wins What? Why?" (2000) 26 Queen's Law Journa/225. 
82 In the context of employment, for example, qualified and capable of performing the job 
requirements. 
83 Though see Employment Equality Act 1998, section 35(1) recently amended by s.24 of the 
Equality Act 2004 regarding remuneration and disability. 
84 See chapter one, though note the difficulties attached to altering prevalent societal assumptions 
about disabled people's capacities for mainstream employment. Such attitudes are systemic and 
may require a more systematic approach beyond the individualised right to protection from direct 
discrimination. SeeM. Weber, "Beyond the Americans with Disabili ties Act: A National 
Employment Policy for People with Disabilities" ( 1998) 46 Buffalo Law Review 123 discussed 
further in chapter s ix. 
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Equality of opportunity purports to tread the middle ground between formal equality 
and equality of results. Equal opportunity is critical of the equal treatment principle 
because of the latter' s perceived toleration of disadvantage through its insensitivity to 
differences between persons. At the same time, equal opportunity theory rejects the 
equality of results approach because of its disavowal of equal treatment in favour of an 
emphasis on outcomes. 85 
One view of the equality of opportunity thesis relies heavily on the metaphor of 
a race between individuals to illustrate its role as an organising principle of a liberal 
society. The race metaphor assumes that basic conditions of equality can be satisfied if 
contestants line up evenly at the starting line (thereby removing pre-existing obstacles) 
and every competitor begins from the starting line. This view of equality of opportunity 
concentrates on removing certain obstacles from the built and social environment so that 
individuals are free to pursue their goals free of those obstacles. Equal opportunity 
recognises that equality cannot be achieved if individuals begin the race from different 
starting points due to the burden of prior disadvantage. Equalising the starting point 
recognises the need for different treatment for the disadvantaged group. For example, 
consider the purpose commonly ascribed to employment anti-discrimination law: that 
individuals should be able to pursue their employment goals free of the obstacle that is 
unlawful discrimination based on race, sex, age, disability and so forth. What it 
amounts to is that a specified person is entitled to compete for the particular goal of an 
employment position, free from the specific obstacle of discrimination on one or more 
of the grounds mentioned. All that follows is that the class of persons are said to be 
equal "in respect of the opportunity the act proscribes". 86 The idea is that the removal 
of discrimination (defined in terms of less favourable treatment on a specific ground) 
equalises the opportunities between members of different groups to access scarce 
positions. Where neutral barriers that have disadvantaged groups in the past are 
removed, all members of the competing group are then free to compete for the position 
on the basis of the rules of the competition as determined by the employer. However, as 
Fredman point out, equality of opportunity stops short, as it reverts to traditional notions 
of neutrality, symmetry and the primacy of the individual.87 As the equal opportunity 
guarantee has purportedly removed these insurmountable obstacles at the start of the 
ss S. Fredman, supra n.25 p.l4. 
86 P. Westen, "The Concept of Equality of Opportunity" in L. Polman and R. Westmoreland 
(eds.) Equality Selected Readings (N.Y., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 158 p.l63. In 
other words, all participants begin at the same starting line without regard to any previous or 
lingering obstacles (not prescribed) that may affect the attainment of their goal. 
87 S. Fredman, supra n.l8 p.l75. 
48 
race (i.e. the obstacle created by sex or race based preferences or the effect of practices 
which disadvantage individuals of a particular race or sex), the competition proceeds on 
the basis of more "objective" and "neutral" criteria. These are generally criteria such as 
qualifications, education and experience which allows for the most "meritorious" 
applicant to succeed. Equality of opportunity is not concerned with the outcome of the 
race per se, and it does not challenge the putative neutrality and validity of the other 
determining criteria. 
The basic conditions of equal opportunity rely on the principles of 
individualism, meritocracy, the notion of improvement through training, conditioning 
and education, and neutrality in the measurement of these attributes. The equal 
opportunity rule in this context does not consider how the opportunity of some 
competitors has been hindered by those very same factors (i.e. race or sex-based 
considerations) with regard to the attainment of"merit", "education" and "experience". 
As Hepple points out, one is not supplying genuine equality of opportunity if one 
applies an unchallenged criterion of merit to people who have been deprived of the 
opportunity to acquire "merit". 88 However, the criterion of merit is a social, unscientific 
concept which remains largely immune from the issue of entrenched disadvantage. A 
truly substantive account of equality of opportunity, Williams argues, would be that "the 
grounds considered appropriate for the good themselves be such that people from all 
sections of society have an equal chance of satisfying them".89 This demands more than 
procedural changes; it requires substantive input into societal structures such as 
education, training, caring systems and workplace routines. The race metaphor falls 
down because it ignores the context or the environment in which the competition is 
conducted.90 As a result, women who have raised fan1ilies will have Jess working 
experience than men, and thus may be viewed as the less meritorious candidates for a 
position. In the disability context, some disabled individuals may not have had the 
opportunity to pursue a mainstream course of education because of lingering attitudes 
and poor facilities, and this will have impacted on their "merit" and experience.91 Thus, 
88 B. Hepple, "Discrimination and Equality of Opportunity" ( 1990) I 0 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 408. 
89 B. Williams, "The Idea ofEquality" in P. Laslett and L.G. Runciman (eds.) Philosophy, 
Politics and Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) 110 p.126. 
90 H. Hahn, "New Trends in Disability Studies: Implications for Education Policy in Inclusion 
and Social Reform" in D. Kezner Lipsky and A. Gartner (eds.) Transforming America's 
Classroom (1997) p.325. 
91 Those who challenge the criteria of merit collecting activities argue that activities such as the 
organisation of a family and a family budget could be considered as experience relevant to a 
number of positions. In the disability context, it is arguable that the independent living scheme 
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the narrow conception of equality of opportunity does not necessarily lead to an ability 
to profit from that opportunity. Prior inequalities in determinative areas can affect the 
ultimate outcome. 
In this sense, equality of opportunity has been described as a form of 'imperfect 
procedural justice': procedures are imposed with a view to achieving a desired outcome 
but without an a priori guarantee that the procedure will promote the outcome in every 
case.92 While the equality of opportunity principle supports the removal of arbitrary 
baniers and factors which impact on an individual's life chances, a general lack of 
coherency has lessened its impact. This Jack stems in part from the operational structure 
of the non-discrimination legal paradigm which purports to promote the equal 
opportunity rule. In particular, many mistake the extent to which such a precept 
positively enables certain members of the an excluded class to actually achieve the goal 
of employment. Despite this, both the Congressional debates on the ADA and the 
Oireachtas debates regarding Ireland' s equality legislation describe equal opportunity as 
the ideal tool to end the longstanding economic isolation of disabled people and other 
minority groups. 
Fredman argues that the equal opportunities principle is best expressed through 
the legal formula of indirect discrimination.93 The specifics of the indirect 
discrimination principle are considered below. 
Indirect Discrimination 
Originating in the case-law under Title Vll of the US Civil Rights Act 196494, indirect 
discrimination was incorporated into European Community law through judicial 
interpretation of Article 141 ofthe EC Treaty.95 Initially developed in the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Justice, the concept was codified in I 997 in the Burden of 
Proof Directive in cases of discrimination based on sex. 96 In the context of gender 
whereby a disabled individual organises the work schedule of their assistants could also be 
viewed as a merit accumulating activity. 
92 B. Hepple, supra n.88 p.41. 
93 S. Fredman, The Future of Equality in Britain (Manchester: EOC, 2002) p.6 
94 Griggs v Duke Power 40 I U.S. 424. 
95 Bilka Kaujhaus v Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607. Though the UK had adopted a tight 
statutory definition of indirect discrimination in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, section 
l(l)(b). 
96 Article 2(2) Burden ofProofDirective 97/90/EC. "Indirect discrimination shall exist where an 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice disadvantages a substantially higher proportion 
of the members of one sex, unless that provision, criterion or practice is appropriate and 
necessary and can be justified by objective factors unrelated to sex." 
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equality the definition has recently been reformulated in the Amended Equal Treatment 
Directive.97 A further definition of indirect discrimination is set out in the Framework 
Directive on equal treatment in employment and vocation in employment.98 
Indirect Discrimination and Disability under Ireland's Employment Equality Act 
The concept of indirect discrimination at first appears attractive because it purports to 
switch the focus from individual discrimination to the effects of practices that have a 
disadvantageous impact on particular groups. It invites employers to think about the 
disparate impact of supposedly neutral practices on different groups of employees or 
prospective employees. The strength of the indirect discrimination principle is that it 
conceptualises discrimination as involving more than episodic or individualised 
wrongdoing. 99 It exposes the discriminatory impact of putatively neutral practices. 
However, the weakness of the indirect discrimination principle lies in its method of 
enforcement and in the very real difficulties involved in proving its constituent 
elements.100 
The complexity of the indirect discrimination case-law in the gender context has 
received considerable comment, particularly in the UK. 101 rt may now have been 
simplified somewhat given the changes to domestic legal definitions prompted by the 
Amended Equal Treatment Directive.102 Up until recently, the legislative formulations 
of the indirect discrimination principle in Ireland were similarly complex, as the EEA 
originally contained four quite distinct definitions of indirect discrimination. The four 
definitions in tbe EEA originally included two definitions of indirect discrimination 
applicable to the gender ground, one specific to pay, 103 and the other applicable to all 
other aspects of the employment relationship. 104 It also included two definitions 
relevant to the other seven grounds, including disability again delineated by pay105 and 
97 Directive 2002173, OJ [2002] L269/l5. See Article 2(2). 
98 Article 2(b) of Council Directive 2000178/EC establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation. OJ l 303116. 
99 C. Gooding, Disabling Lmvs. Enabling Acts Disability Rights in Britain and America (London: 
Pluto Press, 1994) pp. 38 -39. 
100 Fredman points out how indirect discrimination "has proved to be too clumsy a tool to 
achieve its aims". Supra n.18 p.l88. 
101 See C. Barnard and B. Hepple, supra n.14. See also, C. Barnard and B. Hepple. "Indirect 
Discrimination: Interpreting Seymour-Smith" (1999) 58 Cambridge Law Journa/399. 
102 See text to n.97 supra. 
103 Section 19(4) EEA 1998. 
104 Section 22( I) EEA 1998. 
105 Section 29(4) EEA 1998. 
all other aspects of the employment relationship. 106 The original definitions of indirect 
discrimination in the EEA maintained some differences with regard to the definition 
applicable to the gender ground and the definition applicable to the other seven 
grounds. 107 However, these differences have been eradicated by the terms of the 
Equality 2004 Act which was enacted in order to better align the domestic non-
discrimination provisions with the terms of the Race and Framework Directives and the 
Amended Equal Treatment Directive. 
The EEA' s original definition of indirect sex discrimination with regard to 
issues other than pay provided that the neutral provision applied by the employer was 
such "that the proportion of persons disadvantaged by the provision [was] substantially 
higher" for those in the protected group as opposed to those in the reference group. 108 
If the applicant satisfied this formula, a claim for indirect discrimination would only 
succeed if the practice could not be "justified by objective factors unrelated" to the 
claimant's sex. 109 This definition was equivalent to the EU deftnition set out in the 
Burden of Proof Directive. 110 This definition avoids the controversy that surrounded the 
UK's original definition of indirect discrimination which originally considered whether 
the "proportion of women who could comply [with the impugned practice) was 
considerably smaller than the proportion of men who could comply". 111 This test 
required a comparison between the ratios of the privileged group to the protected group 
in two statistical pools. 112 Initial difficulties arose over the choice of comparator groups 
or pools as the decision on the pool had considerable impact on the strength of the 
statistical figures. 113 The definition in the Burden of Proof Directive, which was 
adopted by the EEA, simply requires a comparison between proportions of women and 
men. A detetmination of significance is still required as to whether the proportion of 
those disadvantaged is "substantially higher". 
106 Section 31 (I) EEA 1998. 
107 For further discussion, seeM. Finlay, "Indirect Discrimination and the Article 13 Directives" 
in C. Costello and E. Barry (eds.) Equality in Diversity: The New Equality Directives (Dublin: 
lrish Centre for European Law, 2003) p.l35. 
108 Section 22( I) of the EEA 1998. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Directive 97/80/EC. 
111 See section I (i)(b) of the Sex Discrirnination Act 1975 recentJy amended by the 2005 
Regulations. SeeR v Secretary of State, ex p. Seymour Smith and Perez Case C- 167/97 [ 1999] 
CR 1-623. 
112 H. Collins, supra n.4 p.32. 
113 S. Fredman, supra n.25 p.l09. As Fredman queries, " [s]hould the number of women who can 
comply be take as a proportion of the appropriately qualified workforce, or of the number of 
women in the particular establishment, or of the number of women in the workforce as a whole?" 
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Section 13 of the Equality Act 2004 amends section 22 of the EEA with regard 
to the definition of indirect discrimination on the gender ground. It states that indirect 
discrimination occurs where an. apparently neutral provision puts persons of a particular 
gender (being As orBs) 114 at a particular disadvantage in respect of any matter other 
than remuneration compared with other employees of their employer".115 This is 
deemed discrimination unless "the provision can be objectively justified by a legitimate 
aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary." Section 13 
also inserts a new section 22(1 )(A) into the EEA which provides that statistics are 
admissible for the purposes of determining whether indirect discrimination arises. 
Section 31 of the 1998 Act, which sets out the definition of indirect 
discrimination applicable to the non-gender grounds, including the disability ground, 
was amended by section 20 of the Equality Act 2004. The net effect of this technical 
amendment is to apply the defmition of indirect discrimination that operates in respect 
of the gender ground to the other eight grounds, including the disability ground. The 
reference to persons of a particular gender (being As and Bs) is a reference to persons 
(being Cs and Ds) who differ in respect of the other discriminatory grounds. 116 Thus, 
the defmition of indirect discrimination in the disability context reads: 
"Indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision puts 
persons of a particular disability at a particular disadvantage in respect of any 
matter other than remuneration compared with other employees of their 
employer." 117 
Where this paragraph is satisfied, the employer shall be treated for the purposes of the 
Act as discriminating against the [claimants], unless the provision is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary. 118 
114 Part Til of the EEA is titled "Specific Provisions as to Equality Between Men and Women" 
and utilises the letters "A" and "B" to refer to the comparators who differ by reason of their sex: 
section 18. 
115 Section 12 Equality Act amends the definition of indirect discrimination applicable to pay. 
116 Part IV of the EEA is titled "Specific Provisions as to Equality Between Other Categories of 
Persons" and utilises the letters "C" and "D" to refer to the comparators who differ by reason of 
the other eight protected grounds: section 28. 
117 Section 3l(l)(a) of the EEA as amended. Though note that the definition of indirect 
discrimination in the Framework Directive has taken an approach based on contingent harm, i.e. 
it covers the possibility of adverse impact as opposed to the actual occurrence of adverse impact. 
Article 2(2)(b) of the Framework Directive refers to provisions, criteria or practices which 
"would put" persons having a particular disability at a disadvantage. The EEA definition does 
not reflect this aspect of the Framework Directive definition. See E. Ellis, EU Anti-
Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) pp.91-94 for discussion. 
118 S.3l(l)(b) oftbe EEA as amended. 
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The amended definition omits the previous formulation's requirement of an 
inquiry as to whether the putatively neutral practice was to the disadvantage of a 
substantially higher proportion of individual having the same characteristic as the 
complainant. The new approach requires a showing of a "particular disadvantage" to 
individuals sharing the complainant's characteristics as compared with other employees 
of the employer. However, there is one obvious difficulty with the application of the 
indirect discrimination definition in the context of disability, that is, the fact that 
disabled people do not form a homogenous group. Given the range and number of 
impairments and their varying functional and stigmatic effects, some individual 
claimants may have "great difficulty in identifying a particular group that is 
disadvantaged by the relevant provision, criterion or practice in the same manner as they 
are". 1 19 The downside to the amending defmition is its narrowing scope; the 
comparison must be made between the complainant and the other employees of the 
employer, and not other members of the particular sector or the workforce more 
generally. 
However, even if a case of disparate impact is made out, indirect discrimination 
is not thereby actionable. While a prima facie case of indirect discrimination may be 
raised, the major downfall with the principle is its poor relation to the employer's 
interests in continuing with the practice. This raises the issue of the scope of the 
employer' s justification defence. The original justification test set out in the EEA 1998 
was considerably weaker in that it permitted an employer to justify a prima facie case of 
indirect discrimination where it was "reasonable in all the circumstances". The 2004 Act 
tightens the scope of the employer justification defence by adopting the European 
standard of proportionality. Thus, the provision must be capable of objective 
justification as pursuing a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim must be 
appropriate and necessary.120 The origins of the proportionality test lie in the European 
Court of Justice decision in Bilka Kaujhaus. 121 While it stressed that the assessment of 
whether there was any objective justification was for the national Court, the ECJ laid 
down the following three-tier test: 
119 R. Whittle, "The Framework Directive for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation: 
An Analysis from a Disability Rights Perspective" (2002) 27 European Law Review 303, 308. 
The ADA, in contrast, allows adverse impact to be proven on just one individual. See 42 USC s 
12112(b)(6). However, offsetting this interpretation of the Framework Directive is the fact that 
the text includes disadvantage of a "persons with a particular disability'' which, according to 
Whittle, would allow an individual to establish a claim by reference to tightly defined sub-groups 
within the larger ground of"disability''. 
120 Section 31 (I )(b) EEA as amended. 
121 Bilka-Kaufhaus GmBh v Weber Von Hartz Case 170/84 [1986] ECR 1607. 
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(1) whether the measures chosen by the employer correspond to a real need on the 
part of the undertaking 
(2) whether they are appropriate with a view to achieving the objectives pursued 
and 
(3) are necessary to this end. 122 
However, the ECJ has imported different standards of justification depending on the 
context. For example, where legislation or state social policy has a discriminatory 
impact, it will be justified by tbe state if the means adopted are a necessary objective for 
social policy and it is appropriate and necessary for that end.123 This test was 
subsequently weakened in Nolte124 where the state only had to show that the policy was 
legitimate as opposed to necessary and this will be so where it is unrelated to any 
discrimination on the grounds of sex. Ellis points out that proportionality provides a 
more rational means of patrolling the boundary between the employer's discretion to act 
and the right of the individual not to be discriminated against. 125 It is a more structured 
enquiry and its emphasis on the necessity for discriminatory action makes it a more 
satisfactory and effective test for this purpose than reasonableness.126 Indeed, the 
previous test of "reasonableness in all the circumstances of the case" could have 
allowed an employer to justify its practice on the basis of stereotypical conceptions of 
reasonableness which could include appeals to the way things are ordinarily done. 127 
However, the utility of the proportionality principle depends upon its effective 
application, that is, that the court equitably considers the arguments forwarded by both 
parties. 128 
The Supreme Court of Canada recently stated that adverse effects 
discrimination is the major form of discrimination endured by disabled people. 129 In 
Eldridge v British Columbia, a state policy providing for health care for all citizens was 
122 Ibid. at 1628. 
123 Rinner -Kuhn Case 171/88 [1989] ECR 2743. 
124 Nolte Case C 317/93 [1995] ECR I-1531. 
125 E. Ellis, "The Concept of Proportionality in European Community Sex Discrimination Law" 
in E. Ellis (ed.) The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
1999) 165 p.l79. 
126 Ibid. 
127 An example of the reasonableness standard for the justification test can be seen in the UK 
decision of Ojutif. .. 'U v Manpower Services Commission [ 1982] ICR 661 , where Kerr LJ 
considered that the term "justifiable" was an ordinary word which "clearly applies a lower 
standard than the word "necessary". At p.670. Stephenson LJ referred to the discriminator's 
need for the provision as "that need is what is reasonably needed by the party who applies the 
condition" At p. 674. 
128 Compare the Irish Supreme Court's application of the proportionality test in Re Article 26 and 
the Employment Equality Bill 1996 [ 1997] 2 IR 321 , discussed in the following chapter. 
129 Eldridge v British Columbia (1997) 3 SCR 624. 
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found to be indirectly discriminatory against deaf individuals because of the absence of 
sign-language facilities in hospitals. The Supreme Court noted that the same facilities 
were available to everyone which allowed hearing patients to converse with their 
doctors, whereas deaf patients were denied effective communication. This was, 
therefore, a policy which indirectly denied deaf people the equal benefit of the law. An 
argument for the application of indirect discrimination to the disability ground is that 
... inclusion of a concept of indirect discrimination would promote better 
practice among employers and service providers making them identify and 
remove barriers in advance rather than providing individual solutions to 
individual problems which the current duty to make reasonable adjustments ... 
ensures. 130 
This comment, written from a UK perspective (as the UK's Disability Discrimination 
Act contains no prohibition on indirect discrimination) is, as will be shown below, a 
rather optimistic account of the possible range and utility of the indirect discrimination 
principle. This is particularly the case when the interaction between the indirect 
discrimination principle and the duty to make reasonable accommodation, as set out in 
the Framework Directive is assessed. 131 Despite its emphasis on tackling putatively 
neutral practices affecting members of particular groups, at the level of enforcement, the 
prohibition against indirect discrimination becomes an individual matter. In addition, as 
Baker et al point out, while the concept of indirect discrimination can be utilised to 
remove unnecessary job performance criteria, these are only unearthed in cases 
concemed with what employers have done, not with what they have failed to do.132 For 
instance, a failure to provide 'family-friendly' work arrangements will clearly have 
particular implications for women given the gendered division of labour, yet this is 
immune from challenge as a form of discrimination. This is because there is no 
generally applied provision, criterion or practice. In the disability context, tllis lacuna 
can be reached in part by the reasonable accommodation duty. Thus, it is important to 
consider the relationship between indirect discrimination and reasonable 
accommodation. This issue is considered below. 
However, there remains an aspect to the EEA's structure, discussed below, that 
compromises the potency of both tools in the context of disability and 'neutral' job-
qualifications. The EEA's indirect discrimination provision is intended to capture the 
13°Citing a submission made to the B. Hepple, M. Coussey and T. Choudhury, Equality: A New 
Framework, Report of the Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK AntiDiscrimination 
Legislation (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2000) p.31. 
131 See below for discussion. 
132 J. Baker eta!, Equality: From 111e01y to Action (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2004) p.l28. 
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imposition of a provision which puts persons with a particular disability at a particular 
disadvantage in respect of any aspect of the employment relationship as compared with 
other employees of their employer. A practical application of the Irish defmition in the 
disability context could be the imposition of a specific educational qualification for a 
position - for example, a Leaving Certificate - a neutral requirement which applies 
equally to all prospective employees. Prima facie, this requirement could be shown to 
operate to the disadvantage of individuals with certain learning disabilities who received 
segregated schooling which did not pursue this course of education. This practice could 
put them at a particular disadvantage as compared to other employees of the employer. 
However, where an employer could demonstrate that the requirement to possess a 
Leaving Certificate pursues a legitimate aim- namely, an objective measurement of 
required levels of competency in literacy and numerical skills - and the use of that 
certification is appropriate and necessary, then the certification requirement could be 
justified. The proportionality enquiry is fact specific and requires close consideration of 
the job specifications to see if the actual levels of competency required by the job could 
appropriately and necessarily be gauged only by this means of certification. If, in the 
context of the specific job, such a level of certification was not objectively necessary, or 
qualification could be measured by means of alternative criteria, then the employer's 
use of it would be indirectly discriminatory on the disability ground. 
One recent case before the Equality Tribunal raised the issue of indirect 
discrimination on the disability ground, and arguably, the question of the interaction 
between the indirect discrimination provisions and the duty to make reasonable 
accommodation. However, the Equality Officer managed to avoid a consideration of 
this latter point by relying on an alternative legislative provision. In Gony v Office of 
the Civil Service and Local Appointments Commissioners, 133 the complainant claimed 
direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of disability where the respondent 
refused to allow him to proceed in the competition for appointment to the grade of 
Executive Officer following a successful written examination because he had failed his 
Leaving Certificate English examination in 1990. In 1992, the complainant bad been 
diagnosed with a specific learning disability akin to dyslexia. 134 The complainant had 
participated in an open competition for admission to the Civil Service and he perfonned 
sufficiently well in order to proceed further with the competition. When he informed 
133 DEC - E2005-038. 
134 The complainant's disability remained undiagnosed until the two years after his examinations. 
Following his diagnosis with dyslexia, he asked the Department of Education to review his 
scripts, however, all scripts had been destroyed and reassessment was not possible. 
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the respondent that he did not possess the required Leaving Certificate result, he was 
deemed ineligible to proceed any further. The complainant argued that he was, per 
section 16, fully competent and capable of undertaking the core competencies identified 
for the job subject to the provision of a minimum reasonable accommodation in relation 
to the presentation of written material.135 He argued that the insistence on a pass in 
Leaving Certificate English, given his dyslexia, was indirect discrimination. The policy 
applied to all prospective employees, but it operated to the disadvantage of the 
complainant compared to someone without dyslexia and in practice could complied with 
by a substantially smaller proportion of employees who may have dyslexia or a related 
condition.136 Since he had already been successful in the Civil Service written 
admission tests, he argued that the requirement to pass Leaving Certificate English was 
not justified as being reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. 137 He further relied 
on section 16(3) which stipulates that a person with a disability shall be considered fully 
competent and capable of undertaking the duties of a position if, with the assistance of 
"special treatment", they would be so competent. An employer is obliged to do all that 
is reasonable to assist such a person by providing such special treatment. 
However, the respondent pointed to section 36 of the 1998 Act which states: 
Nothing in this Part ... shall make it unlawful to require, in relation to a 
particular post- (a) the holding of a specified educational, technical or 
professional qualification which is a Benerally accepted qualification in the 
State for posts of that description, ... 38 
(b) Nothing in this part shall make it unlawful for a body controlling the entry 
to, or carrying on of any profession, vocation or occupation to require a person 
carrying out or wishing to enter that profession, vocation or occupation to hold 
a specified educational, technical or other qualification which is appropriate to 
the circumstances. 139 
The Equality Officer identified the issue to be one of indirect discrimination and 
accepted that the respondent's practice could be indirectly discriminatory against 
135 Section 16 of the EEA, which is discussed in chapter five, provides that an individual with a 
disability shall not be considered other than fully competent and capable of carrying out the 
duties attached to a position if, with the assistance of a "reasonable accommodation" they would 
be so capable. 
136 The complainant was relying on the original definition of indirect discrimination in section 31 
of the EEA prior to its amendment by the Equality Act 2004. 
137 The complainant referred to the Canadian decision of Canada (Attorney General) v Green 
[2000) 4 FC 629 where the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal opined that otherwise non-
discriminatory tests had adverse consequences for those with dyslexia, and that the tests 
administered focused on the person's weakness and not on his or her ability to do the job. The 
complainant argued that this was similar to his situation in that the seemingly non-discriminatory 
f:ractice of insisting on a Leaving Certificate pass in English focused on his weak points. 
38 My emphasis. 
139 My emphasis. 
58 
persons with dyslexia in circumstances where necessary supports were not available 
when sitting the examination, unless it could be demonstrated to be reasonably 
justifiable. Despite this, the Equality Officer relied on section 36 of the Act and held 
that the Leaving Certificate examination was not anything other than a "generally 
accepted qualification in the State" for posts such as Executive Officer, and could not 
find it other than "appropriate" in the circumstances. She concluded, therefore that the 
requirement that a candidate have attained this level of education was not 
discriminatory. 
This case demonstrates that section 36 precludes some of the very enquiries 
demanded by the reasonable accommodation duty. Consequently, the Equality Officer 
did need to discuss the interplay between the reasonable accommodation duty and the 
indirect discrimination principle. In this scenario, the individualised, nuanced enquiry 
into the specifics of the disabled individual's circumstances as required by the 
reasonable accommodation duty did not take place. Section 16 requires an employer to 
do all that is reasonable to accommodate a disabled individual by providing special 
treatment or facilities which would allow the individual to demonstrate capability and 
competence for the position. Thus, the reasonable accommodation duty can assist those 
' otherwise' deemed incompetent for a position to become competent.140 The duty on 
the employer is to consider whether a reasonable accommodation would enable an 
individual to become so competent and this is core to the enquiry. However, in Gorry, 
this enquiry was deemed unnecessary because of the dictates of section 36. This section 
legitimates the Equality Officer's conclusion for it states that "Nothing in this Part shall 
make it unJawful to require ... qualifications generally accepted in the State." 
Historically, the Leaving Certificate has been (and remains) the holy grail for entry to 
the civil service and both the indirect discrimination principle and the reasonable 
accommodation duty are subject to the right of the employer to control entry 
qualifications for positions in this traditional manner. Interestingly, the policy of the 
Civil Service in this case does not sit comfortably with the government target of a 3% 
employment rate of disabled people in the public sector. Discussed in chapter six, this 
policy attempts to tackle the barriers to the increased employment of disabled people. It 
specifically mentions that certain educational requirements (for example the Leaving 
Certificate or equivalent formal qualifications) may be less frequently held by disabled 
140 The candidate here had already demonstrated competency for the position by performing 
sufficiently well in the written examination test for entry to the Civil Service. 
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people. Consequently, it urges public sector employers to examine whether there are 
suitable alternative means of assessing job suitability and performance. 
Putting aside the incongruence between the target program and the civil 
service's approach in Gorry, the decision illustrates the inability of the EEA to fully 
tackle practices which indirectly discriminate against disabled individuals, particularly 
when it comes down to the issue of'legitimate' qualifications. Even if the qualification 
standard remains justifiable under the indirect discrimination principle, the question 
remains whether it ought to have been analysed under the reasonable accommodation 
duty. Gorry provides an example of a prima facie indirectly discriminatory job 
specification which did not have to be justified because of section 36. It also remained 
untouched by the core enquiry demanded by the individualised reasonable 
accommodation duty. It demonstrates once again, the inability of the legislation to 
tackle the systemic disadvantage endured by disabled individuals. 141 The relationship 
between indirect discrimination and reasonable accommodation at EU level is discussed 
below. 
Reasonable Accommodation and Indirect Discrimination 
While the Gorry decision turned on the interpretation of a different statutory provision, 
it raises an interesting issue, which is the relationship between indirect discrimination, 
the justification defence and the duty to make reasonable accommodation. Specifically, 
the point at issue is whether a neutral practice or condition which is found to be prima 
facie indirectly discriminatory against a group of disabled people, can be offset by the 
requirement to provide "special treatment or faci lities" to a disabled individual by way 
of reasonable accommodation. 
The Framework Directive provides that a provision, criterion or practice will 
amount to indirect discrimination where 
it would put persons having a particular disability ... at a particular 
disadvantage unless i) [it is] objectively justified by a legitimate aim, or (ii) as 
regards persons with a particular disability ... the employer ... is obliged to 
[make a 'reasonable accommodation'] in order to eliminate the disadvantages 
entailed by such provision, criterion or practice. 142 
141 This is an example ofYoung's thesis that discrimination law falls to get to grip with the 
unchallenged institutional structures of labour. Young argues that non-discrimination 
frameworks ignores wider questions surrounding injustice in the definition of positions, 
admission to them, and what it takes to be qualified for a position. See I.M. Young, supra n. 59 
p,p.200-202. 
42 Article 2(2)(b)(ii) of the Framework Directive. 
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One reading of Article 2(2)(b) suggests that provided the employer provides effective 
accommodation to a disabled employee, the employer will be entitled to maintain the 
provision which puts disabled people more generally at a particular disadvantage. This 
is problematic. Thus, an employer can continue to apply the indirectly discriminatory 
practice against the group, as long as the employer offsets the disadvantage accruing to 
the specific individual with a disability by way of a reasonable accommodation. Thus, 
it suggests that in the context of the example used above, (putting section 36 aside) the 
desirability for a minimum level of certification could be retained despite being prima 
facie discriminatory against a certain category of disabled persons, if when presented 
with a particular disabled individual, the individual could be reasonably accommodated 
through alternative assessment measures. This will apply even if the employer would 
not have otherwise been able to provide objective justification for the provision, 
criterion or practice. As Whittle comments, one effect of the Directive's approach "is to 
remove any group benefits that may have otherwise accrued from a successful action in 
this regard". 143 De Schutter adds that these " [a]d-hoc, individualised compensation 
measures risk becoming substitutes for wider scale modifications especially in the built 
environment or the organisation of work ... " .144 In this sense then, the individualised 
reasonable accommodation provision could allow the continuation of instances of 
indirect discrimination against disabled people generally. 
Equality of Results 
Under an equality of results understanding it is not the fairness of the procedure or the 
competition which is considered, but the actual distribution of resources or rights. In 
this sense, equality of results presents a challenge to the universal, symmetrical 
conception of equal treatment. Whilst the latter formulation is concerned with 
procedural fairness in terms of the even application of rules and distinctions, (once this 
is done, the results take care of themselves) equality of results has been described as 
moving towards a fairer distribution of burdens or benefits. Any model of equality 
predicated on equality of results theory recognises that the under-representation of 
disadvantaged groups in particular occupations and sectors is a symptom of inequality 
143 R. Whittle, supra n.ll9 p.31 0. 
144 0. De Schutter, "Reasonable Accommodations and Positive Obligations" in C. Gooding and 
A Lawson, Disability Equality in Europe From The01y to Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005) 35 p.63. 
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of opportunity prior to market entry: this fact of under-representation represents an 
inequality in the take up of opportunities. 
Equality of results is not a unitary concept. Fredman delineates its application in 
three ways. 145 The first approach focuses on the impact of apparently equal treatment 
on the individual. Where the equal treatment principle is breached, the non-
discrimination structure provides a remedy for the individual but does not result in any 
proportionate decrease in the disadvantage to the group to which the individual belongs. 
The second is concerned with the results on a group (e.g. women, or other minorities), 
but as Fredman points out, the aim here is diagnostic in that it exposes the obstacles to 
participation as opposed to implementing an outcome pattern. She uses the example of 
the low numbers of female airline pilots which on equality of results theory raises a 
presumption of discrimination. If the reason for this exclusion is based on the 
assumption that women do not make good pilots, then the inequality of results has 
demonstrated discrimination. If it is due to the fact that there are not enough trained 
women, then despite the inequality of results, there is no discrimination. Consequently, 
the third and strongest form of equality of results seeks to ensure an equal outcome, 146 
that is, an outcome which is measurable at the end of the process and which 
demonstrates that the unequal burden of disadvantage has been tackled. 
Equal outcome can be described as achieving levels of parity between 
marginalized and non-marginalised groups in terms of access to and the distribution of 
economic, educational, cultural, political and other benefits. Equal outcome is regarded 
as the strongest conceptualisation of equality of results. It aims to redistribute resources 
and opportunities to traditionally disadvantaged groups and thus to improve the position 
of such groups relative to the power holding groups in society. The theory behind such 
intervention is based on the lingering effects of past discrimination, continued 
subordination because of a devalued position, and a concern for distributive justice. 
Equality of outcome is not concerned with the existence or proof of discriminatory 
factors, 147 but rather focuses on alleviating the under-representation of minority groups 
across a workplace or society. Barnard and Hepple argue that indirect discrimination 
can be viewed as results orientated in the first and second sense, but that it falls down 
when it comes to the strongest point of equality of results. 148 This is because of the 
justification defence and the operation of the principle within the confines of 
145 S. Fredman, supra n.25 p.ll. 
146 See C. Barnard and B. Hepple supra n.l4 p.564. 
147 s dn . Fre 1an, supra n.25 p.l3. 
148 Ibid. 
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antidiscrimination law 's enforcement system, which means that the outcome is often 
compensation and always not an actual removal of the original unequal burden endured 
by the members of the complainant's group. 
The strongest concept of equality of results is not attainable by way of 
traditional non-discrimination precepts. It requires the adoption of measures that move 
beyond the employment sphere. This is in recognition of the fact that inequality of 
outcome stems from disadvantages that occur beyond the marketplace. The most 
expansive view of equality of results is the preferential treatment of the minority group. 
However, there are less controversial means of pursuing equality outcome objectives, 
such as preferential training courses, targeted hiring or aggressive outreach programs.149 
Equality in outcome does not, however, insist on parity in numbers. Rather, a balance is 
sought which reflects the spread of places and opportunities among members of 
minority groups in proportion to their position in a particular workplace or society. As 
Fredman comments, "it is usually not equality but fairness or balance which is 
required".150 Positive action programs are designed to promote a better representation 
of groups in a workplace, and therefore seek to address the issue of access to education 
and training initiatives as well as goods, facilities , services and ultimately employment. 
The issue whether the reasonable accommodation duty and the positive action duty 
within the Framework Directive and the Irish legislation are a formulation of equality of 
results in dealt with in chapter six. In many ways, the policy implications of the limited 
version of equality of results theory differ little from those of the equality of opportunity 
theory. Both look to correcting disadvantages arising from the work environment, such 
as unsuitable training modules, inaccessible workstations, and inappropriate tools. 151 
Chapter six also discusses how undue concentration on equality of outcomes 
may in itself be misleading. Equality of results can be reduced to a numbers game; thus 
the increase in members of disadvantaged groups in grades, sectors or workplaces 
reflects an equality of results methodology, but it may be achieved at a particular cost. 
For example, it may be merely indicative of an increasingly successful assimilationist 
policy, which operates to benefit the most advantaged members of the disadvantaged 
class. However, sometimes an increase in the numbers of traditionally disadvantaged 
groups into a particular sector may coincide with a decrease in the status or pay of that 
sector.152 Moreover, the focus on results may detract from the reform of institutional 
149 See infra for further discussion. 
150 S. Fredman, supra n.25 p. l3. 
151 L. Waddington, supra n.ll p.65. 
152 S. Fredman, supra n.25 p.l3 
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structures which generate unequal burdens and disadvantages. These points are picked 
up and developed in chapter six. 
Conclusion 
The notion of formulating problems of discrimination endured by disabled individuals 
within legal structures has powerful resonance. It gives legal expression to the idea that 
there is a legally enforceable response to the unnecessary exclusion of a certain 
proportion of disabled people from employment. Moreover, this departure brings 
greater visibility to disabled people and their struggle for inclusion: it brings the 
problem of disability out of the private sphere and into public discourse. The impact of 
disability non-discrimination law in this sense is enormous. 
That said, what remains to be assessed in the following chapters is whether the 
overall operation of the disability non-discrimination system as assessed in the two 
jurisdictions, move beyond the traditional criticisms accorded to non-discrimination law 
generally. The question is whether the structure of the disability discrimination norms 
represents a truly transformative departure. Direct discrimination bas an important role 
to play in deconstructing the impact of stigma and stereotyping on disabled people's 
chances in the workplace. Facially neutral practices are challenged through the 
proscription on indirect discrimination, which remain, however, justifiable. Many of the 
exclusionary barriers faced by disabled individuals can be justified on grounds, which 
may be job-related, but are not neutral to disability and its impact. Where such criteria 
remain legitimate, certain groups of individuals- such as disabled people -by virtue of 
their prior disadvantage, may fmd it impossible to comply. While it is arguable that the 
individualised accommodation duty could require employers to think of job 
qualifications necessary for job performance and alternative means of certification or 
qualification, section 36 of the EEA expressly limits the utility of the indirect 
discrimination provision in the disability context when it comes to job certification and 
qualifications. This demonstrates, as Fredman points out, the vicious circle which arises 
in situations where qualifications are necessary for a job, but the absence of 
qualifications is due to past or ongoing discrimination.153 
Commentators have highlighted indirect discrimination and reasonable 
accommodation of religious practices, disabilities or pregnancy as legal articulations of 
a substantive version of equality, yet the scope of these articulations still remain far 
153 S. Fredman, supra n. 25 p.ll2. 
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short of a substantive standard of equality of outcomes. This "branding" of these 
concepts as substantive visions of equality is something of an overstatement.154 Ellis 
argues that the indirect discrimination principle is "essentially ... non-dynamic [and] 
non-redistributive .... it seeks to take note of the hidden obstacles facing protected 
groups of people and to set them aside where they are irrelevant to the matter in hand, 
[but] it does nothing to dismantle those obstacles or to change customarily stereotyped 
roles."155 Thus, even if proven, the remedy is often individual compensation rather than 
an absolute duty to eradicate the offending requirement. 156 Therefore, indirect 
discrimination is not concerned with the idea of equality of results in its strongest sense. 
It may speak to notions of equality of opportunity, 157 in that it is concerned with 
eradicating barriers with disparate impact, but not all offending barriers need be 
removed. It merely seeks to remove particular barriers, and leaves many job-related 
criteria, despite their disparate impact unchallenged. 
Limitations also stem from the principle's operation within the pre-defined 
limits of the non-discrimination system. It is adversarial. It over-relies on negative 
enforcement methods and is dependent upon individuals conceiving a wrong and being 
willing to pursue this wrong by way of litigation. These limitations of the anti-
discrimination enforcement model are continued, and appear exacerbated, in the 
disability context. In order for the legislation to be triggered, an objectionable practice 
must occur. Thus, even blatant discrimination goes unchallenged unless an aggrieved 
individual is in a position to pursue a case. This process unduly burdens individuals 
who may already be in vulnerable situations. As Walsh laments, despite all the appeals 
to the transfom1ative potential and the symbolic effect of outlawing discrimination 
across a range of grounds, the structure of the non-discrimination cannot be described as 
preventative and transformative. 158 Discriminatory practices are endemic and 
repetitious. A quick perusal of the case load of the tribunal system demonstrates this. 
There is a considerable degree of repetition in the types of cases pursued under the 
legislation. 
The difference in the disability context is the duty to make reasonable 
accommodation, the mechanics of which are discussed further in chapter five. The 
154 As Barnard and Hepple eventually conclude at the end of their article. C. Barnard and B. 
Hepple, "Substantive Equality" (2000) 59 Cambridge Law Journal 562. 
I SS E. Ellis, EU Antidiscrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 p.J 15 
1s6 S. Fredman, supra n.25 p.ll5. Though where an employer does not eradicate the practice, it 
risks similar claims in the future. 
157 !bid. 
158 J. Walsh, Submission on the Equality Bill, (Equality Coalition, March 2004). Paper on file. 
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question remains: to what extent does the duty to make reasonable accommodation 
pursue substantive goals of equality beyond the narrow version of the non-
discrimination system? This chapter has set out the traditional pre-existing limits of the 
vision of equality within liberal legalism' s conception of anti-discrimination orthodoxy. 
The narrative now turns to the constitutional plane where judicial conceptions of 
equality and attitudes to disability have been instrumental in the operation of, and 
approach to, the reasonable accommodation duty. It reverts back to the statutory 
structure in chapter four by focusing on a distinct issue in the disability context, the 
threshold issue which confines the benefit of non-discrimination protection to a 
particular class of individual. Foil owing an assessment of these issues, the thesis reverts 
to the issue as to whether the disability discrimination system challenges and moves 
beyond the existing non-discrimination paradigm in chapter six. 
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Chapter Three 
Disabling Discourse, Judicial Attitudes and Constitutional 
Protection 
Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the limitations associated with the civil rights model of 
disability discrimination pioneered by ADA, and whether these limitations have been 
replicated in Ireland 's EEA. In this chapter, the focus switches to constitutional 
obstacles to the effective operation of disability equality provisions in both of these 
jurisdictions. The themes which emerge in tlus chapter include: the precarious position 
of the reasonable accommodation duty in constitutional orders with formal equality 
guarantees; the related point of the poor relationship between equality guarantees and 
more 'substantive' constitutional rights and norms; a general sense of judicial 
ambivalence to the emerging discourses on the meaning of disability and the rights of 
disabled people; and an unsophisticated commitment to traditional liberal means of 
apportioning costs based on negative liberties of contract and property. 
A major theme in equality and non-discrimination law concerns costs. It is the 
hidden but powerful agenda behind much of equality law .1 In the context of disability 
discrimination law, the cost agenda, far from being hidden, has remained firmly to the 
fore. This is because where the aim of disability discrimination legislation is to prevent 
employment discrimination against disabled persons arising from the institutional and 
physical barriers contributing to their unemployment, then the legislation faces head on 
the issue of who pays for the removal of those barriers. The legislative history of the 
ADA and the EEA demonstrates that a major concern of both legislatures was the 
elimination of barriers to the full societal participation of disabled people.2 The United 
States Congress-commissioned report by the National Council on the Handicapped, 
Toward Independence, led to the introduction of the bill that would eventually become 
the ADA.3 It recommended an express provision placing a duty on employers to make 
1 S. Fredman, "Disability Equality: A Challenge to the Existing Anti-Discrimination Paradigm" 
In A. Lawson and C, Gooding (eds.) Disability Rights in Europe: From The01y to Practice 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) 199, p.208. 
2 See chapter one for report on the purpose section of the ADA. 
3 National Council on the Handicapped, Toward Independence: An Assessment of Federal Laws 
and Programs Affecting Persons with Disabilities - With Legislative Recommendations 
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"reasonable accommodation'"' for a person's disability. In a similar vein, though some 
time later in Ireland, the Commission on the Status of People with Disabilities5 
recommended the introduction of legislation outlawing all discrimination against 
disabled people. It recommended imposing an obligation on public and private bodies 
to make reasonable accommodation in favour of disabled people.6 Implicit in both 
reports' recommendations is that the proposed laws would transfer some of the costs of 
integrating disabled people from government financed sources to employers. The 
burdens associated with the costs of tackling discriminatory practices has tended to 
focus on a single actor- namely the employer- to the exclusion of the perspective of 
both the affected individual and the tax-payer. Thus, it has been less frequently 
recognised that prejudice, animus and stereotypical assumptions towards the abilities 
and talents of disabled people "signals a market failure that should be redressed to 
everyone's material advantage - including that of the taxpayer",7 the individual and the 
employer. Because the interaction between impairment and the social and built 
environment disables certain individuals, a proper understanding of non-discrimination 
in the disability context obliges employers to take impairments positively into account 
and make reasonable accommodation for it.8 In the context of disability, the concept of 
equality is bounded by the criteria attached to the accommodation duty. This includes 
issues such as the 'reasonableness' of the accommodation and whether its provision 
may impact on an employer's business operation so as to give rise to an "undue 
hardship",9 a cost other than "nominal" 10 or a "disproportionate burden". 11 These 
standards are discussed at different points in this thesis. 
(Washington, 1986) cited in R. Burgdorf Jr., Disability Discrimination in Employment Law 
(Washington, Bureau ofPublic Affairs, 1995). 
4 Discussed in detail in chapter five. 
5 See Report of the Commission on the Status ofPeople with Disabilities, A Strategy for Equality 
(Dublin: Government Stationery Office, 1996) which submitted 402 recommendations for 
improving the lives of disabled people in all aspects of Irish society to Government. 
6 Commission on the Status of People with Disabilities, supra u.S para. 2.14-2. I 6. For comment 
on the Disabilities Bil12001 seeS. Quinlivan, "The Disabilities Bill2001" (2002) 7 Bar Review 
37. 
7 G. Quinn, "The European Social Charter and EU Anti-Discrimination Law in the Field of 
Disability: Two Gravitational Fields with One Common Purpose" in G. DeBurca, and B. De 
Witte (eds.) Social Rights in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 279, 300. 
8 S. Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p.l29 who argues 
that a substantive conception of equality suggests that responsibility for correcting disadvantage 
does not rest with those to whom fault can be attributed. Thus, all those who benefit from the 
existing structure should be expected to bear part of the cost of the remedy. 
9 This is the ADA standard, discussed in chapter five. 
10 This was the standard oflreland's EEA up until July 1998 also discussed in chapter five. 
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In Ireland, the legitimacy of imposing the 'burden' of disability equality upon 
employers was originally and successfully challenged at the constitutional level. 
Disability non-discrimination protections in Ireland have had, it is fair to say, a difficult 
birth. 12 Before the discussion goes any further, it is necessary to set out a brief 
chronological account of the course which the reasonable accommodation duty has 
chartered in Irish law.13 The first Employment Equality Bill was introduced in 1996. 
Following its passage through both Houses of the Oireachtas, the Bill was sent to the 
President for signature. However, the then President, Mary Robinson, exercised her 
discretion under Article 26 of the Constitution and referred the entire Bill to the 
Supreme Court to test its compatibility with the Constitution. 14 This decision is the 
subject of this chapter's analysis. In brief, the constitutional problem, according to the 
Supreme Court, was that the disability provisions of the Employment Equality Bill 1996 
" ... attempts (sic) to transfer the cost of solving one of society's problems on to a 
particular group ... it requires [an employer] to bear the cost of all special treatment or 
facilities which the disabled person may require to carry out the work". 15 The Bill was 
held to be incompatible with the Constitution and it failed to reach the statute book. An 
amended version of the anti-discrimination template, which included a significantly 
watered down version of the reasonable accommodation duty, was tabled as the 
Employment Equality Bill 1997. Briefly put, this introduced a requirement on 
employers to do all that was reasonable to provide special treatment to a disabled 
employee, unless its provision would amount to a cost, other than a nominal cost on 
employers .. 6 This provision became law in the Employment Equality Act 1998 and its 
operation is discussed in chapter five. The Employment Equality Act 1998 
11 This is the standard of the Framework Employment Directive set out in Regulation 5 (Council 
Directive 2000178, OJ 2000 L306/ l6), subsequently transposed into Irish law by the Equality Act 
2004. 
12 0. Smith, "Disability, Discrimination and Employment: A Never-ending Legal Story" (2001) 
23 Dublin University Law Journal 148. 
13 See generally, 0. Smith, Ibid. 
14 Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Employment Equality Bi/11996 [1997] 2 IR 321. 
Pursuant to Article 26 of the Constitution, the President may, following consultation with the 
Council of State, refer a Bill passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas to the Supreme Court 
which is required to pronounce on whether the Bill or any provision of the Bill is repugnant to 
the Constitution. There is no equivalent to Article 26 in the US Constitution. Some state 
constitutions contain provisions that authorise their legislators or executives to request from their 
Supreme Courts "advisory opinions" regarding the constitutionality of proposed legislation. 
Since 1793, the US Supreme Court has consistently refused to issue advisory opinions. SeeP. 
Bator et al. The Federal Courts and the Federal System (Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 
1988), 65-6. 
15 Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Employment Equality Bill / 996 [ 1997] 2 IR 321, 367. 
16 This is a summary ofthe effect of section 16(3)(a)(c) EEA, discussed in chapter five. 
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subsequently required amendment in light of the standards laid down in the Framework 
Directive adopted at EU level. These amendments are contained within the Equality 
Act 2004 and are also discussed in chapter five. 
The chapter picks up on the constitutional discourse which surrounds 
reasonable accommodation as a principle of disability non-discrimination and its battle 
with competing, prior and more substantive, rights. It proceeds by outlining the Irish 
constitutional landscape in the context of the equality and private property guarantees. 
It then examines the disability provisions of the Employment Equality Bill 1996 and the 
Supreme Court's rejection of the reasonable accommodation mandate because of its 
unconstitutional interference with employer's private property rights. This will then be 
followed by a comparative constitutional assessment utilising the ADA and the 
American constitutional tradition. Despite enjoying a strong footing in the United 
States federal order, the ADA bas more recently witnessed constitutional encroachment 
on the reach of its provisions. 
The discussion in this chapter, which pursues a comparative constitutional 
perspective, is an important part of the narrative surrounding the introduction and the 
consequent transformative ambitions of the disability non-discrimination framework. 
What the chapter aims to uncover is the differences in terms of constitutional tradition, 
provision and interpretation between the two legislative schemes which shared similar 
provisions, yet suffered wholly disparate fates. It points out the barriers that exist on the 
constitutional plane to any normative alternative construct of disability and disability 
rights within legal discourse. The chapter contributes to the thesis presented here by 
demonstrating that the refonnulation of the equality norn1, discussed in chapter six, 
"implies constitutional change and attention to interactions between the formal political 
and legal contexts"." Consequently, it briefly introduces the Canadian equality 
provisions and jurisprudence, which provides a useful contrast from the formal models 
of equality operating within traditional equality before the law (Ireland) and equal 
protection (US) doctrines. 
Fundamental Rights in the Irish Constitution 
17 1. Baker et at, Equality From Themy To Action (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 
p.137. 
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Articles 40-44 of the Irish Constitution contain a large body of provisions collectively 
entitled 'Fundamental Rights'. They include many classic liberal rights: equality before 
the law, personal liberty, freedom of expression and assembly, freedom of association, 
family and education rights, property rights and freedom of religion. By contemporary 
standards, the list of rights expressly protected is incomplete. 18 However, this has been 
remedied by the recognition of a large body of 'unenumerated' personal rights under 
Article 40.3:9 Articles 40-44 have been an essential part of the mechanism of judicial 
review and have provided the basis for a number of significant decisions in Irish 
constitutional law. The judiciary has been demonstrably "active"20 and displayed 
considerable imagination in interpreting these provisions. However, it cannot be said 
that the same degree of judicial imagination has been applied to the equality provision. 
The Irish Equality Guarantee21 
Article 40.1 provides: 
All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law. 
This sba11 not be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments have due 
regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function. 
Despite the fact that Article 40.1 is a free-standing equality norm with a potentially 
broad scope, the provision has never been interpreted as a core norm.22 This weakness 
of Article 40.1 seems quite deliberate. The parliamentary material containing the 
debates on tbe Constitution's text indicate that its principal architect, Eamon De Valera, 
18 Bunreacht na hEireann (Constitution of Ireland) dates from 1937 and was devised earlier than 
the wave of modem constitutions adopted in Europe after the war. 
19 Article 40.3.1° states: The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by 
its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen. Article 40.3.2°: The State 
shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of 
injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name and property rights of every citizen. For an 
account of the extensive list ofunenumerated rights discovered by the senior judiciary as being 
inherent in Article 40.3., see J. Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland (3rd ed.) (Dublin: Roundball 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) Chapter 12. 
20 On the activism of the Irish senior judiciary, see D.G. Morgan, A Judgment Too Far? Judicial 
Activism and the Constitution Undercurrent Series (Cork: Cork University Press, 2001). 
2 1 This overview draws heavily on M. Donnelly, S. Mullally and 0. Smith, Predicting the Impact 
of Policy: Gender Auditing as a Means of Assessing the Probable Impact of Policy Initiatives on 
Women: Country Report - Ireland (Liverpool: Feminist Legal Research Unit, University of 
Liverpool, 1999) pp. 64-69. 
22 As Whyte remarks:" ... it remains one of the more underused, and arguably undeveloped, 
principles in Irish constitutional jurisprudence". G. Whyte, "A Comment on the Constitution 
Review Group' s Proposals on Equality'' in R. Byrne and W. Duncan (eds.) Developments in 
Discrimination Law in Ireland and Europe (Dublin: lCEL, 1997) 93 , 93. 
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did not believe in the legitimacy of the concept of equal opportunities.23 The Irish 
judiciary has demonstrated a marked reluctance to rely on the guarantee, preferring to 
invoke other constitutional rights instead. This reluctance has permeated throughout 
the constitutional jurisprudence on fundamental rights to date, with the consequence that 
many questions as to the precise scope of Article 40.1 remain unanswered. 
There are many limitations to Article 40.1. First, the right-holders under Article 
40.1 are individuals. Collective or legal persons, such as trade unions, are not covered 
by the guarantee. At present, the guarantee applies only to individual citizens, and only 
to citizens as "human persons". The phrase "as human persons" has been used by the 
courts to restrict the material scope of the equality guarantee. In Quinn's Supermarket v 
Attorney General/4 it was held that the guarantee refers to human persons for what they 
are in themselves, rather than to any lawful activities, trades or pursuits which they may 
engage in or follow. In the most recent and comprehensive review of the Constitution, 
25 the Review Group called for the deletion of the phrase "as human persons",26 but the 
provision persists. Further, in Murtagh Properties Ltd v Cleary21 it was held that the 
constitutional protection of equality related only to the "essential attributes" of citizens 
as persons, those features which make them human beings, and had nothing to do with 
their trading activities or with the conditions on which they are employed. However, 
there are signs that this interpretation is beginning to lose favour with the judiciary.28 
Hogan and Whyte suggest that the Court "now sees Article 40.1 as having a much wider 
field of application than previously thougbt".29 While there has been no exhaustive 
23 De Valera believed that inequalities persist in nature. "Inequalities must exist in any organised 
society ... I say that equality of opportunity is not possible". 67 Dail Debates 1590ff. 
24 [1972] IR 1. 
25 Report of the Constitution Review Group (Dublin: Government Stationery Office, 1996). The 
Constitution Review in the mid-1990s was intended to provide a systematic and comprehensive 
examination of the Constitution in a two-part process. The first part consisted of the production 
and publication of a report by a government appointed expert group, which was then to be 
considered by an all-party Oireachtas committee. This report draws on comparative 
constitutional discourse and considers it in the particular context oflreland's political and legal 
tradition. lt sets out a number of recommendations for constitutional change. It also includes a 
number of minority recommendations, which evidences the particular views of individual 
members of the expert group where consensus was not obtained. Ultimately, it rests with the 
government of the day to determine whether and to what extent the process of reform should be 
initiated, with the final say resting, necessarily, with the electorate. To date, none of the 
ftovernments since the report 's publication have moved to implement its recommendations. 
6 Report of the Constitution Review Group (Dublin: Government Stationery Office, 1996) 
r-224. 
7 [1972) IR 330. 
28 See generally G. Hogan and G. Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution (3rd. ed.) (Dublin: 
Butterworths, 1994) p. 723 and G. Whyte, supra n. 22 pp. I 01-1 05. 
29 G. Hogan and G. Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution (41h ed.) (Dublin: Butterworths, 2002) 
p.l343. 
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definition of the essential attributes of the human person under this Article, the Supreme 
Court has indicated that classifications based on sex, race, language, religious or 
political opinions are presumptively proscribed by Article 40.1.30 
The second sentence of Article 40.1 specifies "acceptable" bases for the 
differential legislative treatment of persons. These "acceptable bases" for distinction are 
differences in "physical and moral capacity and social function". This reference to 
differences of social function has been particularly problematic for the gender equality 
agenda as the courts have used it to uphold legislation based on questionable 
stereotypes. 31 At the same time, the provision has never been used to promote positive 
equality rights for members of different disadvantaged groups. Nor was it considered as 
providing constitutional support for the introduction of the reasonable accommodation 
provision under the terms of Article 40.1, which permits "the State in its enactments to 
have due regard to differences in capacity". The Constitution Review Group 
recommended that this sentence be replaced by a more general provision: 
This shall not be taken to mean that the State may not have due regard to 
relevant differences.32 
However, there was nothing in this recommendation to suggest that the State should be 
bound by a positive vision of equality to safeguard the rights of individuals to enjoy the 
equal benefit of the law through the accommodation of individual differences.33 
The State's obligation to respect equality applies to the exercise of state 
authority. It would seem that all arms of government are bound by this obligation: the 
administration, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. It remains unclear 
whether the obligation is capable of direct enforcement against persons or bodies other 
than the State. While it is generally presumed that constitutions regulate relations 
between the individual and the State, the Irish judiciary has interpreted a number of the 
fundamental rights provisions within the Constitution as being capable of"horizontal 
application". In a number of cases, the courts have imposed constitutional obligations 
on non-state actors and awarded damages for breach of constitutional rights against such 
30 Re Article 26 and the Employment Equality Bi/11996 [1997] 2 IR 321 , 347. 
31 See Norris v Attorney General [1984] IR 36 (sexual differences between men and women were 
invoked to justify the criminalisation of male homosexuality) and Dennehy v Minister for Social 
Welfare Unreported High Court 261b July, 1984 (differential treatment of deserted wives and 
deserted husbands sanctioned because of women' s different social function). 
32 Report of the Constitution Review Group supra n.25 p. 229. 
33 Contrast the Irish equality guarantee with more expansive equality protections such as section 
15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The latter approach is discussed below. 
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actors.34 While the courts have generally taken the view that the law of tort provides 
adequate protection for personal rights, in the absence of a common law or statutory 
right of action, an individual may sue directly for a breach of a constitutional right. The 
majority of these cases have come under the rubric of the State's duty, under Article 
40.3, to "defend and vindicate" the personal rights of its citizens. As noted above, 
whether or not the equality guarantee is capable of horizontal application remains 
unclear. The possibility has not been ruled out, but given the Irish judiciary's reluctance 
to invoke Article 40.1, and while there still exists a measure of uncertainty as to the 
precise scope and meaning of the equality guarantee, it appears that such an 
interpretation may not be acceptable to the present judiciary. 35 
Much of the reluctance to invoke the equality guarantee can be explained by the 
underlying theory of equality on which the judiciary presumes it to be based and the 
poor relation it has to prior values or more substantive rights. This limited approach was 
explicitly endorsed by the majority of the Constitution Review Group, despite appeals to 
a broader conceptualisation of equality.36 Whyte neatly sums up the Review Group's 
rejection of any constitutional obligation on the State to ensure respect for equality by 
parties such as individuals or private bodies: its approach implicitly endorses "the view 
that the obligation to respect the principle of equality cannot restrict the autonomy of the 
individual or fundamental rights such as freedom of association or expression" .37 
Indeed, as is discussed below, the fundamental rights capable of trumping the equality 
provision were judicially expanded to include rights over private property. The majority 
of the Review Group rejected equality as a "core norm" on the basis of separation of 
powers concerns, arguing that this was "essentially [a] political argument for an 
optimum degree of socio-economic rather than strictly equality before the law .... the 
former is a policy issue appropriate to be addressed by Government and the Oireachtas 
34 In Meskell v CIE [1973] IR 121, pp.l32-l33 Walsh J. remarked that constitutional rights could 
be protected or enforced by action, "even though such action may not fit into any of the ordinary 
forms of action in either common law or equity". 
35 J. Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland (2nd ed.) (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1992) p. 379. 
36 See Report of the Constitution Review Group supra n.25 at p. 221 where it is stated that 
"[e]quality is, however, more than the absence of discrimination whether direct or indirect [Its 
attainment] is not solely a matter of individual effort. It involves the development of strategies 
which would actively promote a civil society based on principles of social, economic and 
political inclusion. This embraces the taking of positive measures to enable persons to overcome 
disadvantage and to afford them real equality of opportunity; and it is important to recognise that 
such measures do not constitute discrimination but rather promote equality." However, this 
statement is nothing beyond simple political rhetoric given the subsequent reaffirmation of a 
p
7
urely formal or "process" approach to the equality guarantee by the Group's report. 
G. Whyte, supra n. 22 p.97. 
74 
rather than by a constitutional assertion".38 Unfortunately, the Review Group did not 
feel it necessary to expand upon what precisely is meant by the obviously more limited 
concept of"equality before the law". As consolation for failing to include a description 
of equality as a "full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms" 39 and for refusing 
to extend the principle of equality to private action, the Review Group alluded to the 
proposition that the silence of the Constitution does not prevent the Oireachtas from 
pursuing such objectives in ordinary legislation. However, this silence ultimately 
proved costly for the 'ordinary' statutory regime of equality in employment in favour of 
disabled people and it illustrates the core weakness of the Article 40.1 guarantee. It 
demonstrates that there is no substantive equality norm on which to base the idea of 
equality inherent in the accommodation of difference. Given that the substantive 
constitutional right of private property was invoked by the Supreme Court in its 
assessment of the disability provisions of the Employment Equality Bill under Article 
26, the judicial approach to the property provisions of the Constitution is discussed 
below. 
The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights in Ireland 
The protection of private property lies at the heart of the fundamental rights provisions 
of the Irish Constitution, the text of which offers express protection in two separate 
provisions. First, there is Article 43, set out below. 
Article 43.1.1 °: The State acknowledges that man, in virtue of his rational being, 
has the right, antecedent to positive law, to the private ownership of external 
goods. 
43.1.2°: The State accordingly guarantees to pass no law attempting to abolish 
the right of private ownership or the general right to transfer, bequeath, and 
inherit property. 
43 .2.1 °: The State recognises, however, that the exercise of the rights mentioned 
in the foregoing provisions of this Article ought, in civil society, to be regulated 
by the principles of social justice. 
38 Report of the Constitution Review Group supra n. 25 at p. 223. Thus, reinforcing the 
traditional division between traditional civil rights and the social and economic counterparts. On 
the separation of powers argument and positive social rights for disabled people, see G. Quinn, 
"Effective Remedies and Other Challenges- An International Legal Perspective" available at 
http://ww.nda.ie. Last accessed December 3, 2003. See also G. Quinn, supra n.7 for a 
discussion on the role of the non-discrimination right in making a bridge between substantive 
equality and the enjoyment of positive social rights. 
39 As is the case with the equality guarantee in the Constitution of South Africa. See G. Vogt, 
"Non-Discrimination in South Africa under the new Constitution" (2000) Public Law 187. 
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43.2.2°: The State, accordingly, may as occasion requires delimit by law the 
exercise of the said rights with a view to reconciling their exercise with the 
exigencies of the common good. 
Second, by virtue of Article 40.3.2°, the Constitution specifically strives to protect from 
unjust attack and, in case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name and 
property rights of every citizen. However, difficulties in constitutional adjudication arise 
in the contrast between the evidently finn protection accorded to property under Article 
40.3.2° and the yielding principles of the common good and social justice contained 
within Article 43. 
Article 43 permits the governmental regulation of property rights in accordance 
with the principles of social justice and the common good. The need for this type of 
regulation in a democratically functioning society has been spelled out by the 
Constitution Review Group: 
If the State is to function, property rights must yield to a wide variety of 
countervailing interests, among them the redistribution of wealth, the protection 
of the environment, the necessity for consumer protection. This is turn means 
that the State must have extensive taxation powers, powers of compulsory 
acquisitions and a general capacity to regulate (and even in some cases to 
extinguish) property rights.40 
The general consensus among Irish constitutional commentators is that the text of these 
Articles, their relationship with each other and their consequent judicial interpretation is 
"replete with difficulties".41 The wording of both Articles is open to subjective judicial 
appraisal as phrases such as "unjust attack", "principles of social justice" and the 
"exigencies of the common good" allow much room for judicial manoeuvres.42 While 
there was considerable concern expressed about the Constitution's property provisions, 
Hogan points out that there were so many irreconcilable textual judicial interpretations 
on the exigencies of Articles 43 and 40.3.2° that a new methodology - that of 
proportionality43 - was adopted in order to bring "an objective structure and order in an 
area where reliance on the text alone offered a wholly subjective appraisal".44 
40 Report of the Constitution Review Group supra n. 25 p.357. 
41 G. Hogan, "The Constitution, Property Rights and Proportionality" (1997) xxxii Irish Jurist 
373,375. See also R. Keane, "Land Use, Compensation and the Community" (1983) 18/rish 
Jurist 23, referring to the "unattractive language" and "tortured syntax" of Article 43 and D. 
Barrington "Private Property under the Irish Constitution" ( 1973) 8 Irish Jurist (n.s.) 1, 2; "The 
wording of Article 43 is certainly difficult. It may, however, be as simply as the complexity of 
its subject-matter allows". 
42 See generally, J. Casey, supra n.35, chapter 18. 
43 The proportionality concept is an often used tool of the European Court ofHuman Rights. 
When state action is being tested for compliance with Convention guarantees, the Court looks to 
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In Re Article 26 and the Employment Equality Bill, the Supreme Court directed 
considerable attention to the constitutional text, yet, as Hogan points out, the case was 
decided on proportionality principles.45 I argue here that its actual (mis)use of 
proportionality reasoning in that case failed to counter any judicial subjectivity in the 
reconciliation of the terms of the Employment Equality Bill 1996 and the property 
provisions of the Constitution. Moreover, a more nuanced engagement with the 
statutory provisions and the proportionality principle could have saved the Bill from 
constitutional failure. Tllis point becomes particularly clear when the approach is 
compared to the Supreme Court's methodology in another Article 26 referral decision in 
the context of planning legislation.46 In order to provide foundation for this assertion, I 
will flrst outline the disability provisions of the Employment Equality Billl996. 
The Disability Provisions of the Employment Equality Bill1996 
The Employment Equality Bill 1996 was the legislative product of a commitment in the 
social partnershlp agreement, the Programme for Economic and Social Progress 
(PESP) 1993-199647, to expand the State's anti-discrimination legislative programme. 
The Bill outlawed direct and indirect discrimination in employment on the basis of nine 
grounds,48 including disability. In addition, and following international disability 
discrimination statutes, the Bill made provision for the concept of"reasonable 
accommodation". 
Section 16(3) of the Bill stated that a person with a disability would not be 
regarded "otherwise than as fully competent to undertake, and fully capable of 
undertaking, any duties if, with the assistance of special treatment or facilities, that 
person would be so fully competent or capable". Then, subject to certain provisos, an 
employer was required to do all that was reasonable to accommodate a disabled 
applicant or employee by making provision for such treatment or facilities. Section 
35(4) went on to stipulate that discrimination would not be taken to have occurred 
the legitimacy of the aim of the contested measure and whether there is a reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved. For 
discussion oftbe concept of proportionality, see generally G. De Burca, "The Principle of 
Proportionality and its Application in EC Law" (1993) Yearbook of European Law 111 and see 
infra for its application in an Irish context. 
44G. Hogan, supra n. 41 p.376. 
45 G. Hogan, ibid. p.387 text to fn.49 . 
46 Re Article 26 and the Planning and Development Bil/1999 [2000] IR 321. Discussed infra. 
47 (Dublin: Government Stationery Office, 1993) 
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where (a) a person needs special treatment or facilities in order satisfactorily to take part 
in a selection process or to undertake that employment; and (b) the employer does all 
that is reasonable to accommodate the needs of that person; [or where], having regard to 
the relevant circumstances (specified in ss.5) the cost of providing the treatment or 
facilities would give rise to an undue hardship. 
Section 35(5) of the Bill set out a number offactors relevant to the decision as 
to whether a reasonable accommodation may give rise to undue hardship. It outlined the 
following factors which were to be considered: 
(a) the nature of the treatment or facilities that would be required; 
(b) the cost of the treatment or facilities and the number of persons who would 
benefit from them; 
(c) the financial circumstances of the employer; 
(d) the disruption that would be caused by the provision of the treatment or 
facilities; and 
(e) the nature of any benefit or detriment which would accrue to any persons 
likely to be affected by the provision of the treatment or facilities. 
Thus, in a somewhat convoluted fashion, the Bill placed a duty on employers to 
provide reasonable accommodation to a newly protected class of worker - disabled 
people - unless the associated costs would give rise to an undue hardship on the 
employer. Somewhat surprisingly, it was the possible cumulative effect of these 
provisions that was found to be at odds with the property provisions of the 
Constitution.49 Before discussing the Supreme Court's findings in that case, for the 
purposes of clarity, I intend to outline the reach of the Constitution's property 
guarantees with which the Employment Equality Bill was ultimately competing. 
Judicial Interpretation of Articles 43 and 40.3.2° 50 
48 The nine discriminatory grounds are: gender, marital status, family status, age, disability, race, 
religion, sexual orientation and membership of the traveller community. 
49 l use the term surprising because most observers at the time were of the opinion that the then 
President, Mary Robinson, had section 37 {l) dealing with the extent to which religious run 
institutions could discriminate in order to maintain the religious ethos of the institution, in mind 
when she referred the Bill to the Supreme Court. (1997) 2 IR 321 pp.350-360 for the Court's 
treatment of this section. The actual outcome did not present a surprise in some quarters. See 
the submission made by the Commission on the Status of People with Disabilities to the 
Constitution Review Group, to the effect that the equality guarantee in the lrish Constitution 
might prove too weak to support the kind oflegislation needed to underpin the equal opportunity 
commitment in the disability context. Cited in G. Quinn and S. Quinlivan, ''Disability 
Discrimination: The Need to Amend the Employment Equality Act 1998 in light of the EU 
Framework Directive" in C. Costello and E. Barry, (eds.) Equality in Diversity: The New 
Equality Directives (Dublin: Irish Centre for European Law 2003) 213, p.225. 
50 Text to these articles is set out, supra. 
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By way of preliminaries, it is worth pointing out that the vast majority of constitutional 
cases concerning the property provisions deal with land use regulation, planning and 
development regulations, and rent restrictions. Therefore, the appearance of these 
guarantees in an Article 26 challenge to anti-discrimination legislation was a novel 
feature. 
As has been noted already, the precise relationship between Article 43 and 
Article 40.3.2° remains disputed: as Casey comments, "in hardly any branch of 
constitutional law has judicial opinion shown so much fluctuation".51 The uncertainties 
build up from the contrast in wording between Article 43.1 where "the State ... 
guarantees to pass no law attempting to abolish the right of private ownership or the 
general right to transfer, bequeath, and inherit property" and 43.2 where stress is placed 
on the exigencies of social justice and the demands of the common good. A 
contributing factor to the uncertainty is what relationship, if any, there is between 
Article 43 and Article 40.3 .2°. 
Article 43 appears to have two objectives. First, it prohibits the State from 
abolishing private property as an institution. The second limb of the Article recognises 
that private property may be regulated by the legislature where such regulations can be 
justified by the requirements of social justice and the common good.52 The exigencies 
of the concepts of social justice and the common good 53 have been examined by the 
Courts on numerous occasions in its rather tangled consideration of the relationship 
between Articles 43 and 40.3 .2°: though initially, the Courts were reluctant to interfere 
in a matter originally thought to be the proper domain of the Oireachtas. However, since 
Buckley v Attorney Genera/, 54 it has been accepted that Article 43 was intended to 
enshrine the property rights of citizens and that those rights could be regulated by the 
Oireachtas in the interests of the common good. However, any decision by the 
Oireachtas as to what constitutes the common good for the purposes of this Artkle 
could be reviewed by the courts. While not considered here in any great detail, the 
property jurisprudence demonstrates that the courts have "found it more or less 
51 J. Casey, supra n.l9 p.662. 
52 For a general discussion of these concepts, see D. Phelan, "The Concept of Social Rights" 
( 1994) 16Dublin UniversityLawJournal 105. 
53 See the Supreme Court's embracement of the Constitution's "constant concern for the common 
good" per Finlay CJ in Webb v Ireland [1988] IR 353, at 383. Casey comments that "[i]t will 
rarely be difficult to estabJjsh the "common good" basis of the impugned Act; the presumption of 
constitutionality obviously helps here. Consonance with principles of social justice may pose a 
greater problem". J. Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland (Second edn.)(London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1992) p.544. 
54 [1950] IR 67. 
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impossible to adhere to a strict categorisation of Article 40.3.2° in contrast with Article 
43 property rights". 55 
The Move to Proportionality 
The definitive statement of the proportionality principle in Irish constitutional 
jurisprudence is Costello J's judgment in Heaney v Ireland. 56 In considering whether a 
restriction on the exercise of rights is permitted by the Constitution, the proportionality 
test, which is predicated on the ideals of minimal restraint on the exercise of protected 
rights and the exigencies of the common good in a democratic society, has been more 
frequently referred to.57 Costello J. noted how the test is a common tool of the 
European Court of Human Rights58 and relied on the following formulation from the 
Supreme Court of Canada: 
The objective of the impugned provision must be of sufficient importance to 
warrant overriding a constitutionality protected right. It must relate to concerns 
pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society. The means chosen must 
pass a proportionality test. They must 
a. be rationally connected to the objective and not be arbitrary, unfair or based on 
irrational considerations; 
b. impair the right as little as possible, and 
c. be such that their effects on rights are proportional to the objective: see Chaulk 
vR.s9 
This line of reasoning was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court.60 
Proportionality and Property Rights 
One of the clearest applications of the proportionality principle to the property context is 
Costello P's judgment in Daly v Revenue Commissioners61 where he stated that because 
the Oireachtas had interfered with property rights did not of itself mean that such 
regulation would be unconstitutional. What was required was that the applicant had to 
55 G. Hogan, supra n.41 p. 386, citing Report of the Constitution Review Group p. 361. 
56 [1994) 3 IR 593. The earlier decision of Cox v Ireland [1992] 2 IR 503 was decided on 
proportionality reasoning without the term being directly referred to. 
57 Per Costello J. at p.607. 
58 Costello J. referred to The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) EHRR 245. 
59 (1990) 3 SCR 1303, 1335-1336. 
60 Director of Public Prosecution (Stratford) v Fagan [1994) 2 IR 265. 
61 [1995] 3 IR I ; [1996] 1 ILRM 122. 
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show that the infringement of his property rights was disproportionate in the 
circumstances for 
. .. legislative interference in property rights occurs every day of the week and 
no constitutional impropriety is involved. When . .. an applicant claims that his 
constitutionally protected property rights ... have been infringed and that the 
State has failed in the obligation imposed on it . . . to protect his property rights 
he has to show that those rights have been subjected to an unjust attack. He can 
do this by showing that the law which has restricted the exercise of his rights or 
otherwise infringed them has failed to pass a proportionality test .... 62 
Of more direct relevance for my analysis here is the Supreme Court decision in 
Re Article 26 and the Planning and Development Bill 1999. 63 The approach of the 
Supreme Court in this decision provides a useful contrast with the Employment Equality 
Bill decision in terms of its analysis of the scope of the property guarantees, its thorough 
review of the Bill and its reconciliation of the competing constitutional rights. The aim 
of Part V of the Planning and Development Bill 1999 was to provide affordable housing 
for persons who would not ordinarily be in the position to buy houses and to ensure that 
housing developments of this kind would not be segregated from the general 
community. This aim was to be realised through planning legislation. Each planning 
authority would be required to include in its development plan a "housing strategy" 
which would designate a specified percentage of the lands zoned for residential use for 
affordable housing.64 The Bill provided that where the owner of land zoned for 
residential use applied for permission for a housing development on the land, as a 
condition of grant, the planning authority could require the owner to either cede up to 
20% of the developed land for such purposes or to provide serviced sites or houses 
actually built for such purposes. The price for such land to be paid by the planning 
authority was to be calculated by reference to its existing use value, that is, on the 
assumption that no development other than exempted development would be allowed on 
the land. 
Counsel assigned by the Supreme Court65 argued that the provisions of the Bill 
were in violation of Article 40.3.2° and Article 43 protecting the property rights of the 
citizen. The Supreme Court subjected both the provisions of the Bill and the property 
62 [1995] 3 IR 1, 11. 
63 [2000] 2 IR 321; [2001] 1 ILRM 8l. 
64 Provision was also made to make housing available for persons within certain defined 
categories; the homeless, members of the traveller community and people living in unfit or 
overcrowded accommodation. 
65 Counsel assigned by tbe Court are charged with arguing against the constitutionality of the Bill 
before the Supreme Court. 
81 
provisions of the Constitution to careful scrutiny. Where an individual challenges the 
validity of legislation which regulates property rights, then the burden rests with that 
individual to establish that it constitutes on unjust attack on those rights. According to 
the Court, 
The challenge typically arises, however, ... in circumstances where the State 
contends that the legislation is required by the exigencies of the common good. 
In such cases, ... there will be an enquiry as to whether, objectively viewed, it 
could be regarded as so required and as to whether the restrictions or 
delimitations effected of the property rights of individual citizens are reasonably 
proportionate to the ends sought to be achieved.66 
While affirming that the provisions of Article 43 were relevant to its enquiry, the 
Supreme Court felt that question of whether the restriction effected of the property 
rights of individual citizens was permitted by the Constitution was firmly grounded on 
proportionality arguments. 67 
The Court went on to apply the tests proposed by Costello J. in Heaney v 
Ireland 68 and was satisfied that the statutory scheme laid down in the Planning and 
Development Bill passed those tests. The statutory aim of providing affordable housing 
was 
... an objective of sufficient importance to warrant interference with a 
constitutionally protected right and, given the serious social problems which 
they are designed to meet, they undoubtedly relate to concerns which, in a free 
and democratic society, should be regarded as pressing and substantial. ... 
[T]he court is satisfied that they impair those rights as little as possible and their 
effects on those rights are proportionate to the objectives sought to be attained.69 
The interesting contrast with the Employment Equality Bill decision, discussed below, 
is the absence there of such a carefully constructed, reasoned and applied 
proportionality test 
Property, Disability and The Article 2670 Referral Decision71 
In April, 1997, following consultation with the Council ofState72, the then President, 
Mary Robinson, referred the Employment Equality Bill 1996 to the Supreme Court 
under Article 26, for the Court's decision "as to whether the said Bill or any provision or 
66 Supra n. 63 p.348. 
67 See Dreher v Irish Land Commission [1984] ILRM 94. 
68 Supra text to n.56. 
69 Supra n.63 p. 354. 
70 See text to n.14, supra. 
71 Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Employment Equality Bill 1996 [l 997] 2 IR 321. 
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provisions thereof is or are repugnant to the Constitution". 73 The Supreme Court was 
obliged to consider the entire Bill and give its decision within sixty days of the date on 
which the Bill was referred. 74 
The disability sections of the Bill were considered separately by the Supreme 
Court. At the outset, the Court noted that the "Bill has the totally laudable aim of 
making provision for such of our fellow citizens as are disabled".75 What had a 
significant bearing on the judgment, however, was the Court's focus on the property 
provisions in Articles 43 and 40.3 .2° of the Constitution. 
It was argued before the Court that the burdens imposed on employers were 
"extremely onerous and so disproportionate to the results intended to be achieved, as to 
amount to a failure adequately to protect the rights of employers to earn a livelihood".76 
The fact that employers would be required to accommodate employees with a disability 
and bear what could amount to "significant costs", without a provision for compensation 
payable by the State, constituted, it was argued, an unjust attack on their property rights 
within the meaning of Article 40.3.2°. 
Against this, Counsel for the Attorney General, argued that disability provisions 
amounted to a delimitation of the exercise of the property rights of employers, which 
had clearly been imposed by the Oireachtas 
with a view to reconciling the exercise of those rights with the exigencies of a 
particular aspect of the common good i.e. the promotion of equality between 
disabled and more fortunate citizens. As such, it was permissible by virtue of 
Article 43.2.2° of the Constitution, unless it could be shown that the 
abridgement thus affected of property rights amounted to an unjust attack of 
those rights within the meaning of Article 40 s.3- subsection 2.77 
A number of cases were cited in support of the argument that the absence of a provision 
for compensation by the State did not, in itself, amount to an unjust attack on property 
rights.78 
72 On the functions and role of the Council of State, see J. Casey, supra n.19 pp. 98-99. 
73 Besides th.e disability provisions, the Supreme Court held that section 15, providing for 
vicarious liability for employers in criminal proceedings, and section 63(3), providing for 
certification as evidence of offences, to be incompatible with Article 38.1 and Article 40.1 of the 
Constitution. 
74 Given its length and the cumbersome fact that this Bill either amended or referred to 33 other 
statutes, this was quite a formidable task and noted by the Supreme Court. Supra n.71 p. 331. 
75 Supra n. 71 p.367. 
76 Ibid pp. 363-364 . 
77 Jbid.p.364 
78Dreher v Irish Land Commissioners [1984] ILRM 94; O'Cal/aghan v Commissioners of Public 
Works [1985] ILRM 364; Cafolla v 0' Malley [1985] IR 486. 
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The Supreme Court stated that the disability provisions were a delimitation of 
the exercise by employers of the constitutionally protected right to earn a livelihood and 
carry on a business. The Oireachtas had attempted to balance the exercise of these 
rights with the common good of promoting equality in the workplace between the 
disabled and "their more fortunate fellow citizens". 79 The issue facing the Supreme 
Court was whether the provisions requiring an employer to make a "reasonable 
accommodation ... unless causing undue hardship",80 were a reasonable delimitation of 
property rights under Article 43 or whether they amounted to an "unjust attack" on an 
individual citizen's private property within the meaning of Article 40.3.2° of the 
Constitution. 
The Supreme Court clearly felt that it was in accordance with the principles of 
social justice that society should make accommodation for disabled people in the 
workplace and that prima facie, society should bear the cost of this. The problem the 
Supreme Court found with the Bill in context of disability is sununed up in the 
following passage: 
. . . it attempts to transfer the cost of solving one of society's problems on to a 
particular group ... it requires [an employer] to bear the cost of all special 
treatment or facilities which the disabled person may require to carry out the 
work unless the cost of the provision of such treatment would give rise to 
'undue hardship' to the employer.81 
In support of its reasoning, the Court expressed some disquiet over the wide definition 
of disability which would make it impossible to estimate in advance the likely cost to 
employers.82 Referring to the "significant costs" which employers might have to bear 
(without provision for compensation by the State), the Court concluded that the 
provision amounted to an unjust attack on their property rights. The Bill was, therefore, 
unconstitutional. 
Unjust Attack on Property Rights? 
The senior judiciary's invalidation of the disability provisions of the Bill is open to 
challenge across a number of grounds. An obvious angle of attack is the judicial view of 
an "unjust attack" on property rights in this context. Hogan and Whyte comment that 
" [t]he notion of unjust attack is dearly one which invites highly subjective 
79 Supra n. 71 p.366. 
80 Set out in sections 16 and 35(4)-(5). 
81 Ibid. p. 367-368. 
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interpretation".83 The principle emulating from the case law is that an absence of 
compensation will render legislation invalid if there is an unjust attack on property 
rights. 84 
Following this line of reasoning, the issue for consideration was whether the 
obligation to "reasonably accommodate ... unless causing undue hardship", without 
provision for state compensation, (though with provision for state assistance)85 amounts 
to an unjust attack on employers' property rights. In order to assess the rationale of the 
judgment, and to expose the judicial belief that such alterations or accommodations 
constitute a prima facie unjust attack on property rights, it is necessary to explore 
further the concept of reasonable accommodation. This the Supreme Court clearly 
omitted to do. 
As noted earlier, the requirement for reasonable accommodation underpins the 
heart of modem disability discrimination legislation. The central terms employed in the 
1996 Bill, like the ADA, are reasonable accommodation and undue hardship; the 
determination, therefore, of whether or not a specific accommodation is required hinges 
on the question of whether it is reasonable and whether it imposes an undue hardship on 
an employer. What the Supreme Court failed to recognise was that employers were not 
required to make every conceivable accommodation for a disabled individual (and thus 
bear what was described as a disproportionate societal burden). Rather, the purported 
obligation referred to the notion of providing "special treatment or facilities ... by doing 
all that is reasonable ... to accommodate".86 The Supreme Court appeared to overlook 
the "reasonable" term (which is in itself significant in terms of delin1iting the extent of 
the obligation) 87 when it stated that an employer may have to "bear the cost of all 
special treatment or facilities" which the disabled person may require to carry out the 
work.88 Given that this Bill enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, the Supreme 
Court should have expressly demonstrated in what way this abridgement of property 
rights amounted to an "unjust attack". Instead, it took too broad an approach to the 
concept of reasonable accommodation. This over-inclusive approach facilitated an all 
too easy and unconsidered reconciliation between the concept of"unjust attack" and 
"reasonable accommodation". 
82 Ibid. p.368. 
83 Hogan and Whyte, supra n. 28 p.l 071. 
84 Central Dublin Development Association v Attorney General ( 197 5) I 09 ILTR 69. 
85 See infra p. 25 on this point. 
86 Emphasis added. 
87 On the relationship between the "reasonableness" of an accommodation and the undue 
hardship defence, see chapter five of this work. 
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The Court did not consider the fact that the Bill imposed both financial and 
practical limits on the requirement to make adjustments to the workplace. It did not 
give due consideration to the terms "reasonable" and "undue hardship" in any 
accommodation enquiry; specifically, whether these could have protected employers 
against such "unjust" interferences. On this point, section 35(5) of the Bill sought to 
identify a number of factors as being relevant to the decision as to whether a reasonable 
accommodation may give rise to undue hardship. Thus, consideration could be given to 
the type or nature of the faciHties or treatment required; cost; the number of persons 
who would benefit; the financial circumstances of the employer; any disruption that 
would be caused by the provision of the treatment or facilities; and the nature of any 
benefit or detriment which would accrue to any persons likely to be affected by the 
provision of the treatment or facilities. However, the Court overlooked the role of 
theses factors in its rush to judgment on an "unjust attack" on employers' property 
rights. 89 Rather selectively, the Court focused on one single limb of section 35(5) as 
support for its argument. Since the fmancial circumstances of the employer could be 
taken into account in determining any undue hardship, this would be inappropriate, 
according to the Court, for it could imply that "an employer would have to disclose his 
financial circumstances and the problems of his business to an outside party".90 The 
balancing of rights which takes place here means that the constitutional equality 
guarantee loses out to the private property guarantee, which seems to include, what 
Quinn and Quinlivan call, "a corporate right of privacy". Indeed, as these 
commentators point out, the reasoning of the Supreme Court on this point is hard to 
understand given that "private companies are already highly regulated in the amount of 
fmancial information they must report to the State on".91 Proper consideration was not 
given to the cwnulative strength of section 35 in protecting employers against 
burdensome and non-effective accommodations. Moreover, in keeping with the theme 
of this work, the refusal on the part of the Supreme Court to involve employers in the 
task of barrier removal by way of the reasonable accommodation duty is a judicial 
endorsement of disability as an individual problem of the person.92 
88 Emphasis added. 
89 Would (re)arranging the working hours of an employee with a disability to accommodate 
intervals of rest or periods of rehabilitation be always such an unjust financial disruption to an 
employer? The refusal of an accommodation cannot be solely based on the inability or otherwise 
of the employer to pay, as this approach would give no account of the other factors set out in 
section 35(4). 
90 supra n.71 p. 368. 
91 G. Quinn and S. Quinlivan, supra n.49 at p.l9. 
92 See n.trther, chapters four, five and six. 
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The Supreme Court went on to state how it would be "impossible to estimate in 
advance what the likely cost to an employer would be".93 The Court, rather loosely, 
referred to "what could be significant costs to employers".94 This is unsatisfactory, 
particularly when other jurisdictions have researched the projected costs of 
accommodations to employers. Empirical evidence in the US clearly indicates the 
inaccuracy of such broad sweeping statements: the Job Accommodation Network, a 
referral service of the US President's Committee on Employment ofPeople with 
Disabilities, regularly surveys employers to establish the costs, savings and benefits of 
making "reasonable accommodations" in the workplace. The findings from its 
September 1996 survey indicate that 19% of accommodations cost nothing and 50% 
cost between $1 and $500; only 3% were found to cost more than $5,000.95 No 
compliance cost research was carried out in Ireland prior to the Bill 's publication. 
Further, the Supreme Court did not consider the argument that accommodations can 
result in savings to employers. 
The Supreme Court also laid (mistaken) emphasis on the absence of a state 
funded support scheme and implied that employers would have to bear all cost of the 
past exclusion of disabled people from working structures. What the Court ignored was 
the fact that the State already makes significant provisions for measures which de facto 
subsidise current initiatives to accommodate disabled people in employment.96 Grants 
available include the Job Interviewer Grant, the Workplace and Equipment Adaptation 
Grant (maximum of €6348. 70 available towards the cost of adaptations to premises or 
equipment), the Personal Reader Grant, the Employment Support Scheme and the 
Employee Retention Grant Scheme.97 Neither did the Supreme Court see fit to address 
the relevance or otherwise of past precedents holding that an absence of compensation 
does not operate as an absolute indication of an unjust attack on property rights.98 As a 
result, these unsubstantiated conclusions aided judicial protection of, and commitment 
93 Supra n.71 p.368. 
94 Ibid. 
95 See US President's Committee's Job Accommodation Network site at 
http://www. pcepd. gov/pubs/ek96/benefits.html 
96 Though this is not to suggest that the existing state funded scheme is an adequate one. As part 
of the mainstreaming of services for people with disabilities, the Supported Employment 
Program for People with Disabilities is now under the aegis ofF As, the national training and 
employment body. 
97 For further details of these schemes see www.fas.ie. On the employee retention grant scheme, 
funding of90% towards the implementation of a retention strategy for any one employee (up to a 
maximum of€12,500) is available, as well as €2,500 towards the development of a retention 
strategy programme. 
98 See Daly v Revenue Commissioners [ 1995] 3 IR 1. 
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to, traditional liberal proprietary rights under the cover of"predicted" unjust attacks on 
individual employers. This conclusion remained at the expense of the many disabled 
people who continue to legitimately burden the costs of exclusion from mainstream 
social institutions. 
The (non)app/ication of the Proportionality Test 
While the text of the Supreme Court judgment indicates the Court's interest in the 
interface between Article 43 and Article 40.3.2°, Hogan argues that the case was in 
effect decided on proportionality grounds.99 The mixture of the underlying appeal to 
proportionality with the relationship between Articles 40.3.2° and 43 resulted in an 
inconsistent and fundamentally flawed application of neither principle. What this 
decision demonstrates is that a poorly applied proportionality principle can allow for as 
much subjective judicial appraisal of competing constitutional rights as was with the 
position under earlier judicial engagements with the text of the property provisions.100 
As McCrudden has written," ... rationality and proportionality do little to address 
adequately the intricacies of discrimination . .. and leave considerable discretion to 
judges to address these problems without guidance and too often prey to their personal 
or professional biases or preferences".101 Despite the Court's implicit appeal to 
(dis)proportionality, nowhere in the judgment is reference made to the proportionality 
test adopted in Heaney, discussed above. 102 Nor did the Court see any use in applying 
this test to the reconciliation between the competing social objectives of the legislation 
and the constitutional rights of the parties involved. Indeed, as has already been pointed 
out, the judgment failed to consider the potential practical application of the disability 
provisions beyond the floodgate unconstitutional vision presented by the Supreme 
Court. 103 This is in stark contrast to the Supreme Court's treatment ofPart V ofthe 
99 Supra text to n.45. 
100 See G. Hogan, supra n.41 on this point. 
101 C. McCrudden, "Theorizing European Equality Law and the Role of Mainstreaming" in C. 
Costello and E. Barry (eds.) Equality in Diversity: The New Equality Directives (Dublin: Irish 
Centre for European Law, 2003) 1, p.20. While a properly applied proportionality principle can 
be an improvement on a "reasonableness" approach, the utili ty of the former is compromised 
when the principle is poorly applied. 
102 Heaney v Ireland [1994] 3 IR 593. 
103 On this point, appeals should have been more strongly made to the presumption of 
constitutionality. A Bill referred to the court under Article 26 enjoys the same presumption of 
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Planning and Development Bill1999, discussed above, which was subjected to a more 
rigorous analysis. 104 The Supreme Court's language here is particularly instructive when 
compared with that of the judgment under consideration. In the Planning and 
Development decision, the Court carefully considered the interference with the 
constitutional right concerned. A thorough reading of the statute allowed it to be 
satisfied that the scheme "impaired the right as little as possible and [its] effects are 
proportionate to the objectives sought to be obtained". Section 35(5) of the 
Employment Equality Bill, which documented limits to the extent of the employer' s 
duty to provide reasonable accommodation, received little to no consideration. The 
Court felt that the protection of corporate privacy rights was superior to the provision in 
the Bill which allowed the fmancial circumstances of an employer to be considered in 
determining the hardship or otherwise imposed by a requested accommodation in any 
individual instance. And in any event, as has already been mentioned, the Supreme 
Court's refusal to consider the other factors relevant to a decision on an 
accommodation 's imposition of undue hardship facilitated its conclusion that the 
scheme was disproportionate to the objectives to be achieved. This line of reasoning 
was sustained further by the Court's inaccurate summary of the statute' s objectives. 
The cursory nature of this summary, especially its omission to make clear that the 
provisions of the Act only apply to disabled applicants or employees who are capable, 
competent and qualified to do the job 105 and the inaccurate description of the burden 
imposed on employers, allowed the Court to conclude that its "effects [were] 
[dis]proportionate to the objectives sought to be obtained". 
A fmal point is the emphasis placed by the Supreme Court on the statute's 
absence of compensation for the interference with employer's property rights. The 
general principle, although subject to individual judicial discretion, is that a person who 
is compulsorily deprived of his or her property in the interests of the common good 
should normally be compensated at a level equivalent to at least the market value of the 
acquired property.106 This principle is subject to the restrictions which the general law 
(of planning) may impose. It did not prevent the Planning and Development Bill from 
passing the constitutional hurdle even though compensation was payable at the existing 
land use level only. The point at which compensation becomes payable is when there is 
constitutionality as an act of the Oireachtas: In Re Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill 
[1940] IR 470. 
104 [2000] 2 IR 321. 
105 See 0 . Smith, supra n.l2 pp.167 -8, discussed in more detail in chapter five. 
106 Dreher v Irish Land Commission [1984] JLRM 94. 
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a deprivation of a property right. The question is whether an employer, if required to 
make a reasonable accommodation for an employee/applicant with a disability, is 
suffering a deprivation and therefore entitled to compensation from the State? If, as a 
result of making the accommodation, the employee becomes (more) productive, the 
employer offsets the cost by availing of state sponsored assistance and/or reduces the 
disabled employees pay107, the disproportionate interference with the said property right 
becomes more difficult to detect. 
The Subjugation of the Equality Guarantee Continues 
As predicted by the Constitution Review Group, the equality guarantee in Re Article 26 
and the Employment Equality Bill1996Iost out in "the inevitable boundary adjustment 
between it and other rights". 108 The Supreme Court judgment contains no treatment of 
the interplay between Article 43, 40.3.2° and 40.1, thus dispatching the latter provisions 
to the constitutional fringes once again. Neither was there any real consideration given 
to the meaning of equality in the context of disability.109 Drawing on Whyte's analysis, 
it is clear, and almost inevitable, that the Court refused to look at the scope of the 
equality guarantee in "results" terms110• A more expansive understanding of equality in 
the context of disability would have allowed the Bill to stand. An example of this 
understanding on the constitutional plane can be seen in the jurisprudence under section 
15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights, discussed below. Prior to this, the discussion 
moves to a consideration of the constitutional treatment of the pioneering disability 
discrimination model in the US. 
The US Constitutional Perspective 
The analysis here switches its focus to the United States constitutional tradition. It 
queries whether established guarantees, such as those protecting private property, or 
107This reduction of disabled employee's pay is permitted by virtue of section 35(1) of the 
Employment Equality Act 1998 which allows an employer to provide a particular rate of 
remuneration for work of a particular description if, due to the disability, the employee is 
restricted in her capacity to do the same amount of work (or work the same hours) as a non-
disabled person engaged in work of that description. The reduction of a disabled worker's pay is 
expressly prohibited by the terms of the ADA. 
108 Report of the Constitution Review Group, supra n.25 p. 222. 
109 Contrast this with the more sophisticated understanding of the Canadian Supreme Court, 
discussed below. 
110 G. Whyte, supra n. 22 pp.95-96. 
90 
other aspects of constitutional doctrine and reasoning, have presented any obstacles to 
the equality objectives underpinning the ADA. 
The fencing in of public power at the constitutional level through the 
recognition of the limits that private rights place on legitimate government was a 
primary objective of the framers of the US Constitution. 111 The aim was to protect a 
number of core rights from encroachment by democratic legislatures; in other words, to 
outline a number of areas of private conduct where the State was not permitted to 
intervene. These rights were delimited and defmed by common law baselines securing 
liberty of contract and property, leading one commentator to summarise that "[t]he 
Constitution [is] an effort not entirely successful to balance the rights of persons, the 
rights of property and political rights". 112 
Given the content of this chapter's discussion it appears somewhat surprising 
that, as a leading market economy, the US Constitution contains no independent 
property clause and that the text does not describe property as a fundamental right. 
Protection is afforded to private property through a combination of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment 
famously provides that "no State shall deprive a person of life, liberty or property, 
without due process in law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the law". The Fifth Amendment warns "nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation". 
The development of the constitutional norms protecting private property can be 
seen in the judicial interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment's "takings" provision. 113 A 
111 The framers of the federa l constitution were concerned with reducing the power of state 
governments dominated by popular majorities who tended to enact legislation to promote their 
own interests over the interests of the nation. SeeM. Tushnet, "The Politics of Constitutional 
Law" in D. Kairys (ed.), The Politics of Law (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990) pp.220-223. 
11 2 J. Nedelsky, "American constitutionalism and the paradox of private property'' in J. Elster and 
R. Slagstad (eds.) Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988) 241 , 246. See generally J. Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American 
Constitutionalism (Chicago and London; University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
113 Any regulation of property use, including most regulation of business, presents a " takings" 
claim that could invite judicial review. This is because the takings clause is not restricted to 
exercises of the power of eminent domain (i.e. where the state condemns private property and 
pays the owner its fair market value), but includes the doctrine of regulatory takings developed 
by the Supreme Court in Penn. Central Transp. Co. v New York City 438 U.S. 104 ( 1978). 
However, the extent to which government can regulate property without committing a 
compensable taking is particularly vast and the Supreme Court has so far failed to develop a 
coherent takings jurisprudence. See J. Nedelsky, supra. n.ll2 pp. 231-240 for a concise account 
ofthejudicial destruction of the takings clause. See also G. Alexander, " "Takings" 
Jurisprudence in the U.S. Supreme Court: The Past Ten Years (1996) 56 Heidelberg Journal of 
International Law 857. 
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literal interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 's text114 suggests that the due 
process clause was meant to have been employed to ensure that no person is deprived of 
life, liberty or property "except by a suitable process- that is, by an appropriate 
procedure". 115 However, the Supreme Court soon began to rely on a substantive 
interpretation of the due process clause. This clause has been used as an assessment 
tool for a suitable procedure for the deprivation of rights, and also as a mechanism 
prohibiting the taking away of these rights altogether. 
The Rise of Substantive Due Process 11 6 
The high watermark constitutional case in terms of the substantive scope of the due 
process clause is Lochner v New York. 111 The case concerned a regulation enacted by 
the state of New York prohibiting bakers from working their employees more than sixty 
hours a week. The majority of the Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional, 
holding that the right of contract, which includes the right to buy and sell labour, is part 
of the liberty protected by the due process clause. While the Court recognised the 
possibility of the regulation being upheld by the "police power''118, which allowed the 
government to legislate with the aim of protecting health or morals, the majority refused 
to assent to the need to protect the health of bakers. Unlike mining, 119 for example, 
baking was not considered a dangerous occupation. The majority view was that this 
legislation was not an appropriate means of protecting the health of bakers as no 
sufficient connection between maximum hour legislation and the protection of health 
114 See also the remarks ofL. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (New York, Foundation Press, 
1978) at p. 452 in the context of a discussion of the rise and fall of substantive due process: 
"[t]he notion of mechanically laying statutes beside the constitutional text to see if they fit was 
~roperly discredited long ago". 
15 Emphasis in original. D.P. Currie, The Constitution of the United States A Primer for the 
People 2nd ed. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000) p.47. Recent decisions 
tend to equate due process with a procedure that is fundamentally fair. Ibid. 
116 See generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (New York, Foundational Press, 1978) 
Chapter 8. 
117 198 u.s. 45 {1905) 
118 To be valid, a purported exercise of the police power required that the law advance a public 
purpose; i.e. further health, safety and general welfare. Excluded from this definition was 
"class" legislation designed to redistribute between groups or to reduce "inequalities of fortune". 
M. McUsic, "Redistribution and the Takings Clause" in D. Kairys (ed.), The Politics of Law (3rd. 
ed.) (New York: Peruses, 1998) p. 617. Demarcation difficulties abound here and the situation is 
not helped by judicial statements on the reach of the constitutional property guarantee. 
119 Holden vHardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) 
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had been shown. 120 In addition, the state bad no interest in protecting workers against 
economic exploitation or in regulating the liberty protected freedom to negotiate tenns 
of employment contracts. This redistributive attempt to relocate power from capital to 
labour was not a valid exercise of the police power. 121 
The minority justices were prepared to hold that liberty of contract could be 
subjected to regulations designed to promote the general welfare or to guard the public 
health, the public morals or the public safety. 122 The dissenters were satisfied that the 
legislature had demonstrated a "real and substantial" relationship between the statute 
and its objectives and looked to factual evidence (including empirical evidence on the 
effects of excessive working hours and the dangers of baking to the health and safety of 
workers). 123 In a powerfully short dissent, Justice Holmes challenged judicial 
interference with values commonly held by reasonable people and expressed by the 
legislature as the people's representative: 
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it 
is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be 
said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit the statute proposed 
would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the 
traditions of our people and our law .124 
What emerges from the Lochner is the Supreme Court's refusal to sanction 
governmental redistribution of resources in this manner. 125 The measures " ... did not 
fall within the 'police power'; the employer had committed no common law wrong, and 
regulatory power was largely limited to redress of harms recognised at common law". 126 
Another notable feature of the majority's reasoning was its careful scrutiny of the 
legislation in tenns of"means-ends" analysis; while the promotion ofhealth was a 
legitimate governmental goal, the maximum hour law was an inappropriate means of 
achieving it. The minority were willing to accept the legislature 's assessment of the 
120 The Court concluded that the statute was the result of"other motives", which it did not 
s~ecify. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) p. 64. 
1 1 See text to n.130. 
122 See judgment of Justice Harlan (with whom Justices White and Day concurred) citing the 
Supreme Court in Jacobson v Massachusetts 197 U.S. 11 "The liberty secured by the 
Constitution of the United State to every person within its jurisdiction does not import ... an 
absolute right in each person to be, at all time and in all circumstances, wholly freed from 
restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the 
common good". Ibid. p. 40 
123 Justice Harlan stating "[n)or can we assume that [the) legislature acted without due 
deliberation, or that it did not determine this question upon the fullest attainable information and 
for the common good". Ibid. p. 73. 
124 Ibid. p. 76 
125 C. R. Sunstein, "Lochner's Legacy" (1987) 87 Columbia Law Review 873, 877. 
126 Ibid. 
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facts, which demonstrated the necessity of protective legislation as the benchmark from 
which to assess a state's regulatory power. 
The Decline of Lochner 
Today, in light of social, economic and political developments, it appears obvious that 
the maximum hour law would be upheld. The Lochner decision was abandoned in 
1917,127 and the 1937 decision of West Coast Hotel v Parrish128, where the Court upheld 
a minimum wage Jaw for women, finally sounded the death knell for Lochner reasoning. 
Whereas in Lochner the baseline for decision making was common law neutrality, the 
West Coast decision indicated a rejection of the common Jaw concept of neutrality and a 
willingness to import a new framework for baseline regulation. The new baseline 
became a system in which all workers had a living wage. 129 As Tribe points out, with 
the onset of the Depression, then World War ll, and the economic realities of those 
times, it could no longer be argued that 
... the invisible hand of economics was functioning simultaneously to protect 
individual rights and produce a social optimum .... Positive government 
intervention came to be more widely accepted as essential to economic survival 
and legal doctrines would have to thus operate from that premise.130 
Since the West Coast decision, the Supreme Court has shown increasing 
deference to legislative interference in property or other economic interests. It has 
abandoned the substantive due process approach on which Lochner was based, and it 
has reduced the scope of the contracts clause, 131 and the use of the takings clause. 132 As 
Tribe points out, in abandoning Lochner, the Supreme Court eventually moved well 
beyond Justice Harlan 's criterion that legislatures need only demonstrate a real or 
substantial relation between the law and their objectives; "soon [the Court] gave way to 
127 Bunting v Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). 
128 300 U.S. 379 (I 937). Here the Court held that "The exploitation of a class of workers who 
are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenceless 
against the denial of a living wage ... casts a direct burden for their support upon the community. 
What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay ... The community is not 
bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers". At 399. 
129C.R. Sunstein, supra n.125 pp. 880-881. 
130 L. Tribe, supra n.116 pp.446-447. 
131 Adopted as a limitation on state authority, the contracts clause of Article I s 10 forbids the 
states to pass laws impairing the obligations of contracts. lt was of most significance in the 
nineteenth century, but as Currie reports, twentieth century decisions have so narrowed its scope 
that it no longer plays an important role. D.P. Currie, supra n.ll5 p.12 
132 See infra text to n.Jl3. 
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virtually complete judicial abdication". 133 The police power has been expanded to 
include and allow economic regulation and redistributive welfare laws. The prevailing 
test for whether legislation affecting economic interests complies with the due process 
clause is whether the legislature had a "rational basis" for upholding it. 134 Substantive 
due process thus lost its teeth and ushered in an era with little to no judicial interference 
with governmental regulation, unless a more concrete constitutional provision was 
involved. As Nedelsky points out, "[a]lthough the Court has not formally abandoned 
property ... neither property nor its sister concept of contract have in fact been effective 
means of challenging legislation for many years now". 135 
Equal Protection of the Laws 
The Fourteenth Amendment adopted in 1868 sets out the US constitutional guarantee of 
equality in the following terms; " [n]o State shall deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". While the amendment is stated to apply 
only to state action, the Supreme Court has, however, interpreted the federally binding 
guarantee of due process in the Fifth Amendment as applying the same protection 
against discrimination as found within the Equal Protection Clause. The legislative 
history of the clause indicates its specific purpose of prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of race with respect to newly emancipated blacks.136 
Gradually, the Supreme Court moved towards a doctrinal basis for the 
application of the equal protection clause beyond the race category. With the demise of 
"substantive due process" in the 1930s, unsuccessful attempts were made to invoke the 
equal protection clause for the protection of economic and property interests from which 
the Supreme Court developed the "rational basis" test. The general rule is that 
133 L. Tribe, supra n.ll6 p.450. 
134 While the judiciary rejected substantive due process· in the economic sphere it proceeded to 
apply the same concept in order to apply the guarantees of the first amendment to the states. In 
so doing, the Court decided that freedom of speech, press, religion and assembly came within the 
liberty protected by the due process clause, because of their " fundamental" nature. The Court 
then went even further when it held that First Amendment liberties enjoyed a "preferred" 
position the result of which meant they enjoyed superior judicial protection than economic 
liberties. D.P. Currie, supra n.ll5 pp. 51-52. 
135 J. Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and Private Property supra. n.l l2 p. 255. 
136 Specifically to reverse the decision of the infamous Dred Scott decision- Dred Scott v 
Sandford 60 U.S. 393 (1856). See also the Slaughterhouse cases where this view was reaffinned 
by the Supreme Court describing the provision as "so clearly a provision for that race and that 
emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other." See 
generally, W. E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial 
Doctrine (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1988). 
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legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by 
the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 137 The Supreme Court then 
adopts various levels of scrutiny for different types of legislation. In keeping with the 
historical antecedents of the Fourteenth Amendment, all racial classifications are 
presumed suspect and are subject to a "strict" level of scrutiny.138 Economic 
classifications are required to meet the rationality test and gender classifications, falling 
somewhere between the two, are accorded intennediate examination. 139 
The ADA's Constitutional Authority 
When passing the ADA, the US Congress set out its constitutional authority in the 
preamble. 140 The first authority is the power to regulate inter-state commerce under 
Art.l (8) (3) of the federal Constitution. In effect, the inter-state commerce clause 
allows Congress to regulate entities that are not in direct proximity to the federal 
government but whose activities affect (in one way or another) commerce between the 
states. 141 The primary intention behind the invocation of this power is to enable 
Congress to 'catch' private sector employers of significant size. This clause is 
traditionally interpreted widely by the courts with the effect that most private entities of 
any size are simply deemed to affect inter-state commerce by their activities. 
Congress next invoked section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in the enactment 
of the ADA. Section 5 gives Congress the power "to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article". 142 In Fullilove v Klutznick143 the Supreme 
Court acknowledged Congress as the ultimate enforcers of the Equal Protection Clause. 
On the basis of numerous research reports, and following years of hearings, Congress 
decided that it was necessary to tackle the endemic societal discrimination suffered by 
137 City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985). 
138 "[A]lllegal restrictions which challenge the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect": Korematsu v United States, 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944). 
139 Craig v Boren 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
140 S. Mikochik, "The Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Some First 
Impressions" (1991) 64 Temple Law Review 619. 
141 See Gibbons v Ogden 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824) where it was stated that the power of 
Congress over interstate commerce is plenary, "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its 
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." At 
196. 
142 "It is fundamental that in no organ of government [does] there repose a more comprehensive 
remedial power than in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with competence 
and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees." Fulliove v Klutznick 448 U.S. 448 ( 1980) 
At 483. 
143 448 u.s. 448 (1980) 
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an estimated 43 million Americans with disabilities. The Supreme Court had already 
ruled that "correctly viewed §5 is a positive grant of legislative power . .. to secure the 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment".144 Under that power, Congress is not 
constrained from enacting "legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause unless the 
judiciary [first] decides ... that [the challenged action] is forbidden by the equal 
protection clause itself."145 As Mikochik summarises, in passing the ADA, 
... Congress invoked that remedial authority to address the major areas of 
discrimination faced day-to day by people with disabilities, by combating those 
policies and practices which, in form or in effect, served as "built in headwinds" 
against their full participation in public life.146 
In introducing the ADA, Congress was acting within its section 5 powers because it was 
endeavouring to ensure that disabled individuals would receive equivalent legislative 
civil rights protection against discrimination as other groups suffering endemic fonns of 
discrimination and exclusion. 147 Coupled with the additional constitutional authority 
granted to Congress under the inter-state commerce clause and the strong bipartisan 
political support for its introduction, the ADA initiaJly enjoyed a strong footho ld within 
the constitutional and political order. 
The ADA's Constitutional Difficulties 
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has begun to erode the constitutional security 
enjoyed by the federaJly-driven ADA. Specifically, the US Supreme Court has utilised 
the Eleventh Amendment's state sovereign immunity clause to the detriment of the anti-
discrimination protections of the ADA. As is discussed below, this has left the 
reasonable accommodation duty open to attack under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
144 Katzenbach v Morgan 384 U.S. 641 , 651. See also United States v Guest383 U.S. 745 
(1966). 
145 Ibid. at 648. "[It) is beyond question ... that Congress has the authority to identify unlawful 
discriminatory practices, to prohibit those practices, and to prescribe remedies to eradicate their 
continuing [effects)"; Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502 (1980). Though Congress may not 
exercise this power to "restrict, abrogate or dilute these guarantees"; Mississipi Univ. for Women 
v Hogan 458 U.S. (1982) 
146S. Mikochik, supra n.140 pp.627-628. 
147 A. Mayerson and S. Yee, "The ADA and Models of Equali ty" Paper presented at 
International Disability Law and Policy Symposium: From Principles to Practice October 22-26 
2000. Available at http://www.dredf.org/symposium/mayerson.html . 
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The state sovereign immunity doctrine guarantees the states immunity from 
suits taken by private individuals in the federal courts. 148 However, the doctrine is not 
absolute, as Congress retains the right to abrogate state sovereign immunity in certain 
circumstances. The abrogation test is twofold: flrst, Congress must have expressed its 
intent to abrogate the immunity; second, Congress's actions must be pursuant to a valid 
exercise of power.149 On the first element, the ADA is clear and unequivocal: "A State 
shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
-
States from an action in a Federal or State Court of competent jurisdiction for a 
violation of this [Act]". 150 As mentioned earlier, the preamble to the ADA took the 
unusual step of asserting its constitutional authority under the terms of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the commerce clause. 151 However, a recent body of precedents has 
clawed back Congress's legislative powers to abrogate the sovereign immunity clause 
through the commerce clause.152 As a result, the only way Congress can validly abrogate 
state sovereign immunity is through a proper exercise of the powers found in section 
five of the Fourteenth Amendment. This means that Congress can only act to ensure that 
the goals of the Fourteenth Amendment are fulfilled. 153 The question, then, with relation 
to the ADA, is whether Congress's actions were pursuant to a valid exercise of its 
Fourteenth Amendment powers. 
Whether legislation can be deemed unconstitutional because it violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause is a question for the judiciary. 
However, the test for appropriate legislation under section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has moved away from the question of whether the measure simply tends to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions. It bad now moved towards a 
"congruence and proportionality test". As set out in City of Boerne v Flores154, the 
148 The Eleventh Amendment provides that"[ t]he judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 
Later the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment also granted immunity to the states 
against suits from their own citizens: Hans v Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
149 Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
150 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) 
151 The purpose of the Act is in part, "to invoke the sweep of constitutional authority, including 
the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address 
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities." 
152 Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida 517 U.S. 44 (1996) 
153 This means that Congress has the power to enforce the Amendment which includes the 
authority to remedy and deter violations of the rights guaranteed there under. However, 
Congress does not have the power to create new rights, due to the long-settled principle that it 
rests with the Supreme Court to define the substance of constitutional guarantees. Confirmed in 
City of Boerne v Flores 521 U.S. 507 (1997), 519-524. 
154 Ibid. 
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essence of the "congruence and proportionality" test is that legislation passed by 
Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment must first identify and provide evidence of 
a constitutional wrong that is to be remedied or prevented. Second, the appropriateness 
of the remedial measures must be considered in light of the wrong presented. According 
to the Court in Flores, where legislation is not "congruent and proportional" to the 
constitutional wrong, the legislation is no longer remedial but substantive, and it 
oversteps the powers afforded to Congress under section Five.155 Moreover, where 
legislation prohibits more constitutional than unconstitutional conduct, it will fail the 
"congruence and proportionality" test. Broad prophylactic measures can be issued under 
Congress's remedial powers. However, in order to justify legislation of this type, 
Congress must establish a strong evidentiary record of unconstitutional behaviour of the 
type to be remedied or prevented by the statute in question. 
A further complication is the three-tier standard of review, as has already been 
referred to. Since most laws grant exemptions or benefits for some people while 
imposing burdens on others, no legislation applies equally to all persons. As noted 
earlier, the Supreme Court has developed three standards of review according to the 
classification of the legislation. The problem in the disability context of the 
"congruence and proportionality test" is the standard of review adopted by the Supreme 
Court in order to ascertain if state legislation denies groups of citizens the equal 
protection of the law. The US Supreme Court has ruled that the disabled (specifically 
"mentally retarded" individuals)156 do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class. 
They are denied the benefit (or indeed the hindrance157) of strict or immediate scrutiny 
of state legislation or state action. The rational basis review only requires that " there be 
a legitimate state objective" and that the means adopted are "rationally related to 
achieving that objective". Thus, under rational basis review, a state may discriminate158 
155 Ibid pp. 519 - 520. 
156 Following Cleburne, see infra, lower courts have held that physically disabled people do not 
constitute a suspect or quasi - suspect class. Therefore, it is safe to assume that all disabled 
people are subject to the minimum rational basis test in judicial review oflegislative regulation 
or action. 
157 City of Cleburne, Texas v Cleburne, Inc. 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). The basis of the Court's 
decision was that mentally retarded people have a reduced ability to cope with and function in 
the everyday world, and are thus immutably different from the rest of the population. Thus states 
have a legitimate interest in regulating the treatment of retarded persons. The Court explained in 
Cleburne that rational scrutiny would provide greater flexibility for lawmakers; "How this large 
and diversified group is to be treated under the law is a difficult and often a technical matter, 
very much a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps 
uninformed opinion of the judiciary''. 
158 Which would include a failure to intervene in the phenomenon of discrimination against 
disabled people. 
99 
on the basis of disability without compromising its equal protection duties, at least if the 
disability classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.159 The 
implications of this approach are discussed in specific terms below. In particular, I 
examine how dominant conceptions of rationality can support disability-based 
discrimination. 
The Supreme Court Decision in Garrett 
In Board a/Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garrett, 160 the Supreme Court, by a 
5:4 majority, held that the states are not subject to private suits for monetary damages 
under Title I of the ADA. Garrett combined two cases, both involving employees of the 
state of Alabama. Garrett had been employed as a nurse but following chemotherapy for 
breast cancer, she was demoted to a lower-paid position in the hospital. Ash, a security 
officer who suffered from chronic asthma and sleep apnoea, was refused any 
accommodation for his conditions. Both respondents brought an action under the ADA 
against the state as their employer. 
The issues for consideration before the Supreme Court were as follows: 
First, whether Congress bad legitimately abrogated the states' sovereign 
immunity against private suit by sufficiently determining the scope of the constitutional 
right at issue, i.e. the injury to be prevented. 161 And second, whether the remedy adopted 
by Congress was congruent and proportional to the constitutional violation under 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Under the two-pronged test required to validly abrogate state sovereign 
immunity, as outlined above, the ADA clearly satisfied the first element, as it expressly 
stated that Congress intended to abrogate the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. The 
second element required that Congress's action be pursuant to a valid exercise of power 
- in other words, that its action was a proper means of guaranteeing the rights under 
Fourteenth Amendment. This required the Court to defme the injury to be prevented. 
Specifically, it had to isolate the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which Title I 
was designed to remedy, and it then had to ask whether the remedy set out in the ADA 
against the states was an appropriate use of Congress 's power. 
159 See the age discrimination analysis applied in Kimel v Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 
(2000) 
160 531 u.s. 356 (2001). 
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With regard to the nature of the constitutional right at issue, the Court cited 
Cleburne for authority that the disabled are a non-suspect class. Hence, the minimum 
'rational basis' standard of review is used to determine if a law or action invidiously 
discriminates against them. 162 The minimum 'rational basis' review only invalidates 
laws that irrationally discriminate against a certain class of people, and it allows the 
states to give almost any reason for their actions. Therefore, the distinction between 
rational and irrational discrimination is critical. Rational (and thereby constitutionally-
permissible) discrimination is any discrimination that is related, however minimally, to 
a legitimate state goal. Past precedents have deferred to broadly-defined legitimate state 
goals, including administrative efficiency and economic saving. 163 Under this standard 
of review, very little discrimination can be termed "irrational", except in cases of 
overtly invidious or intentional discrimination. The critical nature of this distinction lies 
in the fact that many characterise the discrimination endured by disabled people as a 
non-intentional by-product of institutional structures and unthinking practices, as 
opposed to deliberate or intentional exclusion.164 Where this standard becomes pivotal 
is in the context of the Supreme Court's treatment ofthe rights and remedies within the 
ADA against the states, particularly the rights of individuals to sue for failure to comply 
with their right to reasonable accommodation. Citing Cleburne, the Garrett Court 
opined that "[states] are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special 
accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards such individuals are 
rational. "165 
Having outlined the "metes and bounds of the constitutional right in question", 
the Court next examined whether Congress had established a history of unconstitutional 
employment discrimination by the states against disabled people.166 This was necessary 
in order to ensure that Congress's authority is properly exercised in response to state 
transgressions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority undertook a partial and 
selective reading of the legislative history, and quickly concluded that such evidence did 
161 Congress has the power to eradicate discriminatory practices or to prevent them, but Congress 
can only act to prevent the violation of rights guaranteed under the Founeenth Amendment, it 
does not have the power to create new rights. 
162 Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 at 367 relying on Cleburne. 
163 Supra text to n.159. 
164 For a rejection of this, see H. Hahn "Equality and the Environment: The Interpretation of 
'Reasonable Accommodations in the Americans with Environmental Adaptations" (1993) 17 
Journal of Rehab. Administration 101. 
165 Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 at 367. 
166 Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent, compiled a list of over two hundred instances of state 
discrimination against people with disabilities. 531 U.S. 356 (app.C) Breyer J . The majority 
dismissed this evidence as merely anecdotal. 
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not exist. Justice Rehnquist stated that in order to authorize private individuals to 
recover money damages against the states, there must be a pattern of unconstitutional 
discrimination by the states which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy 
imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation. 167 
The Court determined that, despite the large record of discrimination against disabled 
people, Congress did not provide sufficient evidence of a pattern of state 
discrimination. 168 It referred to the wide-spread societal discrimination documented 
before Congress, but it found no Congressional evidence of specific patterns of state 
discrimination. 169 Since no such pattern was found to exist, according to the majority, 
the provision providing for a monetary remedy in Title I of the ADA was not sufficient 
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate a state's sovereign 
immunity from damages under the Eleventh Amendment. Since Congress did not 
accumulate sufficient evidence to show that it was seeking to remedy a constitutional 
violation, it had overstepped its authority. In essence, what Congress had done was to 
incorrectly create new rights within the Equal Protection Clause in favour of disabled 
people.170 
The Court went on to address the hypothesis that, were it possible to squeeze 
out of the examples presented to the Court a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination 
by the states, the rights and remedies created by the ADA against the states would "raise 
... concerns as to congruence and proportionality". 171 
Going back to the standard of review granted to disabled people under equal 
protection jurisprudence, the Court reiterated that it would be entirely rational and, 
therefore, constitutional, for a state employer to preserve financial resources by hiring 
employees who are able to use existing facilities, yet the ADA requires employers to 
"make[ e] existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by 
individuals with disabilities". 172 On this view, the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
require states to make special (i.e. reasonable) accommodations for the disabled, so long 
as their actions towards such individuals are rational. Rational action includes the 
legitimate state interest in preserving resources, and this is presumed antithetical to an 
167 Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 at 374. 
168 Emphasis added. 
169 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that while Congress made a general finding that discrimination 
against disabled people is a serious and pervasive social problem and included supporting 
evidence on this point, however, "the great majority of[this evidence] do not deal with the 
activities of States". 531 U.S. 356, 369 
170 See supra text to n.l53. 
171 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372 
172 Ibid at 372. 
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employer' s duty to employ disabled individuals who may require reasonable 
accommodations. 
In summary, unlike the experience in Ireland, the ADA's constitutional 
authority was not threatened by property guarantees because Congress ensured its 
legitimacy under the operation of the commerce clause. However, recent constitutional 
encroachments have come from the state sovereign immunity clause. In order for 
Congress to legitimately abrogate the states' sovereign immw1ity against private suit by 
individuals, it was imperative that Congress's ADA action was pursuant to a valid 
exercise of power. In other words, whether or not its act was a proper way of ensuring 
that rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were guaranteed. Thus, in order to 
authorize private individuals to recover monetary damages from the states, there must 
be a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the states which violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Then, the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and 
proportional to the targeted violation. In Garrett, there was no accepted evidence of 
state discrimination against disabled people. The majority viewed discrimination 
consequent upon inaccessible environments and structures as rational and constitutional 
discrimination on the part of the states. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that 
Congress's action had overstepped its constitutional authority to enforce equal 
protection guarantees against the states. The effect of Garrett is that state employees 
and job applicants are left with truncated rights and reduced legal recourse when faced 
with discrimination by a state employer on the disability ground. However, the Garrett 
decision does not affect the standing of other remedies provided under the ADA and 
still available to individuals against the states.173 
Consequently, the Garrett decision reiterates the formal nature of equality 
within the United States Constitution. The guarantee that the states shall not deny 
persons the equal protection of the law bas been deemed incapable of recognising that 
disabled people may need to be treated differently in order to enjoy an equivalent 
protection from discrimination as that enjoyed by non-disabled individuals. 
173 The other available remedies include suit on behalf of an individual in the name of the federa l 
government against the states, and recourse to injunctive relief. Moreover, the decision does not 
affect the ability to seek relief w1der the various state disability discrimination laws. 
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The Constitutional Positions Compared174 
There is considerable scope for comparative comment on the Irish Supreme Court's 
assessment of the reasonable accommodation provision under the Employment Equality 
Bill 1996, the maximum hour law rejected by the US Supreme Court in Lochner, and 
the more recent US Supreme Court attack on the constitutional validity of the ADA's 
reasonable accommodation mandate. The decisions in Garrett and Re Article 26 and the 
Employment Equality Bill illustrate bow established modes of constitutional tradition 
and reasoning militate against the recognition of more expansive formulations of 
equality. They also provide evidence of the difficulties of translating the social 
experience of disability and expanded norms of discrimination into the idiom of 
constitutional law. 175 
There is a remarkable similarity between Lochner-style reasoning of 1905 and 
the Irish Supreme Court's decision in Re Article 26 and the Employment Equality Bill. 
In light of developments in social, economic and political strategy, it was noted earlier 
that Lochner-style reasoning fell out of favour in the late 1930s. Yet, intriguingly, 
aspects of that era's reasoning emerge in an Irish decision made over ninety years later. 
The Irish Supreme Court demonstrated a marked similarity to the Lochner majority in 
terms of its adoption and interpretation of a "means-ends analysis". As in Lochner, 
where the promotion of health was a legitimate governmental goal, the Irish Supreme 
Court recognised that measures promoting the participation of disabled people in 
employment were within the legislature's concern for socia l justice and the common 
good. However, just as with the maximum hour law, the reasonable accommodation 
provision was an inappropriate means of achieving it. The majority in Lochner reasoned 
that there were other means of securing or promoting employees' health, without 
infringing fundamentally on the freedom or liberty to contract. Consequently, the 
restrictive regulation violated the police power. Similarly, the Irish Supreme Court 
implicitly held that there were alternative means of achieving the laudable aims 
underpinning the provisions of the Employment Equality Bill, means that would not 
interfere with more substantive constitutional rights of employers. In this regard, it 
174 See generally, V. Jackson and M. Tusbnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (New York: The 
Foundation Press. 1999). Comparative constitutional law analysis is a particularly complex 
undertaking, because of differences bet\veen constitutional texts, in the social contract on which 
the constitution of a country is based and differences in countries judiciary's training, tradition 
and analysis. 
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seemed to be alluding to the need for a public mechanism to fund accommodation costs 
which, as was pointed out already, does in fact exist. Essentially, the Irish Supreme 
Court manipulated the competing rights involved in such a way as to reinforce the status 
quo: the economic subjugation of disabled people. The competing rights considerations 
raised by the equality guarantee were never addressed. The Court also ignored the 
argument that the second sentence of Article 40.1 could constitutionally support 
reasonable accommodations for disabled people. In light of previous judicial 
interpretations of Article 40.1, tllis is not altogether surprising. 176 
What is of interesting from a comparative constitutional perspective is that the 
ADA initially received widespread bi-partisan political support. It received no 
constitutional scrutiny, such as that faced by the Irish provision. One reason for this is, 
of course, the obvious differences in the respective constitutional approaches to private 
property. Decisions interpreting the property clause of the US Constitution 's Fifth 
Amendment have been eroded to the extent that most of the case law is simply 
concerned with whether the regulation in question raises "public use" and ')ust 
compensation" issues. This position, in conjunction with the decline of substantive due 
process, and the fact that Congress need only demonstrate a rational basis for legislating 
under the equal protection clause, meant that concern for the property rights of 
employers was never a threat to the enactment of the ADA. The constitutional basis of 
the ADA was expressly founded under the commerce clause, and this provides another 
distinguishing factor. 
Of greater constitutional concern to the position of the ADA, however, are the 
deeply-entrenched issues of constitutional tradition and analysis. This includes 
Congress's power to enforce and the remedy violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause. The US Supreme Court is no longer solely focused on 
attacking aspects internal to the ADA's statutory structure. 177 Now, the federal statute' s 
legitimacy has been attacked on the constitutional plane. A number of established 
constitutional doctrines have been used as paring tools to reduce the reach of the federal 
statute.178 For example, Congress was found to have overstepped its regulatory authority 
by providing monetary remedies for private individuals against the states for disability 
175 P. Brandwein, "Constitutional Doctrine as Paring Tool: TI1e Struggle for "Relevant" Evidence 
in University of Alabama v Garrett" (200 1/2002) 35 University of Michigan Journal of Law 
R~rm37. 
17 See discussion supra. 
177 Specifically, the definition of a disabled individual and the duty to make reasonable 
accommodation, discussed in chapters four and five respectively. 
178P. Brandwein, supra n.l75 p. 42. 
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discrimination under the ADA. It was argued that Congress had not demonstrated that 
the measures adopted in the ADA were taken to remedy unconstitutional acts by the 
states As such, it was found that there was insufficient evidence of invidious 
discrimination by the states against disabled people to warrant the adoption of the 
remedial measures of the ADA. Therefore, Congress had not sufficiently abrogated state 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. In short, the reasonable 
accommodation provision was not considered a proper enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment against the states. 
What is ironic in tbis comparison is the different arenas in which tbis clash was 
played out in the respective jurisdictions. In the US, longstanding, historical products of 
constitutional reasoning and interpretation have removed the right of individuals to take 
suit for monetary damages against the states for violations ofTitle One of the ADA. The 
states are public bodies, and it is in the public realm that the disability discrimination 
duties have been pared down. As regards private employers, the ADA does not need to 
rely for its constitutional validity on the contested nature of equality and the contestable 
standards of review laid down by the Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The reason that reasonable accommodation persists unchallenged by Fourteenth 
Amendment conceptualisations -of rational and irrational or constitutional and 
unconstitutional discrimination- is that, in the private sphere, the ADA's constitutional 
validity is secured under the commerce clause. In tbis sense, it is ironic that the Irish 
Supreme Court's concern regarded the impact of reasonable accommodation on the 
property rights of private employers. 
There is further common ground between the approach of the Irish Supreme 
Court in 1997 and the US Supreme Court in Garrett, notwithstanding the non-
applicability of the federalist concerns of American constitutional law in an Irish 
context. The commonality is clear in the attitudes to reasonable accommodation, and in 
the constructs of disability, negative rights, and formal equality. Article 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress power to enforce the equal protection 
guarantee, the scope of which is determined by the Courts. There is no duty placed on 
Congress to weed out clearly unequal situations by means of legal regulation. Similarly, 
the silence of the Irish Constitution allows the Oireacbtas to tackle persisting 
inequalities in Irish society by means of legislation.179 However, as mentioned earlier, 
the fact that the Irish Constitution tacitly allows the Oireachtas to take legislative steps 
to remedy the inequalities faced by marginalized groups does not guarantee the 
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constitutionality of such measures. This is particularly so given the prevailing judicial 
view that the principle of equality before the law cannot compete with other, more 
fundamental rights. Similarly, the US Supreme Court has acted in a similar vein by 
utilizing the provisions of the equal protection guarantee, in conjunction with 
established constitutional doctrines, to limit the reasonable accommodation duty. When 
legislatures work within the confines of formal equality, the odds are stacked against 
more expansive versions of equality precepts - such as reasonable accommodation -
even before competing rights or traditions are factored in. Indeed, the Commission on 
the Status of People with Disabilities in Ireland had argued, with considerable foresight, 
that the equality guarantee in the Irish Constitution might prove too weak to support the 
kind of legislation needed to underpin the equality commitment with regards to 
disability. 180 
Similarly, the Irish Supreme Court demonstrated a remarkably one-sided 
approach to the competing issues. It referred to the difficulties of estimating the 
"excessive" costs which would be thrust on employers who were forced to "carry" 
disabled workers at the expense of their production process. The Supreme Court took a 
distinctly limiting view of the concept of disability when it refused to sanction the 
legitimacy of employers' duties to provide for reasonable accommodation. It recast the 
burden of societal exclusion and the impact of discrimination back onto the shoulders of 
disabled individuals. In short, it demonstrated no understanding of the social 
construction of disability. The Irish and US Supreme Courts held broadly similar views 
regarding the cost elements of making a reasonable accommodation. Both proceeded on 
the basis that the provision of a reasonable accommodation involves costs which, from a 
US perspective, a rational state employer would avoid, and which, from an Irish 
perspective, would interfere with an employer's constitutional rights to private property. 
The costs of disability, in this view, legitin1ately rest with the individuals themselves. 
A Substantive Contrast: A Brief Note on the Canadian Perspective 
The fom1allanguage and interpretation of the US and Irish equality guarantees can be 
contrasted with the language of the equality provisions of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (hereafter the Charter), which came into effect in 1985. 
179 Though for a discussion on the limitations of this approach, see G. Quinn, supra n.38 
180 Submission by the Commission on the Status of People with Disabilities to the Constitution 
Review Group, cited in G Quinn and S. Quinlivan, supra n.49 p.225. 
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Section 15 of the Canadian Charter reads: 
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability. 
(2) Subsection {1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its 
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups 
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability. 181 
Section 15 must be read in conjunction with section 1, which applies to all of the 
Charter, and which states that ''the Canadian [Charter] guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". Since the decision of R v 
Oakes182, the government has borne the onus of establishing whether the limits it 
imposes on the Charter's rights and freedoms were reasonable. Thus, the government 
must establish that (i) the objective behind the impugned legislation or action is of 
sufficient importance to justify a Charter infringement and (ii) the means chosen to 
achieve this objective are reasonable and justified. This second requirement involves the 
application of a proportionality test which includes three parts: (i) is there a rational 
connection between the objective and the means? (ii) is there minimal impairment of the 
Charter right? and (iii) does the objective have a proportionate effect? 
Section IS 's specific wording shows it to be clearly beyond formal "equality 
before the law" precepts. Its inclusion of equality "before and under the law" and the 
"equal protection and equal benefit of the law" have been referred to as the "four 
equalities". 183 Moreover, the reference in section 15(2) to its "object of [ameliorating 
the] conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups" endorses a more substantive 
fonnulation of equality. However, despite its more expansive wording, there was some 
initial concern that the scope of the equality guarantee was being defeated through 
judicial reductionism. 184 In the first Supreme Court decision interpreting section 15, 
181 Because of its constitutional nature, this guarantee of equality rights applies to all levels of 
legislative authority in Canada. Its reach is broad in that it applies to all Canadian law, whether 
at a federal , provincial or municipal level, including taxation, immigration, education, health care 
and even human rights protections. 
182 [1986] I SCR 103. 
183 A. Mayerson and S. Yee, supra n.l47 p.7. 
184 G. Brodsky and S. Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step Forward or 
Two Steps Back? (Ontario: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1989) cited in 
A. McColgan, Women Under the Law: The False Promise of Human Rights (London: Longman, 
2000) p.41. 
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Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia,185 the Court recognised that section 15 of 
the Charter protects against the impact as well as the content of discrimination, 
recognising this as an issue of"fundamental fairness". In this way, it signalled a move 
away from the equality-as-sameness argument which has bedevilled formal equality 
guarantees. The Court held that 
S.l5 is designed to protect those groups who suffer social, political and legal 
disadvantage in society ... [and] the burden resting on government to justify the 
type of cliscrimination against these groups is appropriately an onerous one. 186 
It also moved beyond the US insistence on intentional discrimination187 through its 
recognition of indirect discrimination at the constitutional level: "discrimination may be 
described as a distinction, whether intentional or not ... which bas the effect of 
imposing burdens, obligations or disadvantages on an individual or group not imposed 
on others or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits and advantages 
available to others" .188 
The importance of the Andrews decision for clisability equality rights lies in the 
Court's adoption of a contextual, effects-based approach. Tws approach recognises 
disadvantage as central to the analysis of cliscrimination. 189 It exposes the disadvantages 
produced by public policies or social practices which treat disabled people the same as 
their non-disabled counterparts in particular contexts, usually resulting in the exclusion 
of the disabled person. In this sense, Canadian equality jurisprudence has shown itself 
more capable of absorbing key aspects of the social construction of clisabiHty. Section 
15 has provided a context in which the discourse and the legal and policy considerations 
of disability have gradually taken on an equality rights perspective. In Eaton v Brant 
County Education Board'90, which concerned the rights of disabled children to a 
mainstream education, the Supreme Court began to carve out its understanding of 
equality in the disability context (despite an unsuccessful outcome on the facts of the 
case) and stated: 
"Exclusion from the mainstream of society results from the construction of a 
society based solely on mainstream attributes to wwch the clisabled will never 
be able to gain access. It is the failure to make reasonable accommodation to 
ISS [1989] I SCR 143. 
186 Ibid. p.l54. 
187 See Garrett, supra n.l60. 
188 [1989] I SCR 143 p.l54. 
189 M. H. Rioux and C.L. Frazee, "The Canadian Framework for Disability Equality Rights" in 
M. Jones and L.A. Basser Marks (eds.) Disability, Divers-ability and Legal Change (Kluwer 
Law International, 2000) p.171, 172. 
190 
[ 1997] I SCR 241. 
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fme-tune society so that its structures do not prevent the disabled from 
participation, which results in discrimination against the disabled. 191 
Thus, the Canadian Supreme Court, unlike its US and Irish counterparts, has begun to 
recognise how central the notion of accommodation is to understanding equality in the 
disability context. This understanding was cemented in the decision of Eldridge v 
British Columbia192 , which concerned a claim by deaf patients. They alleged a section 
15 violation arising from the failure of the government ofBritish Columbia to provide 
funding for sign language interpretation on hospital and doctor visits. The Supreme 
Court began by emphasising the dual purpose of section 15, which is to affirm the equal 
worth and dignity of all persons, as well as to rectify and prevent discrimination against 
particular groups.193 Justice La Forest started his analysis by considering the historical 
exclusion of disabled people: it had resulted in exclusion from the labour market, it bad 
reduced opportunities for social interaction and advancement, it had led to invidious 
stereotyping and a dependence on institutional care. This historical disadvantage had 
been shaped and perpetuated by the notion that disability is an abnormality or flaw. As a 
result, disabled persons have not generally been afforded the "equal concern, respect 
and consideration" that section 15(1) of the Charter demands. 194 Yet the lower courts 
and Court of Appeal had found no section 15(1) violation, as the need for sign language 
was not attributable to legislative inaction but to the disability: there was simply no 
inequality for which the law was answerable. In essence, this was a reversion to the line 
of reasoning that views disability as an "individual problem of the person". The 
inequality was simply a natural result of the impairment. The impact of this analysis, as 
Pothier points out, is that as long as the state did not directly cause the disability, it was 
free to deliver services on an exclusively able-bodied model, and could ignore the 
disparate impact on those not fitting the model. 195 
The Supreme Court, in rejecting the lower courts ' approach, analysed the case 
as a classic example of adverse effects discrimination, or indirect discrimination. The 
same services were available to all individuals but while hearing individuals were able 
to communicate with their health care professionals, deaf patients were denied effective 
communication in the absence of sign language interpretation. Thus, La Forest J . 
191 Ibid. 
192 ( 1997) 2 SCR 624. For a useful review which urges caution on the extent of the judgment's 
impact for disability equality rights, see D. Pothier, "Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney 
General): How the Deaf Were Heard in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1997-1998) 9 National 
Journal o_(Constitutional Law 263. 
193 Eldridge, at pp. 207-208. 
194 Ibid. p.209. 
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continued, "[section 15(1)] makes no distinction between laws that impose unequal 
burdens and those that deny equal benefits. If we accept the concept of adverse effects 
discrimination ... the government will be required to take special measures to ensure 
that disadvantaged groups are able to benefit equally from government services."196 The 
Court further held that section 1 did not allow this violation of section 15, despite the 
delicate balance in terms of healthcare spend within the province that was created by 
legislative decisions. This was because the Government could not establish that the total 
denial of interpretation services for the deaf constituted a minimal impairment of their 
rights. 197 "The Government has simply not demonstrated that this unpropitious state of 
affairs must be tolerated in order to achieve the objective of limiting health care 
expenditures". 198 The significance of the Eldridge decision is that when government is 
delivering a universal programme, it cannot provide services to the general population 
in a manner that denies persons with disabilities the equal benefit of such a programme. 
Thus, while the Government has to this extent a positive obligation towards disabled 
people, the Charter has never been used as a tool to force the state to promote the 
equality rights of disabled individuals generally. 199 
The discussion in this chapter has focused on the failure of the US and Irish 
Supreme Courts to conceptualise constitutional equality guarantees to take account of 
the specific difference of disability. It contrasted this state of affairs with the more 
developed analysis emerging under the Canadian Charter. However, the analysis should 
not be taken to mean that the Canadian interpretation and its application of 
accommodation mandates is without problems. Chapter six takes up this discussion and 
will more critically assess the Canadian understanding of reasonable accommodation. 
The issue which will be raised relates to the assumption underpinning accommodation 
mandates: accommodation demands, it is argued, an ad-hoc rebuilding of mainstream 
structures to include a greater proportion of disabled people. Thus, the approach does 
not suggest a fundamental rethink of the mainstream norm - rather, the mainstream 
norm is the "unproblematic background'' as opposed to an "institutional arrangement as 
195 D. Pothier, supra n. 192 p.268. 
196 Eldridge, p.224. The Court went on to point out that sign language interpretation would not 
have to be provided in every medical situation. The effective communication standard is a 
flexible one and will have to take into account such factors as the complexity and importance of 
the information to be communicated, the context, the number of people involved. 
197 Applying the test set out in R v Oates, discussed above. 
198 Eldridge, supra n. 192 p .231 · 
199 As to whether the Government could be subject to a section 15 challenge for a failure to act, 
McColgan points out that the Canadian Supreme Court would be likely to follow the Ontario 
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(the] conceivable source ofthe problem"?00 Leaving the substance of that discussion to 
chapter six, it can still be acknowledged here that the Canadian approach to disability 
equality represents a significant advancement in constitutional equality jurisprudence, 
particularly when compared with the approaches in the US and Ireland. The Canadian 
jurisprudence has challenged notions of disability as an individual deficit and has 
moved towards an understanding of disability in terms of social status. In this respect, it 
stands in marked contrast to the US and Irish experiences. In the context of disability, 
these jurisdictions' Supreme Courts failed to adequately interpret their constitutional 
equality guarantees in support. of accommodation mandates. Because of this failure, 
their analysis amounted to a significant judicial endorsement of the inferior status and 
exclusion of disabled people. 
Disability Rights and The Limits of Constitutionalism 
The eminent Mr Justice Brian Walsh wrote that the Irish Constitution 
"is not simply a composition of exhortations or aspirations which it is hoped 
will be followed. It is the basic law which distributes powers and imposes 
obligations and guarantees rights ... " .201 
Constitutionalism represents a particular genus of basic law, and it can incorporate a 
particular and limiting theory of law in western liberal democracies such as the United 
States and Ireland. It is generally recognised that constitutions regulate relations 
between the individual and the State, as envisaged by the social contract theory. Thus, 
the rights and obligations guaranteed and imposed by the Constitution are those between 
the individual and the State. Of course, it would be churlish not to acknowledge that the 
rights frameworks of the respective texts have provided protection to citizens against the 
tyranny posed by state power. Moreover, the Irish judiciary has already interpreted 
many of the fundamental rights provisions within the Constitution as being capable of 
"horizontal" application?02 However, this has not been the case with the equality 
Divisional Court in Ferrell v Attorney General of Ontario 149 DLR (4111) 335. See A. McColgan, 
Women Under the Law: The False Promise of Human Rights (London: Longman, 2000) p.56. 
200 This is the language of Martha Minow, Making All the Difference, Inclusion, Exclusion and 
American Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) p.112, cited in D. Pothier, supra n.192 
~.271. 
01 See Foreword to J. Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland (Dublin: Roundhall Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1987) p.vii written by Mr Justice Brian Walsh. 
202 S. Mullally, "The Myth of Constitutionalism and the "Neutral" State" in T. Murphy and P. 
Twomey (eds.) Ireland's Evolving Constitution 1937-1997 Collected Essays (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 1998) 147 pp. 151-152 and text to n.34. 
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guarantee which, in the absence of specific protective legislation, would be of no 
assistance to a disabled job applicant discriminated against by an employer in a 
"private" decision. 
However, the Supreme Court's judgment trumped employers' private property 
rights and their rights to carry on a business at the expense of minimum forms of non-
discrimination rights for disabled people. The negative consequences of this liberty-
enhancing view of private property are rarely, as Robertson points out, brought to the 
fore: 
[L]iberals find it bard to see that private property can be a source of oppressive 
power even more dangerous to individual freedom than the state. Because 
private property is categorised by them as belonging in the realm where 
freedom is safeguarded, liberals find it hard to fully absorb the way property 
can give owners great power to restrict the freedom of others. The second 
effect is that liberals fmd it hard to appreciate fully the public aspects of private 
property. Because property is categorised by them as belonging in the private 
zone, they find it hard to acknowledge the large range of ways in which it has a 
public dimension?03 
This is a clear example of"Irish constitutional law and practice [having] failed 
adequately to address the tensions between the constitutional values of liberty and 
equality".204 Liberal theory generally assumes that non-intervention by the State in 
private matters expands and protects individual autonomy. However, in this context, it 
has simply preserved the exclusionary status quo. It has substituted private for public 
power.205 Disabled people's claims to equality rights, by the Irish Supreme Court's 
reasoning, have been naturally excluded from the statutory anti-discrimination regime 
by dominant and "neutral" constitutional precepts, values and traditions. There was no 
room to consider the lack of neutrality implicit in their exclusion from the structural 
organisation of work, which the limited provisions of the Employment Equality Bill had 
attempted to redress. 
Why the Irish Constitution failed to deliver in this instance is partly because of 
the judiciary's refusal to rank the constitutional equality norm on which the legislation 
was predicated. The disadvantages associated with the Article 26 procedure did not aid 
the reasoning process?06 There have been numerous calls for rethinking the place of the 
203 M. Robertson, "Liberal, Democratic, and Socialist Approaches to the Public Dimensions of 
Private Property" in J. MacLean, (ed.) Property and the Constitution (Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon: Hart Publishing, 1999) p. 239,242. 
204 S. Mullally, supra n.202 p. 162. 
205 Ibid. 
206 The constitu6onal fate of this Bill was intertwined with the flaws of the Article 26 procedure 
itself. The arguments were abstract in character precisely because there was no consideration of 
113 
equality guarantee within Irish constitutional jurisprudence. The nature of this rethink 
would require some form of resolution with dominant conceptions of liberty and more 
substantive rights. Yet, the Constitution Review Group argued against the extension of 
the equality guarantee on the ground, inter alia, that it would constitute an "unjustified 
intrusion" upon other fundamental rights?07 
Additionally, what has emerged from the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Board ofTrustees of the University of Alabama v Garretr08 is the clear 
constitutional obstacle209 to the proper recognition of the social construction of disability 
within current civil rights protection. This decision, like the Irish Supreme Court 
decision, was predicated upon a particular and limiting conceptualisation of disability. 
The contested nature of the "reasonable accommodation" provision as an element of the 
equality concept becomes more than a matter of academic interest or a mere legislative 
quibble. It has clashed with (and floundered before) established components of US 
constitutional law, much as the Irish provision faced a brick wall in the property 
guarantees raised by the Irish constitutional text. When the reasonable accommodation 
mandate struggles for recognition the shadows of the "discourse of legitimacy [enjoyed 
by] constitutionallaw"/10 judicial control of our legal understanding of disability and 
disability rights will usurp any legislative attempts to capture the social-political aspects 
of disability? 11 No matter how limited the right to reasonable accommodation may be, it 
remains the only acknowledgment of the socio-political factors of disability within the 
anti-discrimination framework which, in all other aspects, adheres to the medical, 
"personal limitation" construct. There are great difficulties facing the disability equality 
agenda where dominant modes of judicial reasoning interpret anti-discrimination 
measures in terms of the medical or economic model of disability. It is difficult enough 
to alter dominant constructs of disabiUty where disability discrimination remains 
contested at statutory level, as was the case in the US prior to the Garrett decision. 
These difficulties are compounded when traditional modes of constitutional thinking 
thicken the mix. Constitutional tests utilized by the US Supreme Court, such as the 
any actual competing claims between a disabled applicant seeking reasonable accommodation 
and an employer claiming undue hardship and unjust attack on property rights. This allowed for 
the fictional vision of floodgate type expenses being thrust on employers forced to heavily 
accommodate severely impaired workers. 
207 S. Mullally, supra n.202 p.162. 
208 Supra text to n.I60. 
209 See generally chapters four and five. 
210 P. Brandwein, supra n.I75 p.38. 
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"congruent and proportionality'' test, did not allow for the particular view of reasonable 
accommodation in considering whether the remedies in the ADA were proportional to 
the injury to be prevented. The dominant view was that reasonable accommodation is a 
special right granted to people with impairments in order for them to participate in 
mainstream society.212 When viewed as "special", the Supreme Court interpretation 
maintains the locus of the problem in the individual's medical or personal deficiencies. 
Special intervention is required because of a disabled person's impaim1ents, and not 
because they are individuals disadvantaged by the built and social environment. The 
restructuring of job requirements is only viewed as "special" if one perceives the usual 
way of doing tasks as the natural way. "Yet if one recognizes that such requirements are 
often structured to exclude people with disabilities - and, therefore, the expectation of 
adaptation is shifted from the individual to the structured environment, then the lack of 
such accommodation is not inllerently rational."213 As a result, if the Supreme Court 
viewed the ADA's terms through the lens of the social model, there would have been 
space for the view of reasonable accommodation not as "special accommodations" but 
as proper steps needed to remedy violations of the equality clause.214 
In Ireland, the view that the Constitution remains a barrier to the introduction of 
proper means of ensuring the inclusion and participation of disabled people across 
society is widespread, and possible amendments to the property provisions of the 
Constitution have been mooted. The Labour Party proposed a constitutional amendment 
in order to "give constitutional effect to a broader interpretation of the rights of persons 
with disabilities". 215 It proposed a constitutional provision reading, inter alia, 
" ... the State may impose an obligation on some or all sections of the 
community to take reasonable steps to accommodate the needs of persons with 
a ... disability, notwithstanding that the provision for that ~urpose of 
appropriate treatment or facilities may give rise to a cost". 16 
211 See the contradiction between this approach taken by the judiciary and the more proper 
judicial restraint admonished by the Supreme Court in Cleburne. See specifically, text to n.l57 
sur·a. 
21 See chapters five and six for a rejection of this view of reasonable accommodation. 
213 J. Lav, "Conceptualizations of Disability and the Constitutionality of Remedial Schemes 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act" (2002) 34 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 197 
~p.226-227. 
14 Ibid. Such an interpretation is clearly possible since even the Supreme Court concluded that, 
under rational basis review, segregating people with disabilities could be a violation of equal 
~rotection. See Cleburne, supra n.l3 7. 
15 The Labour Party, Yours by Right: proposals for achieving equal citizenship for people with 
disabilities 2001-2004 (200 1) p. 7. 
216 ibid. 
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That said, there is the alternative view that a constitutional amendment would be 
unnecessary to reverse the specific ruling in the Employment Equality Bill decision. 
Instead, "[w]hat is needed is a much more sophisticated balancing of the competing 
interests at stake".217 While unnecessary in the present context due to the State's 
membership of the European Union, the sophisticated balancing required in the 
disability context generally might be a somewhat forlorn ambition in light of the politics 
pursued by the Supreme Court.218 
The judiciary's fundamental misunderstanding of the concepts of reasonable 
accommodation and the social construction of disability contributed greatly to the Irish 
decision's outcome. Notwithstanding these factors, a revised and watered-down version 
of the duty was inserted into the Employment Equality Act 1998. This was amended by 
tbe tenns of the Equality Act 2004, which implemented the terms of the Framework 
Equal Treatment Directive and was introduced as a consequence of the State's 
membership of the European Union.219 The next chapter switches focus to an issue 
internal to the discrimination legislation' s structure - that of defining those who are 
entitled to its protection. 
217 G. Quinn, The Irish Times May 19, 1997. 
218 Sinnott v Minister for Education [2001] I.E.S.C. 39 
219 By virtue of doctrine of supremacy ofEU law. See Article 29.4.3° - 8° of the Constitution and 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, discussed in chapter five. 
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Chapter Four 
The Definitional Quandary: The Meaning of "Disability" and its Place 
within The Anti-Discrimination Model 
Introduction 
Chapter one considered how the legal system's main experience with disability reflects 
the medical model which underpins social security legislation. The basis of this 
approach is compensatory: medical science delineates those ' truly disabled ' individuals 
who are unable to work and the state compensates them, while a guard is similtaneously 
provided against fraudulent attempts at claiming disability. However, the focus of anti-
discrimination legislation in the employment context has warranted a shift away from 
the presumptive attitudes engendered by this view of disability. 
As has been described in chapter one, advocates of the social model of 
disability reject the medical model, which defines disability as deviations from bio-
medical norms of human structure or function that exist in individuals because of 
disease, illness or accident. The social model stresses the role of external barriers, rather 
than organic deficiencies, in its account of the pervasive social exclusion endured by the 
disabled. While this thesis need not dedicate itself to a review of the diverse strands of 
social model theory, it utilises the general perspective of the theory as a tool to highlight 
difficulties with the anti-discrimination model 's approach to demarcation. However, 
mainstream opinion continues to consider that disability and impairment are 
synonymous, both in form and in outcome. This position derives from the commonly-
held view that disability amounts to a functional limitation which disables the individual 
in personal or social activities. For most people, it is the impairment which causes the 
various limitations and barriers faced by disabled people. 
The idea underpinning the disability equality norms is that a large proportion of 
disabled people could participate in employment but are excluded through a 
combination of stereotypical attitudes about their capabilities and rigid aspects of the 
built and structural environment which disproportionately impact upon the disabled as a 
group. Unlike in the more familiar anti-discrimination statutes, it may not be 
immediately obvious in the disability context that a particular individual possess the 
"discrimination-prompting attribute".' Making this distinction, in light of the purpose 
1 M. Crossley, "The Disability Kaleidoscope" (1999) 74 Notre Dame Law Review 62 1, 625 . 
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of anti-discrimination law, brings into focus the fact that the boundaries of the disability 
category are complex and cannot easily be reduced to clinical criteria. Thus, the 
question of who exactly is disabled is an active battleground in political and theoretical 
discourse.2 
This chapter documents and analyses the two approaches to disability definition 
that have been taken under the United States' Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
and Ireland's Employment Equality Act (EEA). In the main, disability discrimination 
statutes defme disability in terms of personal and organic deficit. The models tend to 
come in two main formats: a functional model that focuses on the severity of the 
impairment as a disqualification or barrier to activities and employment; and an 
impairment model that focuses on the existence of some organic impairment.3 At their 
core, both models are predicated on a conceptualisation of disability as inherent and 
problematic to the person, though they retain some differences with regard to the 
practical extent of the respective statutes ' protections. Despite the disability 
movement's concern over the EEA's impairment-based definition, this chapter 
concludes that this definition is preferable, as it presents fewer barriers to the operation 
of the non-discrimination system. 
Defining Disability: The Issues 
In discussing who the legislation was designed to cover, it is a useful starting point is to 
ask which individuals would need to be protected to achieve the goals of anti-
discrimination legislation in the employment context.4 While this raises broader issues 
regarding the nature and possible achievement of the goals of an anti-discrimination 
legal measure, this section addresses this question in the context of the introduction of 
specific disability discrimination protection in the United States' ADA. It is clear that 
the legislative construction of disability is of consequence from a number of 
perspectives. First, the most essential point is that in order to be protected by disability 
non-discrimination legislation, a person must satisfy the defmition of disability set out 
in the Act. Secondly, and somewhat related, is that any defmition adopted in statutory 
2 See generally J. E. Rickenbach, Physical Disability and Social Policy (Toronto, Buffalo: 
University ofToronto Press, 1993) for a useful discussion on the medical, economic and 
minority group models of disability. 
3 D.C. Baynton, "Bodies and Environments: The Cultural Construction ofDisability" in P.D. 
Blanck (ed.) Employment, Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Issues in Law, 
Public Policy and Research (Eavanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 2000) 387, 392. 
4 See the purpose section of the ADA, discussed in chapter one. 
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form becomes a statement, both to the disability movement and to society in general, of 
the law's construction of the disabled individual and the disability generally. It provides 
an indication as to whether revised understandings of disability - prompted by the social 
model- are now permeating equality constructions.5 
There is little ambiguity about the overall objectives which non-discrimination 
precepts seek to achieve with respect to disabled people. The ADA does not articulate 
its goals narrowly: it articulates a broad-based rationale for the legislation's 
introduction. The preamble states that "[t]he Nation's proper goals regarding individuals 
with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent 
living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals".6 Its primary purpose is "to 
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities".7 Considering such ambitious and 
wide-ranging objectives, it is surprising that persons whom one would expect to be 
included within the protection of the ADA have been excluded through a sustained 
campaign ofjudicial reductionism.8 The question is raised: what kind of individuals 
does the statute set out to protect, and bow bas its ultimate interpretation responded to 
its initial ambitions? 
The first point regarding the threshold issue is that there is an immediate 
distinction between the operation of the non-discrimination regime in the context of 
disability as compared with the sex discrimination system. In the latter, there is never a 
discussion around the individual's 'protected class' status, as sex discrimination affords 
protection from discrimination symmetrically to both sexes. This can be contrasted with 
the protected class approach prevalent in disability discrimination statutes, which 
provide asynuuetrical protection against discrimination to those deemed disabled. 
Consequently, non-disabled individuals do not fall within the protected class and are not 
entitled to statutory protection.9 However, due to the specific definition of disability 
under the ADA, many plaintiffs expend considerable time, money and energy on 
proving that the type and impact of their impairments are sufficient to qualify as a 
disability within the meaning of the statute. The irony is that having placed considerable 
emphasis on the medical and functional impacts of impairment, applicants are then 
s See 0. Smith, "Disability, Discrimination and Employment: A Never -ending Legal Story" 
FOOl) 23 Dublin UniversityLawJourna/148, 163. 
42 U.S.C.§ 12101 (a)(8). 
7 1n its long title, Ireland's Employment Equality Act describes it as "an act to make further 
provision for the promotion of equality between employed persons"; thus, articulating its goals 
less ambitiously and with Jess aplomb. 
8 Discussed below. 
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forced to prove that the impairment is not so serious as to prevent them doing the job.10 
As Burgdorf argues, "proving that one is disabled is the direct antithesis of the goals 
underlying the non-discrimination mandates of the ADA ... ".11 He bemoans the pattern 
of restrictive judicial interpretations under the ADA, where many cases are dismissed at 
summary judgment solely by a process oflooking at the characteristics of the 
plaintiffs. 12 In cases of summary dismissal, the court never gets to consider whether the 
plaintiff could have performed the job in question with or without a reasonable 
accommodation or, if an accommodation was necessary, whether it was reasonable to 
expect its provision within the terms of the Act. It has become clear that a particular 
perspective on the nature of disability, and on who should be considered disabled for the 
purposes of the ADA, has pern1eated the ADA jurisprudence. It correlates closely with 
the traditional approach underpinning social security protection, which is concerned 
with assessing needs-based claims and mininlising fraudulent claims. The purposes of 
anti-discrimination law are different, 13 yet remain conflated with the reductionism of the 
social security system. 14 
In the employment context, the ADA addressed the goal of improving the status 
of people with disabilities by including the "General Rule" that "no covered entity shall 
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability' '. 15 
This encompasses three requirements which are placed on employers. First, there is the 
prohibition of simple or direct discri.mination, which forbids employers from 
discriminating against individuals with disabilities on the basis of their disability. The 
second requirement involves a protection against what is termed disparate-impact 
discrimination16 or, in European terms, indirect discrimination. The third requirement 
9 See section 35(3) of the EEA as amended. 
10 R.L. Burgdorf Jr.," 'Substantially Limited' Protection from Disability Discrimination: The 
Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition ofDisability" (1997) 42 
Villanova Law Review 409, 571. 
II Ibid. 
12 Ibid. p. 561. See also "Study Finds Employers Win most ADA Title I Judicial and 
Administrative Complaints" (1998) 22 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 403. 
13 The issue is not one of delineating complete inability to work due to the impact of functional 
impairment, but rather the presence of an impairment which disproportionately impacts upon an 
individual's opportunity by prompting discriminatory treatment. 
14 See generally, L. Waddington and M. Diller, "Tensions and Coherence in Disability Policy: 
The Uneasy Relationship Between Social Welfare and Civil Rights Models of Disability in 
American, European and International Employment Law'' Paper presented at An International 
Disability Law and Policy Symposium, From Principles to Practice October 22-26 2000 
available at: <htto://www.dredf.org/symposium/waddington.htmJ> last accessed November 04, 
2002. 
IS 42 usc s. 1210I(b)(I). 
16 42 USC s. 42 2000e-2(a). 
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demands that an employer make a reasonable accommodation for a qualified individual 
with a disability. 17 As chapter two pointed out, Ireland's EEA follows a broadly similar 
template. Yet, as Friedland argues, writing in the US context, these goals pull in 
different directions. She suggests that the definition of disability is open to constriction 
if the legislature is simply concerned with meeting the economic goals of the 
legislation}8 If the aim of the legislation was simply to eliminate dependence on 
government-funded welfare and to ameliorate the situation of persons previously unable 
to work, then a narrow definition of disability, such as "a total inability to work" as is 
adopted under social security regulations, would have been appropriate. A possible 
fonnulation would have been a "total inability" - in the absence of accommodation - to 
work. 19 However, where the stated statutory goals refer to the integration and 
mainstream participation of disabled people in social life, then the tenet of"equality of 
opportunity"20 implies that the legislation must have intended to remove existing 
barriers to the continued and productive employment of a wider range of disabled 
people. However, the statute intended to tackle attitudinal, physical and environmental 
obstructions to the use or development of disabled people's skills. The task of the 
statutory drafters was to formulate a definition of disability encompassing both goals. 
Thus, whatever definitional route is taken, complainants must still work with the 
statutory definition assigned to the term "disability"? 1 It is with the construction oftbe 
assigned definition that tllis chapter is ultimately concerned. 
At this point, an even greater divergence takes place between the definitions of 
disability under the ADA and Ireland's EEA. The ADA's approach focuses on the 
severity of impairments in functional terms and their impact on certain personal and 
societal activities. On the other hand, the Irish definition provides something akin to a 
list of impainnents in quasi-medical terms. 
The Meaning, Effect and Impact of the Disability Definition under the 
ADA 
17 42 USC s 12112(b )(5)(A) discussed in chapter five. 
18 See M.T. Friedland, "Not Disabled Enough: The ADA's "Major Life Activity" Definition of 
Disability" ( 1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 171 , 189. 
19 ibid. 
20 42 usc s 121 0 I. 
21 ibid. 
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The Confusion Starts Here: Defining Disability under the Rehabilitation 
Act 
Despite being generally termed as the predecessor to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act 
1973 is significantly different in its scope and application. It can best be described as a 
general vocational rehabilitation statute. Almost as an addendum, however, it included 
an innovative initiative into the rights sphere for disabled people.22 
The Act requires departments and agencies in the executive branch of the 
federal government to submit an affirmative action plan for the hiring, placement and 
advancement of people with disabilities?3 In addition, its reach extends to federal 
contracts by providing that contracts in excess of $2,500 must contain a provision 
requiring the contractor to take affirmative action to employ and advance the situation 
of people with disabilities?4 Section 504 goes on to outline a general non-
discrimination aim. It appears that section 504 was modelled on almost identical 
provisions in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 196425 and Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972?6 The Congressional Committees involved borrowed this 
language without giving much thought to what anti-discrimination protection based on 
disability would mean in practice?7 The original text to s. 504 provided 
"no otherwise qualified handicappecf8 individual in the United States ... shall 
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving federal financial assistance" 
Discussions on the suitabiHty or otherwise of the definition of"handicap" (disability) 
for the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act took place during the drafting of regulations 
22 SeeR. K. Scotch, From Goodwill to Civil Rights: Transforming Federal Disability Policy 
(1984) pp.Sl-54 and C. Feldblum, "Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination 
Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About it? (2000) 21 Berkeley Journal of 
Employment and Labor Law 91 , pp. 98-102 and also L. Eichhorn, "Major Litigation Activities 
Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of the ''Disability" Definition in the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990" (1999) 77 North Carolina Law Review 1405, 1420. 
23 s. 50 I. 
24 s. 503. 
25 Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race in any program or activity receiving federal 
financial assistance. 
26 Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex in any educational program or activity receiving 
federal financial assistance. 
27 R. Scotch, supra n.22 pp.Sl-54. The regulatory framework envisioned to support the 
legislation was to be developed over the following four years facilitated Congressional laxity in 
this regard. At 60-81. 
28 Handicapped was the term still used at this time and was replaced with the term disability upon 
the ADA's introduction. 
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for sections 501, 503 and 504. The pressing question was whether the definition used in 
a vocational rehabilitation statute was appropriate in its application to the non-
discrimination provisions of section 504. Problems were swiftly identified with the 
defmition of a handicapped individual as "any individual who 
(A) has a physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or 
results in a substantial handicap to employment and 
(B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability from 
vocational services". 
This definition, which could be reasonably apposite for the purposes of determining 
participation in vocational rehabilitation programs, was patently unsuitable to disability 
discrimination protection under civil rights statutes.29 Specifically, the definition failed 
to include the possible discrimination directed at persons with a mental or physical 
disability that does not result in "substantial handicap to employment" or the 
discrimination endured by disabled persons who would not be beneficiaries of 
vocational rehabilitation services.30 Shortly thereafter, the Rehabilitation Act 
Amendments of 1974 were introduced.31 The amending instrument did not alter the 
existing definition of"handicapped individual", preferring to add a new definition for 
Titles IV and V of the Act. Thus, for the purposes of these Titles, which includes 
sections 501 , 503 and 504, the term "handicapped individual" means any person who 
(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of 
such person's major life activities, 
(ii) bas a record of such an impairment, or 
(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.32 
This three-pronged definition of disability (handicap) was extended to the ADA and its 
restrictive judicial interpretation has prompted increasing dissatisfaction with the 
ADA's operation. 
Definition of Disability: The ADA 
Ignoring alternative proposals, the ADA's drafters borrowed the definition of disability 
from the Rehabilitation Act 1973?3 The thinking behind this was that the federal 
29 C. Feldblum, "Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What 
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About it?" (2000) 21 Berkeley Journal of Employment 
and Labor Law 91, 100. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See Report of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, S.R. No. 93-1297, 93rd Congr., 
2"d Sess., for discussion and Feldblum, ibid. pp. 102- 106. 
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judiciary would have the benefit of the body of precedents applying the definition for 
the previous fifteen years.34 Congress had no reason to be concerned about a possible 
reduction in the ADA's coverage through the definition of disability because the courts 
had, for the most part, read the definition in a broad and all-encompassing manner. 
Apart from a couple of isolated decisions,35 whose precedential value provided 
foundation for the courts' subsequent tum-around under the ADA, the courts rarely 
analysed under the the Rehabilitation Act whether the plaintiff was indeed a disabled 
individual. Thus, the disability lobby remained confident that the same persons, with the 
wide range of impairments covered under existing disability anti-discrimination 
legislation, would be protected under the ADA. However, this confidence was shattered 
in the 1990s when the federal judiciary changed course and began to parse thoroughly 
both the definition of disability and the impairments of plaintiffs, excluding all those 
who did not accord with its particular view of a "truly disabled" claimant. 
The text of the deftnition is considered below, followed by a discussion of the 
implications of its judicial interpretation and application. 
The Three-Pronged Definition of Disability under the ADA 
The first prong defines an individual with a disability as a person with any physical or 
mental impairment which "substantially limits" one or more of"the major life 
activities". The second prong includes any individual with "a record of such an 
impainnent". The third prong includes within the meaning of the term an individual 
who is "regarded as having such an impainnent".36 
As is the case with many regulatory definitions, one definition begets several 
more.37 Accompanying this somewhat sparse statutory text, therefore, is a bewilderingly 
array of material, including a rich legislative history, regulations, interpretive guidance 
32 Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (1998). 
33 Set out in s.3 ADA, 1990. For an excellent account of the history and debates surrounding the 
definition of disability proposed for the ADA, see generally C. Feldblum, supra n. 29 and R.L. 
Burgdorf, Disability Discrimination in Employment Law (Washington: Bureau of National 
Affairs; 1995), chapter 4. 
34 In addition, it was felt that it would be easier to muster political support for a definition of 
disability with fifteen years experience, rather than attempt to convince Congress to adopt a new, 
untested definition. C. Feldblum, supra.n. 29 p.l28. 
35 Forrissi vBowen 794 F.2d 931, A AD Cases 921 (4th Cir. 1986) and E.E. Black Ltd. v 
Marshal/497 F. Supp. 1088, 1 AD Cases 220 (D.Haw. 1980). 
36 Section 3(2)(a)-(c) ADA 
37 S. Locke, "The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Disability under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act" (1997) 68 University of Colorado Law Review 107, 110. 
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and many advisory memoranda, the most prolific author of these being the United States 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereafter the EEOC).38 The legislative 
history of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 1973 indicates that the three-pronged 
definition was designed to address different types of disability discrimination. The first 
prong was designed to address direct discrimination based on actual disability, and to 
provide a definition to facilitate the statute's disability-based affirmative action 
requirements.39 The remaining two prongs were designed to address discrimination 
stemming from classifications of disability and perceptions regarding disabilities. 
However, all three are compromised by the limiting nature of the terms "major life 
activities" and "substantial limitations": these terms place massive and contradictory 
procedural burdens on claimants. 
The First Prong: Actual Disability and Major Life Activities 
The first prong is the most restrictive in that it only covers persons with a physical or 
mental impainnent that substantially limits one or more major life activities. The term 
"physical impairment" is defined as "any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic 
disfigurement, or anatomical loss" affecting one or more of the body's systems.40 
Mental impainnent is defined as "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder".41 In general, 
these terms have been accorded a wide and liberal interpretation, though certain 
conditions tend to push at their boundaries.42 
38 The EEOC regularly publishes a series of guides to assist compliance with all of the major 
federal laws that prohibit discrimination in employment. See also the Department of Justice 
regulations, codified at 28 C.F.R. pt.361. For sharp criticism of this "backdoor regulation" and 
the EEOC's attempts to "rewrite the statute", see B. J. Fisher with G. E. Farb, The ADA: Ten 
Years On (National Legal Center for the Public Interest, 2000) pp.2-10. 
39 L. Eichhorn, supra n.22 p. 1427. Burgdorf explains the apparent inconsistency between the 
first prong which is restrictive in scope and the more expansive second and third prongs. It 
stems from the broad purposes that Congress wished the definitions to serve - i.e. both 
affirmative action efforts, barrier removal efforts and non-discrimination mandates. A broad 
definition was required for the non-discrimination mandate, but "the objective of affirmative 
action programs would ... be undermined if ... employers could claim success based upon 
workers whom the employer merely regarded as being a person with a disability." It does not 
stretch credulity too far to imagine an employer who says "I have a perfect affirmative action 
program under section 503; I regard all my employees as impaired". R. L. Burgdorf, supra n.lO 
PJ'" 432-433. 
29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (h)( I). Body systems are described as "neurological, musculoskeletal, 
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, 
digestive, genito-urinary, haernic and lymphatic, skin and endocrine. (July 2003 ed.) 
41 Examples included are mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental 
illness, and specific learning disabilities". 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (h)(2) (July 2003, ed.). 
42 For example, obesity and certain fatigue syndromes which depend upon self-reporting. 
Though see infra for discussion of the requirement for medical validation of impairments. 
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The burden of proving that an impairment "substantially limits" one or more 
"major life activities" and that the individual is "qualified" for the job he or she has lost 
or seeks is the arduous task facing an ADA claimant. Regulations promulgated by the 
EEOC and the US Department of Justice define "major life activities" as including 
functions such as: caring for oneself; performing manual tasks; walking; seeing; 
hearing; speaking; breathing; learning; and working.43 This list, however, was not 
intended to be exhaustive, and certain courts have been willing to add to the range of 
"major life activities".44 
Nowhere in the legislative history does there appear to be any clear explanation 
as to why actual disabilities are defined in terms of"substantial limitations" on "major 
life activities". The regulations simply define "major life activities" as the functions 
listed above. There appears to be no common thread linking the items listed. Some are 
physiological, some are sensory- they seem arbitrarily decided. Without a common 
thread, it becomes even more difficult to forecast functions "such as these" with regard 
to the inclusion of other "major" life activities. In addition, the inquiry into which life 
activities are "major" is a requirement loaded with bias: presumably, one who cannot 
perform a "major life activity" does not have much of a life.45 Eichorn persuasively 
states that: 
(i)fthe disability label has historically depended upon arbitrary notions of the 
activities that people should be able to perform and the ways in which they 
should perform them, then the categorisation of some activities as "major" takes 
this arbitrariness one step further.46 
This approach contradicts the disability movement's attempt to shift the goal posts from 
descriptions of impairments and towards social, cultural and environmental reactions to 
impairments. The ADA defmition, however, locates disability primarily in the body of 
the individual. For example, one "major life activity" is said to be walking, yet disability 
advocates argue that this could preferably be defmed in terms of moving about freely.47 
While there is more than one method of moving about freely, walking remains the 
dominant, valued and protected form. As Silvers points out, disablement can be seen as 
a social phenomenon when one realises how tightly it is linked to disadvantage: ''From 
the standpoint of persons mobilizing in wheelchairs disablement is experienced not as 
43 29 CFR 1630.2(i) (July 2003 ed.). 
44 Lower federal courts have ruled that standing and sitting, as well as procreation, sexual 
conduct and nonnal social relationships are major life activities. SeeR. Burgdorf, supra n.33 
£.133-136. 
5 L. Eichorn, supra n.22 at p. 1429. 
46 Ibid. 
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the absence of walking but as the absence of [access to] bathrooms, theatres, 
transportation, the workplace .. . all those opportunities most other citizens expect to 
access. ,,4s Yet the statutory formulation emphasises individual impairment, whereas the 
social formulation directs attention to an obstacle-laden environment.49 The definition at 
once reinforces the strict demarcation line inherent in the disability-ability dichotomy 
and ignores the spectrum-of-abilities theory advocated by the disability movement.50 
Feldblum reports that the attorneys drafting the regulations under the 
Rehabilitation Act believed that the now-contentious limiting phrase would simply 
exclude coverage of minor impaim1ents.51 Any physical or mental impainnent that 
affected an individual's life in any significant or major way was w1derstood to be 
covered under the new defmition.52 However, the failure to make this implicit 
understanding an explicit feature of the statute has given the judiciary free rein to 
exclude coverage to impairments far beyond supposedly minor ones. 53 
Actual Disability and Substantial Limitations 
Moving on to the issue of"substantiallinlltations", the EEOC states that a "substantial 
limit" on a major life activity arises if the person is either: 
I. unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general 
population can perform; or 
2. significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an 
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the 
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general 
population can perform that same major life activity. 54 
The EEOC has also stated that in determining whether an individual is substantially 
limited in a major life activity, a court must look at: 
47 D.C.Baynton, supra n.3 p. 388. 
48 A. Silvers, "Formal Justice" in A. Silvers eta!. (eds.) Disability, Difference, Discrimination: 
Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998) 
p.l3 
49 D.C. Baynton, supra n.3 p.388. 
50 The US Civil Rights Commission have argued that while laws and the general public usually 
assume that people with disabilities are significantly impaired in ways that make them sharply 
distinguishable from non-disabled people, ilie underlying reality is not so easily categorised; 
instead of two separate and distinct classes. There are spectrums of physical and mental abilities 
that range from superlative to minimal or non-functional. See Accommodating the Spectrum 
(Washington) p. 87. 
51 C. Feldblum, supra n. 29 pp. 104-105. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Discussed in more detail, infra. 
54 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2 (j) (I) (i)-(ii) (July 2003 ed.). 
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(l) the nature and severity of the impairment; 
(2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and 
(3) the permanent or long-term impact, resulting from the impairment. 55 
The language ofthls sub-clause implies that the ADA coverage is restrictive: it should 
only apply to the "truly disabled" and not to those less severely or temporarily impaired. 
Yet, Congressional fmdings and debates show that the Act was intended to protect those 
people with disabilities who were not necessarily limited in their activities, but who 
were limited by the exclusionary impact of prejudice and negative attitudes.56 Congress 
was concerned to protect individuals both from negative societal reactions to the 
differences caused by impaired modes of functioning and from negative reactions to 
atypical bodies generally. Clearly, the statutory language here is at odds with the nature 
of the harm it seeks to remedy and prevent. EEOC regulations indicate that an 
impaim1ent lasting eight weeks, for example, would not be considered to be 
substantially limiting. If the right contained within the statute is the right to be free from 
discriminatory actions, it is difficult to perceive why this guarantee does not extend to 
those with less than "substantial" limiting impairments or with impairments of a 
temporary duration. 57 Indeed, it remains questionable whether the statutory text 
provides sufficient foundation for the EEOC's assertions on this point. While the 
statutory concept contemplates quality and quantity considerations - what life activity is 
limited and how seriously- it does not include "temporal considerations". 58 The 
argument is that the history of the Act does not suggest that a substantial limiting 
condition should not be considered as such merely because it does not last long enough. 
This unhappy terminology, and the associated difficulties that arise, continues in the 
second and third prongs, as considered below. 
The Second Prong - "Record" of a Disability 
Many disability advocates took the view that the restrictiveness of the first prong of the 
disability defmition would be offset by the width of coverage thought to be inherent in 
55 29 C.F. R. § 1630 2(j) (2) (i)-(iii) (July 2003 ed.). A "substantial" limit on the major life 
activity of working means that the individual is significantly restricted in the ability to perform a 
class of job activities as compared to an average person with comparable training, skills, and 
ability. 29 C. F.R.§ 1630.2(3)(i). (July 2003 ed.). 
56 See the purpose section attached to the ADA, introduced in chapter one. 
57 Of course, describing this impairment as a disability is a separate issue, though it could 
become so if discriminatory animus is directed towards such an impairment, whatever its 
duration. 
58 R. Burgdorf, supra n.33 p.l35. 
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the second and third prongs. The legislative history of the ADA indicates that the 
second prong, the record prong, is intended to prevent discrimination against individuals 
who have been classified, correctly or incorrectly, as having an impairment that limits a 
major life activity. 59 Building on this, section 504 regulations, and the subsequent 
EEOC ADA regulations, define the record prong as including those who have a history 
of an impairment or those misclassified as having an impairment.60 The EEOC's 
Interpretive Guidance includes, by way of example, individuals who have recovered 
from impairments, such as cancer patients, and individuals misclassified as learning 
disabled.6 1 However, the "substantially limited" restriction still looms over these two 
prongs. Any determination as to whether an individual is covered by the second prong is 
contingent on the "record" at issue being a record of an impairment that substantially 
/imitec/'2 a major life activity. A record of condition that is not an impairment, or a 
record of an impairment that is not substantially limiting, does not satisfy this part of the 
defmition.63 
The Third Prong - "Regarded as" Having a DisabilityP4 
The "regarded as" prong recognises that individuals are often identified or labelled as 
disabled and subjected to discrimination based on society's accumulated fears, 
stereotypes and prejudices regarding disability. Consequently, the "regarded as" prong 
is directed at the entity that harbours such prejudices or fears, rather than at the person 
alleging the discrimination. Thus, the emphasis here is very much placed on the 
employer's perception and whether the employer treats the individual as having an 
impaim1ent that substantially limits major life activities. Not surprisingly, the "regarded 
as" test has been expanded upon in regulations, first issued under the Rehabilitation Act, 
1973:65 To be regarded as having an impairment means that the individual 
59 See Senate Report No. 106-116 at 23, House Education and Labor Report at 52-53 and House 
Judiciary Report at 29. 
60 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j)(2)(iii); 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(k) (July, 2003 ed.). This would include school 
or other institutional records or documents labelling or classifying an individual as having a 
substantially limiting irnpairn1ent. 
61 29 C.F.R. Ch. XIV, Appendix to Part 1630- Interpretive Guidance on Title loft he Americans 
with Disabilities Act, commentary on§ 1630.2(k) (July 2003 ed.). 
62 My emphasis. 
63 See Byrne v Board of Education 979 F. 2d 560 (71h Cir. l992). 
64 SeeR. Burdgorf, supra n.33 pp.l52- 163. 
65 For the Rehabilitation Act's definition see 45 C.F.R §84.3(j)(2)(iv) ( 1993). 
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(A) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit 
major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such 
a limitation; 
(B) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life 
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such 
impairment; or 
(C) has none of the impairments defined [in the impairment paragraph] but is 
treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting 
impairment.66 
The common thread is that a person who does not meet the definition of disability in the 
first prong is treated as having such a disability by the employer, based on either 
personal or societal perceptions. Thus, if an employer makes an adverse decision against 
an individual because of myths, fears and stereotypes about disability, then the 
employer's action would fall under the third prong of the definition, whether the 
employer's perception was a universal or an idiosyncratic one. 
Burgdorf argues that the regulatory formulation outlined here overly 
complicates a reasonably straightforward statutory objective.67 Paragraph A and Bare 
remarkably similar: "[b ]oth deal with circumstances in which a person has a physical or 
mental impairment but not one that substantially limits a major life activity, and in both 
instances the individual is treated as if the impairment did limit major life activities".68 
The difference is that in (A), the employer treats the impairment as more limiting than it 
really is, whereas in (B), the person's activities are limited as a result of attitudinal 
barriers in society. Paragraph (C) is simply where a person has no actual physical or 
mental impairment but is treated as possessing such an impaim1ent. 
The rationale underpinning the " regarded as" prong was articulated by the 
Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v Arlini9, decided under the 
Rehabilitation Act 1972. Here, the Supreme Court recognised that an impairment which 
does not have a substantial limitation or does not diminish a person 's capabilities "could 
nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative 
reactions of others to the impairment".70 The inclusion of this prong by Congress was, 
according to the Supreme Court, an acknowledgment "that society's accumulated myths 
66 EEOC, Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2 (I) (July 2003 ed.). 
67 R. Burgdorf, supra n.33 p. 154. 
68 Ibid. p.l53. 
69 480 u.s. 273 (1987). 
70 Ibid. p. 283. 
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and fears about disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical 
limitations that flow from actual impairments".71 
The Qualification Requirement 
The complex US defmition of disability is compounded by the fact that the anti-
discrimination principle only applies to a "qualified individual with a disability".72 This 
paradigm is prescribed in section 101(8) ofthe ADA to mean an individual who "with 
or without reasonable accommodation can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires". This makes it necessary to 
determine whether the individual is qualified for the job as a precursor to discrimination 
protection. This aspect to the ADA is discussed in the following chapter as part of the 
discussion surrounding the operation of the reasonable accommodation duty. 
Conditions Expressly Excluded 
The ADA goes on to expressly exclude conditions which might be open to doubt as to 
whether they can be included in the disability category. Section 511 (b) contains a list of 
eleven conditions that are excluded from the definition of disability for the purposes of 
the act. The eleven conditions are set out in three categories: (1) transvestism, 
transsexualism, paedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identification disorders 
not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behaviour disorders; (2) 
compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; (3) disorders resulting from the use 
of psychoactive substances and illegal drugs.73 
The Impact of the ADA Definition on the Statutory System 
This section demonstrates how the judiciary has restricted protection under the ADA to 
its own definition of a truly deserving "disabled person". This is contrary to the 
construct of disability presented by the disability movement and it is also contrary to the 
original intentions of Congress. Congressional members and Washington advocates 
simply did not foresee the disarray that would be created by the federal judiciary's 
interpretive ploy. Yet, history should have warned that legislatures cannot always rely 
71 Ibid. p. 284. 
72 Section 102 (a) ADA, 1990. Emphasis added. 
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on the judicial body to interpret broad statutory provisions in accordance with policy 
aims. The statute has been drafted in an open-ended manner and many key concepts 
have been filled out by non-binding agency regulators: consequently, Congress has been 
accused of abdicating its legislative power.74 
As is outlined below, the federal courts have not interpreted the ADA in a 
manner faithful to its remedial purpose, which was to affirm the capabilities of the 
disabled and end their labour market isolation. Attempting to discourage frivolous cases 
taken under the often-misunderstood reasonable accommodation duty, the judiciary has 
shifted the focus to the issue of coverage. By this ploy, the personal characteristics of 
the employee or potential employee take centre stage. This redirects the debate on 
disability exclusion back towards the relative deficit of the individual and away from the 
endemic and structural nature of disability discrimination. The discussion below 
demonstrates how the ADA' s functional limitation approach has been turned on its head 
and, as a consequence, how this pioneering model of disability anti-discrimination law 
has lost much of its original worth. 
Catch 22: Not Disabled Enough, Yet Too Disabled to do the Job 
Protection from discriminatory action on tbe basis of a characteristic should not depend 
upon the degree of the characteristic if the facts show that the action was in any case 
irrational, irrelevant and unfair. This is not to suggest that the degree of an impairment 
is never relevant. On the contrary, the degree and impact of an irnpainnent may be 
relevant at a different stage: in tenns of the practicalities of any available 
accommodation or in the context of service provision. However, disabled employees 
and applicants in the United States are still faced with a Catch 22 situation. If a person 
has an extensive impairment, the federal courts view this as compromising his or her 
qualifications for a position.75 If they do not have what is proven to be a substantial or 
significant limitation, they are then excluded from the Act's protection. 
An examination of the prevailing federal jurisprudence on the definition of 
disability unearths a number of anomalies. For example, some ADA plaintiffs have 
successfully persuaded courts that a specific impairment causes a substantial limitation 
73 SeeR. Burgdorf, supra n.33 pp.146-148 for discussion. 
74 S. Epstein, "In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's Financial Hardship 
Becomes 'Undue' under the Americans with Disabilities Act" (1995) 48 Vanderbilt Law Review 
422, 441. 
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on a major life activity. Remarkably, other courts disagree that the same impairment 
satisfies the statutory definition. As O 'Brien comments, there has been no consistent 
line of reasoning indicating why one impairment is a disability and another is not.76 
Successful claimants (those who have not had their cases dismissed at summary 
judgment) have had impairments such as depression, HIV, diabetes and infertility 
recognised. Cases dismissed include persons with impairments such as paranoid 
thought disorder, asthmatic bronchitis, carpal tunnel syndrome77, back injuries, high 
blood pressure, psoriasis and degenerative arthritis. This individual scrutiny as to 
whether a plaintiff is truly "substantially limited" by his or her particular set of 
symptoms enables courts to dispose of claims on motions for summary judgment. At the 
same time, the courts can insulate their rulings from review by restricting them to 
factual findings of deficiencies in the plaintiffs' particular medical conditions.78 
However, the key enquiry under the ADA should not be an extensive report on the fact 
and impact of impairment - rather, the key issue should concern how the employer 
reacted to the impairment in the eruployn1ent context. Protection against discrimination 
and prejudice should not depend on the minutiae or intricacies of a particular condition 
and on the degree to which a particular condition impacts on a major life activity. 
Rather, it ought to react to the general phenomenon of disability discrimination, which 
is based on myths, stereotypes and assumptions about disability and disabled people 
generally. The ADA approach to the demarcation issue individualises the definition of 
disability to an extent that detailed medical scrutiny of an individual is required in order 
to detennine whether he or she warrants protection. This process of individualisation 
spills over from the judicial experience with disability in the entirely different 
framework of social security protection. 
As a consequence of the US federal courts ' approach, there are considerable 
risks associated with disability discrimination suits. For example, take an employee with 
a non-apparent disability who makes an accommodation request- this request 
necessarily discloses her disability to her employer. However, the employer may refute 
the claimant's disabled status as a defence to the request. If the claimant cannot prove 
75 Entitlement to non-discrimination protection is only conferred upon a "qualified individual 
with a disability". See 29 C.F.R. §l630.2(q). Discussed further in chapter five. 
76 R. O'Brien, Crippled Justice: The History of Modern Disability Policy in the Workplace 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 200 I) p.l79. 
77 The US Supreme Court, in an unanimous opinion, reversed the lower court 's finding that the 
employee's carpal tunnel syndrome was a disability covered by the ADA: Toyota v Williams 
2002 WL 15402, Jan 8 2002. 
78C. Lanctot, "Ad Hoc Decisions Making and Per Se Prejudice: How Individualizing the 
Detem1ination of"Disability" Undermines the ADA" ( 1997) 42 Villanova Law Review 327, 332. 
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that her impairment rises to the level of a disability- i.e. by amounting to a substantial 
limit on a major life activity, or that the employer regarded her as having such a 
limitation - she is not a disabled person, and loses her civil rights protection. The bitter 
irony is that she has now provided her employer with grounds for her termination.79 By 
disclosing her impairment, which has fallen short of the "disabled standard' of the 
ADA, the employer can direct any discriminatory animus toward her whatsoever, 
entirely free of legal sanction. Sutton v NM Dept of Children Youth and Families80 
provides a clear example. The plaintiff, who suffered from degenerative arthritis of her 
hip, was found not to be regarded by her employer as having a disability. The Court 
conceded that her ability to stand for four hours instead of eight might be an 
impairment, but this did not affect any of her major life activities. But since the plaintiff 
only had the strength to stand for four hours as opposed to eight, she was considered no 
longer competent for her position and had given the employer grounds for termination. 
The plaintiff was not entitled to protection of the ADA. With the focus squarely located 
on the characteristics of the plaintiff, other critical enquires were simply dispensed with. 
There was no need to consider whether any discriminatory animus was directed toward 
the claimant, or whether or not the alleged treatment was "on the grounds" of disability. 
There was no need to consider whether the employee was qualified for the position- i.e. 
whether she could perform essential functions with or ~ithout reasonable 
accommodation -or whether an employer was otherwise justified in the course of action 
taken. 
The other side to the coin is that if the courts perceive an individual as being too 
disabled, they are likely to hold that the person is not qualified to do the job. The ADA's 
qualification requirement deems a person with a disability as an "otherwise qualified 
person with a disability who with or without a reasonable accommodation can perform 
the essential functions of the job" .81 The impact of this provision is discussed in chapter 
five. 
Mitigation Measures 
79 R. O'Brien, supra n. 76 p.181. 
80 922 F.Supp. 516 (D.N.M.). 
81 Section 101 (8) ADA. 
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All regulatory guidance and Congressional reports82 indicate that the determination of 
disabled status for the purposes of the ADA was to be carried out without regard to 
medication or to aids such as prosthetic devices or to other equipment used to 
ameliorate the effects of conditions. Eight out of the nine US Court of Appeals that 
considered the issue accepted tbis and agreed with the guidance of three enforcement 
agencies that the effects of mitigating measures should not be considered. One Court of 
Appeal - the Tenth Circuit - did not. It decided to evaluate the effect of mitigation 
measures on an individual's impairment in order to decide whether it substantially 
limited a major life activity. Tllis issue eventually came before the US Supreme Court. 
In Sutton et al v United Airlines,83 the Supreme Court, led by Justice O'Connor, 
rejected both legislative history84 and interpretive material developed by the EEOC,85 
when it held that a person was not disabled for the purposes of the ADA if her condition 
could be mitigated with medication or equipment. As will be discussed below, the 
ramifications oftbis line of reasoning are far-reaching. This case makes plain the nature 
of judicial engagement with the disability definition under the ADA. 
Three decisions of the Supreme Court were handed down which clearly 
indkated its intent on this matter.86 In the main decision, Sutton, twin sisters with severe 
myopia which was fully corrected by their eyeglasses, challenged United Airlines' 
policy which required global pilots to have uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or better. 
Both sisters met the federal vision standards required and bad met all other qualification 
criteria- age, education, experience and certification. However, they failed to meet the 
airline's standard of possessing uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or better. 
82 See the Senate Report: "whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to 
the availability of mitigating measures such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids." S. 
Rep No. 101-116 p.23 (1989). Referring to the "regarded as" prong, it continued: "[An] 
important goal of the third prong ... is to ensure that persons with medical conditions that are 
under control, and that therefore do not currently limit major life activities, are not discriminated 
against on the basis of their medical conditions. For example, individuals with controlled 
diabetes or epilepsy are often denied jobs for which they are qualified. Such denials are the 
result of negative attitudes and misinformation." At p. 24. See also Report of the House 
Committee, H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt ID, p.28 (1990). 
83 527 us 47 1 (1999) 482. 
84 When it comes to statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court, once that Court relies on plain 
legislative text, aU accounts of legislative intent are immediately discarded. "Because we decide 
that, by its terms, the ADA cannot be read in this manner [i.e that persons should be assessed in 
their unmitigated state], we have no reason to consider the ADA's legislative history." Ibid. 
E.482. 
5 Justice O'Connor questioned the authority of the EEOC to issue regulations interpreting the 
definition of disability, which has express authority to issue guidelines interpreting Title I of the 
Act. Ibid. p.479. 
86 The other two decisions are Albertson v Kirkinburg 527 U.S. 555 and Murphy v United Parcel 
Ser11ice 527 U.S. 516. 
135 
' 
The plaintiffs argued that the company discriminated against them on the basis 
of their disability, or because it regarded them as having a disability. Without 
considering the claim on its merits- i.e. whether the action of the company was 
warranted in light of business necessity or safety exemptions - the Supreme Court 
concentrated exclusively on the definition of disability. The issue arising was whether 
an individual's satisfaction of the statutory definition of disability should refer to 
measures that mitigate the individual's impairment. By a seven to two majority, 
O'Connor J., writing for the Court, held that since the sisters' impairment was mitigated 
by their eyeglasses, they were not disabled and therefore fell outwith the statutory 
protection. Three reasons were forwarded in support of this holding. 
First, Justice O'Connor relied on the statute's use of the phrase "substantially 
limits" in its "present indicative form".87 In a proper reading of the Act, this required 
that" ... a person be presently - not potentially or hypothetically - substantially limited 
in order to demonstrate a disability".88 Justice O 'Connor continued: "[a] "disability" 
exists only where an impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity, not where it 
"might", "could" or "would" be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not 
taken".89 Despite their visual impairments, the twins, while wearing eyeglasses, were 
not disabled because the impairments, where corrected, did not substantially limit any 
major life activity. 
Second, relying on Bragdon v Abbott90, the Court emphasised the individualised 
nature of the inquiry as to whether a person bas a disability under the ADA. Any 
relinquishment of this individualised approach "would require Courts and employers to 
speculate about a person's condition and would, in many cases, force them to make a 
disability determination based on general information about how an uncorrected 
impairment usually affects individuals, rather than on the individual's actual 
condition".91 This argument was sufficient for O'Connor J. to dismiss the EEOC 
regulations on the matter. 92 
87 527 u.s. 471 , 482. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 524 U.S. 624 (1998) where the Court stated: "[t]he determination of whether an individual has 
a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, 
but rather on the effect oftbat impairment on the life of the individual." At pp.641-42. 
91527 u.s. 471 , 483. 
92 Feldblum argues that the Court's emphasis on individualised assessments in this context is 
misplaced. She points out that : "[i]t is true that individualized assessments lie at the very core of 
disabil ity anti-discrimination law. Because one of the causes of discrimination faced by people 
with disabilities is stereotypes regarding what people with disabilities are capable of doing, it is 
critical that each person with a disability be individually assessed to determine his or her 
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Third, and in an interestingly selective piece of judicial deference to 
Congressional findings,93 O'Connor J. described Congress's fmding that "some 
43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities" as "critical".94 
From this statement, O'Connor J. deduced that Congress did not intend to bring under 
the statute's protection all those whose uncorrected conditions amount to disabilities.95 
Since the twins' impairments were found to be insufficiently debilitating to 
satisfy the first prong of the definition, the Court went on to consider the alternative 
argument: whether the sisters were "regarded as" being disabled. The relevant question 
in this context was whether United Airlines regarded the sisters as substantially limited 
in a major life activity. According to Justice O'Connor, there are two ways to fall 
within this definition: first, where a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has 
a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities or 
second, where a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, non-limiting 
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Common to both 
approaches is the idea of a misperception. Either the employer wrongly believes that a 
person bas a substantially limiting impairment, or believes that a person has a 
substantially limiting impairment which, in fact, is not so limiting. The basis of this 
protection bas been to protect those persons who, on the basis of society's accumulated 
myths and fears about disability, are regarded as being disabled. Justice O'Connor felt 
that the company did not mistakenly regard the sisters as having an impairment, because 
the remedial measures- glasses - were obvious and ubiquitous. 
As a last resort, the sisters argued that United Airlines regarded them as 
disabled because of a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.96 
However, to succeed on this prong, a plaintiff has to demonstrate that he or she is 
capacity to do a job ... and moreover .. . disability law presumes the need for intensive 
indjvidualized assessments whenever reasonable accommodations are at issue .... but the idea 
that an individualized assessment would be used to determine whether one person with epilepsy 
would be covered under the law while another person with epilepsy would not, was completely 
foreign both to Section 504 jurisprudence and to the spirit of the ADA as envisioned by its 
advocates". C. Feldblum, supra n.29 pp. 152-153. 
93 The Court is so eager to rely on Congress's findings for the purposes of this argument Yet, 
irorucally, it refused to also rely on relevant House and Senate reports indicating congressional 
intent on the issue of mitigating measures as this was contrary to the view favoured by the Court. 
94 527 u.s. 471 ' 484. 
95 Thls conclusion was reached after a brief exarrunation of the two different means of 
ascertaining those with a disability - the functional and non-functional approaches. See C. 
Feldblum, supra n. 29 p.l54 for a discussion of the insignificance of the numerical estimation of 
the number of people with disabilities during the drafting process. See also National Council on 
Disability, Significance of the ADA Finding that Some 43 Million Americans Have Disabilities 
(Policy Brief Series: Righting the ADA, November 2002). 
96 See infra for discussion on the "regarded as" prong of the definition of disability. 
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excluded from more than one type of job and that they are regarded as excluded from an 
entire class of jobs or a broad range ofjobs.97 O'Connor J. found that the plaintiffs were 
not regarded as excluded from a class of jobs: the employer did not regard the employee 
as incapable of fulfilling the requirements of an array of jobs, but those attached to the 
particular position.98 The sisters were regarded by United Airlines as qualified to fly 
planes regionally but not globally. Citing EEOC regulations,99 O 'Connor J. argued that 
to be substantially limited in the life activity of working, the sisters had to show that the 
employer regarded their impairment as a barrier to work as a pilot anywhere, rather than 
as a barrier to a position as a global airline pilot. Since the position of global airline 
pilot is a single job, the sisters failed to meet the elements of the "regarded as" prong as 
it applies to the major life activity of working. 
The Supreme Court's approach in Sutton reflects a judicial concern for 
managerial power in light of the perceived threat posed by the remedial nature of the 
disability non-discrimination model. An employer, according to Justice O 'Connor, "is 
free to decide that physical characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to the 
level of an impairment- such as one's height, build or singing voice- are preferable to 
others". This preference extended to the freedom to ignore or terminate those whose 
impairments are limiting, as long as such action excluded those with substantially 
limiting impairments. Applicants for employment could, as a consequence, be rejected 
if they had epilepsy or a vision problem, as long as the employer regarded their 
condition as limiting but not substantially limiting. 100 The result here is that the ADA is 
turned "on its head". 101 For example, epilepsy could be one such medical condition 
which, on O'Connor J's reasoning, an employer may decide is not "preferable'' in the 
workplace, notwithstanding that the individual may be qualified to do the job. It is not 
difficult to imagine certain employers screening out such unsuitable workers, thereby 
nullifying the very core of the ADA's protection. 
Justice Stevens, in dissent, presented a composite retort to the majority opinion. 
Relying on an earlier opinion authored by a member of the majority, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Stevens J. drew the Court's attention to its oft-repeated statement that "the 
authoritative source for fmding the legislative intent lies in the Committee Reports on 
97 The exclusion from a "class of jobs" and an "array of jobs" categories is discussed below. 
98 527 u.s. 471 , 493. 
99 The inability to perform a single particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in 
major life activity of working. 29 CFR §1630.2G)(3)(i). 
1~. O'Brien, supra n. 76 p.195. 
101 Ibid. 
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the bill. "102 Consequently, if the Court had adhered to its own past precedents and 
consulted the rich legislative history of the ADA, it would have unearthed no foundation 
for its argument and ultimate conclusion. 
The dissenting Justice also rejected O'Connor J 's view that the definition of 
disability excludes the assessment of impaired individuals in their unmitigated state. 
Justice Stevens pointed out that the three prongs "do not identify mutually exclusive, 
discrete categories ... [rather] they furnish three overlapping formulas aimed at ensuring 
that individuals who now have, or ever had, a substantially limiting impairment are 
covered by the Act."103 He argued that the Court's emphasis on the "present indicative 
verb fonn" used in the flrst prong was misguided, and that while the first definition was 
written in the present form, the second and third deflnitions were not. He also identified 
the weakness in the Court's reasoning by pointing out that if a disability only exists 
where a person's actual or present condition is substantially impaired "there would be 
no reason to include in the protected class those who were once disabled but who are 
now fully recovered."104 The second prong clearly covers a person who once had a 
serious impairment and has recovered. Moreover, an approach which assures protection 
under the Act without regard to "mitigation that has resulted from rehabilitation, self-
improvement, prosthetics, or medication" avoids the counterintuitive conclusion that the 
ADA's safeguards disappear when "individuals make themselves more employable by 
ascertaining ways to overcome their physical or mentallimitations." 105 
The dissenting judge deftly dealt with the majority's concern for the business 
community - that is, that the ADA might force them to hire persons who would 
endanger the lives of the public - and the related gate keeping role taken on by the 
majority to protect against frivolous cases and overburdening of the court system. 
Stevens J. clearly recognised this case for what it was. It simply raised the threshold 
question, and it had nothing to do with whether the claimants were genuinely qualified 
or whether they could perform the job without posing an undue safety risk, or whether 
the employer could have been said to take discriminatory action on the basis of the 
impairment.106 According to Justice Stevens, the case simply asks whether the ADA 
102 Citing Justice Rehnquist (as he then was) in Garcia v United States, 469 U.S. 70,76 (1984). 
103 527 u.s. 471' 498. 
104 Ibid 
105 Ibid, p.499. "The fact that a prosthetic device, such as an artificial leg, has restored one's 
ability to perform major life activities surely cannot mean that section a of the definition is 
inapplicable.". At p.498. 
106 An employer may avoid liability if it shows that the criteria it imposes is "job-related and 
consistent with business necessity'' or that a deficiency in such criteria would pose a health or 
safety hazard.§ 1211 3(a) -(b) ADA. 
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lets the sisters in the door and "[i]nside that door lies nothing more than basic protection 
from irrational and unjustified discrimination .... " 107 The dissenting judge saw no valid 
reason for the majority to restrict the definition of disability so that it would only benefit 
the numbers of individuals estimated in the Congressional findings. He reminded the 
Court that it has been a traditional tenet of statutory construction that remedial 
legislation should be construed broadly so as to effectuate its purposes.108 He also 
referred to the fact that, in the past, generous interpretations have been granted to other 
core anti-discrimination statutes so as to include classes of individuals traditionally 
excluded "even when the particular evil at issue was beyond Congress' immediate 
concern in passing the Jegislation".109 
The Court's interest in constricting and narrowing the defirution of disability 
made it a gatekeeper, according to Justice Stevens. Since persons can already file 
employment discrimination clain1s on the basis of their race, sex, religion or age, he 
found it "hard to believe that protecting individuals with one more antidiscrimination 
protection will make any more of them file baseless or vexatious lawsuits" .110 
Moreover, be pointed out that Congress had never regarded this as a reason to restrict 
classes of antidiscrimination coverage. An analogy following this logic to its conclusion 
would be the supposition that the fact that all women or all men can pursue a Title Vll 
sex discrimination claim is a sufficient reason for judicial restriction of the class. In 
short, the number of people who could pursue redress is irrelevant: what matters simply 
is the merits of the claim. 
Ultimately, Stevens J. felt that this case should not have been decided on the 
basis of coverage or access. While he did not deliberate on the merits of the twins ' 
claim, he did allude to the fact that had United Airlines decided that the twins should not 
be hired because of safety concerns, he need not have dissented. However, this issue 
got lost in the majority's scramble for judicial control of the ADA. This interpretative 
107 527 u.s. 471 , 504. 
108 Stevens J., citing Tcherepnin v Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967). See C. Feldblum, supra n.29 
p.l54 for a discussion of the (in)significance of Congress's estimation of the number of disabled 
people in the US. 
109 Such forays have included construing Title VII to cover claims of same-sex harassment 
(Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. , 523 US 75 ( 1998) and to include claims ofrace 
discrimination from Hispanic Americans and Asian Americans, as well as Caucasians. See eg. 
Steelworkers v Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
110 527 U.S. 471 , 511. 
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ploy extends far beyond myopia and short-sightedness 111 and undermines the broad-
based policy aims on which the ADA is founded. 
The Problem of the "Substantial Limit on the Major Life Activity of 
Working" Limb112 
The ADA regulations include as disabled not only those individuals whose impairments 
present substantial limitations to their general functioning, but also those whose 
impairments impact substantially on their ability to work. If a plaintiff can demonstrate 
a substantial limitation on one of the other major life activities, then there is no need to 
invoke the work-based life activity.113 Following this, the EEOC's regulations indicate 
tbat courts should first determine whether an individual is substantially limited in any 
other major life activity before considering limitations in work. 114 For example, a 
visually impaired person may demonstrate that she is an individual with a disability by 
demonstrating the substantial limit on the major life activity of seeing. However, those 
with impairments such as cancer, HIV, carpel tunnel syndrome, scarring, back injuries 
and so forth may have no problems with functioning as regards the major life activities 
or no problem in functioning generally, yet are limited by an exclusion from work. 
Contrary to the interpretations of"breathing", "walking" or "hearing", defining 
"working" as a major life activity is problematic. This is not only because of the vast 
range and variety of jobs but also because of the confusion deriving from the separate 
tests specially formulated for its application. It is not surprising to Jearn then that most 
of the litigation and analytical discussion on the concept of "substantial limitation" has 
arisen in the context of its meaning under the major life activity of working. 115 Under 
this approach, the issue for consideration is how much of an interference with working 
or employability must be shown. According to the EEOC, in the context of working, 
[t]he term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to 
perform either a class ofjobs or a broad range ofjobs in various classes, as 
compared to the average person having comparable training skills, and 
abilities. 116 
111 In some jurisdictions, short-sightedness is not capable of bringing an individual under the 
protection of disability discrimination legislation. See the UK's Disability Discrimination Act 
1995 -2005. 
112 See generally, S. Locke, supra n.37. 
113 29 C.F.R. Appendix 1630.2(j) (July 2003 ed.). 
114 29 C.F.R. Appendix 1630.2(j) (July 2003 ed.). 
11 5 Courts have denied protected status to many persons under this limb. 
116 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (July 2003 ed.). Emphasis added. Presumably the argument goes 
that an exclusion from one job does not demonstrate a substantial limitation on the ability to 
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The EEOC regulations simply imply that 'substantial limits', in the context of working, 
means more than an inability to perform one particular job and also less than a general 
inability to work. Thus, "the courts have been engaged in an elusive search for the grey 
area in between."117 Apart from these general insights, little can be stated with certainty 
about the range of these regulations or the outcome of their application in any given 
case. The courts seem to proceed on the basis of quantitatively analysing whether an 
impairment bars a person from a "class of jobs" similar to tbe case in hand or from a 
broad range of jobs in various classes.118 The EEOC provides additional factors 
specifically relevant to the issue of working which courts may consider. These are set 
out to assist courts in determining the impairment's effect on the individual's ability to 
obtain other work in the geographical area. 
The factors are set forth as follows: 
(A) the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access; 
(B) the job from which the individual bas been disqualified because of an 
impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, 
skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also 
disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or 
(C) the job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an 
impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, 
knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the 
individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in 
various classes). 119 
The case law indicates that the courts have struggled to apply the "class of jobs" or 
"broad range of jobs" categories. The two categories have been meshed together and 
this places massive evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs. The test has caused more 
confusion than resolution, and the evidentiary and procedural burdens placed on 
plaintiffs forced the EEOC to reissue its Interpretive Guidance, clarifying the nature of 
the burden demanded by the provisions. 120 
work in general. It merely demonstrates an effect on one job in particular. This is why the 
regulations look to a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs to see if the exclusion is truly 
"substantially limiting' the life activity of working. 
11 7 S. Locke, supra n.37 p. I 17. 
1 18 As Locke comments, " [ w ]hile the EEOC has defined other activities by the ability to perform 
a physical task, working bas been defined in terms of securing employment. Instead of 
attempting to break working down into specific tasks, the EEOC has opted to define the term by 
determining how many jobs one can theoretically obtain. Ibid. p. 116. 
119 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (1993). 
120 The Guidance reads that the standards regarding numbers and types of jobs are not intended to 
require an onerous evidentiary burden. They are meant to require only evidence of"general 
employment demographics and/or of recognised occupational classifications that indicate the 
approximate number of jobs (e.g. 'few,' ' many,' 'most') from which an individual would be 
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A controversial issue remains as to whether exclusion from one job because of 
an actual or perceived impairment is sufficient by itself to establish coverage under the 
Act. Responses differ on this point, depending on which prong of the definition is under 
consideration. In respect of the first prong- actual impairment- EEOC regulations state 
that a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working requires a plaintiff to 
show more than an inability to perform a single specific job for one particular employer. 
The EEOC gives the example of a pilot with a vision impairment who could not work as 
a commercial airline pilot, but who could work as a co-pilot or as a courier service pilot. 
In this example, the person is only unable to perform a particular job or a narrow range 
of jobs. However, the rationale behind this approach is again misplaced. There appears 
to be no pressing reason, beyond the "need" to restrict the protected class, why an 
employee who presents prima facie evidence of discrimination just once on the basis of 
"disability" should be excluded and made to climb evidentiary mountains to prove that 
he or she is disqualified from a class of job or a broad range of jobs. Feldbium argues 
that the "resonance of the requirement that an individual be unable to work in a whole 
range of jobs ... in order to meet the ADA's definition of disability reflects the staying 
power of the historical image of a "disabled person" as a person who is unable to work 
and unable to function in society" .121 
The problem with the working as a life activity limb is that the courts have 
turned the limb into a standard to be applied whenever it comes to determining whether 
an individual has a disability. What seems evident from the application of the 
substantial limitation in working limb is a meshing of the evidentiary functions 
regarding the threshold issue and the substantive claim of discrimination. Instead of 
ruling that the employer was not in violation of the ADA because the individual was not 
qualified for the job in question, or that the employer could otherwise defend his or her 
decision within the statute- as in the EEOC' s pilot example- the courts are dismissing 
cases without reaching their merits ou the basis that a person is not an individual with a 
dis a hili ty. 122 
"Regarded as" Substantially Limited in the Major Life Activity of Working 
excluded because of an impairment.. .. " 29 C.F.R.1630 (appendix. to pt. 1630) (commentary on § 
1630.20)) (July 2003 ed.). 
121 C. Feldblum, supra n.29 p.143. 
122 For evidence of the bizarre litigation twists demanded by the federal courts approach on this 
issues, see Feldblum, ibid. 
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The case law under the third prong demonstrates that the courts are divided on whether 
an employer's rejection of a person with a physical or mental impairment as incapable 
of doing a particular job is sufficient to establish that the employer "regarded" the 
person as having a disability. The leading case rejecting the "one job is enough 
approach" is Forrisi v Bowen. 123 In this case, a utility systems repair man rejected from 
his job because of his agoraphobia did not succeed in showing that he was "regarded as" 
having a substantial limit on the life activity of working. In contrast, a man discharged 
from his position in the Army Corps of Engineers due to an incorrect interpretation of 
his spine abnormality was found to have met the "regarded as" criteria, because the 
Corps perceived this to impose a disqualifying limitation on his ability to lift weight. 124 
Here, there was no suggestion made of a need to show that his perceived impairment 
would impact on his employability beyond the immediate position from which he had 
been discharged. 125 
As has been stated before, the essence of the "regarded as" prong is based on a 
misperception. Either the employer perceives the individual as having a substantially 
limiting impairment when the impairment is not substantially limiting, or the 
individual's impairment is only substantially limiting because of the attitudes of others 
towards it, or the individual may have no impairment but is regarded by the employer as 
having a substantially limiting impairment. Such misperceptions are most likely to arise 
in the context of the "working" life activity. It is ultimately questionable whether the 
Forrissi test has any legitimate application under the "regarded as" prong. This is 
because the "regarded as" prong operates on the basis of employer misperceptions 
regarding an individual ' s disabled status. If an employee or applicant is basing his claim 
on the basis that the employer regarded him as substantially limited in working - for 
example, because of facial disfigurements/infectious diseases - why is there a need for 
the plaintiff to establish the analytical framework present in actual disability cases? 
This requires proof that the employer regarded the plaintiff as incapable of working for 
him or her, and that his impairment generaliy foreclosed the type of employment 
involved.126 "[R]equiring a plaintiff to prove that if the employer' s erroneous 
perception of her condition had been correct, her employability generally would have 
123 794 F.2d 931 , A AD Cases 921 (4th Cir. 1986). 
124 Thornhill v Marsh 866 F .2d 1182 (9th Circ. 1989). 
125 R. Burgdorf, supra n.33 p. 159. 
126 Indeed, proof of the latter requirement would be very difficult because of the difficulty of 
estimating similar reactions or misperceptions among employers to the plaintiff's impairment or 
perceived impairment. 
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been seriously curtailed is unduly burdensome". 127 This test was formulated in the 
context of actual disability, not in the context of misperceived or non-existing 
impairments. 
An examination of the ADA's legislative history uncovers Congressional intent 
to reject the Forrissi "not just one job" approach under the "regarded as" prong of the 
disability defmition. The Senate committee report pointedly cites examples of 
individuals included within the " regarded as" concept as being "people who are rejected 
for a particular job for which they apply because of fmdings of a back abnormality in an 
x-ray, notwithstanding the absence of any symptoms, or people who are rejected for a 
particular job solely because they wear hearing aids . . .. " 128 The Report adds: 
A person who is excluded from any activity covered under this Act or is 
otherwise discriminated against because of a covered entity's negative attitudes 
towards disability is being treated as having a disability which affects a major 
life activity. For example, ... if an employer refuses to hire someone because of 
a fear of the "negative reactions" of others to the individual, or because of the 
employer's perception that the applicant may have a disability which prevented 
that person from working, that person would be covered under the third 
prong". 129 
Similarly, the approach of the other committees indicates that exclusion from a single 
job because of a physical or mental impairment would establish coverage of the 
excluded individual under the "regarded as" disability prong. 130 The EEOC regulations 
issued under the ADA do not go so far as to embrace the intent inherent in the 
legislative history, though they do acknowledge that exclusion from a single position 
may be sufficient to satisfy the " regarded as" prong in certain circun1stances. The 
Interpretive Guidance states: 
"An individual rejected from a job because of the "myths, fears, and stereotypes 
associated with disabilities would be covered under this part of the definition of 
disability, whether or not the employer's ... perception were shared by others in 
the field". 131 
In many cases, the "exclusion from one job" approach has been used as a useful 
reductionist tool. It justifies judicial dismissal of claims under the "regarded as" prong 
at summary stage. As a result, the courts have compromised the objective of the 
127 s k . Loc e, supra n.37 p.l43. 
128 Senate Report. No. 116, 101 st Con gr., 1St Sess. 24 ( 1989). 
129 Ibid. 
130 See House Committee on the Judiciary which relies on Thornhill. 
13 1 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. A§ 1630.2(1). 
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"regarded as" prong as laid out in both the legislative history and in the EEOC 
regulations. 
In summary, it has been demonstrated that ADA plaintiffs face a mammoth task 
where employers defend a charge of disability discrimination by pressing for summary 
judgment on the basis of non-disabled status. The complex combination of the three 
prongs of the disability definition, and the investigations required by "substantial 
limitations" upon "major life activities", complicates and weakens a legislative 
framework which was defined with a purpose far removed from microscopic analysis of 
impairments and their effects. 
The Meaning of Disability under Ireland's Employment Equality Act 
Although it was initially denounced by the disability lobby in Ireland, 132 the EEA's 
definition of disability differs significantly from the ADA defmition. It does not 
confine its protection to individuals who can demonstrate "substantial limitations" in a 
range of daily life activities. In other words, the definition is not tainted by the need to 
confme protection against discrimination to those who truly 'deserve' it. Rather, it seeks 
to extend protection to all those who actually endure discrimination. Consequently, the 
EEA's impairment model of disability has been widely welcomed, as it recognises that 
the phenomenon of discrimination is not confined to those with severely-limiting 
impairments. The position in Ireland, at least to date, reflects the general attitude of the 
US federal judiciary under the Rehabilitation Act 1973.133 There bas been little attention 
directed to the issue of whether the applicant is or is not a disabled individual. 134 More 
often than not, coverage under the Act has been accepted or conceded. 
Notwithstanding its practical advantages, the EEA' s impairment model has 
been subjected to criticism from certain quarters. It has been asked whether the 
defrnition continues to perpetuate the individual deficit model of disability. This point is 
addressed below, following a consideration of the statutory definition. 
The EEA's Definition of Disability 
132 See 0. Smith, "Disability, Discrimination and Employment: A Never-Ending Legal Story" 
(2001) Dublin University Law Journal 148 p. 163. 
133 Discussed briefly above. 
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Section 2( I) of the Employment Equality Act, 1998, furnishes the following definition 
of disability for the purposes of the Act: 
(a) the total or partial absence of a person 's bodily or mental functions, 
including the absence of a part of a person's body, 
(b) the presence in the body of organisms causing, or likely to cause, chronic 
disease or illness, 
(c) the malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of a person's 
body, 
(d) a condition or malfunction which results in a person learning differently 
from a person without the condition or malfunction, or 
(e) a condition, illness or disease which affects a person 's thought processes, 
perception of reality, emotions or judgement or which results in disturbed 
behaviour and shall be taken to include a disability which exists at present, 
or which previously existed but no longer exists, or which may exist in the 
future or which is imputed to a person. 
It should be noted that this is the defmition in its entirety. There are no amplifying 
regulations, or no supplementary guidance, as is the case with the ADA. Like the ADA, 
the EEA defmition does include an individual who does not, in fact, have any disability. 
It extends protection to individuals where the alleged discriminator has perceived the 
individual to be disabled -this is the imputed limb of the definition of disability. In 
contrast to the ADA, however, the EEA definition does not require that the imputed 
disability be a "substantially limiting one". The definition also includes those who have 
been discriminated against because they may have a disability in the future or because 
they have bad a disability in the past. Section 6(1) also extends the Act' s protection to 
those who may endure discrimination because of their association with a disabled 
person. 
Yet, when the Act was drafted, both opposition members in the Oireachtas and 
some in the Irish disability movement expressed reservations about the definition 
because of what they felt was an excessively medical focus. As formulated -the final 
paragraph excluded - the definition amounts to an itemisation of medical conditions that 
can be described as "classic" impairments and it can be perceived as placing undue 
attention on the health status of a person with a disability. 135 The disability movement 
was unhappy with this approach because of the inclusion of a list of impaim1ents in 
quasi-medical terms. It was felt that the definition ignores the contributing external 
factors that encompass disability. 136 As is discussed below in greater detail, the danger 
134 See infra for further discussion. 
135 0. Smith, supra n. 5 p. 164. 
136 See chapter one. 
147 
with this approach, from a social model perspective, is that "disability" is reduced to a 
description of impairment: it holds that disabled people's limitations and disadvantages 
arise from personal, medical deficiencies, and not from any wider source of societal 
disadvantage. The problems of constructing a definition of disability that accords with 
the social model, while also satisfying the existing operational requirements of non-
discrimination law, are discussed below. Indeed, the social model of disability does not 
give any guidance as to how disability might be defined differently. 137 Notwithstanding 
the impairment model of disability in the EEA, it has been argued that the non-
discrimination law system as a whole, as it is applied to disabled people, endorses social 
model thinking because it locates the problem of discrimination outside the individual 
person. In this sense, then, discrimination law recognises that discrimination is a major 
social problem for disabled people, and this view is in keeping with disability as a social 
construct. 138 However, as chapter six argues, the flaw to this argument is the question of 
whether the design of the non-discrimination system can adequately tackle the forces of 
exclusion that contribute to the social creation of disablement. 
The Application of the EEA Definition 
A brief perusal of case law taken to date under the Employment Equality Act reveals the 
sorts of individuals protected and, importantly, how disability is constructed and 
recognised. The latter is important, because law is a tool that both constructs and 
reflects social reality in modern society.139 Thus, every legal definition, whether in 
social welfare law, education law or discrimination law " takes part in the social 
construction of disability". 140 The issue raised here is whether the anti-discrimination 
law definition in the EEA perpetuates the individual deficit model of disability. 
The Labour Court recently stated that section 2 defines disability in broad terms 
and confirmed that both epilepsy and loss of hearing are covered by the definition in s.2 
(c). 141 In the first case, the Labour Court determined that the company had terminated 
the complainant's employment because she suffered from epilepsy and that "[t]his, 
prima facie, constituted an act of discrimination on the disability ground. The 
137 T. DeGener, "Defmition of Disability" (EU Network of Experts on Disability Discrimination, 
August, 2004) pp.S-6. 
138 1bid. p.5. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 See A Computer Company v A Worker ED/00/8 Determination no. 013 (epilepsy) and A 
Motor Company v A Worker ED/0 1140 Determination no. 46 (bearing impairment). 
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[company] can only be relieved of liability if it can be shown that, by reason of her 
disability, the complainant was not fully competent and fully capable of performing the 
duties of her employment, having regard to the conditions under which those duties 
were to be performed and could not have had her needs reasonably accommodated". 
What is useful to note from the interpretation and application of the disability definition 
here is that the Labour Court did not consider the severity, extent, or impact of the 
condition on the complainant's life once medical evidence was provided as to its 
existence. Thus, the Irish definition does not operate to screen out individuals who do 
not match up to the stereotypical view of a disabled person. In A Complainant v Civil 
Service Commissioners, 142 the complainant was registered with the National 
Rehabilitation Board as having a mental health problem and it was accepted that 
schizophrenia comes within the definition of disability. Other decisions on the disability 
ground support the assertion that, in the main, where supported by medical evidence, the 
disability of the complainant is accepted. Employers have generally not disputed a 
complainant's disability status. 143 There has been only one case to date where the 
respondent employer disputed the complainant's disability status. In Mr 0 v A Named 
Compan/44 the complainant suffered from anxiety, work-related stress and depression 
that required hospitalisation. In this case, the employer argued that the alleged condition 
was not properly evidenced and that it did not conform to the definition of disability in 
section 2(1) of the 1998 Act. The Equality Officer relied on the medical professionals 
present at the hearing, representing both the respondent and the complainant, who 
accepted that the complainant's illness was covered by the definition of disability in the 
1998 Act. The Equality Officer also explained that the complainant was correct in 
arguing that "it is irrelevant whether the stress was work-related, the fact is that be 
suffered stress (a disability under the 1998 Act) and the issue of discriminatory 
treatment, harassment and victimisation must be investigated in that context". 145 This 
decision clarifies that, for the purposes of protection under the EEA, it is not necessary 
to investigate the cause of disability. 
The Impact of the EEA Definition 
142 DEC - E-2002/015. 
143 See Anne Harrington v East Coast Area Health Board (wheelchair user) DEC - E/2002/00 1 
and An Employee v A Local Authority (brain injury) DEC- E/2002/4 and Mr. C v Jaranrod 
Eireann DEC-E-2003/054 (depression). 
144 DEC - E - 2003/052. 
145 Ibid paragraph 4.3. The Equality Officer remained satisfied on the basis of the extensive 
medical evidence that the disability in question was not solely work-related in this context. 
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Concern has been expressed in some quarters that the width of the disability definition 
under the Irish legislation could invite spurious claims or discrimination claims based 
on minor impairments. In chapter three, it was pointed out how the Irish Supreme Court 
was concerned with the width of the disability definition in the context of its interaction 
with the duty to make reasonable accommodation under the 1996 Bill - this was found 
to be unconstitutiona1. 146 The fear was raised that employers would be required to 
"accommodate" large numbers of minor impairments, and this would involve unknown 
levels of resources. The concerns raised by this line of argument are greatly overstated 
and demonstrate a general misunderstanding of the nature of impairment, disability 
discrimination and, specifically, the reasonable accommodation duty. 
A proper examination of the legislation indicates that spurious claims will not 
be easily entertained by the interpreting tribunals. Moreover, spurious claims are not 
created or indulged by the supposed width inherent in the EEA's defmition of disability. 
Since the Irish defmition of disability covers minor impairments, and does not require 
that a person's limitations be substantial, part of the Supreme Court's concern was that 
this introduced an unacceptable level of uncertainty with regards to the costs to be borne 
by employers. But it must be recalled that direct discrimination is defmed as less 
favourable treatment on one of the prohibited grounds accorded to one person as 
compared with another person·. Further, an employer is obliged to do all that is 
reasonable to accommodate the needs of a person with a disability. Despite the absence 
of an express provision, the intent behind the statutory structure is that a failure to make 
an accommodation would amount to discrimination on the disability ground. 147 
However, the case against a broad definition of disability, on the grounds of restricting 
employers' accommodation costs, is misplaced. That a person with a minor impairment 
can invoke the protection of anti-discrimination legislation if she bas been treated less 
favourably does not involve unduly burdensome costs. 148 If any accommodation were 
required, the burden would be nominal precisely because the disability is minor. 149 What 
146 Re Article 26 and the Employment Equality Bill 1996 [ 1997] 2 IR 321. 
147 See chapter five. 
148 In this sense, then, discrimination based upon disability resembles typical forms of 
discrimination because of the central feature of negative stereotyping or hostile attitudes. This 
thesis has been borne out by research into litigation on disability discrimination in Canada. See J. 
Mosoff, "Is the Human Rights Paradigm "Able" to Include Disability: Who's In? Who Wins 
What? Why?" (2000) 26 Queen's Law Journa1225. 
149 See Definitions of Disability in Europe: A Comparative Analysis Final Report (2002) p. 60. 
Available at http://www.brunel.ac.uk/depts/govn/research/finalreport.doc Accessed November 
1, 2002. 
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other accommodation, beyond granting leave/time off for rehabilitation to an employee 
with a minor impairment, is reasonable, useful or effective? This is an accommodation 
generally granted to all employees.150 Thus, the argument that the definition of 
disability should be narrowed on the grounds of potential cost misses the point. What 
this argument ultimately reduces to is the extent to which reasonable accommodation 
burdens employers. The argument is taken up again in chapters five and six. 
What is also notable from a perusal of the Irish case law is the importance of 
clinical opinion to the Equality Tribunal's decision that the individual claimant is 
disabled for the purposes of the Act. The weight of clinical opinion is such that a failure 
on the part of an employer to employ it when assessing the ramifications of a particular 
condition has been found by the Equality Tribunal to establish evidence of a failure to 
adequately engage with the reasonable accommodation duty. 
While the statute's definition of an individual with disability does not expressly 
refer to medical judgment, all expositions on the criteria to which the definition refers is 
undertaken with reference to medical judgment.151 Thus, legal relevance is attached to 
specific physical and mental attributes ofthe body on the basis of mainstream medical 
opinion. Protected status is determined through medical confirmation of the 
characteristics of the claimant against the background of the statutory definition of 
disability. Leaving aside the practical issue of the need to prove the existence of an 
impairment by means of medical evidence, it is the long process of medical assessment 
that draws objections from the disability movement. While the proof issue is by no 
means as protracted under the EEA as compared with the ADA, medical evidence 
regarding impairment falls back into the trap of connecting inability and incapacity with 
disability. Problems of medical certification have largely been ignored by the 
legislative body, but the fact remains that medical diagnosis is far from unproblematic 
and far from objective.152 Medical conflict surrounds many impairments, such as 
obesity, chronic fatigue syndrome, and other impairments which depend on self-
reporting, particularly self-reporting with regards to pain. Social science research has 
150 Note the operation of the Unfair Dismissals Act in this context. This argument is also used to 
deconstruct the "specialness" of accommodations. See further chapters five and six. 
151 As chapter one introduced, the medicalising of disability means that disability is validated on 
the basis of clinical authority which subjects disabled people to the power of the medical gaze. 
Thus, one's subjective experience of impairment or limitation is often irrelevant unless it is 
professionally validated. Social science researchers have argued that medical professionals have 
a tendency to falsely universalize the impact of particular impairments. The result is a failure to 
recognise that a given impairment may produce varying degrees oflimitation in different people. 
SeeM. Crossley, supra n.l pp.650-651. 
152 M. Crossley, supra n.l pp.689-694, for discussion. 
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shown that issues of gender, age, ethnicity and social status all impact on clinical 
diagnosis, recording and recognition of an impairment. 153 This demonstrates that the 
line-drawing involved in medical decisions is far from objective and can produce 
arbitrary and unfair results. 
Rethinking Disability Definitions 
Discrimination and Accommodation: Separate Concepts, Separate 
Definitions? 
In light of the large numbers of persons who it was assumed would benefit from ADA 
protection but who were subsequently excluded by the US Supreme Court's 
reductionism, it has been argued that the definition of disability should be reworked. It 
should be recalled here that the general rule prohibiting employers from discriminating 
against a qualified person with a disability because of that disability places two distinct 
obligations on employers: the familiar non-discrimination mandate, and an extended 
defmition of discrimination caused by the failure to make a reasonable accommodation. 
Friedland argues that litigation has produced many "strange results" because "the single 
defmition of disability is not well matched to the two distinct components of the Act's 
approach to employment." 154 She advocates redrafting the ADA so as to have separate 
definitions of disability dealing with discrimination in employment and accommodation 
in employment respectively. 
There is some merit to Friedland's argument, especially when we assess the 
utility of the accommodation mandate to the "record of' and "regarded as" prongs of the 
disability definition. If an individual presents herself with a record of a disability, or if 
the employer incorrectly regards the individual as disabled and acts negatively towards 
her, this is a case of traditional disparate treatment (direct discrimination). What need of 
accommodation or what kind of accommodation is envisaged if an employer mistakenly 
regards her as having a disability? Entitlement to workplace accommodation should 
only be accorded to those whose impauments have a work impact. In any event, no 
153 Ibid. See also C. Woodhams and S. Corby, "Defining Disability in Theory and Practice: A 
Critique of the British Disability Discrimination Act 1995" (2003) 32 Journal of Social Policy 
159 for a critique of the medical assumption underpinning the DDA defmition and a report on 
research which demonstrates how this stifles the impact of social variables on disabled status. At 
pp.161-172. 
154M. Friedland, supra n. l8 p.l73. The cause of this can be traced to the uneasy importation of 
the three-pronged definition from the Rehabilitation Act. 
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entitlement to accommodation arises merely because of meeting the threshold for 
disabled status. There is no automatic entitlement to an accommodation. The point 
behind the accommodation duty is that it assists in overcoming work-related barriers 
and not all impairments raise such barriers. In any event, the provision of an 
accommodation depends upon many other governing factors built into the Act. 155 
However, the real difficulty in the US context manifests itself in a more 
damaging manner because" ... the anti-discrimination and accommodation 
requirements of the ADA share the same definition of disability, judicial decisions 
regarding that defmition set precedent for both discrimination and accommodation 
suits."156 This concern over the presumed extent of the accommodation mandate's 
special reach gives the courts "legitimate" reasons to entangle themselves in confusion 
over "disabled status". The result has been that the courts, misunderstanding the 
operation of the discrimination/accommodation duality, limit the definition for fear of 
accommodation costs being thrust on employers. And they may do so even when cases 
present evidence of simple discrimination. The result is a narrowing of the threshold 
requirement in a way that undermines not only the accommodation provisions but also 
the more accepted non-discrimination provisions.157 
This "narrowing" of the definition of disability does not arise in the Irish 
context. This is because the width of the Irish defmition 's statutory language defies 
restriction by the interpreting bodies. The expansive definition could be said to be 
predicated on a legislative understanding of the specifics of the 
discrimination/accommodation spectrum, and also on a confidence in the belief that the 
inclusion of minor impairments places no great burden on employers because of the 
correlating minor nature of the accommodation (if any) that may be required. However, 
as has been discussed in an earlier chapter, the Irish Supreme Court missed this point 
and it implicated the definition of disability in its conclusion on the interface between 
accommodation mandates and property rights. 158 In this sense, then, the senior judiciary 
relied on the traditional conception of disability as problematic to the person. It 
excluded any understanding of disability as arising from the interaction between 
impairment and structural barriers, including those operated by employers. The impact 
ISS See chapter five. 
1s6 M. Friedland, supra n.18 p. 195. 
IS? Ibid. 
ISS See chapter three for discussion. 
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of this approach has been the weakening of the accommodation duty from a wholly 
different point of attack. 159 
Protection Based on Stigmatised Characteristics? 
Crossley argues that an alternative approach would be to open up the protection of 
disability discrimination law to anyone adversely affected on the basis of a physical 
characteristic. 160 This would open up the protected class and could include individuals 
who were bald, had blue eyes, or red hair, or were short in stature.161 However, 
limitations could be put on the approach, through expressly excluding characteristics 
that the legislature deemed not to merit protection162 and by placing a qualifier on the 
protection against discrimination on the basis of physical attributes. For example, 
prohibited discrimination might include actions only based on a physical characteristic 
associated with social, cultural or economic disadvantage, or associated with stigmatic 
exclusion, and this would exclude the blue-eyed and red-haired examples mentioned 
above. This approach would be in keeping with social model theory, as it would look at 
the economic, social and cultural disadvantages that can stem from an individual's 
differences. In the final analysis, the courts would still be involved in line-drawing, with 
regards to how grave the disadvantage might be, or how connected the disadvantage 
might be to the characteristic in question. However, as Crossley points out, " if we are 
stuck drawing lines, we should at least attempt to identify standards for drawing lines 
that comport with our understanding of whom we wish to protect. ... [I]t might be 
perfectly rational to trade one set ofline-drawing issues for another if we believe that 
the second set of issues is more closely related to accomplishing our policy goal" . 163 It 
can be argued that this second approach to line-drawing, divorced from a reliance on 
clinical criteria, avoids tbe conflation of disability with impairment and recognises the 
social, cultural or economic disadvantages that are associated with particular 
characteristics. In this respect, the law would take a small step away from the 
159 See chapter two and chapter five for discussion. 
160 M. Crossley, supra n.l. p.713. 
161 For criticism of the inclusion of individuals whose impaim1ents are minor, not stigmatised 
and not subject to social subordination, see C. Gill, "Questioning Continuum" in D. Barrett 
Shaw (ed.), The Ragged Edge: The Disability Experience from the Pages of the First Fifteen 
Years of the Disability Rag (1995) p.42. 
162 As is the case in the ADA which excludes, inter alia, left-handedness, kleptomania and 
paedophilia. 
163 M. Crossley, supra n.l p.714. 
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dominance of the medical model of disability and move towards addressing the social 
factors which can disadvantage disabled people. 
While Crossley's argument does not retain quite as much relevance in the EEA 
context, it is argued here that this type of definition could be usefully employed in the 
context of positive action programmes. One concern expressed by the disability 
movement is that the legislation is not reaching those with so called "unpopular 
disabilities" - those with more severe impairn1ents, with certain mental impairnlents, or 
with learning disabilities. These individuals endure disproportionate levels of exclusion 
because of stigma, prejudice and fear. In this sense, positive action programmess could 
be usefully tailored to specific sub-groups of disabled people, based on levels of stigma 
and exclusion. Positive action is discussed in chapter six. 
Does the EEA perpetuate the medical model of disability? 
In terms of legal practicalities and ease of coverage, the EEA defmition of disability is 
preferable to the ADA's because of the complexity that bedevils the interpretation of the 
latter. In light of Crossley's alternative approach to the protected class, as set out above, 
I consider here whether the impairment definition supported by medical evidence 
reinstates the individual medical model into the EEA. The EEA, it is argued, perpetuates 
medical and individual models of disability through its conflation of impairment with 
the broader social construction of disability. This argument concerns the ideological 
impact which a medicalised defmition of impairment still carries within an equality 
statute: if disability is viewed solely as deficiencies in biological forms of structure and 
functioning, then the social disadvantages which accompany it appear natural and not 
attributable to any cause or factor external to the individual. However, disability 
discourse adopts a different point of view. The collapsing of the entire defmition or 
concept of disability into the concept of impairment appears dangerous from the 
perspective of disability theory. As Crossley points out: 
0 0 
Once we begin to understand impairnlent as describing the ways in which a 
person's activities are affected by a bodily condition or deficit, it is but a short 
step to viewing all the disadvantages suffered by disabled people as being 
simply part and parcel of their impairment. ... To the extent that we conflate a 
description of the body with the social, political and cultural disadvantages that 
accompany it, the latter start to appear to be caused by, and inextricably linked 
to, the former. But the belief that bodily inferiority naturally causes the 
disadvantages of disability reflects precisely the medical model of disability that 
disability theorists reject. Thus, when a court speaks of a plaintiff's impairnlent 
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being a medical condition and then goes on to describe the person as being 
impaired in relation to her employment opportunities, the message sent by the 
choice of language is that the social disadvantages of decreased employment 
opportunities is but one side effect of a medical condition and not the result of 
exclusionary forces. 164 
Crossley is writing in the context of ADA analysis, and it remains questionable whether 
her comments extend with equal force to the EEA definition. Thus, not all impairment 
or capacity-related definitions within anti-discrimination law perpetuate the medical 
individualised model of disability to the exclusion of the social construction.165 This 
point recognises that the application of strong social model reasoning within non-
discrimination discourse becomes impossible. This is because social model reasoning 
characterises disability as a disadvantage accruing from an inhospitable built and social 
environment which excludes individuals with impairments. 166 As Degener points out, it 
mixes characteristics and treatment. 167 Yet, by definition, discrimination is manifested 
through stigma, animus, thoughtfulness or neglect based on the presence or assumed 
presence of a particular characteristic - in this instance, impairment. In this sense, 
discrimination law needs to define discrimination (the treatment) as well as disability 
(the characteristic), as it is unworkable to legally define disability as the outcome of 
discrimination. Thus, the issue of whether discrimination law perpetuates a medical 
model of disability depends upon the width and character of its definition. The ADA 
definition dangerously conflates disability with impairment in its emphasis on 
functional activities compromised by bodily conditions. In this sense, then, the medical 
model is perpetuated: the definition of disability covers a certain "truly disabled" group 
of individuals delineated by complicated, excessive and costly medical enquiries into 
the extent of their personal deficits. The EEA's definition, while it is impairment-based, 
does not have its entire statutory structure predicated upon the medical model. That 
determination depends upon a wider enquiry. Thus, the capacity for disability 
discrimination law to further the social model agenda does not solely rest on its 
definition of disability. Whether discrimination law pursues a social model 
understanding of disability not only depends upon its definition of disability but, 
ultimately, on its cumulative impact in terms of offsetting the creation and perpetuation 
of socially-constructed disablement. This last point is developed in chapter six. Thus, in 
spite of its medical interpretation, the practical reality remains that the impairment 
164 M. Crossley, supra n.I p. 702. 
165 T. DeGener, supra n.l37 p.ll. 
166 See chapter one. 
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definition of disability in the EEA is likely to pose the least problems for individuals 
seeking access to protection. It is related to impairment, it does not depend on the 
severity of the condition, it covers past, present, future or imputed impainnents, and it 
covers associates of individuals with impairments. DeGener argues that discrimination 
law needs a definition of disability not merely to define the group protected under the 
law but to assist in defining the acts prohibited. To this end, the definition should 
describe and utilise the term "disability-based" discrimination, rather than the term 
"disabled person".168 
Conclusion 
Disability discrimination is based on the forbidden ground of 'disability' which, in 
statute law at least, appears to mesh the elements of impairment and disability. As a 
system, law relies heavily on regulatory classifications, and in the context of disability 
non-discrimination protection, such strict categorisation can deny social models of 
disablement by requiring, and thereby legitimatising, medical assessments as 'objective' 
definitions of the term. The medicalisation of disability, from a judicial perspective, acts 
as a both a validation device and a limitation device. Yet, as the disability movement 
has argued, medicalisation can entail a complete takeover of the self: it feeds a 
construction of the disabled individual in terms of treatment, rehabilitation, personal 
shortcoming, dependence and passivity. 
The federal courts in the US have shown remarkable inconsistency in their 
assessment of when an impairment rises to the judiciary' s nebulous standard of 
disability. Judicial treatment has relied on the rehabilitative school of medical thought in 
its refusal to accept anything other than traditional, stereotypical designations of 
disability. It has been particularly difficult to detach the concept of disability from its 
historical meaning of an inability to work or function in society due to personal 
misfortune. The judicial approach simply reflects broader societal views of disability as 
a fixed, permanent and debilitating state, requiring pity, rehabilitation and charity. 
Judicial engagement with these influences bas manifested in the need to confme the 
category in order that the deserving disabled only are protected. The implication is that 
the "special protection" afforded by the ADA should be available to the "worthy" only. 
The result has been a situation in which the delineation of those worthy of protection 
167 T. DeGener, supra n.l37 p.ll. 
168 T. DeGener supra n.l37 p.ll. 
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has become the federal courts' occupation. Yet, they have lost sight of the foundations 
upon which the protection is putatively built: equality of opportunity, independent 
living, economic self sufficiency, and equal citizenship. 
With the medicalisation of disability, the overt focus of the "problem" remains 
on the individual. This reinforces the rehabilitative approach to the problems faced by 
impaired individuals. The reason that control is accorded to medical opinion is because 
of the line-drawing that is required under the anti-discrimination law framework. The 
focus of anti-discrimination protection is comparative: discrimination is less favourable 
treatment accorded to an individual with a disability, as opposed to the treatment 
accorded a non-disabled individual. The anti-discrimination framework, in the context 
of disability, extends discrimination to include an additional form of protection in the 
guise of the reasonable accommodation mandate. This provision occupies an uneasy 
position within the equality framework of the liberal state. The judiciary, particularly in 
the United States, has assumed a gatekeeping role in order to limit the number of 
individuals who can claim under the accommodation mandate. This approach can be 
traced to the judicial attitude to disability with regards to social security regulations: the 
desire to protect only the "truly disabled" and to reduce the incidence of fraud is 
paramount. 
The EEA definition operates differently to the ADA's in that it is not based on a 
certain minimum severity of disability. It is not concerned with the degree of functional 
limitation(s). It has recently been recognised as a model definition for other EU States 
who are implementing the Framework Directive.169 At the same time, it has been 
criticised by the disability movement for its excessive focus on impairment, and for its 
putative disregard of the social construction of disablement. As was discussed above, 
there are considerable difficulties attached to formulating a definition of disability based 
on the social model perspective. As discussed in chapter one, the social model 
perspective mixes the treatment and the characteristic. Discrimination law cannot 
simply define the characteristic (disability) as the treatment (discrimination). The EEA 
defmes the characteristic as impairment. In this way, discrimination law 's multi-faceted 
prohibition ofthe social phenomenon of discrimination, it is argued, brings the system 
within a social model perspective. For this to hold true, it is argued here that the non-
discrimination principle needs to be reformulated within a more substantive equality 
nom1. In chapters five and six, it is considered if there are too many other limitations to 
169 T. Degener, supra n. 13 7 p.ll. 
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Reasonable Accommodation: The Legal Response to Workplace 
Disability Discrimination 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the mechanics of the duty to make reasonable accommodation 
under the ADA, Ireland's EEA and the Article 13 Framework Directive. 1 The ADA's 
articulation of the reasonable accommodation mandate inspired equivalent provisions 
across the globe. The periodical literature in the United States discussing the authority, 
meaning, extent and impact of the reasonable accommodation mandate is particularly 
voluminous. Discussion of the concept takes a number of perspectives across a wide 
spectrum of positions? This thesis argues that reasonable accommodation is a 
permissible conceptualisation of disability equality law but queries the extent to which 
its initial promise as a tool to address exclusion has been realised. The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide a comparative assessment of the mechanics of the concepe in order 
to substantiate and extend the general argument regarding the operation of the disability 
discrimination framework. First, the founding United States model will be assessed, 
given its seminal position in the field of disability discrimination law. A lengthy and 
complicated structure, the application of Title I of the ADA is based upon the 
interaction of four factors: i) the individual's particular disability,4 ii) the essential 
functions of the job she seeks to perform, iii) the possible accommodation that would 
enable her to do the job and iv) the burden that those accommodations would impose on 
employers.5 The latter three factors shall be considered below. 
1 Framework Directive 2000/78 OJ [2000] L303/16. 
2 These range from the law and economics school's concern with an unfunded mandate (see R. 
Epstein and C. L. Weaver, "Incentive versus Controls in Federal Disability Policy" in C.L. 
Weaver (ed.) Disability & Work: Incentives Rights and Opportunities (1991) p.6), to traditional 
civil rights supporters' concerns that reasonable accommodation goes beyond permissible civil 
rights legislation, which, thereby, threatens the system as a whole, to disability rights theorists, 
who see it as a proper application of the civil rights system. 
3 For a comparative perspective, seeS. Herr, "Reforming Disability NonDiscrimination Laws: A 
Comparative Perspective" (2001/2002) 35 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 305. 
See also G. Quinn, M. McDonagh, and C. Kimber, Disability Discrimination Law in the United 
States, Australia and Canada (Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 1993). 
4 As already discussed in chapter four. 
s P. Karlan and G. Rutherglen, ''Disabilities, Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation" 
(1996) 46 Duke Law Journal I p.lO. 
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The specifics of the Irish duty are then discussed. First, the original position set 
out in the Employment Equality Act 1998 is considered. This is followed by a brief 
examination of the European Union model, as set out in the Framework Directive, and 
by a consideration of the consequent transposition of the Framework Directive into Irish 
law via the terms of the Equality Act 2004. The discussion here of the reasonable 
accommodation mandate under the ADA, while reasonably extensive, does not claim to 
be an exhaustive treatment on the entire range and extent of the duty. Rather, it is 
included to demonstrate points of contrast and comparison in the search for examples of 
good practice and to illustrate points of weakness both in statutory design and in the 
judicial interpretation of the duty. It relies for further insight on the extensive regulatory 
guidance which accompanies the ADA's reasonable accommodation duty. It should be 
noted that while the reasonable accommodation provisions of the ADA influenced 
equivalent measures in disability anti-discrimination statutes elsewhere, the duty is now 
experiencing something of a downturn in fortunes in its domestic setting. This is as a 
result of judicial reductionism, academic attack and widespread media bias.6 As is 
pointed out below, recent case law has begun to question the "perceived fairness"' of 
requiring accommodations for disabled people. 
Reasonable Accommodation under the ADA 
Background 8 
The meaning of reasonable accommodation has been described as the ADA' s "greatest 
unsettled question"9 and, by two other commentators, "by far its most important one". 10 
6 See L. Hamilton Kreiger, "Foreword- Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies" (2000) 21 Berkeley Journal of 
Employment and Labor Law I and M. Diller, "Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights 
Model" (2000) 21 Berkeley Journal ofEmployment and Labor Law 19. 
7 SeeS. Befort and T. Holmes Donesky, "Reassignment under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?" (2000) 57 Washington and Lee 
Law Review 1045, 1048. 
8 The phrase "reasonable accommodation" first appeared in regulations published by the EEOC 
under Title VII defining employer prohibitions on discrimination against employees on the basis 
of religion. See 22 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1995). These regulations were essentially codified by an 
amendment to Title VII that required employers to "reasonably accommodate" religious 
observances and practices. 42 USC § 2000e(j), cited in R.L. Burgdorf Jr., Disability 
Discrimination in Employment Law (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, 1995) pp. 274-
275. 
9 P. Karlan and G. Rutherglen, supra n.5 p. 8. 
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The scope of the reasonable accommodation duty is the core protection provided by the 
ADA for many disabled people. Its meaning, therefore, is of crucial importance for all 
three major players: the courts, who have been described as "confused and 
inconsistent"; for disabled people themselves, who need greater certainty in their 
protection; and for employers, who also have unpredictable obligations. 11 A 
considerable number of cases decided by the federal appeal courts have demonstrated 
remarkable variation in respect of core issues, such as the burden of proof, the 
"reasonableness" of accommodations and the defence of''undue hardship".12 The US 
Supreme Court has only recently considered the concept of reasonable accommodation 
for the first time. In that decision, it confined its comments to the facts of the case, 
which concerned the impact of a form of reasonable accommodation on an employer' s 
seniority system. 13 
Much of the criticism about the open-ended nature ofthe ADA's 
accommodation mandate has been directed at the legislature. 14 While Congress did 
attempt to articulate its intention with respect to the various threshold requirements of 
the Act, this has achieved at best a debatable success. Much of the guidance regarding 
the legislative intent on the scope of duty has derived from the Senate Committee 
Reports.15 Although it has been accepted that these contain insights on what Congress 
meant by reasonable accommodation, the guidelines have been derided as patchy and 
incomplete by some ADA commentators. 16 Clearly, Congress felt that any fixed 
standards would be counter-productive and that the federal courts would be in a better 
position to decide standards on a case-by case basis. It was believed that the federal 
courts ' interpretive prowess, aided by the EEOC's federal regulations and guidance, 
would cumulatively endorse the overall intent of Congress 's actions in the disability 
context. This approach has met sharp criticism. Congress has been accused of "complete 
10 S. Schwab and S. WiUbom "Reasonable Accommodation ofWorkplace Disabilities" (2001) 
Cornell Working Paper Series. Available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/leda/searchlseriesbyauthor Last accessed December 4, 2002. p.3 
I I Jbid. 
12 See B. Poitras Tucker, "The ADA's Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights 
Paradigm" (200 1) 62 Ohio State Law Journa/335 (detailing cases where the federal courts have 
narrowed the scope of the ADA) and R. Colker, ''The ADA: A Windfall for Defendants" (1999) 
34 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review 99 (demonstrating how employers have been 
successful in the overwhelming majority of ADA Title One cases). 
13 See US Ailways v Barnett 535 U.S. 391 (2002) discussed below. 
14 For a critique of the open-endedness of the reasonable accommodation provision, see Schwab 
and WiUbom, supra n.IO pp.31-33. 
15 Specifically the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, see Senate Report no. 
116. 
16 S. Schwab and S. Willbom supra n.lO. p 21. 
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abdication of its legislative power" for "[t]he assumption that the courts will adequately 
clarify what Congress did ignores both history and reality."17 The practical reality is that 
many federal courts routinely ignore both the guidance produced by the Senate Reports 
and the interpretive guidance set out in the EEOC's regulations. 18 Recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on the ADA indicates that the federal courts' conservative element 
is only too willing to undermine Congressional intent, particularly where the latter has 
been imperfectly expressed. 
Legislative description 
The obvious place to seek guidance on the boundaries of the reasonable accommodation 
obligation is in the statutory text. At first glance, the statute appears limited in its 
description ofthe accommodation duty. To a certain degree, the absence of fixed rules 
as opposed to standards is comprehensible, given the intricate interplay between an 
unquantifiable number and degree of impairments, the variable needs for 
accommodations, a correspondingly vast number of job requirements and the variable 
levels of employer resources. 19 However, problematic lacunae remain, which a more 
vigilant legislative body could have avoided without compromising the individualised 
core of the accommodation enquiry. 
Section 102 of the ADA sets out the "General Rule" that no covered entity0 
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of [their] 
17 S. Epstein, "In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's Financial Hardship 
Becomes 'Undue' under the Americans with Disabilities Act" (1995) 48 Vanderbilt Law Review 
422, 441 cited in R. O'Brien, Crippled Justice (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001) p. 176. 
18 O 'Brien points out that the federal courts prefer to take their cue from the body oflaw 
established by the Supreme Court. Hence, many of the federal courts have combined the 
substantive issue about employment discrimination with the procedural issue of determining 
whether someone has a disability. Ibid. 
19 As the EEOC points out, the "case -by-case approach is essential if qualified individuals of 
varying abilities are to receive equal opportunities to compete for an infinitely diverse range of 
jobs. For this reason, neither the ADA nor the [regulations/appendices] can supply the correct 
answer in advance for each employment decision concerning an individual with a disability. 
Instead, the ADA simply established parameters to guide employers in how to consider and take 
into account, the disabling condition involved." EEOC, Appendix to Part 1630- Interpretive 
Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, (July, 2003 ed.) p.349 
20 "Covered entities" are defined to mean an employer, employment agency, labor organization 
or joint labor management committee. EEOC, Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment 
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. Ch. XIV (July 2003 ed.) § 
1630.2(b). 
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disability at all stages of the employment relationship.21 As this thesis has discussed, the 
act of discriminating in employment is made novel in the disability context, as the 
statute stipulates that "discrimination" includes "not making reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee ... ".22 The provision goes 
on to state that a denial of employment opportunities to an "otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability" amounts to discrimination if such a denial is based on the 
employer's need to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental 
impairments of the applicant.23 
Qualified Individuals and Essential Functions24 
The extent of the accommodation duty placed on employers by Title I is tempered by a 
number of statutory caveats. These obviously include the qualifying term "reasonable" 
and its interaction with the "undue hardship" defence.25 These terms shall be considered 
below, following an analysis of two elements that are often omitted from the debate 
over accommodations - the qualified individuals and the essential functions 
requirements. 
Instrumental to the application of the reasonable accommodation provision is 
the definition of a "qualified individual with a disability" to whom the duty to 
accommodate only extends. Title I decrees a "qualified individual with a disability'' to 
mean an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position in question.26 The insights raised here on 
the role played by this factor in the accommodation matrix will be of particular 
comparative use when discussing Ireland's reasonable accommodation provision. 
The business community's primary concern with the ADA can be summed up 
as an uneasy belief that its measures would force employers to hire or retain individuals 
whose impairments made it impossible for them to do the job. The predominant sense 
21 Specifically with regard to job procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of employees, 
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 
22 Section 102(b)(5)(A). 
23 Section 102(b)(5)(B). 
24 See generally, R.L. Burgdorf Jr., Disability Discrimination in Employment, (Washington, 
D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, 1996), chapter 6. 
25 Other statutory defences available to an employer include a refusal to employ an individual 
where that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the 
workplace, unless that risk cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation: 
section 103(b) ADA. 
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among the employer lobby was that equality objectives in the context of disability 
would result in unqualified personnel, increased health and safety expenditures, 
productivity slumps, and a reduction of employer prerogative in the design and 
operation of workplace functions. However, a proper analysis of the ADA's non-
discrimination provisions clarifies that an employer's refusal to hire or retain a person 
who does not possess the ability to perform the essential functions of the job does not 
amount to discrimination. What remains important in any such determination is the 
procedural manner by which the employer arrived at this decision.27 
The qualification requirement is addressed both in the statutory text and in the 
EEOC's Interpretive Guidance. These seek to outline a structural framework for 
deciding whether or not a job function is "essential". Title I of the ADA extends 
statutory protection from discrimination only to qualified individuals with a disability. 
This is a disabled person who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform 
the essential functions of the employment position she holds or desires.28 If the person 
concerned is not "qualified" in the particular sense required by the statute/9 she loses 
her non-discrimination protection. At the same time, it is important to emphasise the 
rationale underpinning the "essential functions" prerequisite.30 The purpose behind the 
essential functions concept is one that seeks to ensure that employers do not 
systematically ignore the capabilities of disabled workers by misconceiving that a 
disability in itself prevents job performance, when in fact a person is capable of 
performing the job that the employer needs carried out.31 Determining whether an 
individual is "qualified" is obviously an individualised issue, to be assessed on a case by 
case basis. The EEOC has stated that the first step involves determining whether the 
individual satisfies the prerequisites for the position in terms of appropriate education, 
employment experience, skills and licences. The US Supreme Court has stated that any 
such inquiry should determine, first, whether the particular individual can perform the 
essential functions of the job despite his or her disability and, second, if the individual 
26 Section I 0 I (8). 
27 See below for discussion on this point. 
28 Section I 0 I (8). 
29 EEOC regulations define "qualification standards" to mean " the personal and professional 
attributes including the skill, experience, education, physical, medical, safety and other 
requirements established by a covered entity as requirements which an individual must meet in 
order to be eligible for the position held or desired." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q). 
30R. Burgdorf, supra n.24 pp. 191-192. 
31 The Report of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee states that the purpose of 
the concept is to ensure that people with disabilities are not "disqualified simply because they 
have a difficulty in performing tasks that bear only a marginal relationship to a particular job". 
Cited in R. Burgdorf, supra n.24 p. 206. 
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cannot perform its essential functions, whether a reasonable accommodation would 
enable him or her to do so?2 
The essential fi.mctions concept allows, therefore, disabled employees and 
applicants to demonstrate an ability to carry out the fundamental aspects of the 
employment position, even if the job possesses some marginal tasks which they may not 
be able to carry out because of their disability. If a person with a disability is denied a 
job, or discharged because his or her disability precludes the performance of a marginal 
job function, then this action has negatively impacted on the individual's employment 
opportunities and is actionable under the statute. The crucial question is whether a 
particular function is in fact "essential" to the performance of the specific job. 
On this point, initial guidance can be found in the statutory text, which attaches 
considerable weight to the employer's right to determine the functions of the job. The 
statutory provision states that" ... consideration shall be given to the employer's 
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential"33 and evidence of the employer's 
judgment shall be taken to include " ... a written description before advertising or 
interviewing applicants for the job" if any such document is prepared by the employer. 
While the employer's job description is an important factor, it is by no means the 
decisive one. Several courts have ruled that employer job descriptions are not 
controlling, and that a fact-specific individualised inquiry of this type " ... should reflect 
the actual functioning and circumstances of the particular enterprise involved."34 
Indeed, the point that employer prerogative was not conclusive in this regard was fmnly 
endorsed by Congress: an amendment to assign the prerogative a presumptive validity 
was thrown out prior to the ADA's enactment.35 
The EEOC has produced further regulatory guidance on the "essential 
functions" requirement. It defines the term as the "fundamental job duties" of the job the 
individual with a disability holds or desires and it expressly excludes from consideration 
the "marginal functions" of the position.36 It goes on to list a number of reasons that 
may make a particular function essential. These include the following: 
(i) The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to 
perform that function; 
32 School Board of Nassau County v Arline 480 U.S. 273, 1 AD Cases 1026 (1987), decided 
under the Rehabilitation Act 1973. 
33 Section 101 (8). 
34 Hall v United States Postal Service 857 F.2d. 1073, I AD Cases 1368 (Sixth Circ. 1988). 
35 See generally R.Burgdorf, supra n.24, chapter six. 
36 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(n)(l) (July, 2003 ed.). 
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(ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of employees 
available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; 
and /or 
(iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is 
hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function?7 
In addition, the regulations list the type of evidence that may be considered in 
determining whether the function is essential.38 These include the employer's judgment 
and the written job description prepared before advertising or interviewing for the 
vacant position.39 In addition, the time spent on functions may be indicative of its status 
within the overall job position.40 The terms of a collective bargaining agreement may be 
presented as evidence of whether a function is essential or not to a particular job 
description, as can evidence of the work experience of past and current incumbents41 in 
the position. 
Thus, there is a clear relationship that cannot be overlooked between 
"qualification" for the "essential functions" of the job in this statutory sense and the 
obligation to make reasonable accommodation. However, this is one of the more 
obvious sites where a disabling discourse clouds the operation of disability equality 
rights. What proves difficult from a disability rights perspective is the conjunction of a 
restricted functional limitation definition and a qualification clause which produces, at 
least in many employers' eyes, an untenable dichotomy: the fact of disability and a 
correlating assumption of a lack of qualifications or capacity for the position. As Hahn 
points out, " the conjunction of these terms obviously produces difficulty in proving that 
the actions of an employer were prompted by discriminatory attitudes rather than by 
evaluation of a lack of ability''.42 Evaluation of a Jack of ability or qualification for a 
position is often prompted by an inherently disabling perspective which relies on far 
37 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii) (July, 2003 ed.). 
38 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (n)(3). 
39 29 C.F.R. l630.2(n)(3)(i)-(ii). While deference is given to the employer's judgement, it is 
open to challenge by the plaintiff based on the practical experience of the workplace. Though 
this is certainly an example ofhow the operation of the ADA weighs more heavily on applicants 
for positions seeking discrimination protection as compared with job- incumbents. Statistical 
studies on litigation under the ADA bears out this point. See M. Russell, Beyond Ramps: 
Disability at the End of the Social Contract (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1998) p. 
120. 
40 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (n)(3)(iii). Some obvious examples indicate when such a test should or 
should not be relied on. For example, consider the amount of time a pilot spends in taking off 
and landing a plane, but it could hardly be conceived that such functions are not essential to the 
£osition. 
1 29 C.F.R. I 630.2(n)(3)(iv). (July 2003 ed.). 
42 H. Hahn, "Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning?" (2000) 
21 Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law 166, 187. 
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from neutral criteria such as merit or past experience. This may include, for example, a 
demand for experience of performing the tasks of a position in a particular manner, 
which may prove exclusionary for many disabled individuals. 
Practical Requirements of Accommodations 
Reasonable accommodation can be viewed as a tool of public policy that recognises the 
myriad ways through which the built and social environment favours the needs and 
requirements of non-disabled individuals and, as a consequence, requires alterations of 
that environment to mitigate its disproportionate and exclusionary impact on disabled 
people. The term "accommodation" in the context of disability is used in an umbrella 
sense: it can refer to a multitude of changes to be made in the ordinary functioning of 
the workplace in order to ensure the adequate participation of a qualified individual with 
a disability. 43 The EEOC bas described reasonable accommodation in the following 
way: 
It is best understood as a means by which barriers to the equal employment 
opportunity of an individual with a disability are removed or al1eviated. These 
barriers may, for example, be physical or structural obstacles that inhibit or 
prevent the access of an individual with a disability to job sites, facilities or 
equipment. Or they may be rigid work schedules that permit no flexibility as to 
when work is performed or when breaks may be taken or inflexible job 
procedures that unduly limit the models of communication that are used on the 
job or in the way particular tasks are accomplished.44 
Conscious of not imposing immutable standards, the ADA makes some attempt 
to identify for employers the forms that possible accommodations may take. However, it 
falls short of providing a tangible framework of examples. These have been collated in 
non-binding EEOC guidance and can also be extracted from the often-conflicting 
decisions of the federal courts.45 
The EEOC regulations state that reasonable accommodation requires 
modifications in three main circumstances. First, they stipulate that modifications or 
adjustments ought to be made to a job application process so that qualified applicants 
with disabilities can be considered. Second, the most commonly considered 
43 Chief Judge Posner: "It is plain enough what "accommodation" means. The employer must 
be willing to consider making changes in its ordinary work rules, facilities, terms, and conditions 
in order to enable a disabled individual to work." VandeZande v State of Wisconsin Dept. of 
Administration 44 F.3d 538, 542. 
44 29 C.F.R. Appendix to Part 1630 atp. 419. 
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accommodation requires modifications or adjustments to the work environment or the 
manner or circumstances under which a position is customarily performed, so that a 
qualified individual with a disability can perform its essential functions. Third, 
accommodations must be made so as to allow an employee with a disability to equally 
enjoy all the benefits and privileges of employment that are enjoyed by non-disabled 
employees in similar positions.46 
Various regulatory sources describe the types of adjustments required by the 
concept of reasonable accommodation.47 In all, some seven express categories and a 
catch-all category are included in the statutory text. These categories include (1) 
making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by 
individuals with disabilities.48 The concept "may'"'9 also include (2) job restructuring, 
(3) part-time or modified work schedules, (4) reassignment to a vacant position, (5) 
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, (6) adjustment or modification of 
examinations, training materials or policies and (7) the provision of qualified readers or 
interpreters and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 5° EEOC 
Regulations further expand on the range of accommodations that employers may be 
required to furnish through illustrative examples in the commentary appended to 
federal regulations.51 
Unlike the Irish and EU measures discussed below, the ADA provides a number 
of sign posts indicating the possible directions reasonable accommodation may take. 
However, the generality of the statutory language has not lent itself to consistent 
application. As a consequence, there is considerable divergence on the range and extent 
of the duty in the federal jurisprudence. 
Examples of Reasonable Accommodation 
Making facilities accessible and usable by an employee or applicant with a disability 
appears an obvious component of any reasonable accommodation duty. However, there 
45 See B. Poitras Tucker, supra n.l2 for a discussion of the inconsistencies in the reasonable 
accommodation case-law. 
46 29 C.F.R § 1630.2 (o)(l )(i)-(iii) (July 03 ed.). 
47 See EEOC, Appendix to Part 1630. 
4
& S. 10 I (9)(A). 
49 Schwab and Willbom point out that the ambivalent tone of the statute's wording here is 
unhelpful: an accommodation "may" require any of the listed actions; then again, it "may not''. 
Supra n. 10 at p.31. 
50 S. l01(9)(B). 
51 29 C.F.R. Appendix to Part 1630, commentary on§ 1630.2(o). 
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is no general duty to make as many aspects of the workplace environment as accessible 
as possible to the widest range of disabilities. This approach is reflective of the 
individualisation of the accommodation process and is a recognition that, while the 
blanket removal of structural barriers may be a natural progression, not all 
accommodation requirements are amenable to that approach. The modification duty 
here is reactive rather than anticipatory in nature. It focuses on the particular needs of a 
particular job-seeker or employee. 52 Examples include, inter alia, installing a ramp, 
reserving car park spaces near building entrances, making restroom facilities 
accessible, rearranging, altering or purchasing new office furniture or equipment, and 
so forth. 
Job restructuring is another form of reasonable accommodation, though toying 
with the essential functions of a position is unnecessary.53 What does require 
modification is a position's marginal functions which an employee with a disability 
may be unable to perform: these marginal duties may be reallocated or redistributed. 54 
Additionally, restructuring may require altering when or how a function either essential 
or marginal is performed. This requires an employer to assess traditional workplace 
practices and to consider whether any alternative manner of performing the job will 
allow the previously excluded disabled employee reach the required end. 
As disabled individuals often have greater medical requirements, the use of 
leave from work is described as a reasonable accommodation. An employer must 
permit the use of accrued paid leave or provide unpaid leave when necessitated by an 
employee's disability. An employer does not have to provide paid leave beyond that 
which is provided to similarly-situated employees. 55 Closely related to the leave 
requirement is the duty to modify work schedules. While in certain positions, the time 
during which an essential function is performed may be critical, in other positions this 
52 R. Burgdorf, supra n.24 p. 282. 
53 Though see the discussion over the difficulties of subtracting marginal from essential functions 
in the reasonable accommodation enquiry raised by Burgdorf, ibid. p.209. 
54The reorganisation of tasks within a team or workplace can often take place without undue 
disruption where an individual's disability makes it difficult to carry out a particular task. 
Gooding points out how such shifts take place all the time amongst able bodied people: tasks and 
duties are shuffled to suit the skills and talents of individuals. Thus, rearranging rules to take into 
account a person's disability should be an extensions of this process, as opposed to an 
exceptional requirement. C. Gooding, Disabling Laws. Enabling Acts Disability Rights in 
Britain and America (London: Pluto Press, 1994) p.8. 
55 An employee with a disability who is granted leave as a reasonable accommodation is entitled 
to return to his or her same position unless the employer demonstrates that holding open the 
position would impose an undue hardship. With regard to leave entitlements, see the Family and 
Medical Leave Act 1993 (FMLA). There are salient differences between the operation of the 
ADA and FMLA. 
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may not be the case. A modified schedule may involve adjusting anival or departure 
times, providing periodic breaks, altering when certain functions are performed, or 
allowing an employee to use accrued leave. These must be provided if such alterations 
would allow a worker with a disability to perform the duties attached to her position 
and if it would not result in an undue hardship on employers. Such modifications can 
prove especially useful to persons with certain conditions that may necessitate 
treatment during the working day, or to persons with mobility impairments who may 
require schedules to be adjusted to align with transportation requirements. 
A common form of reasonable accommodation is the provision of devices or 
equipment which would allow the disabled individual to perform the essential functions 
of the position in question. The EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual lists an extensive 
array of equipment and devices which may be required as a reasonable accommodation. 
These include items such Telecommunication Devices for Deaf People (TDDs), 
specialised computer software which converts documents to braille, speaker phones, 
and so forth. The EEOC also includes a cost assessment of the specific provisions. 56 In 
addition, the statute requires -where appropriate- adjustments to take place in 
examinations, training materials and policies. The ADA importantly adds that the 
defmition of discrimination includes the selection and administration of tests that do 
not accurately reflect the skills and aptitude of an employee with a disability.57 
Regulations issued by the EEOC expand upon the purposes behind this form of 
adjustment: 
It is unlawful for [an employer] to fail to select and administers tests concerning 
employment in the most effective manner to ensure that, when its test is 
administered to a job applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs 
sensory, manual or speaking skills, the test results accurately reflect the skills, 
aptitude, or whatever other factor of the applicant or employee that the test 
purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sensory, manual or 
speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills are the 
factors that the test purports to measure).58 
The provision of readers and interpreters is also a common form of reasonable 
accommodation: however, a reader would not be required if the reader would in effect 
be performing the job's essential functions instead of the employee doing so. The 
purpose of a reader or interpreter is to assist in the performance of the essential duties of 
the post. 
56 See the Technical Assistance manuals published and regularly updated by the United States 
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division. Available at www.ada.gov. 
57 § 102(b)(5)(7). 
171 
The ADA specifically lists reassignment to a "vacant position" as a form of 
reasonable accommodation. The ADA's committee reports, as Burgdorfhas noted, 
"indicate that including a reassignment obligation furthers important interests in 
preventing the employee's loss of a job and the employer's loss of a valuable worker in 
circumstances where the employee can be transferred to another position."59 
Reassignment allows for the retention of a person with a disability who can no longer 
perform the essential functions of his or her original position but who can be 
accommodated in a vacant position. EEOC guidance points out that reassignment is 
required only for current employees and not for job applicants.60 The employee must be 
"qualified" for the new position in terms of satisfying the requisite skill and experience 
and must be able to perform its essential functions with or without reasonable 
accommodation.61 The EEOC regulations indicate that reassignment is the reasonable 
accommodation "of last resort" and is only required following a determination that there 
is no effective accommodation that will allow the employee to perform the essential 
functions of her current position, or where all other reasonable accommodations would 
impose an undue hardship on the employer.62 This provides a timely reminder that all 
modifications requested by way of reasonable accommodation are subject to the undue 
hardship defence, in addition to the health and safety exemptions under Title 1.63 
Reassignment and Seniority Systems64 
The US Supreme Court has recently considered for the first time the reasonable 
accommodation duty in the particular context of job reassignment and its impact on 
seniority systems. In US Airways v Barnett,65 by a 5:4 majority, the Supreme Court 
58 29 C.F.R. § 1630.11 (July, 2003 ed.). 
59 R. Burgdorf, supra n. 24 pp. 297-298 relying on Senate Report at 31-32 and Education and 
Labor Committee Report at 63. 
60 29 C.F.R. app s 1630.2 (o) (July, 2003 ed.). 
61 The EEOC regulations indicate that the employee does not need to be the best qualified 
individual for the position in order to obtain it as a reassignment. 
62 EEOC, Appendix to Part 1630 at p.357. 
63 An employer can include in any consideration of the qualification standards of an employee 
with a disability whether that individual might pose a "direct threat" to his or her fellow 
employees. Section 103(b) ADA. The EEOC regulations define "direct threat" to mean "a 
significant risk of harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be 
eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation''. 29 C.F.R 1630(q). 
64 See generally Leading Cases, "Americans with Disabilities Act - Accommodation and 
Seniority Systems", (2002) 116 Harvard Law Review 342. 
65 535 U.S. 391 (2002), 122 S. Ct. 1516. Barnett injured his back whilst working as a cargo 
handler and transferred to a physically less demanding mailroom position. His new position later 
became open to seniority-based employee bidding under US Airways' seniority system. US 
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handed down the principle that, in general, it will be unreasonable to reassign an 
employee with a disability where such a transfer would violate the rules of a seniority 
system. Thus, the Court held that seniority systems, whether collectively bargained or 
unilaterally imposed by management, trump the duty to make reasonable 
accommodation for disabled employees, because of the importance of the seniority 
system to employee expectations. Such systems governing job placement "give 
important employee benefits by creating, and fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, 
uniform treatment. "66 According to the Supreme Court, the case-by case, individualised 
assessments required by the reasonable accommodation process would serve only to 
destabilise the seniority systems. The Supreme Court did go on to create an exception 
to this general rule. It ruled that a plaintiff " ... remains free to show that special 
circumstances warrant a finding that, despite the presence of a seniority system (which 
the ADA may not trump in the run of cases), the requested ' accommodation' is 
'reasonable' on the particular facts.'167 The Court was content not to delineate such 
exceptional circumstances, but it did allude to a number of examples. In one of these, 
an acceptable exceptional circumstance might be where a plaintiff shows that the 
employer retains the right to unilaterally alter its seniority system, and does so 
frequently, thereby reducing employee expectations that the system will be followed. 
As a result, one further departure needed to accommodate an individual is unlikely to 
affect any difference.68 Additionally, the plaintiff may be able to discharge the burden 
of showing that the system already contains derogations which mean that, in the 
circumstances, one further exception is unlikely to matter.69 
The effect of this decision is to create a presumption about the inviolability of 
seniority rules, except in rare circumstances. A logical extension of this decision is that 
it provides an incentive for employers to organise strict seniority systems in order to 
avoid reasonable accommodation obligations. Yet, the outcome in Barnett is not clearly 
derivative of the ADA's statutory text. By requiring reassignment to a vacant position, 
the ADA makes it clear that employers are not required to "bump" other employees to 
Airways refused his request to accommodate his disability by allowing him to remain in the 
mailroom and he subsequently lost his job. He claimed disability discrimination due to US 
Airways' failure to allow him to remain in the mailroom by way of reasonable accommodation. 
66 535 us 391 (2002), 404. 
67 Ibid at 405. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. Thus the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the presence of"special circumstances" 
that make a departure from the seniority system reasonable in any particular case. If such special 
circumstances are shown, the burden then shifts to the employer to show why the reassignment 
would pose an undue hardship. 
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make space for a disabled employee. The ADA expressly states that "reassignment to a 
vacant position" and "modification of existing policies" are required by way of 
reasonable accommodation.70 Therefore, it seems logical to presume that a modification 
of an existing seniority policy by assigning a person to a vacant position could be a 
reasonable accommodation, unless the position was not in fact vacant or the employer 
could demonstrate undue hardship on its business operations. In addition, the statute 
nowhere exempts the rules of seniority systems from tbe requirements of the reasonable 
accommodation duty, as is the position under equivalent provisions in the United 
States' Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Indeed, the legislative history of the 
ADA makes it clear that the existence of collectively-bargained protections for 
seniority "would not be determinative" on the issue of whether an accommodation was 
reasonable.71 
This decision is an example of a judicial failure, from the lower to the superior 
courts,72 to interpret the statute in accordance with its plain language and in a manner 
consistent with its stated goal of integrating and retaining disabled people within 
workplace structures. The creation of a rebuttable presumption that reassignment to a 
vacant position may violate seniority rules moves away from the individual case-by 
case approach to the ADA's reasonable accommodation duty. As part of the 
accommodation required through "modifying policies", it should have remained an 
issue within the general scope of accommodation enquiries. Thus, it should be fact-
specific and individually assessed. On this view, a standard presumption that an 
employer-negotiated seniority system is inviolable gives way to a balancing enquiry 
between the seniority system and the proposed reasonableness of the accommodation 
and any undue hardship defence. 
Two Supreme Court Justices dissented from the majority line of reasoning. In 
dissent, Justice Souter, who was joined by Justice Ginsburg, pointed out that there was 
nothing in the ADA which insulates seniority rules from the reasonable accommodation 
duty, as is specifically the case with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act 1967.73 Justice Souter looked to the statute's 
legislative history. This gives evidence of Congress's intention that a collective 
70 My emphasis. 
71 House Representative Report No. 101 - 485, pt.2, p.63 (1990). See also the Senate Report No. 
101-116, p.32 (1989). 
72 For discussion on the litigation history ofthis case and lower courts divergent approach to the 
issue, seeM. B. Robinson, ''Reasonable Accommodation vs. Seniority in the Application of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act" (2003) 47 St. Louis University Law Journal 179. 
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bargaining agreement providing for seniority could be considered as one factor in 
determining the reasonableness of an accommodation.74 He went on to state that, in his 
opinion, Mr Barnett had discharged the burden of showing that his proposed 
accommodation was a "reasonable one", despite the policy in place at US Airways, 
because of the absence of any "unmanageable ripple effects" from his request. 75 In fact, 
Justice Souter went on to declare that" ... it is hard to see the seniority scheme here as 
any match for Barnett's ADA requests, since US Airways apparently took pains to 
ensure that its seniority rules raised no great expectations"76, no other employee was 
"bumped", and nobody had lost a job on his account. He declared that since the request 
was reasonable, the burden should shift to US Airways to demonstrate that the seniority 
violation would have created an undue hardship. 
The US Supreme Court's interpretation of the ADA with regard to seniority 
systems is further evidence of the disabling discourse surrounding judicial 
interpretation of disability civil rights. A sharp division is drawn by the Supreme Court 
between "normal" or "ordinary" workers' expectations of fair, uniform treatment and 
the atypical, special statutory rights granted disabled workers. The latter, according to 
the Supreme Court, serves to "destabilise" the predictable standards of the workplace 
environment. Claims that disabled workers enforcing accommodation duties are 
"destabilising" once again provides evidence of a judicial attitude which assumes the 
innate displacement of disabled individuals. 
What is clear from this review of the majority and dissenting judgments is that 
legal discourse often views disabled individuals' claims to reasonable accommodation 
as a form of "special" rights. Such claims go beyond the legitimate boundaries of the 
traditional civil rights paradigm. 77 However, the goal of equality of opportwlity is 
undemlined when judicial statements attack the legitimacy of the reasonable 
accommodation provision by questioning the level of protection accorded to disabled 
people, despite the strong purpose statements of Congress. In this sense, judicial 
73 Both of these statutes contain explicit protection for seniority systems - See 42 USC§ 2000e-
2(h) (1994 ed.) and 29 USC§ 623(£) (1994 ed.) respectively. 
74 535 U.S. 391 (2002), at 421 , citing Senate Report no. 101- 116 p.32 (1989). 
75 Ibid. p.421. 
76 Ibid. p.423. 
77 For a persuasive counter to this point including how employers routinely provide 
accommodations for all employees as a matter of course and how reasonable acconm1odation in 
favour of disabled people is an extension ofthis process, see R. Burgdorf, " 'Substantially 
Limited' Protection From Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and 
Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability'' (1997) 42 Villanova Law Review 409, 529-32 
and H. Hahn, "Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning?" 
(2000) 21 Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law 166. 
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discourse in the US has yet to fully accept or grasp that the existing rules of the 
workplace operate to the advantage of many non-disabled workers in the first place. 78 
This calls for, as Tucker argues, greater education for the courts and the public at large 
on the true meaning of civil rights for disabled people.79 In tum, this depends on a great 
change in the prevailing understanding of the concept of disability. 
Procedural Reasonable Accommodation: An Interactive Process 
The ADA regulates the procedural aspects along with the substantive scope of the 
accommodation mandate. In the first instance, it must be pointed out that an employer 
need only make a reasonable accommodation for the known disability of an employee 
or applicant. 80 Thus, the disabled employee or applicant must make his or her 
impairment known to the employer, except where a disability is immediately obvious. 
The ADA's accommodation duty envisions an interactive process of ongoing 
dialogue between the employer and the disabled employee with regard to the type of 
accommodation required.81 In US Airways v Barnett, discussed previously, Justice 
Stevens made reference to the Appeal Court' s correctly-held view that there was a 
triable issue of fact with respect to whether the employer had violated the statute by 
failing to engage in an interactive process concerning the respondent's proposed 
accommodations. According to Justice Stevens, this holding remained untouched by the 
Supreme Court 's judgment in that decision.82 However, it must be pointed out that the 
courts are divided over the extent and existence of the procedural aspect of the 
accommodation duty.83 The most common reason given for a refusal to recognise this 
procedural component is the possibility of an odd situation where "employers who had 
provided an adequate substantive accommodation could nevertheless be held liable for a 
78 See further, A. Myerson and S. Yee, Reasonable Accommodation after Barnett (2003) 
available at <http://www.ncd.gov> 
79 B. Poitras Tucker, supra n.l2 p.335. 
80 See EEOC, Appendix to Pt. 1630, §1630.9 p.363. 
81 To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered 
entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in 
need of the accommodation. EEOC, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (o)(3) (July, 2003 ed.). See also 
Appendix to Part 1630 § 1630.2(o) . 
82 228 F.3d I I 05 117 (CA9 2000). 
83 That is, the lower federal courts. The Supreme Court has not considered the procedural aspect 
of reasonable accommodations. 
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procedural shortcoming."84 However, this outcome has arisen in other areas of 
procedural obligations without any great practical or theoretical difficulty ensuing.85 
The procedure element of the reasonable accommodation duty has an 
interesting role to play in the context of addressing employer reactions to disabled 
people and their status as employees. For example, it is recognised that discrimination 
by employers against disabled applicants can take many forms, and not least of these is 
an inherent discriminatory bias against such persons, in much the same way as with 
gender- or race-based preferences.86 In particular, employer aversion may arise in the 
context of the accumulated myths regarding the limitations and deficits of the 
stereotypical person with a particular type or severity of disability. More often than not, 
employment decisions in this sort of situation are taken on the basis of generalised, 
inaccurate information which feeds and helps to perpetuate these myths and 
stereotypes.87 The procedural aspect of the accommodation duty can reduce decisions 
caused by employer aversion in a number of ways. For a start, the "forced interaction" is 
more likely to increase the chance of decisions being made on the basis of substantive 
information rather than on the basis of inherent aversion.88 In addition, as Schwab and 
Willbom argue, procedural discussions may eventually contribute to the ADA's goal of 
changing employer preferences, as the discussion may inform and educate employers of 
the positive potential and strengths of individuals with disabilities.89 
Additionally, the interactive process has a role to play in offsetting the 
disadvantages of statistical discrimination. The fact of statistical discrimination weighs 
heavily on the labour market capital of disabled people. Statistical discrimination is 
often utilised by employers to screen out certain characteristics among its potential 
workforce, and it is achieved by acting on the basis of average, statistical stereotypes. 
Schwab and Willbom explain this employer practice as it occurs in the disability context 
in the following manner: 
If the average productivity of a certain class of individual with a disability is 
lower than that of other workers and if it is expensive for employers to make 
individual determinations of productivity within that class, the profit 
84 See S. Schwab and S. Will born, supra n.l 0 p.36. 
85 For example constitutional due process and estoppel, ibid. See also statutory unfair dismissals 
in the Lrish context, discussed in M. Redmond, Dismissal Law in Ireland (Dublin: Butterworths, 
1999), chapter 13, and see infra for discussion of the Labour Court's imputation of a procedural 
obligation in the Irish Employment Equality Act. 
86 Often this bias is an unconscious one and is the result of the accumulated impact of 
exclusionary attitudes and unthinking factors which disproportionately affect disabled people. 
87 EEOC, Appendix to Part 1630, § 1630.5. 
88 S. Schwab and S. Will born, supra n.1 0 p.34. 
S9 Ibid. 
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maximizing employer will rely on the lower average productivity and refuse to 
hire individuals with disability even if many are excellent workers .... Because 
it is expensive to distinguish a particular productive individual with a disability 
from the class of persons with disabilities who have lower average productivity, 
an employer is better off relying on the statistical stereotype.90 
When employers rely on statistical information or misinformation91 regarding the 
productivity of the average disabled person, it contributes to a low employment rate and 
disproportionately high levels of poverty among disabled people as a group. As a 
consequence, many disabled people have a reduced incentive to invest in their own 
productivity bank.92 Through requiring individual evaluation of disabled people under 
the reasonable accommodation duty, the ADA deems statistical discrimination illegal.93 
The procedural requirement, it is argued, has the potential to break this cycle of 
deprivation and "creates a proper set of incentives for people with disabilities to invest 
in their own productivity."94 Viewing the provisions positively, disabled people have 
been empowered by the knowledge that the law grants them the right to be individually 
considered and engaged with under the procedural limb of the reasonable 
accommodation mandate.95 
The interactive nature of this process should not be taken, however, to imply 
that the disabled employee or applicant retains an ongoing duty with regard to this 
aspect. The regulations clearly state that the onus lies with the covered entity to initiate 
the interactive process in order to unearth the precise nature of the individual's disability 
and the potential features of any accommodation required to allow competent 
performance of the essential functions of the position. The obvious advantage to the 
employer of this system is that, very often, the person best equipped to advise on the 
nature and type of accommodation required is the disabled person herself.96 On the other 
hand, there is the risk of such a mechanism unduly burdening individuals with 
90 Ibid. p.l7 
91 Schwab and Will born discuss how employers act on the basis of proxies designed to fill 
information deficits about the productivity and labour values of certain groups of possible 
employees. Ibid p.S-8. 
92 The fact of statistical screening and discrimination means that members of the depressed 
groups lack the incentive to invest in their own productivity, since they believe that they are 
going to be treated as an average member of the group with a similar disability, in a negative, 
discriminatory and exclusionary manner. 
93 EEOC, Appendix to Part 1630 points out that it would be a violation of the ADA for an 
employer to limit the duties of a disabled employee based on a presumption of what is best for 
the person or a presumption about the abilities of an individual with such a disability. 
94Schwab and Will born, supra n.J 0 p.35. 
95 Though this right remains enforceable in a negative manner. 
96 See advice on the extent of this interactive process, supra, text to n.81 
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disabilities in circumstances where employers try to abrogate responsibility, on both the 
administrative and financial front, to the protected employee. 
The "Reasonableness" of Reasonable Accommodation? 
A reading of the duty to make reasonable accommodation indicates two limitations. 
First, the accommodation which is granted need only be a "reasonable" one, and 
second, any failure by an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation can be 
excused if it would impose an "undue hardship" on its business operation. The statute 
fails to expand on the relationship between the reasonableness of the employer's 
accommodation and any encroachment towards undue hardship. However, it was 
generally thought that the approach on this issue would be consistent with that adopted 
under the Rehabilitation Act and in the EEOC regulations.97 Originally, it was believed 
that a "reasonable accommodation" entailed a modification that was effective in 
enabling an individual with a disability to perform the "essential functions" of the 
particular job she holds or desires, as per the EEOC regulations. Thus, the term 
"reasonable" was linked with the suitability or effectiveness of the accommodation in 
terms of it facilitating the disabled person's performance of essential job functions. The 
reasonableness of the accommodation did not refer to any limitations in terms of cost or 
inconvenience to an employer but rather to "its potential to provide equal opportunity 
[and] reliability".98 A second approach imports an independent standard of 
"reasonableness" into the reasonable accommodation inquiry and is divorced from the 
tradWonal EEOC approach. The US Supreme Court has recently confirmed that the 
terms "reasonable" and "undue hardship" impose analytically separate, though related, 
limitations on the scope of required accornmodations.99 The approaches are addressed 
below. 
The first approach is that the "reasonableness" of the accommodation duty 
placed on employers requires a level of provision that enables the disabled person to 
satisfactorily perform the essential functions of the job in question. This argument was 
made by lawyers in the US Ainvays v Barnett decision, discussed above, and it has also 
97 C. Feldblum, "Definition of Disability under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What 
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About it?" (2000) 21 Berkeley Journal of Employment 
and Labor Law 91. Professor Feldblum one was of the drafters of the ADA. 
98 L. Waddington, "Implementing and Interpreting the Reasonable Accommodation Provision of 
the Framework Employment Directive: Learning from Experience and Achieving Best Practice" 
(EU Network of Experts on Disability Discrimination, August 2004) p.63. 
99 US Airways v Barnett 535 U.S. at 399-402. 
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been put forward by disability rights advocates and commentators.100 Thus, the 
accommodation's reasonableness should be considered in the light of its ability to meet 
an individual's disability-related needs in the workplace. Support for this approach can 
be found in the EEOC regulations, which state that "reasonable accommodation means 
... [m]odifications or adjustments ... that enable a qualified individual with a disability 
to perform the essential functions of [a] position."101 If this is correct, then an 
accommodation is ''reasonable" where it allows a disabled person to carry out the 
essential job functions of the position she holds or desires. On this analysis, an 
accommodation would be unreasonable if it would not adequately assist a person with a 
disability meet the position's essential job functions. In other words, it implies that the 
accommodation offered is insufficient and therefore unreasonable in its approach. But 
does it follow from this reasoning that the "best" accommodation which allows the 
performance of essential job functions is demanded by the term "reasonable"? It seems 
difficult to defend an interpretation of"reasonable" that requires the maximum 
provision of accommodating measures to a particular disabled individual. Such an 
approach would be antithetical to the term "reasonable", at least to its meaning within 
legal discourse. It also appears to be contrary to EEOC guidance in the area, which 
states than an employer may choose between a number of "reasonable" 
accommodations - it is not necessarily required to choose the best (often interpreted as 
the most expensive) accommodation.102 For argument's sake, however, consider the 
statement that a "reasonable" accommodation is one that best allows the employee or 
applicant to meet the essential functions of a job. If this is correct, does it add to the 
burden placed upon an employer, apart from the undue hardship enquiry? This question 
raises the boundary issue implicit in any interpretation of reasonableness and in any 
impact it may have, for example, on very large employers who might not be able to rely 
on the fmancial distress element of the "undue hardship" defence. However, the basis 
of this question is predicated on an incomplete assessment of the meaning and extent of 
the undue hardship defence, as employers could still rely on non-pecuniary factors in 
100 Justice Breyer, writing in US Airways v Barnett, reported on the respondent's argument which 
was that: "the statutory words "reasonable accommodation" mean only "effective 
accommodation," authorizing a court to consider the requested accommodation's ability to meet 
an individual's disability-related needs and nothing more. On this view, a seniority rule 
violation, having nothing to do with the accommodation' s effectiveness, has nothing to do with 
its reasonableness. It might at most, help to prove an "undue hardship" on the operation of the 
business". 535 U.S. 391 at 399. But this, as it was acknowledged, is for the employer to 
demonstrate. 
101 29 C.F.R. § 1630(o)(ii) (July 2003 ed.). 
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deciding whether or not a particular accommodation presents a hardship which is 
"undue" .103 Thus, it would appear that the better approach would be to keep up the 
traditional and purposeful separation between reasonable accommodation and undue 
hardship. 
However, there is evidence that this traditional approach has been eroded by 
certain federal circuits that have interpreted the reasonableness limb of the reasonable 
accommodation duty as one that provides an additional means for allowing employers 
to avoid their obligations.104 The statute clearly states that an employer must reasonably 
accommodate a qualified employee with a disability, unless it can prove that doing so 
would cause an undue hardship on its business operations. The issue for the courts, 
however, is whether the term "reasonable" modifies the accommodation duty in a 
manner distinct from the undue hardship defence, or whether proving the 
"unreasonableness" of the proposed accommodation is, in essence, the same as proving 
an undue hardship. In VandeZande v State of Wisconsin Department of 
Administration, 105 a federal appeals court decision, Chief Judge Posner argued by 
analogy with the duty of reasonable care imposed by the law of negligence. The Chief 
Judge cited Judge Learned Hand's dictum that, in deciding what care is reasonable, the 
court considers the cost of increased care106 and he used this approach to flesh out the 
meaning of"reasonable" in the context of Title I. He denied that this approach would 
mean that the cost and benefits of alterations to a workplace to enable a disabled person 
to work would always have to be quantified, or that an accommodation would be 
deemed unreasonable if the cost exceeded the benefit, however slightly. "At the very 
least", Judge Posner argued "the cost could not be disproportionate to the benefit". 107 It 
is argued here that the cost-benefit analysis suggested by Judge Posner is misplaced and 
actually falls under the umbrella of the "undue hardship" defence. Contrary to the 
general assumption, undue hardship entails more than just difficulties with expenditure 
and looks to non-pecuniary impacts on employers, as is discussed below. Other federal 
appeal courts have similarly stated that in detem1ining whether an accommodation is 
"reasonable," one must look at the costs of the accommodation in relation to its 
102 EEOC, Appendix to Part 1630, "Process ofDetermining the Appropriate Reasonable 
Accommodation" p.364. 
103 Section 101 (1) (b) - I- IV. 
104 See G. Scolieri and M. Woodward, "A Call for Clarification: Achieving a Uniform Proof 
Structure in Reasonable Accommodation Cases under the Americans with Disabilities Act" 
(2002) 20 Hofstra Labour and Employment Law Journa/117. 
105 44 F.3d 538, 542. 
106 Citing Judge Hand in United States v Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
107 Supra n.65 p. 542. 
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benefits.108 It is important to point out that this analysis has no foundation either in the 
statute, in its legislative history, or in the regulations issued under the ADA. 109 
However, in US Ainvays v Barnett 110, the Supreme Court recently discussed 
these aspects of "reasonable accommodation". It specifically addressed the 
respondent's argument that the reasonableness of an accommodation is concerned with 
"enabling" the individual with a disability to perform the job's essential functions. This 
is in keeping with the EEOC's Regulations. The respondent's argument was that any 
other view would make the words "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" 
virtual mirror images, thus creating a redundancy in the statute. 111 Ignoring the 
approach taken under the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court refuted the 
"reasonable" as "effective" accommodation argument: first, because" ... in ordinary 
English the word "reasonable" does not mean "effective"112 and second, because 
nowhere in the statute did" ... Congress indicate that the word 'reasonable' means no 
more than 'effective' ."113 It dismissed the EEOC regulations equating reasonable 
accommodation with "enabling" a person with a disability to do the essential functions 
of a job- this was simply a phrase that "emphasizes the statutory provision's basic 
objective."114 The regulations, the Court continued, do not say that "enable" and 
"reasonable" mean the same thing. Rather, the Supreme Court simply stated that "(i]t is 
the word "accommodation" and not the word "reasonable" that conveys the need for 
effectiveness". 115 Accordingly, "[a]n ineffective "modification" or "adjustment" will 
not accommodate a disabled individual 's limitations." 116 The Court fu.rther declared 
that "an accommodation could be unreasonable in its impact even though it might be 
effective in facilitating performance of essential job functions". But surely its impact 
beyond the individual in whose favour it is raised should come within the undue 
hardship analysis? Yet, the Supreme Court was at pains to point out that this 
interpretation of"reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" does not result in 
the former becoming a redundant term. The undue hardship enquiry, it argued, relates 
108 See Monette v Electronic Data Sys. C01p. 90 F. 3 d 1173, 1184 n. I 0 5 AD Cas. (BNA) 1326, 
1335 (6th Cir. 1996) and VandeZande supra n.1 05. 
109 See House Education and Labor Report at 69. 
110 535 U.S. 391, 122 S. Ct. 1516. 
111 Ibid. p. 400. 
112 Ibid. But surely, an interpretation based on ordinary English should not come into play, given 
the significance of reasonable accommodation in the disability context and its historical 
development as a 'term of art' in that context. 
113 Ibid. p. 40 I. 
114 Ibid. 
1 
IS Ibid. p. 400. 
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to the impact of the provision of reasonable accommodation on the operation of the 
business. This is because 
" . .. a demand for an effective accommodation could prove unreasonable 
because of its impact, not on business operations, but on fellow employees -
say, because it will lead to dismissals, relocations, or modification of employee 
benefits to which an employer, looking at the matter from the perspective of the 
business itself, may be relatively indifferent. " 11 7 
This analysis appears misconceived, particularly in light of the factors to be considered 
in any determination as to the existence of an undue hardship. One of the factors to be 
taken into account is any impact which the accommodation would have upon the 
operation of the facility, and this is surely capable of including issues such as employee 
relations. 
The decision in Barnett charges the lower courts to interpret the term reasonable 
accommodation so that a plaintiff must show that an accommodation "seems reasonable 
on its face, i.e. ordinarily or in the run of cases". This approach, while it may be 
designed to prevent frivolous claims, gives the judiciary broad discretion based on 
circular reasoning.118 Moreover, this approach opens a can of wonns, for it allows 
"employers to interject their own ... possibly prejudiced view about what is reasonable 
and allows courts to second-guess otherwise workable and not unduly burdensome 
accommodations". 119 It may also restrict employees to requesting traditional 
accommodations, and not necessarily ones which enable them to carry out the job's 
essential functions. Also, this approach denies the interactive nature of the reasonable 
accommodation process, because it gives an employer scope to argue that, despite an 
accommodation being effective and not unduly costly or difficult, it does not view it as 
being "reasonable". Both the original interpretation of reasonable accommodation under 
the Rehabilitation Act and its explanation in the EEOC regulations have always 
approached "reasonable accommodation" as a term of art: that is, modifications or 
changes to the work environment that allow a qualified individual with a disability to 
carry out a job's essential functions. It is based on the premise that it allows "a covered 
entity's employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment 
as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities".120 The 
emphasis is on allowing the disabled individual to participate on an equal footing, The 
116 Ibid. Emphasis in original. But could an effective modification be umeasonable because it 
affects other issues, such as other employees? 
11 7 535 U.S. 391, pp.400-401. 
118 G. Scolieri and M. Woodward, supra n. l04 p.l22. 
119 L. Waddington, supra n.98 p.69. 
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other side of the equation - the permissible extent of the impact of any proposed 
reasonable accommodation on employers- had always been detennined by means of the 
undue hardship enquiry. As Waddington points out, the Court's opinion in Barnett 
"makes a dramatic and unfortunate break with the ADA's legislative history and 
implementing regulations by stating that the statute imposes an independent standard of 
reasonableness of accommodations" .121 
Undue Hardship 
Once an employer determines that a "reasonable accommodation" will allow a qualified 
employee or applicant with a disability to perform the position's essential functions, it 
must make space for that accommodation, unless an "undue hardship" will ensue for the 
employer's business operations. It was with the precise parameters of this concept that 
the ADA's principal detractor, the business community, was most vociferously 
concerned. Given the inclusion of the untested concept of reasonable accommodation, 
the business lobby was even more concerned with Congress's minimal articulation on 
the substance of any undue hardship. Congress had clearly stated its intention of 
requiring more than "de minimis" expenditure. Early consultation on the ADA indicated 
that an accommodation could not be refused unless its provision threatened the 
continued existence of the employer's business concern. 122 Congress pulled back from 
the perceived asperity of this approach but the business lobby pushed for a more 
exacting standard. Its argument was premised on the fact that it would be profoundly 
unfair to leave employers open to liability on the basis of a statutory silence that resulted 
in a standard so vague as to hardly amount to a standard at all. In spite of extensive 
campaigning, two amendments addressing this concern were defeated. 123 The first 
sought to establish as an undue hardship any accommodation that exceeded ten per cent 
of a disabled employee's annual salary.124 The second amendment wouJd have limited 
120 29 C.F.R. s 1630.2(o) (July 2003 ed.). 
121 L.Waddington, supra n.98 p.70. 
122 B. Tucker, "The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview" ( 1989) University of fllinois 
Law Revilnv 923. 927. 
123 For more extensive discussion on the debates surrounding the Olin Amendments, as these 
were tenned, see S. Epstein, supra n.17 
124 Opponents to this amendment argued that it would unfairly switch the focus away from the 
resources of the employer and onto the annual salary of the employee. 136 Congress Record 
H24 74. It would also severely disadvantage lower-wage workers in need of accommodations, 
and large numbers of disabled people in employment hold mainly lower wage and unskilled 
positions. 
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expenditures on reasonable accommodation to five per cent of annual profit for 
businesses with gross annual receipts of $500,000 or less. 
However, all Congress placed in the statutory text was a statement to the effect 
that an undue hardship "means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense", 
which is to be judged in light of the following statutory factors: 
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act; 
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the 
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at 
such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of 
such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; 
(iii) the overall fmancial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the 
business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the 
number, type, and location of its facilities; and 
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the 
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the 
geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or 
facilities in question to the covered entity. 
What these factors make clear is that the primary consideration is not the "cost" of the 
accommodation but rather the employer's ability to absorb the cost and the impact of its 
provision. 125 As a result, an "undue hardship" determination is by its nature an 
individualistic one, and one to be made on a case-by-case basis. The only boundaries 
immediately ascertainable to the accommodation duty are those accommodations that 
are less than the risk of the employer being driven out of business and more than a de 
minimis expense. However, within these boundaries, there is considerable room for 
manoeuvre. 
Epstein lists three reasons for Congress's loyalty to such a vague standard. First, 
Congress anticipated that the concept of reasonable accommodation would, for the most 
part, place no more than trivial expenses on employers.126 Second, Congress was ofthe 
opinion that the undue hardship concept had operated adequately under the 
Rehabilitation Act: any ambiguities had been satisfactorily clarified by the courts who 
were better placed to define the standard's parameters on a case-by case basis. Third, 
and quite persuasively from a disability rights perspective, Congress concluded that 
because of the infinite permutations of disability, accommodation requirements and 
125 J. Cooper, "Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable 
Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act" (1991) 139 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1423, 1449. 
126 See the Jobs Accommodation Network, a service of the Office ofDisability Employment 
Policy of the US. Department of Labor which regularly collates and updates information on the 
mean cost and type of various accommodations. http://www.jan.\.vvu.edu 
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levels of employer resources, a fixed standard worked against the principle of fair and 
equitable application across all situations. 127 
Reasonable Accommodation: Ireland 
Origins 
The reasonable accommodation provision in Ireland's employment equality legislation 
had a difficult birth.128 As already discussed in chapter three, the legislature's first 
formulation of the reasonable accommodation duty was held by the Supreme Court to 
infringe the property provisions of the Irish Constitution.129 From October 1999 until 
July 2004, a reformulated reasonable accommodation provision operated under the 
Employment Equality Act 1998. However, as of July 2004, the Equality Act 2004 took 
effect, the purpose of which is to amend the 1998 Act in light of the State's obligations 
under the Framework Directive. Consequently, a further formulation of the reasonable 
accommodation duty is up for discussion. The approach taken here is chronological: 
first, the focus is on the terms of the Employment Equality Act 1998 Act; then, attention 
is directed to the provisions of the Framework Directive; and finally, the discussion 
turns to the Equality Act 2004, which transposes the terms of the Directive. 
Reasonable Accommodation under the 1998 Act 
The reasonable accommodation duty under the 1998 Act operated at the intersection of 
a number of statutory provisions. 
Under the 1998 Act, the reasonable accommodation duty was provided for in a 
rather unwieldy fashion in section 16(3)(a)-(b). This stated that "[t]or the purposes of 
[the] Act, a person who has a disability shall not be regarded as other than fully 
competent to undertake, and fully capable of undertaking, any duties if, with the 
assistance of special treatment or facilities they would be fully competent to undertake, 
and be fully capable ofundertaking, those duties." 130 If a disabled individual was 
decreed as fully capable and competent of job performance with special treatment or 
127 S. Epstein, supra n.l7 p. 427. 
128 See generally, 0. Smith "Disability, Discrimination and Employment: A Never-ending Legal 
Story" (200 I) 23 Dublin University Law Journal 148 pp. 156-160 for discussion and also chapter 
three of this work. 
129 Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Employment Equality Bill 1996 (1997] 2 IR 321. 
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facilities, then the subsection went on to require that "[a)n employer .. . do all that is 
reasonable to accommodate the needs of a person who has a disability by providing 
[such]special treatment or facilities ... " 131 Finally, and importantly in terms of 
delineating the extent of the obligation placed on employers, paragraph (c) decreed that 
"[a] refusal or failure to provide for [such) special treatment or facilities .. . shall not be 
deemed reasonable unless such provision would give rise to a cost, other than a nominal 
cost, to the employer". An employer's obligation, then, extended to providing special 
treatment by doing all that is reasonable to accommodate a person with a disability, up 
to a nominal cost standard. Unlike the original position in the US, there is within this 
construction an immediate link between the reasonableness of the accommodation and 
its costs. Where the cost exceeded nominal expenditure, an employer was relieved of its 
accommodation duty. As chapter three discussed, this approach was due to the 
constitutional history surrounding the provision of the legislation. This provision shall 
be returned to in due course. 
An "Essential" Function Omission? 
The employer's reasonable acconunodation obligations are clearly circumscribed by 
the terms of section 16(1)(a)-(b) which, it is presumed, must have been intended to 
mirror the "qualified individual with a disability" approach of the ADA. However, the 
provision is lacking in one crucial regard. Section 16(1) states that the Act shall not be 
interpreted to require any person to recruit or promote, or to provide training or 
experience to an individual for a position if the individual-
(a) will not undertake (or, as the case may be, continue to undertake) the duties 
attached to that position or will not accept (or, as the case may be, continue 
to accept) the conditions under which those duties132 are, or may be required 
to be, performed, or 
(b) is not (or, as the case may be, is no longer) fully competent and available to 
undertake, and fully capable of undertaking, the duties attached to that 
position, having regard to the conditions under which those duties133 are, or 
may be required to be, performed. 
This provision thus insulates employers from a requirement to hire or retain 
incompetent or incapable personnel, though the employer bas to bear in mind the effect 
130 Section 16(3)(a) EEA 1998. 
131 Section 16(3)(b) EEA 1998. 
132 Emphasis added. 
133 Emphasis added. 
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of the later subsections, relating to the provision of an accommodation, on any 
evaluation of competency based on disability. 
The divergence in approach between the two statutory schemes under 
consideration stems from the extent to which employers are entitled to delineate and 
define the functions (in the US) and the duties (in Ireland) of the particular position. To 
recap, in the US, the employer must make a reasonable accommodation for a "qualified 
individual with a disability": a person who, with or without reasonable accommodation, 
can perform the "essential functions" of the job required or desired. As has been 
discussed above, the "essential functions" component of the non-discrimination scheme 
plays a material role in determining the equal opportunities available to disabled 
employees in the US. What the US formulation recognises is that there may be non-
essential components to a job that present barriers to that job's performance by certain 
disabled individuals. Alternatively, a job may be restructured to be carried out in a way 
that will allow a disabled person to complete the task which the employer requires. The 
"essential functions" requirement specifies that non-essential job functions should not 
place any material barrier to the employment prospects of disabled employees or 
applicants. It demands assessment procedures which are capable of measuring the 
employment capabilities of disabled people and it requires adaptable job descriptions 
loyal to actual job practices. In this way, it seeks to ensure that job descriptions are not 
rigidly drafted in such a way as to have a disparate impact on disabled individuals' 
employment opportunities. It is, therefore, a pivotal component of the reasonable 
accommodation mandate. 
The Irish legislation, on the other hand, does not adequately safeguard against 
the possible abuse by employers of their prerogative to set and determine job duties. 134 
These could be designed in such a way as to insulate employers from the specific 
requirements of disabled applicants or employees. The legislation clearly states that an 
employer need not employ or retain any person who is not competent and fully capable 
of undertaking the duties attached to a position. Note that the "duties" which are 
required to be performed are not linked to the requirement of a capacity to perform the 
"essential" duties of the position, the duties integral to the job itself. Further, the statute 
states that such duties are to be assessed with regard to the "conditions under which 
134See G. Quinn and S. Quinlivan, "Disability Discrimination: The need to amend the 
Employment Equality Act 1998 in light of the EU Framework Directive on Employment" in C. 
Costello and E. Barry, Equality in Diversicy: The New Equality Directives (Dublin: ICEL, 2003) 
p.213, 220. Note also the effect of section 36, discussed in chapter two, which allows an 
employer to insist on educational qualifications deemed generally acceptable in the State. 
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those duties are, or may be, required to be performed". Presumably, the prerogative 
power with regard to the conditions attached to the duties of a position remains, as is 
traditionally the case, with the employer, the statute being of no further assistance. The 
effect of this provision is that it leaves room for employers to reduce their reasonable 
accommodation obligations. Employers could demand nothing short of fuJI and 
competent performance of all the duties of a position, as they determine them, with the 
result that some disabled applicants or employees may be "not competent" or "not 
capable" for a position because of their inability to carry out what are merely ancillary 
job functions. There is a pertinent difference between providing a reasonable 
accommodation to allow an applicant carry out the "essential" duties of a position and 
providing a reasonable accommodation which would still not enable an employee to 
perform "all" the duties of a post. This could tum out to be a problematic omission. 
Despite this criticism, the Irish legislature did not take the opportunity to amend 
the "essential functions" duty omission in the recent Equality Act, 2004. Section 
16(1 )(a)-(b) remains intact in its original form. 
Practical Requirements of Reasonable Accommodation 
When it comes to practical indicators ofwbat reasonable accommodation entails, the 
Irish legislative scheme was at first remarkably lax in two respects. The first point is 
that the 1998 Act contained no guidelines equivalent to the ADA's eight categories of 
reasonable accommodation. This made it unclear, for example, whether reassignment to 
a vacant position is required by way of a reasonable accommodation under the Irish 
legislation. As is pointed out below, the Equality Act 2004 tackles this position of 
uncertainty to a certain extent, but the new approach is far from comprehensive 
The second point is that, unlike the US system, which is supplemented (perhaps 
to excess) with technical assistance, House Committee Reports and Federal Regulations, 
there remains a dearth of any kind of equivalent information or assistance with regard to 
the Employment Equality Act, and this is the case seven years on from its enactment. 135 
The fact that the statute fails to expand upon or clarify the scope of the duty leads to 
even greater uncertainty for all parties. Employers are given no assistance with 
135The Equality Authority has committed itself to develop such guidelines in its Strategic Plan 
2003-2005, available at <www.egualitv.ie >There is of course a happy medium to be struck on 
this point. It could be argued that the amount and level of regulatory jargon in the US is such 
that it allows for consistent flouting of statutory rules based on arguments over binding or non-
binding, (as the case may be) and often conflicting, regulations. 
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estimating the scope and form their obligation should take. Employees and applicants 
are also in a weak bargaining position in that they have no benchmark against which to 
measure any accommodation requests. The net effect of this is that precedents will be 
deduced on a case-by-case basis. This places a massive burden on disabled employees 
and applicants to pursue complaints through the formal enforcement channels regarding 
refusals, or inadequate accommodation provision. Despite the fact that the Equality 
Authority committed itself to develop guidelines in its 2003-2005 Strategic Plan, there 
has been no movement towards the development of regulatory guidance on reasonable 
accommodation. 
This information deficit has had a considerable impact: early examples from the 
Irish case-law indicate a complete unawareness among employers regarding the 
procedural implications of the reasonable accommodation duty, let alone its substantive 
ramifications. As has already been pointed out, the procedural aspect of the reasonable 
accommodation mandate is an obvious means for employers to ensure that they have 
sufficient information to evaluate their compliance with the substantive obligations of 
the statute. With regard to the accommodation's procedural enquiry, the Labour Court 
determination in A Health and Fitness Club and A Worker136 clearly laid down the 
extent of this aspect of the employer's duty. The Labour Court referred to the terms of 
section 16(1 ), which release the employer from employing any person who is not 
competent or capable of performing the duties for which they are employed, but made it 
clear that this is subject to the terms of section 16(3), the duty to do all that is reasonable 
to accommodate. This, in turn, is dependent on the employer being nonnally required 
" to make adequate enquiries so as to establish fully the factual position in relation to the 
employee' s capacity" .137 The Labour Court went on to describe the enquiry as being in 
all cases fact-specific but at a minimum 
" ... an employer, should ensure that he or she [is] in full possession of all the 
material facts conceming the employee's condition and that the employee is 
given fair notice that the question of his or her dismissal for incapacity is being 
considered. The employee must also be allowed an opportunity to influence the 
employer' s decision. In practical terms this will normally require a two-stage 
enquiry, which looks firstly at the factual position concerning the employee 's 
capability including the degree of impairment arising from the disability and its 
likely duration. This would involve looking at the medical evidence available 
to the employer either from the employee's doctor or obtained independently. 
Secondly, if it is apparent that the employee is not fully capable, s. 16(3) of the 
136 Labour Court ED/02/59 Detennination No.037. 
137 Ibid. 
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Act requires the employer to consider what if any special treatment or facilities 
may be available by whlch the employee can become capable. 138 
Emphasising the interactive nature of the accommodation enquiry, the Labour Court 
stated that its adequacy is contingent upon the employee concerned having "full 
opportunity to participate at each level and [being allowed] to present relevant medical 
evidence and submissions".139 Thus, the interpretation of the legislation to date indicates 
two approaches underpinning the reasonable accommodation enquiry: first, there must 
be a discussion with tbe individual as to what form an accommodation should take and 
second, expert evidence (almost always medical) is used to identify the most appropriate 
accornmodation. 140 Thus, the Irish approach differs from that recommended by the 
EEOC under the ADA. There, the disabled individual is recognised as being in the best 
position to advise on the practical form of the reasonable accommodation and this 
accords with the general (if contested) approach to the burden of proof. Under the EEA, 
while the disabled individual is expected to be consulted on the nature of the 
accommodation, it appears from the approach of the Equality Tribunal that considerable 
deference is shown to expert, most often medical, opinion on the form any reasonable 
accommodation should take. 141 
However, retaining the theme of information deficit on the accommodation 
duty, case law to date indicates that employers are either making insufficient efforts on 
the accommodation front or simply making no efforts whatsoever. Employers are 
dismissing disabled employees or refusing applicants employment on assumed 
incapacity grounds without carrying out any accommodation inquiry. 142 On this point, 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 In A Computer Company v A Worker ED/008/08 the Equality Officer referred to the 
importance of obtaining a medical report to determine the capabilities of the complainant. 
Similarly in A Company v A Worker ED/01/11 a failure to carry out an assessment of the 
complainant regarding capabilities was held to be a failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation. 
141 See An Employee v A Local Auth01ity DEC- E/2002/4 where it was held that a vocational 
assessment was required and A Company v A Worker ED/0 l/ 11 where the Labour Court 
emphasised the need to have an expert assessment carried out in order to ascertain the 
capabilities of the complainant. 
142 See the determination before the Labour Court of A Garden Centre and A Worker ED/02/17 
Detemunarion no.021 0 where the employer stated that if he had known that the complainant had 
a disability he would never have hired him and, as soon as he found out about the complainant's 
medical history, he djsrnissed him. In a foray showing blatant disregard and/or ignorance of the 
Act, the employer even went as far as arguing that the responsibility for the matter rested with 
F AS (the national employment agency) as they had been "extremely negligent in recommending 
someone with the claimant's illness to him." See also the decision of Mark Kehoe v Convertec 
Limited DEC-E-2001/034 where, upon discovering the existence of the complainant's disability, 
the employer's defence was "1 gave you a job when no-one else would take you on". As a result, 
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the decision of the Equality Tribunal in Mr 0 v A Named Company is illustrative. 143 
Here, the Equality Officer found that the respondent company had discriminated against 
the complainant under the terms of the 1998 Act when it treated him less favourably 
than a colleague with a different disability in relation to a return to work on a phased 
basis, 144 and also because it failed to comply with the duty to make a reasonable 
accommodation. The importance of dialogue between an employer and the employee 
was emphasised in the decision: "I am satisfied that the respondent should have afforded 
the complainant an opportunity to express his own wishes in terms of workload on his 
return to work in an effort to find common ground which would have been acceptable to 
both parties". While the employer had attempted to treat the complainant "in a sensitive 
manner ... in reality, [it] failed to some extent in terms of providing him with 
reasonable accornmodation."145 Similarly, in the recent decision of Bowes v Southern 
Regional Fisheries Board, 146 the Equality Officer, addressing a refusal by the employer 
to fit a company vehicle with hand controls, commented that "it is ... noteworthy that 
the respondent failed to engage in any real dialogue with the complainant in relation to 
this requirement." The Equality Officer referred to the earlier Labour Court 
recommendation which set out "the basic process which employers must, at a minimum, 
observe in order to provide reasonable accommodation and it specifically includes 
constructive dialogue with the workers concerned".147 
"Reasonable" Accommodation under the 1998 Act 
It is necessary to briefly mention the "reasonable" limb of the reasonable 
accommodation enquiry in the context of this comparative analysis. The wording of the 
1998 Act was different to its US counterpart when it came to the "reasonable" aspect of 
the accommodation duty. To recall, the issue discussed under the ADA was the 
relationship between the determination of a "reasonable" accommodation and the 
employer·s undue hardship defence. More specifically, the competing approaches to the 
"reasonableness" of the accommodation determination were assessed. The US Supreme 
the Equality Officer found that the "company made no effort to establish the impact of the 
complainant's disability on his performance" and did not have regard to section 16(3} of the Act 
- i.e the duty to make reasonable accommodation. 
143 DEC - E- 2003/052. 
144 This was a claim for direct discrimination because a phased return to work had been granted 
to an employee with a different disability. 
145 The Equality Officer ordered a remedy of€8,000 compensation. 
146 DEC - E-2004/008. 
147 At p.JO of the decision. 
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Court has rejected a link between the reasonableness of the accommodation and its role 
in allowing a disabled employee perform a position's essential job functions, despite 
strong evidence that this was the approach which Congress intended. The Supreme 
Court noted that lower courts past reconciliation of the terms, and the burden placed on 
the plaintiff to show that the accommodation was reasonable on its face - i.e. ordinarily 
or in the run of cases - amounted to a sufficient approach to the issue.148 
The divergent interpretations that are possible for the "reasonable" prefix to the 
accommodation duty under the ADA do not appear to occur in the Irish legislation. The 
wording in the EEA is set out in section 16(3)(b): "[a]n employer shall do all that is 
reasonable to accommodate the needs of a person who has a disability by providing 
special treatment or facilities ... ". The phrase "doing all that is reasonable to 
accommodate the needs of a person with a disability" could be argued to be equivalent 
to the original US approach which delineates the reasonableness of the accommodation 
in terms of meeting the needs of a disabled person in terms of allowing her perform the 
job's essential functions. However, the notion of"doing all that is reasonable" under the 
1998 Act was ultimately judged in light of the burden it presented to the employer. This 
is because the 1998 Act stated that a refusal of special treatment would not be 
unreasonable if it gave rise to costs, other than a nominal cost. The reasonableness of 
the proposed accommodation was not assessed by balancing its utility to the employer 
and the employee concerned in terms of enabling competent job performance, but 
through a measurement of the costs imposed upon employers. 
Nominal Costs under the 1998 Act 
Following the Supreme Court judgment on the 1996 Bill, the original draft of the 
Employment Equality Bill 1997 placed before the Oireachtas contained no reference to 
the new Jy-controversial concept of reasonable accommodation. 149 However, at 
committee stage, the reasonable accommodation duty was reintroduced and an amount 
of parliamentary time was spent discussing the standard against which employers' 
reasonable accommodation duties would be judged. Recall here that the statute 
eventually decided to place an obligation on an employer "do all that is reasonable to 
accommodate" a disabled person's needs by providing "special treatment or facilities", 
148 US Ai1ways v Barnett 535 US 39 (2002). 
149 0. Smith, supra n.l28 p. 168. See sections 16(3) of the Employment Equality Bill 1997 as 
initiated and s.35(4). 
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unless the provision would give rise to a cost, other than a "nominal cost". 150 The 
nominal cost standard was greeted with massive disappointment by the Irish disability 
lobby and was the constant subject of debate and amendments from opposition members 
throughout the Bill's passage. How did such a standard- described at the time as "a 
rhetorical flourish signifying nothing"151 -come to be enshrined as the means to 
overcome the barriers faced by disabled people in accessing the Irish workplace? 
The Oireachtas debates are an important resource as to the origins, meaning and 
extent of the "nominal cost" standard. The debates have since been supplemented by 
decisions and recommendations of the Equality Tribunal and the Labour Court. 
Parliamentary discussions identified the possible effects of a "nominal cost" standard.152 
There were a number of reasons behind the insistence on the "nominal costs" standard. 
Every amendment with alternative formulations of the reasonable accommodation 
obligation was rejected. Plainly, there was the obvious fear of infringing the boundaries 
laid down by the Supreme Court judgment.153 Since the previous formulation of 
"reasonable accommodation unless undue hardship" was found to infringe employers 
rights to private property, the sponsoring Ministers154 kept referring to these fixed 
constitutional parameters. In essence, their hands were tied, or so they believed. 
Opposition members, however, refused to desist. They continued to formulate 
alternatives to "nominal costs" and attempted to construct an approach within the 
parameters of the Supreme Court judgment.155 The Government was accused of 
abandoning its legislative power in this context. It should have been more engaged with 
establishing a constructive consensus that would address and tackle the concerns of the 
Supreme Court. Its "real job", according to one Senator, should have been to ftnd a way 
through these criticisms which met the constitutional requirement, but which also went 
as far as possible towards protecting the rights of disabled people.156 However, the 
•so Section 16(3) of the 1998 Act. 
lSI Senator BRyan, Seanad Eireann vol. 154 col. 823 (5 March 1998). 
1s2 For example: "There is the extraordinary situation ... that if an employer must incur a cost of 
any description, the rights of disabled people are not taken into account." Senator O'Meara, 
Seanad Eireann vol 154 col 820 -21 (5 March 1998). 
1s3 See exchanges between Senator Norris and Minister of State, Ms Wallace, TD. Senator 
Norris: "Let us take a risk. Aie we really that frightened of the Supreme Court judgment?" Ms 
Wallace: "We cannot continue to keep chancing it in the Supreme Court". Seanad Eireann vol 
154 col 826- 828 (5 March 1998). 
1s4 The Ministers responsible for guiding the legislation through the Oireachtas were Mr J. 
O'Donoghue, TD, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and Ms M. Wallace, TD, 
Minister of State with responsibility for Disability Issues. 
ISS See for example, the amendment tabled by Senator Norris at Seanad Eireann vol 154 col 661 
(6 February I 998). 
1s6 Senator BRyan, Seanad Eireann vol 154 col822 - 823 (05 March 1998). 
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Ministers reiterated the necessity for constitutional compromise and the nominal cost 
standard. In addition, the Oireachtas debates show that the Ministers had grown 
somewhat weary of the protracted discussions surrounding the disability ground: the 
Minister of State referred to disability as being one of nine protected grounds under the 
legislation, the implication being that excessive focus was being directed at the 
disability ground. 157 Related to this excuse is the somewhat feeble promise from the 
then Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform of"an opportunity to revisit the 
question of statutory provision for reasonable accommodation in the context of specific 
disabilities legislation". 158 Obviously, the lack of space dedicated to the formulation of a 
more specific and sophisticated standard against which reasonable accommodation 
requests were to be balanced indicates the policy dilemma faced by the sponsoring 
Ministers at the time. The choice was between getting the Bill onto the statute book, 
despite an apparent dilution in standards, or removing the disability provisions in their 
entirety and concentrating on the disability ground in the context of more 
comprehensive disabilities legislation. The delay associated with the latter option was 
considered unpalatable. Unlike the unitary scope of the ADA, the Irish disability 
equality framework is at present spread across at least four separate enactments. 159 
Ultimately, the Government' s response to the Supreme Court judgment was to 
formulate a proposal that moved away from the impermissibility of laying down the 
excessive costs envisaged by the Supreme Court and towards one that allowed no costs 
whatsoever (arguably a plausible, ifliteral interpretation of the nominal standard) to 
accrue to the employer. It is difficult to see bow the "nominal" standard was the only 
outcome available to the Government following the Supreme Court's decision. In itself, 
the Supreme Court's judgment is a contestable decision and possibly one that would not 
necessarily be followed by a differently-constituted Court or outside of the Article 26 
referral setting. 160 That said, it is clear that the problems the Supreme Court had with the 
reasonable accommodation mandate of the first Bill were cumulative. The Oireachtas 
could have sought to address these problems one by one, with clear and specific 
legislative protections to ease the concerns of the Supreme Court Justices. It could, in 
the words of one commentator, have formulated a " more sophisticated balance" 
151 Minister of State, Ms M. Wallace, TD, "There are nine categories in the Bill."" ... we must 
cover all nine". Seanad Eireann vol 154 col 828 (05 March 1998). 
158 Mr John O'Donoghue, TD, Seanad Eireann vol 154 col665 (6 February 1998). 
159 The four enactments include the Employment Equality Act 1998, the Equal Status Act 2000, 
the Equality Act 2004 and the recently introduced Disability Act 2005. 
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between the competing interests.161 Instead, the legislature deferred to the property 
concerns of the Court in order to keep within constitutional parameters. 162 
Nominal Costs Before the Tribunals 
Despite this rather gloomy view of the "nominal costs" standard, the Tribunals have 
actually assessed the 'nominal' component in a relative sense, as distinct from a literal 
sense. Support for this approach can be found in the words of the then Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform: 
" .. . the definition of"nominal" would not be the same for every employer or 
enterprise. The term ... may be interpreted in a relative sense. [W]hat may be 
regarded as nominal by a large enterprise employing thousands of people will 
not be the same as that regarded as nominal by a small business with only two 
or three employees."163 
The adjudicative bodies under the Act - the Equality Tribunal (consisting of Equality 
Officers) and the Labour Court- have followed this approach to the nominal cost 
standard in the cases to date. In A Motor Company v A Worker, 164 the complainant, who 
had a hearing impairment, was dismissed because of his difficulties with telephone 
communication caused by excessive noise coming from nearby building works. While 
the respondent company had provided a headset, the matter did not improve. It was 
subsequently discovered that the headset in question was not of a type which would 
have actually dealt with the problem. A more specialised headset was available, 
recommended by the National Association for Deaf People, at a cost of €450. The 
respondent's argument was that any action beyond the provision of the original, but 
ineffective, accommodation would have resulted in the respondent incurring additional 
costs, which would have been other than nominal. However, the Equality Officer held 
that as a "substantial company and, in the context of its turnover, a cost of €450 could 
160 For example, if the constitutionality of the Bi!J bad not been tested within the Article 26 
procedure, but as an Act under Article 34.3.2°, it is arguable that the outcome could have been 
radically different given a concrete factual situation. 
161 G. Quinn, The Irish Times, May 19, 1997. 
162Issues such as the width of the definition of disability and the resulting impact of this factor on 
employers who bear the cost of reasonable accommodation (the anomalous basis of this point has 
already been addressed in chapter four), the impact of reasonable accommodation on small 
employers, and the availability of state aid or tax relief to offset the costs of accommodations 
could have been addressed. 
163 Seanad Eireann, Volume 154, Col666 (6 February 1998). 
164 ED/01 /40 Labour Court Determination No. 026. 
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not be considered as anything other than 'nominal"' to the respondent.165 In An 
Employee v A Local Authority, 166 the Equality Officer followed the Minister of State's 
line of reasoning when she determined that had a professional job coach been engaged 
by the respondent to assist the complainant, the complainant would have been able to 
carry out the functions attached to the position in a competent manner. 167 The 
respondent's refusal to consider and assess this option, and its decision to dismiss the 
complainant, was influenced by subjective factors and could not be considered 
reasonable. The Equality Officer then considered whether the respondent could be 
relieved from financing this special treatment by the nominal costs provision of the Act. 
Citing the Minister of State, the Equality Officer argued that the legislative intention in 
this context "was that all employers would not be treated in an identical fashion" 168 and 
that the particular circumstances of each case would be determinative. As a result, she 
did not believe that the costs associated with the provision of a job coach "could be 
considered as anything other than nominal to a large public sector organisation".169 
Thus, a number of factors can be said to have informed the Tribunals ' approach 
to the nominal cost standard. These have included: an individual consideration of each 
employer, i.e., employers are not treated in an identical fashion in determining whether 
an accommodation gives rise to a cost other than nominal; the size of the enterprise; and 
the status of the enterprise, i.e., whether it is public or private body. 
European Intervention: Reasonable Accommodation and the 
Framework Directive 
The Framework Directive designates the principle of equal treatment to mean that there 
shall be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of the named grounds. 170 
Like the Irish legislation, but unlike the ADA, the Framework Directive does not 
explicitly identify a failure to make a reasonable accommodation as a compensatable 
discriminatory act. However, the text to the Directive makes a link between the 
accommodation mandate and the need to comply with the principle of equal treatment, 
which should be sufficient to ensure adequate protection. Article 5 of the Framework 
165 Ibid. The determination does not include any information on the ratio of turnover to 
accommodation cost 




170 Article 2(1). 
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Directive states that the principle of reasonable accommodation is to be adopted by 
Member States "in order to guarantee compliance with the principle of equal treatment 
in relation to persons with disabilities". Reasonable accommodation means 
that employers shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular 
case, to enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or 
advance in employment, or to undergo training, unless such measures would 
impose a disproportionate burden on the employer. 
As a broad-based general Directive, this European instrument does not expound further 
on the many components of the accommodation mandate that have been more 
comprehensively articulated under the ADA. It is in keeping with the European 
principle of subsidiarity to allow for detailed transposition of EU legal obligations to 
take place at national level. However, the adoption of broad based minimum standards 
can result in fluctuating standards of protection across the Union. 
Essential Functions? 
The discussions above indicate the importance of a synthesis between the competence 
of disabled people for the performance of the essentia/171 functions of a position and the 
duty to reasonably accommodate. Where the "essential" qualifier to the functions which 
are required for a position is omitted, the reasonable accommodation mandate could be 
compromised in its bid to end discriminatory exclusion of many disabled people. This is 
because an unscrupulous employer could seek to require performance of all functions, 
including marginal or non-essential duties, and this could raise real barriers to the 
employment of disabled persons. Article 5 of the Framework Directive pertains 
exclusively to reasonable accommodation, yet it does not contain any formula linking 
the employability of disabled persons in terms of the performance of a job 's "essential 
functions" with the duty to accommodate. However, reference should be made to 
Recital 17, which states: 
" this Directive does not require the recruitment, promotion, maintenance in 
employment or training of an individual who is not competent, capable and 
available to perform the essential functions of the post concerned or to undergo 
the relevant training, without prejudice to the obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation for people with disabilities."tn 
In light of this chapter's earlier discussion on the "essential functions" doctrine, it is 
difficult to understand why such an integral aspect of the non-discrimination system has 
171 My emphasis. 
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been placed outside of the binding Articles of the Framework Directive. It would have 
been preferable if the Recital's intent had been expressed in a stronger format because 
of the possible avoidance mechanism that exists in Irish legislation. 173 However, as was 
discussed above, the amended Irish legislation fails to make the critical distinction 
between the 'essential' functions of a job and the 'non-essential' functions of a job. 
Reasonable Accommodation unless Disproportionate Burden 
In keeping with traditional accommodation requirements in the context of disability, 
there are, of course, limits to the European accommodation duty. As ever, an employer 
need only make a reasonable accommodation and again, this is a term for which 
Member States may furnish further guidance. There are no indications of what is 
envisioned by the "appropriate measures" to be taken by employers in order to comply 
with the accommodation mandate. It is presumably up to Member States to formulate 
regulations and guidance on this point. And, as has been demonstrated in the Irish 
context, some Member States are remarkably lax when it comes to advising both 
employers and employees on the scope of their respective obligations and entitlements 
under this aspect of the legislation.174 However, it could be that any decision on the 
reasonableness or otherwise of a proposed accommodation will be taken by the 
enforcement authorities of Member States on a case-by-case basis. Recall that under the 
original approach to "reasonable" accommodation under the ADA, the question of 
reasonableness was equated with the form of alterations that would assist the disabled 
individual carry out the essential functions of the job and it was unrelated to whether or 
not this would impose an undue hardship on the employer. This approach also accorded 
with what was originally assumed to be the shifting burden of proof between the parties: 
namely, that the applicant undertook the burden to demonstrate that a reasonable 
accommodation was possible and the respondent held the burden of demonstrating any 
undue hardship on its business operations. Waddington argues that the ADA approach 
was influential on the drafting of Article 5 of the Framework Directive and that the use 
of the term was " intended to convey the same meaning as it bas in the ADA, or at least 
the meaning the term, had when the Act was originally adopted".175 Thus, an 
172 Emphasis added. 
173 See G. Quinn and S. Quinlivan supra n.l34 for discussion. 
174 Contrast the dearth of supporting measures with the Codes of Practice issued by the Disability 
Rights Commission under the UK's Disability Discrimination Act 1995-2005. 
175 See L. Waddington, supra n.98 pp.62-64. 
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accommodation which achieves the goal of allowing a disabled individual perform a 
job's essential functions should be regarded as reasonable. Of course, since this 
interpretative approach has not been made explicit in the Directive, there may be some 
differences in approach at the level of national law. As has been discussed above, this 
problem persists in the Irish context. 
Where an accommodation is reasonable, in the sense of the discussion above, 
the way an employer may defend the burden is to prove that the accommodation would 
give rise to a "disproportionate burden". Thus, an employer's accommodation duty 
extends to implementing "special measures" designed to ensure equal employment 
opportunity for disabled persons at all stages of the employment relationship, unless this 
would give rise to a disproportionate burden on the employer. Recital21 of the 
Directive lists the factors to be considered in detennining whether the measures adopted 
give rise to a disproportionate burden. These include: 
i) in particular, the financial and other costs entailed; 
ii) the scale and financial resources of the organisation or undertaking and; 
iii) the possibility of obtaining public funding or any other assistance. 
The term "disproportionate burden" implies a different standard of review from those 
utilised under the ADA and under Ireland's original legislation. If one looks closely at 
the factors to be considered in determining the existence of a disproportionate burden, 
there is "particular" emphasis laid on its financial cost to the employer. The language of 
the Directive speaks to the possibility of the provision of an acconunodation imposing a 
burden on an employer and moreover, the possibility that this burden may be 
disproportionate. The question for consideration here is whether the "disproportionate 
burden" defence is to be influenced by the proportionality enquiry adopted by the ECJ 
in the context of the justification of indirect discrimination, or whether it will be more 
strictly confmed to the pecuniary measures listed in Recital 21. On the basis of 
paragraph 21 of the Recital, Wells has argued that under the Directive, the financial cost 
of the accommodation is the primary factor in determining whether a "disproportionate 
burden" exists. 176 And the language of the Recital seems to keep with the view that what 
is to be assessed is the question of whether the employer's economic enterprise has been 
disproportionately burdened. What appears to have been intended is a calculus that 
176 "This polar opposition of individual gain versus employer cost is not conducive to tackling 
attitudinal and systemic forms of disability discrimination, and it may reinforce the perception 
that the principal result of accommodation of disabled people is expense and not benefit." K. 
Wells. "The impact of the Framework Employment Directive on UK Disability Discrimination 
Law" (2003) 32 Industrial Law Journa/253, 264. 
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ensures that the burden (presumably the employer's burden, and not the burden of 
unemployment and/or discrimination suffered by a disabled person as per the text to 
Article 5) should not be disproportionate to the benefits of the accommodation in 
question, taking into account the factors listed in the Recital. 
It appears unfortunate that the recital does not expressly refer to the possible 
benefits which may accrue to an employer as a result of making a reasonable 
accommodation. These may include benefits such as the adaptation of a premises which 
will facilitate a wider customer base by including those with disabilities, or the 
accommodation of an existing employee with a disability, thereby avoiding any 
severance payments, or a resulting increase in productivity of the accommodated 
worker. But contrary to Wells' assertion, it is arguable that in a proper proportionality 
enquiry, one must look to the benefits of the action and compare them with the burden 
or costs. What is crucial to determine is whose perspective this proportionality enquiry 
takes, and it is at this stage that one could argue for a more nuanced approach which 
assesses the burdens and benefits from the perspective of both the employee and the 
employer. While the Directive does not expressly point to the benefits to employers in 
making reasonable accommodations, and it does not expressly concern itself with the 
burden or cost to the employee of a failure to accommodate,177 it is arguable that it does 
not expressly exclude such a perspective in the proportionality enquiry. And, if the ECJ 
approach to proportionality operative in the indirect discrimination context has any 
influence, it is argued that this perspective ought to be fashioned into the equation. 
Moreover, what ought to be remembered in any analysis of the extent of the duty of 
reasonable accommodation is its original purpose, which is that of equality of 
opportunity, and not that of economic efficiency. 178 This purpose provides support for a 
more balanced proportionality enquiry. 
Article 5 expressly underlines the important role which public support and 
funding will play in any determination of disproportionate burdens: "This burden shall 
not be disproportionate when it is sufficiently remedied by measures existing within the 
framework of the disability policy of the Member State concerned". So where the State 
makes "sufficient provision" for accommodations available, the burden on employers 
177 This raises the question whether the consequences of not providing the accommodation for 
the disabled individual - such as continued marginalisation or exclusion of an individual - should 
be factored into the equation where an individual would not be able to find a comparabJe job, or 
less severely, if alternative employment wouJd require either no accommodation or a more 
modest one. 
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will not be disproportionate. 179 It is interesting to assess what is meant by "sufficient" in 
this context. Of itself, a literal interpretation of "sufficient" does not seem to imply that 
the State must offset all of the cost of the accommodation in order for a burden on an 
employer to be proportionate. Indeed, it would be difficult for an employer to argue that 
where it has availed itself of any state grants to support an accommodation that the 
insufficiency of the grant itself results in a disproportionate burden on the employer. In 
other words, all of the factors must still be assessed in any determination of 
disproportionate burden in this context. 
Reasonable Accommodation under The Equality Act 2004 
The Framework Directive was transposed into Irish Law by the Equality Act 2004, 
which came into effect in July 2004. 
In the disability context, the main amending provisions refonnulate the standard 
against which a reasonable accommodation may be judged. They also go somewhat 
further in defining what "appropriate measures" by way of reasonable accommodation 
should be taken. Section 16(3)(a) starts by emphasising the competence and capability 
of disabled persons for employment with the provision by the employer of"appropriate 
measures" by way of reasonable accommodation. The amending duty to make 
reasonable accommodation by taking appropriate measures is delimited as follows: 
the employer shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to 
enable a person who has a disability -
(i) to have access to employment, 
(ii) to participate or advance in employment, or 
(iii) to undergo training 
unless the measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer. 180 
This formulation marks an improvement on the approach taken in the 1998 Act. It 
clarifies that the reasonable accommodation duty applies at different levels of the 
employment relationship. Critically, as derived from the Framework Directive, the 
standard against which appropriate measures are to be measured is the imposition of a 
"disproportionate burden" on the employer. Thus, there is no room for considering in 
the proportionality enquiry the burden of not providing the accommodation on the 
178 As Schwab and Willbom point out in the US context, Congress rejected efficiency as the 
guiding principle for the ADA and that the Act sometimes requires inefficient actions". Supra n. 
10 p.4. 
179 An example of State funded provisions of this nature is the Supported Employment Program 
for People with Disabilities co-ordinated by F AS, an initiative that seeks to facilities the 
integration of people with disabilities into paid employment in the open labour market. 
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employee. Lifting the wording of the Directive almost verbatim, section 16(3)(c) lists 
the factors to be taken into account in determining whether the measures impose such a 
burden. These include: 
(i) the fmancial and other costs entailed, 
(ij) the scale and financial resources of the employer's business, and 
(iii) the possibility of obtaining public funding or other assistance. 
The 2004 Act builds on the terms of the 1998 Act in that it makes an attempt at 
providing statutory guidance on the substantive content of reasonable accommodation. 
It does so by describing what form "approptiate" measures in relation to a person with a 
disability could take. "Appropriate" measures 
(a) means effective and practical measures, where needed in a particular case, to 
adapt the employer's place of business to the disability concerned, 
(b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), includes the adaptation of 
premises and equipment, patterns of working time, distribution of tasks or the 
provision of training or integration resources, but 
(c) does not include any treatment, facility or thing that the person might ordinarily 
or reasonably provide for himself or herself.181 
Interestingly, there is still no indication as to whether reassignment to a vacant position 
- the reasonable accommodation of last resort under the ADA - would be required by an 
employer as a reasonable accommodation W1der Irish law. 
A provision that needs to be factored into the discussion, particularly in terms of 
its impact upon disabled applicants for employment positions, is contained in section 
36. Section 36(1 )(a) states that "Nothing in this Part .. . shall make it unlawful to 
require, in relation to a particular post- (a) the holding of a specified educational, 
technical or professional qualification which is a generally accepted qualification in the 
State for posts of that description." Section 36(1 )(b) continues ''Nothing in this part 
shall make it unlawful for a body controlling the entry to, or carrying on of any 
profession, vocation or occupation to require a person carrying out or wishing to enter 
that profession, vocation or occupation to hold a specified educational, technical or 
other qualification which is appropriate to the circumstances." What is interesting, 
particularly as regards applicants for employment, is that section 36 is expressly stated 
to be unaffected by the reasonable accommodation duty. Thus, the reasonable 
accommodation duty is incapable of countering the assumed legitimacy of educational 
180 Section 16(3)(b) Employment Equality Acts 1998-2004. 
181 Section 16(4)(c)Employment Equality Acts 1998-2004. 
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qualifications deemed to be "generally accepted" qualifications for posts in the State.182 
It is submitted here that this provision is too broad. It does not make room for the fact 
that job specifications can be tailored not onJy to require specific minimum 
qualifications for a job, but also in ways which exclude those who have capabilities 
which have been or are capable of being measured in alternative, less common ways, 
hence making these alternative standards not "generally accepted". Thus the means of 
unpacking job specifications not strictly required for particular positions, so long a 
feature of the indirect discrimination provisions, is undermined by the overriding nature 
of section 36. It is submitted that this is another example of how the disability 
discrimination provisions differ in the protection afforded to job incumbents and to 
those seeking work. A job incumbent who becomes disabled on the job may already 
possess a generally accepted educational requirement (such as a Leaving Certificate) 
and will be entitled to request a reasonable accommodation to allow him to remain in 
employment. However, a disabled applicant who was denied access to training and 
educational opportunities in the past, but who has since obtained other qualifications, 
may be unable to seek to rely on the reasonable accommodation duty because section 36 
insulates "generally accepted qualifications" from the reasonable accommodation 
enquiry. 
Conclusion 
The discussion of different statutory constructs of reasonable accommodation reveals 
disappointing shortcomings in the Irish context. The concept has chartered an uneasy 
course in Irish Jaw. Tbe most obvious failing of the Irish legislation was thought to have 
been the "nominal cost" standard under the 1998 Act. This allowed an employer to 
avoid providing any special treatment or facilities for an employee or disabled applicant 
where such provision would give rise to any costs other than a nominal cost. It appears, 
however, that the various adjudicating bodies adopted a relative, rather than a literal 
interpretation of this standard. Despite this welcome development, the provision still 
manages to blunt the wide-ranging objectives underlying the concept of reasonable 
accommodation. The nominal cost provision lasted only five years on the Irish statute 
book. The standard against which an employer's obligation is now measured has been 
raised to that of"disproportionate burden" under the Equality Act 2004. 
182 See the decision of Gony v Office of the Civil Service and Local Appointments DEC - E2005 
-038. discussed infra. 
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Due to a distinct dearth of statutory direction on the contours of the reasonable 
accommodation provision under the 1998 Act, applicants and employers were forced to 
rely on guidance emanating from case-law under the Act. However, the decisions 
emerging from the Irish case - law did not flesh out the bare bones of the 1998 Act. This 
is not only because of the deficiency in the Irish legislative text, but also due to the 
dearth of regulatory assistance regarding the disability ground directed at employers and 
employees in Ireland. Judge Posner described the meaning of"reasonable 
accommodation" in the US as simply "plain enough". The plainness he speaks of is hard 
to gauge from the Irish statutory text. It derives to some extent - in the US context -
from the abundance of explanatory guidance available to all parties involved. However, 
the Irish statute has only recently attempted to make itself clear on this point. In 
addition, the perceived (and often misunderstood) width and nature of these forms of 
platitudes by employers can lead, in the absence of regulatory guidance, to a policy of 
ignorance or confusion. This point certainly emerged from the Irish case-law under the 
1998 Act. Faced with an applicant or employee with medical or capacity issues, 
employers seem willing to take their "discriminatory" chances. Either they refuse to hire 
such persons on capacity grounds and/or they ignore any possible reasonable 
accommodation enquiry. Few employers in the case-law have faced the reasonable 
accommodation enquiry head on.183 And by this process, what they are in the first 
instance breaching is the procedural aspect of the reasonable accommodation 
requirement. They are failing to enquire - prior to discharge or refusal to hire - what 
effect a reasonable accommodation would have on the person's ability to perform the 
functions of the job. Of course, it could be argued that the employer's failure in this 
regard could well stem from a continuation of discriminatory animus, rather than from 
any ignorance of the process of reasonable accommodation. 184 As a result oftbe 
traditional tendencies of the adjudicative bodies, all of the successful claims so far have 
involved alleged discriminatory dismissals, with complainants awarded derisory levels 
of compensation. The result is a body of case-law which does not indicate the forms a 
reasonable accommodation may take, but rather the need to make, as a matter of 
procedure, a reasonable accommodation enquiry. 
183 For example, see blatant discriminatory attitudes of the employer in A Garden Centre and A 
Worker ED/02/17 Determination no. 0210. The employer ... stated that if he had known that the 
complainant had a disability he would never have hired him and as soon as he found out the 
complainant' s medical history he dismissed him". At p. 2. 
184 A plausible hypothesis since many of the cases under the Irish Act has involved claims of 
direct discrimination plus a failure to reasonably accommodate. 
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Th.is is where, comparatively speaking, the ADA statutory text clearly 
outclasses its Irish counterpart. Under the 1998 Act, the Irish legislation omitted to 
include anything equivalent to the seven discrete categories and the eighth 
miscellaneous category of reasonable accommodations referred to under the ADA. 
While section 16(4)(c) provides some indication, many issues regarding the practical 
sweep of the accommodation mandate still persist. For example, what is the status of job 
restructuring under the EEA? Does the duty to make reasonable accommodation include 
"reassignment to a vacant position"? Of course, through the process of evolution that 
accompanies statutory interpretation, such examples could plausibly come within the 
term "appropriate measures". The point is that the possibility here raises massive 
uncertainties for employers and employees alike. 
The Government defended its refusal to plug these statutory gaps by referring to 
the avenues of redress open to employees or applicants with a disability who perceive 
themselves as having been subject to discrimination. 185 It is unacceptable to defend 
legislative laxity by pointing to the avenues of redress available to some ofthe most 
vulnerable members of Irish society. This is especially the case when, as has already 
been pointed out, most of the cases to date have involved discriminatory dismissals. In 
general, the issue of whether a reasonable accommodation need not have been made by 
an employer is being addressed in the case-law in the context of discriminatory 
dismissal decisions. Since the Labour Court and Equality Officers are reluctant to order 
any remedies other than compensation, not only have the individual claimants taken 
great personal risk for minimal return, but they are also left without the job. Ultimately, 
the Irish legislature has much to answer for with regard to this uncertain state of affairs. 
In the United States, the implementation of the ADA was delayed for two years while 
the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission devised the necessary regulatory 
guidance. This guidance is regularly updated and is supplemented by technical 
assistance manuals with a wide array of examples of forms of accommodations both 
required and not required by the terms of the Act. 186 While the Irish Equality Authority 
185 See the opinion ofMinister of State, Ms Wallace, speaking in the context of the 
Government's refusal to accept an amendment to the effect that employer's cannot take into 
account state aid and grants in any assessment of costs beyond the "nominal" standard. "The 
message must go out clearly to employers that an employee with a disability can bring them 
before the Director of Equality Investigations if they have not taken into consideration the 
various supports available. Dail Debates, vol492, col. 48 (09 June, 1998) 
186 See < http:www.ada.gov > for the latest Technical Assistance manuals. 
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committed itself to developing guidelines on the scope of the reasonable 
accommodation duty in employment by 2005, these have yet to appear. 187 
This chapter has outlined the practical application of the reasonable 
accommodation in a comparative context. The following chapter goes on to critically 
assess its impact within the overall framework of anti-discrimination law. 
187 See Equality Authority, Strategic Plan, 2003-2005 available at < http://www.eguality.ie > 
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Chapter Six 
Assessing the ADA and EEA: Equality of Opportunity or 
Substantive Positive Equality ? 
Introduction 
Following the previous chapter's discussion ofthe operational details of the ADA and 
EEA's reasonable accommodation mandate, and chapter four's discussion of the 
protected class approach to statutory equality protection, this thesis is now moving 
towards a position from which to assess the overall operation of the disability 
discrimination frameworks. Central to the discussion is the place of the reasonable 
accommodation duty. The discussion in this chapter takes place at a number of levels. 
The chapter concentrates on the conceptualisation of the reasonable accommodation 
mandate within the ADA and EEA Specifically, it considers whether these two 
examples fall within the traditional equal opportunities model or whether they are better 
formulated within a substantive model of equality which positively promotes equality 
objectives. Consequently, the chapter questions the transformative role ascribed to the 
disability non-discrimination system and considers the charged liberal rhetoric which 
surrounds it in the two legal systems under discussion.' It argues that while the 
individual right to accommodation is a useful tool, its operation and interpretation, at 
least within the ADA and the EEA, can leave unchallenged the policies and practices 
which create the experience of inequality for disabled people.2 This analysis considers 
the possibility that the difficulties endured by disabled people may be beyond the reach 
of the civil rights analysis of the minority group model, as discussed in chapter one. In 
other words, the broader condition of inequality endured by disabled people will not 
always fit into the present moulds ofnon-discrimination.3 In essence, by outlining what 
1 An example of this rhetoric is the expansive preamble attached to the ADA 42 U.S.C. section 
12101. 
2 L. Waddington and A Hendriks, "The Expanding Concept of Employment Discrimination in 
Europe: From Direct and Indirect Discrimination to Reasonable Accommodation 
Discrimination" (2002) 18 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 403, pp.414-415. 
3 Elements of the disability movement remain rightly sceptical regarding the ability of the non-
discrimination system to tackle the depressed situations of a ll types of disabled people. The 
discrimination system, it is argued, favours employees over applicants (in terms of proof), 
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the current structure of disability non-discrimination law cannot do, the chapter draws 
together some of the cumulative defects inherent to the ADA and the EEA. However, 
this is not taken to mean that an equality perspective is limited to the current non-
discrimination norms. 
While at certain points the reasonable accommodation duty gestures towards 
substantive formulations of equality, these remain imperfect, particularly in light of the 
emerging reformulation of the substantive equality nonn.4 Because of its attention to the 
difference of disability and its movement beyond indirect discrimination principles, 
reasonable accommodation bas been the subject to a type of fanfare which bas deemed 
it a form of affirmative action in favour of disabled people. This assumption is subject 
to critical enquiry here. While it is certainly true to say that the duty envisages 
alterations to workplace structures to allow for the participation of some disabled 
people, the basis of the duty is to accommodate individuals into existing structures 
without systematically challenging the institutional norms and structures tbemselves.5 
Many of the traditional problems with the anti-discrimination regime persist and appear 
exacerbated in the disability context.6 Past experience with the anti-discrimination 
framework offers evidence of the limitations of such a reliance and there is little to 
suggest that this is eased in the disability context. In particular, the reasonable 
accommodation duty is severely constrained by the continuing adherence to 
individualism. Given the vulnerable situation occupied by disabled people, who are 
often at the margins of society, the burden of individually-based enforcement seems 
particularly marked. The group dimension of reasonable accommodation has not been 
recognised either in the ADA or the EEA.7 There are many points at which the 
favours those with late onset mobility or sensory impairments as opposed to those with less 
popular or accepted impairments, such as mental impairments. In the interaction between the 
various controlling terms, [as discussed in chapter five) it is argued that the legislation has little 
to offer individuals with multiple or serious impairments. See J. E. Rickenbach, "Minority 
Rights of Universal Participation: The Politics ofDisablement'' in M. Jones and L.E. Basser 
Marks, ( eds.) Disability, Divers-ability and Legal Change (Kluwer International, 1999) p.l 01, 
107-108. 
4 S. Fredman, ' 'Disability Equality: A Challenge to the Existing Anti-Discrimination Paradigm" 
In A. Lawson and C, Gooding (eds.) Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to Practice 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) 199, 213. 
5 See D. Pothier, "Eldridge v British Columbia (A ttorney General): How the Deaf Were Heard in 
the Supreme Court of Canada" (1997-1998) 9 National Journal of Constitutional Law 263. 
6 These include the priority granted to market outcomes, the focus on individual rights as 
opposed to group relations, the excessive reliance on comparators, the negative and individual 
enforcement regime and the limited impact of positive action. See J. Baker et al. Equality From 
Theory to Action (Basingstoke: Pal grave Macmillan, 2004), chapter seven. 
7 This contrasts with the reasonable accommodation mandate in South Africa where it operates 
as a generalised duty which embraces all grounds of discrimination and is expressly linked to the 
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reasonable accommodation duty may fail to access the real experience of inequality 
endured by many disabled people. Where an individual needs an "extra- reasonable" 
accommodation, or where its provision would effect an undue hardship or 
disproportionate burden, the inequality remains. Compounding matters is the fact that 
its overall utility cannot be divorced from the persistent problems of delineating those 
entitled to benefit from the duty.8 Admittedly, this point has greater pertinence with 
respect to the operation ofthe ADA.9 
The first part of the chapter's discussion considers the purpose of, and the 
policy behind, different forms of positive action. Positive action programs are not 
mandated under the ADA and positive action initiatives are entirely voluntary (and 
consequently underused) under Ireland's EEA. Judicial attitudes to the legitimacy of 
positive action at EU level are then considered. The European Court of Justice's 
treatment of positive action programs in the gender context reveals the tension between 
the equal treatment principle and the notion of"full equality in practice"10, which 
greatly affects developments in this area. Thereafter, the scope of Ireland's positive 
action provisions in the EEA and Equality Act 2004 are discussed. The discussion 
considers how positive action tools fit into the models of equality underpinning anti-
discrimination regulations, raised in chapter two. Despite the more expansive ambitions 
of positive action programs, it points out how the focus on equality outcomes through 
altering the composition of a workplace can be misleading. To this extent, positive 
action programs do not provide uncritical answers to the condition of inequality that 
disabled people face in accessing the labour market. In short, they may alter the under-
representation of disadvantaged groups in particular sectors, yet they can leave 
unchallenged the existing structures which generate systemic inequalities. 
To substantiate the overall assessment of the disability non-discrimination 
framework, the second part of the chapter is a comparison between stronger forms of 
positive action (traditionally hard preferences11) and the reasonable accommodation 
duty. The chapter proceeds to distinguish the reasonable accommodation duty from 
preference-providing forms of positive action. It recognises one particular point under 
the ADA where the synthesis between reasonable accommodation and positive action is 
at its strongest - that is, where reassignment to a vacant position is at issue. However, 
duty on certain employers to engage in affinnative action. See Employment Equity Act 1998, 
section 15(2)(c). 
8 See generally chapter four. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See Article 141(4) ofthe TEC. 
11 Discussed below. 
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this fonn of reasonable accommodation is unreferenced under the EEA. Despite the 
criticism of the ADA and the EEA's non-discrimination framework, I do not reject the 
utility of rights-based approaches to disability exclusion. Rather, it is argued that 
existing principles need to be supplemented with more expansive equality tools. 
Consequently, part three of the chapter moves on to consider supplementary approaches 
to the traditional disability non-discrimination regime. 
The traditional divergence between the social model and the minority group 
model of disability bas been with regard to the former's reliance on the existing rights 
strategy underpinning anti-discrimination law. The condition of disability-based 
inequality and exclusion is not, on a social model analysis, capable of resolution within 
legal frameworks. However, as the chapter goes on to consider, this perspective fails to 
recognise that the narrow and negative discrimination model is moving slowly towards 
positive fonnulations. These formulations include developments such as mainstreaming, 
positive equality duties and links between non-discrimination and positive freedom-
enhancing social rights. Rather than characterising the minority group model and the 
social model as inherently antagonistic, these formulations suggest an alliance between 
universalist approaches to disability (an offshoot of the social model)12 and the concept 
of equality. In turn, those approaches are linked to a more substantive, social rights-
based conception of freedom and participation.13 Ultimately, it appears that the 
prospects for future developments of this nature are greater in the context of Ireland's 
equality framework. 14 This leads to the conclusion that the once-pioneering model of 
disability discrimination law - the ADA - is being left behind. This can be attributed 
both to a judicial assault on its existing provisions and also to the failure to move 
beyond liberal, negative and individual formulations of equality rights. 
The discussion begins by turning to the equality ambitions of positive action 
programs. 
12 Universalism in the context of disability was developed by US sociologist, Irving Zola, and 
shares considerable common ground with the original social model analysis. See I. Zola, 
"Toward the Necessary Universalizing of a Disability Policy (1989) 67 The Milbank Quarterly 
401. 
13 SeeS. Fredman, supra n.4 pp. 213-217. 
14 This is because of Ireland's membership of the European Union, which opens the state up to 
developments taking place on a pan-European stage, for example, the provisions of the European 
Social Charter. The momentum is also developing domestically with poverty and equality 




Concerns about whether negative prescriptions against non-discrimination15 sufficiently 
address the unemployment rate of disabled people inevitably lead towards the debate 
which surrounds the concept of positive action, or affmnative action, as it is known in 
the United States.16 A number of tools fall under this umbrella term, with each enjoying 
variable degrees of public and political support.17 The extent of the concept has been 
consistently challenged and considerable confusion surrounds what types of practices 
are, or should be, properly termed affirmative or positive action. 18 
Broadly stated, positive or affirmative action can be described as the deliberate 
use of race, gender or disability criteria for the specific purpose of tackling the endemic 
exclusion and disadvantage of a group on such grounds.19 Positive action measures go 
beyond the prohibition of discrimination and strive to alter the composition of a 
particular workplace or sector. 20 Given its required use of race, sex or disability criteria, 
the concept challenges the traditional formulas of equality discussed in chapter two, 
particularly the equal treatment and equal opportunity models. The equal opportunity 
principle shares features of a substantive formulation of equality by requiring the 
15 Despite the fact that the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation for a disabled applicant 
or employee is ostensibly framed in positive terms, as a matter of practice, the duty becomes a 
negative right. A failure to provide a reasonable accommodation amounts to disability 
discrimination which, practically speaking, particularly in the context of discriminatory 
dismissals, is compensatable in monetary terms only. 
16 In the United States, the term used is affirmative action. In general, this thesis adopts the 
European terminology, though affirmative action is adopted when quoting or citing from US 
sources. 
17 The contentiousness of these interventions stems from the presumed interference with the 
demands of neutrality, meritocracy and free market principles, and has generated widespread, 
and often hyperbolic, reaction. ln particular, claims of"reverse discrimination" suffered by more 
advantaged groups, particularly white men, have dominated recent political and mainstream 
debate. See F. Pincus, Reverse Discrimination Dismantling the Myth (Boulder, London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2003), Chapter two for statistical rejoinders to the claimants of reverse 
discrimination. 
18 See C. McCrudden, "Rethinking Positive Action" (1986) 15lndustrial Law Journa/219 who 
distinguishes five categories of positive action: i) identification and removal of discriminatory 
practices; ii) facially neutral but purposefully inclusionary policies; iii) outreach programmes 
designed to attract members of underrepresented groups; iv) forms of preferential treatment, 
including targets or set-asides; and v) provisions which redefine merit. 
19 S. Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Claredon Law Series, 
2002) p.I26. 
2° C. Bell, A. Hegarty and S. Livingstone, "The Enduring Controversy: Developments on 
Affirmative Action Law in North America" (1996) International Journal of Discrimination and 
the Law 233, 234. 
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removal of structural barriers to participation. However, once overt barriers to 
participation have been removed, then the model reverts to the primacy of the individual 
and places the stress on merit?1 It does not necessarily allow individuals to move 
through the door of opportunity. The equal opportunity model specifically rejects 
positive action programmes which would allow individuals to be treated preferentialJy 
on the basis of certain characteristics, such as their sex or race. Positive action 
programmes also contradict the equal treatment's tenet of non-discrimination and 
treatment as an individual22, as well as the liberal state's commitment to neutrality in its 
treatment of its citizens. Of course, as has been discussed, a more considered assessment 
of these concepts reveals the in-built patterns of injustice in state commitment to 
neutrality, rationality and the status quo.23 Statistical evidence on the education, 
employment, and mean income of traditionally more advantaged groups, as compared 
with members of disadvantaged groups, demonstrates persistent disparities and this is 
despite more than a generation of non-discrimination Jegislation.24 Yet, the "benign" 
use of race- or gender-specific criteria by the state or employers for classification 
purposes is viewed as being as invidious as discrimination based on malign prejudice. 
However, formal approaches to discrimination Jaw do not seem to alleviate 
disadvantage per se. 
The most common rationale for positive intervention is to alleviate and redress 
the impact of past discriminatory practices which persist despite years of statutory 
prohibition against discrimination. The adoption of an historical rationale for affirmative 
action policies attracts a number of objections. In particular, it is argued that those who 
benefit from positive action policies today are rarely those who originally endured the 
virulent forms of exclusion of the time, such as those who suffered under the Jim Crow 
21 Chapter rwo discussed the limitations of this model. It remains unconcerned with the impact 
of past discrimination and the consequent fact that members of disadvantaged groups might not 
be in a position to take advantage of such opportunities. 
22 In terms of interference with individual accumulation of merit and placing burdens on 
individuals not personally responsible for historical or institutional discrimination. However, as 
McColgan argues, the merit against which affirmative action programs operate is far from 
neutral: merit is defined by a yardstick represented by the dominant and valued attributes of the 
comparative norm. Thus, bland statements about rights to equaJ treatment are of substance only 
for those who can compete with the majority on the terms of the majority. A. McColgan, 
Women Under the Law: The False Promise of Human Rights (London: Longman, 2000) p.165. 
23 In particular, the concept of equalising starting points is not concerned with whether more 
members of disadvantaged groups will in fact be in a position to take advantage of such 
opportunities. For example, past discrimination in the education system, or child-care burdens, 
may mean that individuals will not find it easier to take up positions. 
24 See F.Pincus, supra n.l7 pp.9-18 for a statistical analysis of the relative position of white men, 
females and blacks in the United States that demonstrates the many economic advantages still 
enjoyed by white men despite their claims as victims of"reverse discrimination". 
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laws in the United States.25 By extension, it is argued that those who assume the burden 
of affirmative action are rarely those who took part in the discriminatory practices in 
question.26 In response, proponents of positive action have articulated a two-pronged 
forward looking rationale: the first prong sees positive action as a means of overcoming 
prejudice by changing widely-held attitudes towards members of disadvantaged groups; 
the second is an integrative argument which sees affirmative action as a necessary tool 
for integrating disadvantaged groups into a properly-functioning democratic society.27 
One of the contributory factors to the often inflammatory and hyperbolic 
debate surrounding positive action is the absence of a clear picture of what positive 
action progran1mes actually entail. There is a tendency to equate positive action with 
strict hiring preferences and quotas, despite the existence of tight legal controls on these 
types of practices in both Europe and the US. A charge frequently levied against the 
conception of positive action is that of"reverse discrimination".28 The argument 
proceeds on the basis that any preference based on race, sex or disability is invidious, no 
matter how benign the purpose. Thus, past discrimination against disabled people is 
wrong, so any form of present discrimination in their favour is equally wrong. However, 
the charge of reverse discrimination bas been rejected by the defenders of affirmative 
action who argue that affirmative action policies are lacking one crucial component of 
past discrimination: that is, the fact that past discrimination towards blacks, women and 
disabled people bas been predicated on the basis of inferiority and a reduced sense of 
moral standing because of their race, colour, sex or disability. Nagel, a well-known 
defender of affirmative action in the United States, writes: 
25 The Jim Crow era in the US dates from the late 1890s when southern states began 
systematically to codify in law and state constitutional provisions the subordinate societal 
position of African Americans. See http://www.jimcrowbistory.org/home.mtm 
260. Dupper "Remedying the Past or Reshaping the Future? Justifying Race-based Affirmative 
Action in South Africa and the United States" (2005) International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations 89, pp.101-102. Problems with the rationale of past 
discrimination against disadvantaged groups have been raised by the courts. Some Justices in 
the United States have attempted to limit affirmative action to assisting actual victims of proven 
discrimination. See the judgment of Scalia. J. inAdarand Constructors v Pena, 515 U.S. 20 
(1995): "Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made 
whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as a creditor race or a debtor race." 
27 O.Dupper, ibid. pp. 113- 120, for discussion. Iris Marion Young bas also argued that 
affirmative action policies should not be predicated on the compensatory theory of past 
discrimination Rather, the primacy purpose is " to mitigate the influence of current biases and 
blindness of institution and decision makers." In this way affirmative action programs can be 
judged: not on the grounds they perpetuate discrimination against innocent privileged members 
of society (which on discriminatory theory they do) but on the basis of assisting members of 
certain groups over others in discrete and carefully tailored circumstances for particular 
purposes. See I. M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990) p.l98. 
28 See below for discussion of the anomalous nature of"reverse discrimination". 
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"Race and sexual discrimination are based on contempt or even loathing for the 
excluded group, a feeling that certain contacts with them are degrading to 
members of the dominant group, that they are fit only for subordinate positions 
or menial work [ ... ]Affirmative action involves none of this: it is simply a 
means of increasing the social and economic strength of formerly victimized 
groups and does not stigmatise others".29 
Thus, the crucial elements of disdain and prejudice are lacking in affirmative action 
policies, which puts affirmative action "morally in a different category".30 This 
distinction, it is argued, makes it misleading to refer to properly-controlled affirmative 
action polices as "reverse" discrimination.31 
ln any event, many forms of positive action fall far short of hard quotas or 
preferences in opening up access to employment opportunities. In an attempt to provide 
accurate background information for the debate on the legitimacy or otherwise of these 
actions, Pincus describes seven different types of affirmative action policies across a 
number of aspects of social life in the USA.32 These can be grouped into three general 
categories: needs-based programmes funded and provided by the state; outreach 
programmes designed to attract qualified candidates and encourage applications from 
members of under-represented groups; and the use of preferential treatment as a hiring 
tool, which itself can be divided into soft and hard categories.33 A soft preference is 
where two candidates are equally qualified and, in the tie-break scenario, the member of 
the under-represented group is appointed. A hard preference is that which occurs where 
the preferred candidate is less well-qualified - but not so unqualified as to be deemed 
incapable of performing the position, which would compromise the principle of 
objectivity- and the policy dictates that their membership of an under-represented group 
is determining. The question as to whether the formulation of reasonable 
29 T. Nagel, 'A Defense of Affirmative Action' in T. L. Beauchamp and N. E. Bowie (eds.) 
Ethical Theo1y and Business (1988) p.346. 
30 0. Dupper, supra n.26 p. 93. 
31 Ibid. 
32 The seven different forms of affirmative action include: Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs Affirmative Action Guidelines, Government Agencies under the Equal 
Employment opportunities Act 1972; Hiring and Promotion Quotas (applied generally onJy by 
court order or with court approval); Race/Gender - Plus Policies ( onJy used to rectify severe 
employment segregation- used more extensively in higher education - see the seminal US 
Supreme Court decision of University of California v Bakke 438 U.S. 265 ( 1978) and the more 
recent decision of Gratz v Bollinger and Grutter v Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 (2003)); Race Based 
Scholarships; Government Contract Set Asides and Voluntary Afflfltlative Action. F. Pincus, 
supra n. l7, chapter 2. 
33 See C. McCrudden, "The Constitutionality of Affirmative Action in the United States: A Note 
on Ada rand Constuctors Inc v Pena" (1996) 1 International Journal of Discrimination and the 
Law 369. 
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accommodation can be conceptualised as providing hard preferences in favour of 
disabled people is taken up below. 
In Europe, the picture is less easily summarised. Given the leeway enjoyed by 
individual member states in areas outside of the Union's competence, a report on the 
exact picture of the range of positive action measures is beyond the scope of this work. 
What does seem to be the case is that, in the employment context, the majority of 
positive action initiatives are undertaken by the states acting as public sector employers. 
The European approach to the legal legitimacy of positive action programmes on the 
gender ground in the employment context is discussed below. This is followed by a 
treatment of the positive action provisions applicable to the disability ground. 
The European Approach to Positive Action in the Gender Context 
The European Commission bas long recognised the persisting inequities stemming from 
women's horizontal and vertical occupational segregation as a barrier to the Union's 
economic competitiveness.34 Following findings from Commission-driven research/5 
issues such as the organisation of working hours, the devaluation of"women's work", 
the balancing of family and professional responsibilities and the reintegration of older 
women into the workforce have been acknowledged as both pressing and beyond the 
remit of the formal equal treatment principle. At first, merely soft law proposals were 
introduced: initiatives were developed to identify and remedy situations which lead to or 
perpetuated inequalities in the workplace.36 These were subsequently complemented by 
the terms of the Equal Treatment Directive.37 
Positive action in the gender context originally derived its legitimacy from 
Article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive, which provides that the Directive shall be 
34 Though in more recent times, following efforts to ascribe a more "human" and "social" face to 
Community action, the rationale for intervention supports the removal of such barriers for the 
sake of the alleviation of the inequalities themselves. See Employment Action plans and Articles 
2 and 3 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
35 See European Commission, Positive Action. Equal Opportunities/or Women in Employment. 
A Guide (1988). 
36 C. Barnard, EC Employment Law 2"d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p.244. The 
work of the Commission in this context has been considerableand includes Council 
Recommendations, guides and programmes designed to educate employers on the means of 
putting such a program into place. It also includes Community programmes committing and 
funding programs directed at increasing opportunities for women, see for example, the NOW 
Programme (New Opportunities for Women). 
37 Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC. See also Council Recommendation on the Promotion 
of Positive Action for Women 84/635/EEC [1984) OJ L33 1134. Though non-binding the 
Recommendation is not completely devoid oflegal effect as it should be taken into account in 
the interpretation of the Directive. 
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"without prejudice to measures which promote equal opportunity for men and women, 
in particular by removing existing inequalities which affect women's opportunities" in 
access to employment, promotion, vocational training and working conditions. 
Following the Treaty of Amsterdam, which created an emboldened new framework for 
EC equality law,38 Article 141(4) of the TEC contains the new text for positive action. 
This new provision will be discussed following a consideration of the original positive 
action regulations in EC jurisprudence. The case-law discussed below demonstrates an 
obvious reluctance on the part of the Court to depart from dominant conceptions of 
equal opportunities loyal to individual qualifications and merit. 
EC law permits, rather than requires, positive action, which takes place at member state 
level. This approach to positive action, according to one commentator, makes it 
conceptually equivalent to formal notions of equa1ity.39 
The Court of Justice and Positive Action 
The cases of Kalanke,40 Marschall, 41 Badeck42 and Abrahamsson43 illustrate the 
evolution of the ECJ's position on the permissible reach of positive action measures in 
the context of gender equality. Abrahamsson was the first decision of the ECJ post-
Article 141 of the TEC and it will be considered last. One preliminary point should be 
made prior to this discussion. The consideration of the gender positive action 
jurisprudence is merely indicative of the ECJ approach in that particular context and it 
may not necessarily control the approach to be taken by the ECJ in the disability 
context. Article 7(1) of the Framework Directive and Article 5(1) of the Race Equality 
Directive44 are materially equivalent to Article 141(4). According to McColgan, the 
ECJ interpretation of Article 141 ( 4) is a likely indication of its approach to positive 
action on the newly protected grounds.45 However, in the disability context, Article 7(2) 
needs to be factored into the equation: it states that "With regard to disabled persons, the 
38 Articles 2 and 3 EC Treaty deem the promotion of equality between men and women a task 
and aim of the Community. 
39 H. Fenwick, "From Formal to Substantive Equality: The Place of Affirmative Action in 
European Union Sex Equality Law'' (1998) 4European Public Law 507, 508. 
4° Kalanke v Freie-Hansestadt Bremen Case C- 450/93 [1995] ECR I-3051 
41 Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen Case C - 409/95, [1997) ECR I- 6363 
42 Badeck v Hessen Case C-158/97 [2000) ECR I-1875 
43 Abrahamsson &Anderson v Fogelqvist Case C-407/98 [2000] ECR 05539. 
44 Article 5 states: "With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle of equal 
treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting specific measures to 
Erevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin .. " 
5 A. McColgan, Discrimination, Text, Cases and Materials 2"d ed. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005) p.l68. 
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principle of equal treatment shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States to 
maintain or adopt provision on the protection of health and safety at work46 or to 
measures aimed at creating or maintaining provision or facilities for safeguarding or 
promoting their integration into the working environment". Also material to the matter, 
of course, will be the relationship, if any, between the positive action provisions and the 
duty to make reasonable accommodation. Because of these specific points, it is difficult 
to foresee the extent to which the gender positive action cases will impact on the Court's 
approach to the disability ground. However, some tentative points may still be 
attempted. 
Tbe Kalanke case concerned a challenge to a Bremen law on positive action 
applicable in the public sector which, in the case of a tie.;break situation, gave priority to 
an equally-qualified woman over a man if women were under-represented in the 
workforce. The Court ruled this particular approach an impermissible departure from 
the principle of the individual right to equal treatment and in contravention of Article 
2( 4) of the Equal Treatment Directive. Despite accepting that "existing legal provisions 
on equal treatment, which are designed to afford rights to individuals, are inadequate for 
the elimination of aU existing inequalities", the Court held that "[n]ational rules which 
guarantee women absolute and unconditional priority for appointment or promotion go 
beyond promoting equal opportunities and overstep the limits of the exception in Article 
2( 4) of the directive.'"'7 The Court's judgment attracted much criticism.48 It omitted any 
attempt at balancing the competing policy arguments. It focused excessively on formal 
equality and it displayed a considerable lack of sensitivity to the reality oftbe workplace 
disparities between women and men across the Union. Since both applicants were 
equally qualified and had, by defmition, equal merit, " it is hard to see why the male 
applicant had any greater right on the assumed facts to be selected than the woman".49 It 
is difficult to see how the Bremen law departed from the much-revered principle of 
46 For discussion of the health and safety provisions, seeR. Whittle, inji-a o.78 pp. 317-318. 
47 para.22 
48 The Commission issued a communication in the aftermath of the Kalanke decision (see COM 
(96) 88) and considered proposing an amendment to the Equal Treatment Directive to offset the 
restrictiveness of the ECJ's approach. The proposed amendment would have been to the effect 
that " [p]ossible measures [permissible) shall include the giving of preference, as regards access 
to employment or promotion. to a member of the under represented sex, provided that such 
measures do not preclude the assessment of the particular circumstances of an individual case." 
The decision also generated a considerable body of academic literature. See U. O'Hare, 
"Positive Action Before the European Court of Justice: Case C-450/93 Kalanke v Fie Hansestadt 
Bremen" [1996] 2 Web Journal ofCurrent Legal Issues; Peters, "The Many Meanings of 
Equality and Positive Action in Favour of Women under European Community Law - A 
Conceptual Analysis" (1996) 2 EU 177. 
49 S. Fredman, supra n.l9 p.l37. 
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individual merit, as the regulation constituted a tie-break positive action scheme and 
was hardly, in the words of the Court, "an absolute and unconditional priority". As 
Lonen and Veldman comment, an "insistence on equal treatment in this case implies 
that flipping a coin is the desired decisional mechanism". 5° Moreover, the Court gave no 
indication as to what a pemussible equal opportunities strategy might entail. 
The Court of Justice retreated from this strict stance in a later decision in 
Marschall. This retreat was in part facilitated by the specifics of the positive action 
program under challenge. It provided that where there were fewer women than men 
within a particular career bracket, women were to be accorded priority for promotion in 
the event of equal suitability, competence and professional performance "unless reasons 
specific to an individual [male] candidate tilt the balance in his favour".51 It was this 
" individual consideration" component to the positive action policy that prompted the 
Court to rethink its position. It referred to the need for positive action to exist in 
harmony with the principle of non-discrimination so as to "counteract the prejudicial 
effect on female candidates of ... attitudes and behaviour and thus reduce actual 
instances of inequality which may exist in the real world. "52 A cursory analysis of the 
real world recognises that "even where male and female candidates are equally 
qualified, male candidates tend to be promoted in preference to female candidates 
particularly because of prejudices and stereotypes concerning the role and capacities of 
women in working life".53 The mere fact that a male candidate and a female candidate 
are equally qualified does not mean that they have the same opportunities. 54 The rule 
handed down in Marschall is that: 
"[A] national rule which, in a case where there are fewer women then men at 
[the level of post in a sector] and both female and male candidates for the post 
.. . and both . .. candidates .. . are equally qualified in terms of their suitability, 
competence and professional performance, requires that priority be given to the 
promotion of female candidates unless reasons specific to an individual male 
candidate tilt the balance in his favour, is not precluded by [the terms of the 
Directive] ... provided that in each individual case the rule provides for male 
candidates who are equally as qualified as the female candidates a guarantee 
that the candidatures will be the subject of an objective assessment which will 
take account of all criteria specific to the candidates and will override the 
50 T. Lonen and A. Veldman, "Preferential Treatment in the Labour Market after Kalanke: Some 
Comparative Perspectives", (1996) 12 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations 48. 
51 Para.33. 
52 Para. 31. 
53 Para.29. 
54 Para. 30. 
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priority accorded to female candidates where one or more of those criteria are 
not such as to discriminate against the female candidates."55 
What saved the system in Marschall was the in-built individual assessment of all 
candidates. This allowed the employer to disregard the system which favoured equally-
qualified women following an objective assessment, non-discriminatory to female 
candidates, which could tilt the balance in the male's favour. 56 The effect of the 
Marschall decision is to narrow the reach of Kalanke, which only outlaws hard 
automatic preferences (which are few in any case, and was arguably not the case at ail in 
Kalanke). Marschall was generally welcomed, if only because it was seen to alleviate 
the harshness of the court's stance in Kalanke. At this stage, EU law only approved of 
soft positive-action provisions - that is, those that eschew fixed-quota schemes through 
an insistence on equal qualifications and individualised assessment of male candidates. 
However, the Court completely side-stepped the site of the future chailenges in positive 
action jurisprudence - that is, programmes which are not predicated upon equal 
qualifications, but instead operate quotas for jobs or membership of decision-making 
bodies. 57 
The position was instead incrementally extended in Badeck, which concerned 
the legality of the Hessen law on equal rights for men and women and the removal of 
discrimination against women in public administration. This law contained what was 
called a "flexible results quota", which applied in areas of the public sector where 
women were underrepresented. It gave priority to female candidates where male and 
female candidates had equal qualifications, and where the priority was necessary for 
complying with the binding targets in the "women's advancement plan"58, but only if no 
55 Para. 33. 
56 This so-called soft quota in favour of women, however, has been queried with regard to the 
type of criteria that may be applied to "tilt the balance back in the favour of men". While the 
factors may not be discriminatory against women, they also cannot be made on the basis of 
generalisations about the position of men. However, in practice, the savings clause could allow 
consideration of the controlling factors which existed to disadvantage women in the first place, 
namely traditional promotion criteria, such as age, seniority, length of experience. 
57 SeeS. Fredman, supra n.l9 p.l40. Statistical obj ectives or quotas forms a central part of the 
Commission' s aim of achieving balanced participation for men and women in decision making. 
See Council Recommendation EC 96/694 on the balanced participation of men and women in the 
decision-making process. OJ L 319/l l. 
58 The provincial legislation under consideration required public administrative departments to 
adopt women's advancement plans, which aimed, in part, to avoid possible instances of indirect 
discrimination against women by adopting wider indicators of expertise and qualifications 
(including for example capabilities and experience gained by looking after children or persons 
requiring care) where relevant. The plans also went further by setting binding targets for 
increasing the proportion of women in sectors in which they were under-represented, and this 
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reasons of"greater legal weight" were put forward. The reasons of"greater legal 
weight" amounted to five rules, described as "social aspects", which make no reference 
to sex. These rules gave preferential treatment: firstly, to former employees in the 
public service who had left the service because of family commitments; secondly, to 
individuals who worked on a part-time basis for family reasons and who wished to 
resume full time employment; thirdly, to former temporary soldiers; fourthly, to 
seriously disabled people; and fifthly, to the long-term unemployed. The ECJ concluded 
that the priority rule was not "absolute and unconditional" in the Kalanke sense. 
Additionally, the Court looked favourably upon the criteria by which the initial selection 
of candidates occurred before the flexible quota was carried out. Although ostensibly 
gender-neutral, these criteria did in essence allow for some indirect discrimination 
against men. Thus, the shift with Badeck is more marked than one might first assume. 
As Costello points out " ... once the priority does not amount to the actual award of a 
position of employment, quite strong preferences may be employed."59 This ranges from 
vocational training right up to the selection of candidates for interview. However, the 
Court still did not offer any guidance on the second limb of the formula, where 
candidates are the subject of an objective assessment which takes account of their 
specific personal situations. Moreover, the cornerstone of all the positive action plans 
approved so far by the ECJ has ultimately been equal qualifications between men and 
women. 
Following the decisions of Kalanke, Marschall and Badeck, the legal basis for 
positive action in the gender context has been strengthened with the insertion of Article 
141(4) into the EC Treaty. The text to Article 141(4) is reproduced below. 
"With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in 
working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member 
State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages 
in order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational 
activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional life". 
Here, the EC Treaty recognises that a formal commitment to equal treatment may be 
insufficient to pursue the notion of"full equality in practice". While certain 
commentators expected that Article 141 ( 4) would alter the interpretation of Article 2( 4) 
included positions set-aside for women, save where there were good reasons demonstrating that 
not enough qualified women were available. 
59 C. Costello, "Positive Action" in C. Costello and E. Barry (eds.) Equality in Diversity: The 
New Equality Directives (Dublin: Irish Centre for European Law, 2003) p.l77, 191. 
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of the Directive, given its apparently wider scope, the Court has in fact interwoven its 
interpretation of the new Treaty provision with the existing case-law.60 
Abrahamsson was the first decision on the compatibility of Swedish positive 
action regulations in academia with the terms of the Equal Treatment Directive post 
Article 141(4). The Swedish regulations amounted to a departure from the type of 
provisions previously considered by the ECJ in that it required universities, when 
recruiting to academic positions where women were under-represented, to grant 
preference to a candidate from the under-represented sex. Instead of a strict commitment 
to the revered principle of equal qualifications, the regulations allowed for the less 
qualified candidate to be appointed, but only where the difference between the 
candidates' qualifications was not so great as to compromise the requirement of 
objectivity in decision-making over appointments. The ECJ ruled the scheme to be 
incompatible with Article 2(1) and 2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive. It relied on its 
decision in Marschall to the effect that tbe Directive was not contravened where 
preference was granted to the candidate from the under-represented sex, given that 
qualifications were equal and the in-built safeguard of individual, personalised and 
objective assessments was present. The stronger wording present in Article 141(4) 
which refers to "special advantages to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in 
careers" introduced with the purpose of "ensuring full equality in practice" between 
men and women could not support the Swedish regulations. The ECJ held that it could 
not be " inferred that Article 141(4) allows a selection method [such as the Swedish 
regulations] which appears, on any view, to be disproportionate to the aim pursued".61 
However, this simple reference to proportionality was not elaborated.62 In Badeck, 
Advocate General Saggio stated that the reconciliation between the primacy of 
individual consideration and the need for substantive equality when interpreting Article 
2(4) could be carried out under proportionality principles. On this view, equal treatment 
conflicts with positive action only if the remedial measure is disproportionate - in other 
words, it demands excessive sacrifices from those who do not belong to the target 
group, or when the social reality does not justify it. Positive action could therefore be 
lawful if it were proportionate in this sense. However, equivalence in merit still 
retained its primacy in this formulation. This type of analysis did not appear in the 
Badech judgment, nor was proportionality engaged with in any meaningful sense in 
A bra hamsson. 
60 Ibid. p. 185. 
61 Para.55. 
62 SeeS. Fredman, supra n.19 p.l42. 
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It is submitted here that the ECJ adopted an over-inclusive approach to the 
Swedish regulations and, at the same time, failed to give sufficient weight to the more 
expansive wording of Article 141(4). The Swedish regulations did not allow for 
completely unqualified women to take up academic posts. The principle of objectivity in 
decision-making would simply not have allowed this to happen. All the regulations 
permitted was the slight relaxation of equal qualifications. The need for parity in 
qualifications remains a major contributing factor to the vertical occupational 
segregation of women in many workplace sectors, particularly given the unequal burden 
of gender roles. This would not result in the selection of unsuitable candidates for the 
position. However, the ECJ's disavowal of the Swedish regulations means that, at least 
in the hiring context, the legitimacy of strong positive action preferences has been 
corroded. Candidates have to be equally qualified, and only in cases of under-
representation can sex be used as a factor in the decision. 
Positive Action on the Disability Ground 
Chapter one detailed some of the stereotypical assumptions and negative attitudes which 
persist with regard to the proper place and role of disabled people in mainstream 
society. 63 These are extremely difficult to alter and are compounded by the 
pervasiveness of environmental and structural barriers.64 Negative attitudes and 
stereotypical assumptions may be better challenged with the inclusion of all types of 
disabled people in revised societal structures.65 This suggests that more aggressive 
efforts beyond legal formulations of individual non-discrimination protections are 
63 It is because disabled people are a devalued and marginalized minority that society sees 
nothing untoward and unacceptable about the exclusionary barriers it has erected. Silvers utilises 
the exercise of historical counterfactualising to demonstrate how the assumptions as to the utility 
of disabled people would be different if disabled people constituted a dominant social group. 
See A. Silvers, "Reconciling Equality to Difference: Caring (F)or Justice for People with 
Disabilities" Hypatia (Winter 1995) p.48. 
64 Hahn's work utilising the minority group analysis is that negative attitudes have translated into 
unequal burdens of the built environment being placed on disabled people. Policy decisions are 
tainted with unfavourable attitudes towards disabled people, thus structures are built and 
institutions are created in an exclusionary manner, because law, ordinances and regulations 
permit their construction in such a manner. See H. Hahn, "Accommodations and the ADA: 
Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning" (2000) 21 Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor 
Law 166. 
65 C. Barnes, "A Working Social Model? Disability and Work in the 21 51 Century'' Available at 
Centre for Disability Studies Resources Web page: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-
studies/archiveuk/archrrame.htm last accessed November I 8, 2003). 
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required to rectify the exclusion of disabled people from the working structure.66 Such 
efforts need to be directed against both of the problems that lead to economic exclusion: 
discrimination, especially unconscious and structural forms of discrimination, and the 
limits on inclusion posed by the interaction between disability and the institutionalised 
practices of society.67 
Positive action programmes aim to side-step some of the limitations of the 
negative, individualised non-discrimination construct. However, because positive 
measures tend to be grafted on to the negative non-discrimination framework, they can 
be viewed suspiciously by courts as exceptional, suspect and open to challenge. 68 The 
justifications for positive action in favour of disabled people are not difficult to make 
out. Although not having endured the legacy of slavery, like black people in the United 
States, the legacy of institutionalisation and (ongoing) segregation has a major impact 
on the life chances of disabled people.69 Disabled individuals have lived through a 
lengthy period of institutionalisation and de facto (if not totaJly de jure) segregation. 
While political and social theory continues to challenge this construct of the disabled 
identity, institutional discrimination against disabled people persists. This is 
compounded by open or more covert forms of negative attitudes regarding the capacity 
a~d moral worth of the impaired body and mind. Yet, non-discrimination prescriptions, 
which rely mainly on individual enforcement, can rarely guard against the more covert 
fom1s of discrimination that can lie behind the subjective decision-making that 
employers wield with regard to employment opportunities. It is very easy to hide a 
prima facie prejudice against disabled people and their abilities behind concerns for 
health and safety or other business matters.70 Disabled people often do not get beyond 
the door of opportunity because an assumed dichotomy between inherent limitations 
(impairment) and workplace capacity retains its validity in the eyes of decision-makers: 
the assumption that disabled people do not work and cannot work becomes a natural 
fact beyond challenge. It has been argued that only with the positive inclusion of 
disabled people within employment structures can attitudes of employers, managers and 
66 M. Weber, "Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy for 
People with Disabilities" ( 1998) 46 Buffalo Law Review 123 (Obtained from Westlaw, no page 
numbers available). 
67 Ibid. 
68 J. Baker et al. supra n.6 p.l27. 
69 In 2002, the Irish Government admitted that there were still a considerable number of 
individuals with learning difficulties residing full-time in mental institutions despite their 
apparent good-health. By the end of2005, their number totalled almost 400. See F. O'Toole, 
The Irish Times, January 3•d, 2006. 
70 M. Russell, Beyond Ramps: Disability at the End of the Social Contract (Monroe, Maine: 
Common Courage Press, 1998) p.ll8. 
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co-workers be challenged and the patterns of exclusion that prevent disabled people 
from making it inside the front door be broken down.71 As is discussed below, it is by 
no means clear that the duty to provide reasonable accommodation to disabled people 
can positively impact on the visibility and inclusion rates of disabled people in 
mainstream employment structures in proportion to their current rates of exclusion.72 
To this extent, it is important to consider the role and purpose of positive action 
principles in the disability context. 
Disability and Positive Action: The Framework Directive 
As of yet, the European Court of Justice bas not bad to determine the reach of the 
positive action provisions in their application to the disability ground in the context of 
employment and occupation. Article 7 of the Framework Directive adopts a similar 
approach to the EC Treaty in that it bases the adoption of positive action by Member 
States on "ensuring full equality in practice". Again, it is stated that the principle of 
equal treatment shall not prevent Member States from maintaining or adopting specific 
measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to any of the protected 
grounds. The approach is equivalent to that operating on the gender ground: the 
principle of equal treatment shall not prevent Member States from introducing positive 
action measures. Thus, the commitment to substantive equality that was initially 
apparent in the Framework Directive's positive action provisions is diluted by the 
permissive formulation of the construct. Fenwick describes this approach to positive 
action as conceptually consistent with the formal notion of equality.73 A truly 
substantive vision of equality sees positive action not as an exception or aberration to 
the principle of equal treatment, but as an integral component of a wider, reformulated 
equality norm. This would demand more than merely permitting positive action 
strategies by those with the inclination to act. A better approach would seek to impose 
mandatory positive action plans on those with extremely segregated workplaces. An 
example of this approach can be found in Canada's employment equity legislation, 
-
71 M.Weber, supra n.66. 
72 See D.C. Stapelton and R. V Burkhauser, The Decline in Employment of People with 
Disabilities: A Policy Puzzle (Kalmazoo, Michigan, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research, 2003) p.7. The argument from within more critical factions of the disability 
movement is that antidiscrimination regulation favours certain types of disabled people, thereby 
intensifying the exclusion felt by those with less accepted or serious disabilities. The statistics 
on the tribunal complaints generally bear this point out. 
73 H. Fenwick, supra n.39 p. 508. 
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where obligations are imposed on employers to survey their workplace for evidence of 
segregation, low pay or exclusion of members of protected groups, and to introduce 
action plans in response to any findings.74 
However, a more optimistic view of the European positive action precepts puts 
to one side the permissive nature of Article 7 and emphasises the ultimate goal, which is 
"full equality in practice". The language in Article 7 is results-oriented and speaks of a 
commitment to altering disadvantage that is associated with specific grounds. It refers to 
"creating or maintaining provisions or facilities for safeguarding or promoting (disabled 
workers ' ] integration into the workplace". The pressing question, of course, surrounds 
the interpretive ploy of the ECJ - that is, whether it will adopt the same tight control 
which it wields over positive action in the gender context. The demand for equal 
qualification as determined in the traditional, merit-accumulating manner continues to 
permeate the positive action framework on the gender ground as overseen by the 
European Court of Justice. It remains to be seen whether such a strict approach to hard 
preferences is continued by the ECJ in the context of disability. It is questionable, given 
the political salience of the disability ground, and given the existence of the 
individualised accommodation duty, whether an equivalent approach on the gender and 
disability grounds will be adopted. This is because the traditional argument against 
gender-based positive action, namely its contravention of the equal treatment principle, 
does not have the same resonance in the disability context. It is impossible to deny that 
for the disability ground, at least, perfectly equal treatment can constitute 
discrimination.75 It may well be the case that the interaction between the 
accommodation duty and the positive action provisions will be instrumental in shaping 
the direction of disability positive action jurisprudence. It may also be likely that 
proportionality principles will come into play, despite the fact that the ECJ's positive 
action jurisprudence on gender has skirted over tllis concept. This will be returned to 
below in a discussion of the interaction between these two concepts in Irish law. 
If the ECJ accepts the entrenched nature of the disadvantage that disabled 
people suffer in the European labour market, then it could legitimate positive action 
74 Under the Employment Equity Act, the federal public service, Crown corporations and 
federally regulated private sector employers with I 00 or more employees must examine their 
workforces to determine whether any of the designated groups is under-represented. Each 
employer must identify and remove barriers to the employment of disabled people and, where 
necessary, establish goals for improving their representation. See infra for a discussion of 
equality action plans and audits in the context oflreland's EEA. 
75 On the tension between the equal treatment principle and the wider conceptualisations of 
equality, see H. Collins, "Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion" (2003) 66 Modern Law 
Review 16. 
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programmes which include quotas adopted at Member State leve1.76 While this 
methodology has been strictly curtailed in the gender context, it is arguable that the 
entrenched disadvantage that disabled people occupy in society could prompt a change 
in judicial attitudes. On this point, the Commission has generally assumed that the ECJ 
would be sensitive to the extreme nature of the exclusion of disabled people and would 
tailor its scrutiny of employment quotas and schemes accordingly. In other words, the 
social reality of unemployment rates of up to eighty per cent among disabled people 
ought to be recognised.77 However, Article 7(2) makes this point explicit because its 
wording is specifically tailored to the disability ground alone. The wording states that 
"[ w ]ith regard to disabled persons, the principle of equal treatment is without prejudice 
... [to provisions] aimed at ... safeguarding or promoting their integration into the 
working environment". Whittle argues that this "sends a clear signal to the Court of 
Justice that positive action measures for this group must be treated differently to those 
in respect of gender".78 Accordingly, it is submitted here that the Directive should not 
prevent any obstacle to the proportionate use of employment quotas and other schemes 
in the disability context. 
Positive Action: Ireland 
The architecture of Ireland's equality legislation includes provisions which allow for 
voluntary positive action programmes applicable across all nine protected grounds. Yet 
positive action is an under-utilised tool within Ireland's anti-discrimination law 
framework. The regulations pertaining to positive action were initially set out in the 
Employment Equality Act 1998 and these have recently been amended by the Equality 
Act 2004. 
76For a discussion of disability quotas, see L. Waddington, "Reassessing the Employment of 
People with Disabilities in Europe: From Quotas to Anti-Discrimination Laws" (1996) 18 
Comparative Labour Law Review 62. 
77 See National Disability Authority, Disability Agenda 4- Disability and Work (2004). 
78 R. Whittle, "The Framework Directive for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation: 
An Analysis from a Disability Rights Perspective" (2002) 27 European Law Review 303, 319-
320. 
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Section 33: Employment Equality Act 1998 
Originally, sections 35 and 33 of the Employment Equality Act 1998 pennitted 
employers to adopt positive action initiatives on a number of the non-gender grounds, 
including disability. 
Section 35(2) of the 1998 Act remains intact, following the introduction ofthe 
Equality Act 2004, and it provides that special treatment or facilities for persons with 
disabilities in relation to vocational training courses shall not be unlawful under the 
terms of the Act. Where special pay, treatment or facilities are provided for disabled 
people, these do not have to be extended to non-disabled people.79 The point of this 
latter provision, in section 35(3), would seem to be to protect positive action initiatives 
from attack of claims of"reverse" discrimination by non-disabled individuals. 
Originally, section 33(3) of the EEA 1998 envisaged a role for the State in the 
positive action context. It granted power to the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform to provide training or work experience for disadvantaged groups of individuals 
where the Minister believed that such a group would be otherwise unlikely to have such 
an opportunity. The resource implications of this course of action appear to have been 
the primary reason why such a direction was never ordered by the Minister in 
question.80 In any event, section 22 of the Equality Act 2004 repealed section 33 oftbe 
1998 Act in its entirety, substituting an amended definition of positive action which 
completely removed the provisions relating to the certification of training opportunities 
for particular groups. 
Most importantly, section 33 stated that the Act did not preclude measures 
intended to "reduce or eliminate the effects of discrimination" on "persons with a 
disability or any class or description of such persons" where such measures are designed 
to "facilitate [their] integration into employment generally or in particular areas or a 
particular workplace ... ".81 
In keeping with the asymmetrical nature of disability discrimination protections, the 
positive action provisions pertaining to disability were not framed as derogations from 
79 Unfortunately, unlike the ADA, the EEA allows a special rate of remuneration payable to 
disabled individuals in certain circumstances. See section 35(1). 
80 In addition, it is arguable that the inclusion of these general policy provisions which allow the 
Minister to act in such circumstances can be seen as political strategies adopted at the time of the 
Bill' s passage designed to assuage the concerns of the equality lobby over the continued single-
axis approach to tackling discrimination in Irish society. 
81 Section 33(l)-(2)(b). This provision also extends to persons over the age of 50 and members 
of the traveller community. 
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the symmetrical right to equal treatment granted to all. The language of this original 
Irish positive action provision appeared to be broad-based. As long as the measures 
were intended to "reduce or eliminate" the effects of discrimination and designed to 
"facilitate the integration" of disabled people into employment in general or in a 
particular workplace, they were prima facie lawful. The controls over the positive action 
programme indicate the legislature's adoption of two differing rationales for such 
action: first, the remedying of past discrimination following the emphasis on the need to 
reduce or eliminate discriminatory effects, and second, the more forward-looking 
integrative argument, based on including more disabled people within employment 
structures and creating a more inclusive civil society. The amended positive action 
provisions in Irish employment equality law are discussed below. 
Positive Action: The Equality Act 2004 
The amended section 33, inserted by section 22 of the Equality Act, alters the definition 
of positive action in certain respects. It states that the Act does not "render unlawful 
measures maintained or adopted with a view to ensuring full equality in practice 
between employees". Such measures being 
(a) to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to any of the discriminatory 
grounds (other than the gender ground), 
(b) to protect the health or safety at work of persons with a disability, or82 
(c) to create or maintain facilities for safeguarding or promoting the integration of 
such persons into the working environment. 
Thus, any measures adopted must advance the principle of "full equality in practice" 
and can be designed to prevent disadvantages accruing to the discriminatory grounds or 
to create facilities which promote the integration of protected individuals into the 
workplace. A comparison of the 1998 and 2004 definitions reveals that the latter's 
inclusion of the provision "full equality in practice", which is linked to the prevention or 
compensation of"disadvantage", appears to be a wider mandate than the 1998 Act's 
determination of "the effects of discrimination" against the target group. Thus, 
disadvantage could be viewed as a wider term than discrimination, which, as we have 
already seen, can be interpreted in a formal and narrow sense.83 Thus, disadvantage in 
82 Article 7(2) of the Framework Employment Directive refers specifically to health and safety 
concerns. It states : " ... with regard to disabled persons, the principle of equal treatment is 
without prejudice to the right of Member States to maintain or adopt provision on the protection 
of health or safety". SeeR. Whittle, supra n.78 pp. 317-318 for discussion. 
83 See chapter two. 
229 
the context of the disability ground recognises the forms of discrimination which are 
manifested in the form of negative attitudes, and the disadvantages that accrue because 
of the barriers to participation that persist in the interaction between an individual's 
impairment and the demands of the workplace structure. Further, this approach is 
strengthened by the provision which allows the creation or maintenance of facilities to 
ensure the integration of such persons into the work structure. Thus, the onus of 
initiation is shifted away from reacting to the accommodation requirements of a 
particular disabled individual and towards the ex-ante actions of the employer. 
The extent to which employers may legitimately implement positive action 
policies is of particular interest. What types of measures in favour of disabled people 
could offset the effects of disadvantage and help integrate them into employment? Does 
the Act legitimise the adoption of quotas in the form of specific recruitment for certain 
positions in order to meet disability targets? For example, could an employer, however 
unlikely it may seem, reserve one hundred per cent of available positions for take-up by 
disabled persons?84 To answer this question, it must be recognised that positive action 
targets and quotas are generally not regarded as being without limits. If the rationale 
underpinning their application is to remedy past and lingering forms of discrimination, 
to promote integration and to change attitudes through challenging established 
prejudicial belief structures, then the extent or measure of this purpose should determine 
the scope of the remedy. Statistical surveys carried out in the United States constantly 
indicate that there are a large body of disabled individuals who want to work but who 
cannot find work due to a combination of institutional and attitudinal barriers.85 Thus, 
within a particular employment sector, a hiring target for a particular group, such as 
those with disabilities, would be approximate to (i.e. a proxy for) what the employment 
rate of disabled people could or should be in ideal conditions.86 One could start with 
statistics regarding qualified individuals with disabilities registered as looking for work 
in a local economy. However, a real difficulty in this regard is the status dichotomy that 
persists between being registered disabled for the purposes of disability benefit and 
84 This would be likely to fall outside of the forms of action permissible within positive action 
programs. Particularly, on the proportionality enquiry favoured by Advocate General in the ECJ 
decision in Badeck discussed above, because a balance ought to be struck between the ambitions 
of the targeting policy and also the possible burden to be borne by individuals who are not 
members of the target group. 
ss See D.C. Stapelton and R. V Burkhauser, The Decline in Employment of People with 
Disabilities: A Policy Puzzle (Kalmazoo, Michigan, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research, 2003) p.7 
86 M. Weber, supra n.66. See also NDA, Disability Agenda - Disability and Work (2004). 
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being an individual with a disability seeking employment free from discrimination. 87 In 
Ireland, in particular, given the statistical gaps regarding the prevalence, impact and 
extent of disability, it could be difficult to determine what the hiring rates for disabled 
people would be in the absence of discrimination in its broader sense. However, such an 
approach is not wholly foreclosed. In light of the recent census results of 2002, and the 
proposed work of the National Disability Authority on a methodology for disability 
statistical work, it should become possible to perform a demographic breakdown by 
region in order to come up with an estimate figure regarding the employment rate of 
disabled people.88 However, the overarching comment to make on the positive action 
provisions is that the information deficit is costly and the provisions are highly unlikely 
to be taken up by an employer acting in a voluntary and economically rational manner.89 
It has only been filled in practice by the (rarely used) remedy of court-ordered 
affirmative action in the United States in the case of extremely sex- or race-segregated 
workplaces,90 an option which is unavailable to courts and tribunals under the ADA or 
the EEA. 
Other examples of positive action initiatives would be the utilisation of 
disability as a "plus one factor" in favour of a disabled individual, or the use of 
disability as the determining factor where all other factors are equal, that is, in a tie-
break situation. Other positive action initiatives falling short of quota-based hard 
preferences could involve the alteration of entry qualifications in instances where 
87 The difficulty here is with the problematic interface between welfare policy and anti-
discrimination policy in the context of disability. Those receiving disability benefit are recorded 
as having an inability to work, and this conflicts with the notion of disabled individuals being 
qualified and available for work. See L. Waddington and M. Diller, "Tensions and Coherence in 
Disability Policy: The Uneasy Relationship Between Social Welfare and Civil Rights Models of 
Disability in American, European and International Employment Law" Conference Paper 
delivered at From Principles to Practice: An international DisabiHty Law and Policy Symposium, 
October 22-26 2000 available at: http://www.dredf.org/symposium/waddington.html Last 
accessed April II , 2002. 
88 See the Central Statistics Office, 2002 Census of Population, Volume 10- Disability and 
Carers Dublin: Government Stationery Office, 2004) and also the work planned by the National 
Disability Authority, Disability Agenda '"'Designing and Piloting a Research Instrument for a 
Proposed National Disability Study" (Dublin: National Disability Authority, May, 2004). Issue 
2. 
89 S. Schwab and S. Willborn "Reasonable Accommodation ofWorkplace Disabilities" (2001) 
Cornell Working Paper Series. Available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ledalsearchlseriesbyauthor Accessed December 4, 2002 who discuss 
the information deficits that employers labour under in this regard. 
90 The ADA contains no affirmative action provisions. In the United States, the federal 
Rehabilitation Act 1973 requires departments and agencies in the executive branch of the federal 
government to submit an affirmative action plan for the hiring, placement and advancement of 
people with disabilities. In addition, its reach extends to federal contracts by providing that such 
contracts in excess of $2,500 must contain a provision requiring the contractor to take 
affmnative action to employ and advance the situation of people with disabilities. 
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existing practices might adversely impact on applicants with certain disabilities: that is, 
employers could rethink what other measurements beyond, for example, formal 
certification, could be used to indicate competence for a position.91 What this form of 
probing raises, of course, is the issue of whether the duty to make reasonable 
accommodation and positive action provisions share certain similarities in their features. 
This point is discussed more fully below. 
However, the determining feature in any discussion of this provision is that the 
commitment to offset group-based disadvantage is immediately undermined by the 
passive nature of the statutory provisions on positive action. Framed in voluntary terms 
- i.e. it shall not be unlawful to ... - it would be an embellishment to describe the 
positive action provisions as posing even a moral obligation on employers to act 
positively with regard to disability and the other grounds in ways such as those 
described above.92 Further, when it came to the negotiations around the amending 
Equality Act, the equality lobby again expressed its disappointment at the omission of a 
statutory obligation on employers to engage in positive action in the workplace.93 There 
is nothing in the Act to suggest that it will be anything other than a piece of dead letter 
law.94 At a bare minimum, the statute precludes anti-discrimination claims from 
members of traditionally advantaged groups and, in this way, it eliminates the anti-
differentiation rebuttal of positive action provisions.95 
Positive Action Outside Anti-Discrimination Law: The Government's 
3% Target 
The experience of the public sector target bears out many of the issues discussed above. 
91 Note the operation of section 20 of the Employment Equity Act in South Africa, discussed 
below, which directs employers to consider alternative ways of measuring competence and 
qualifications for a position. While the acceptance of lower qualification standards or entry 
requirements in respect of minority candidates appears on its face to be anti-meritocratic, there is 
utility in proper assessment of qualification standards actually necessary for the perfom1ance of a 
particular job. As McColgan points out, the demand for higher qualifications- which can serve 
to exclude less advantaged candidates- could be a form of indirect discrimination. A. 
McColgan, supra n.22 p.l66. Moreover, while it is arguable that the alteration of entry 
conditions could amount to an adjustment that might be undertaken by way of a reasonable 
accommodation, it is important to reiterate that section 36(4) of the EEA exempts qualifications 
"generally accepted in the State" from the scope of the reasonable accommodation duty. 
92 See H. Fenwick, supra n.39 p.508. 
93 The Equality Coalition, Submission on the Equality Bill (March 2004) p. 1 0. 
94 This assumption is based on the experience of the similar and under-utilised positive action 
provisions of the Employment Equality Act 1977. 
95 Section of the Act 35(3) EEA 1998-2004. 
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Beginning in 1977, the Government introduced a positive action measure aimed at 
achieving a 3% target for the employment of disabled people in the public sector in 
order to jump-start their integration into mainstream employment. While tbis measure 
has been described as being "quota"-based, quotas are more properly described as legal 
obligations which are backed up with specific sanctions. This initiative, though 
Government-led, is not legally enforceable. It places only a moral obligation on the civil 
and public service to comply with its directions. As a result, its effectiveness has been 
compromised. That said, some progress has been made. In 1981, disabled people 
comprised 0.9% of the workforce in the Civil Service and 1.11% of the public service 
workforce. By 1990, compliance had only improved marginally. However, by 1993, the 
3% target was achieved in all but three of the nineteen Government Departments. By the 
late 1990s, the figure had dropped below the 3% target once again. Of course, it is 
possible - and this possibility has been alluded to - that this target was achieved through 
manipulation of the definition of disability.96 Compliance across the wider public sector 
bas been less successful, and it appears that throughout the last decade, compliance in 
the civil service has diminished again. 97 Monitoring of the target has also been erratic. It 
was hoped that the promised establishment of an inter-departmental monitoring 
committee would track progress more carefully. Further promises for achievement of 
the target have been made in various partnership agreements, with the second most 
recent agreement advocating achievement "at an early date".98 
Under the regulations, public service employers are expected to take specific 
initiatives, suited to their circumstances, to recruit and retain employees with disabilities 
in order to meet the target. Public sector employers are expected to identify and seek to 
remove or reduce barriers to recruiting and retaining employees with disabiHties where 
it is within their competence to do so. Among the main barriers that may be identified at 
recruitment level in the public service are: 
• The specification of a minimum educational requirement (for example the Leaving 
Certificate or equivalent formal qualifications may be less frequently held by people 
96 P. Conroy and S. Flanagan. "Research Project on the Effective Recruitment of People with 
Disabilities into the Public Service 2000" (2001) Report Commissioned in Partnership by the 
Equality Authority and the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Refonn. Available at 
www.egualitv.ie (last accessed, October 30, 2003). 
97 By the late 1990s it had fallen below the target again. See C. Murphy, Employment and 
Career Progression of People with a Disability in the Irish Civil Service (Dublin: Good body 
Economic Consultants, 2003). 
98 Government oflreland, Programme for Prosperity and Fairness 2000-2002 (Dublin: 
Govemment Stationery Office, 1999). 
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with disabilities).99 Employers may need to examine whether there are suitable 
alternative means of assessing future job suitability and performance; 
• The requirement for full time working /attendance during normal office hours. (Job 
redesign or part-time working may be necessary elements in an initiative to attract 
people with disabilities into employment and to retain them.) 
Research demonstrates that public sector managers have problems with the 
relationship between the disability target and the operation of the employment equality 
legislation. Conroy and Flanagan report an apprehension among employers regarding 
the 3% target and the Employment Equality Act. In particular, the question raised was 
"where does the apparent preferential treatment of the 3% target end and discrimination 
begin?" 100 Although there may be concern over the form and extent of positive action 
measures allowable under the Employment Equality Act, the comment quoted above 
indicates something of a misunderstanding among public sector employers over the 
statute's provisions. The Act provides that it does not render unlawful (in other words, it 
is not discriminatory) the taking of measures with a view to ensuring fuU equality in 
practice, to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to "disability", or "to create 
or maintain facilities for the integration of such persons into the working 
environment". 101 It would be difficult to envisage bow a 3% public sector target for 
disabled workers could be seen as anything other than a measure facilitating their 
integration into employment, thereby offsetting the effects of discrimination, 
particularly given that 10-12% of the population has a disability and this sector suffers 
an unemployment rate of between 70 and 80%. Moreover, the asymmetrical nature of 
the statute's disability non-discrimination provisions means that employers are secure 
from claims by non-disabled individuals of breaches of the equal treatment principle. 
Despite this, Conroy and Flanagan report that as a safeguard from discrimination 
claims, many public sector employers apply the principle of non-discrimination at the 
recruitment process and the principle of positive action once the person is employed in 
the public sector. 102 Given that many disabled people fmd that the greatest barrier to 
participation is overcoming the prejudices which employers hold regarding their 
capabilities, this approach seems to be missing the point. Usually, public sector 
employers are comparatively well-informed on the potentials of workers with 
99 Though see the effect of section 36(4) and(5) regarding qualification standards discussed in 
chapter two. 
100 P.Conroy and S. Flanagan, supra n. 96 para.4.1. 
101 Section 33 of the Employment Equality Act 1998-2004. 
102 Ibid. One employer is quoted as stating that merit as a principle of admission is strictly 
applied by the Civil Service. 
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disabilities. When one considers the information deficit which many private sector 
employers suffer, hopes regarding their impetus for positive action programmes are not 
high. 
Disaggregating Reasonable Accommodation from Preferential 
Positive Action Programs 
In this second part of the chapter, I address the tendency, particularly common within 
the ADAjurisprudence103 and within academic literature, 104 to equate the ADA's 
reasonable accommodation duty with the policy of affirmative or positive action, as it is 
understood in the traditional sense of providing preferences to members of protected 
groups. The discussion is based upon a comparison between the concept of reasonable 
accommodation and the positive action initiatives which fall under McCrudden's third 
category.' 05 This heading refers to forms of positive action which involve preferential 
treatment (often termed hard preferences) for the purposes of increasing particular 
groups' participation and representation in sectors where they have been historically 
underrepresented and excluded.106 It remains questionable whether reasonable 
accommodation can be equated with positive action in this sense, as the general 
formulation of the reasonable accommodation duty does not expressly set out to 
increase the representation of disadvantaged groups within workplace structures or 
sectors. 107 As is discussed below, the one possible exception to this is reasonable 
accommodation by way of"reassignment to a vacant position".'08 While it can certainly 
be stated that reasonable accommodation and positive action programmes share certain 
103 See Justice Breyer writing in US Airways, Inc. v Barnett !2 S. Ct. at 1521: " ... [T]he Act 
specifies ... that preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act's basic equal 
opportunity goal. The Act requires preferences in the form of"reasonable accommodation" that 
are needed for those with disabilities to obtain the same workplace opportunities that those 
without disabilities automatically enjoy. By definition any special "accommodation" requires 
the employer to treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e. preferentially." See below for 
a rebuttal of this analysis based on the social construction of disability. 
104 See below for references. 
105 The discussion is confined to a consideration of the reasonable accommodation duty in the 
context of employment discrimination law in the two jurisdictions under consideration. It is 
therefore mindful of the fact that in other jurisdictions, notably Canada and South Africa, 
reasonable accommodation operates more expansively. There, express links are made between 
reasonable accommodation and affirmative action, which emphasise the group, as opposed to the 
traditional individual orientation, of accommodation mandates. See infi'a for further discussion 
ofthese measures. 
106 See generally C. McCrudden, supra n.33. 
107 This is developed below. 
108 Section 101 (9)(B) ADA. 
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features, it is Jess acceptable, in my view, to conceptualise measures undertaken by way 
of reasonable accommodation as positive action. This is because of key distinctions 
between the two forms of intervention, which are drawn below .109 The discussion goes 
on to highlight the limitations to positive action programmes. It considers how more 
substantive equality formulations represented by positive duties to promote equality 
could offset and supplement both the individualism of the accommodation duty in the 
disability context and the permissive nature of positive action programmes. 
Preferential Treatment? Parallels between Reasonable Accommodation 
and Positive Action 
The resemblance between the implementation of positive action programmes and the 
provision of reasonable accommodations in favour of disabled people is straightforward. 
Each involves an employer taking active or positive steps to provide something of 
benefit to the members of the group protected by anti-discrimination law.110 Thus, 
reasonable accommodation has been characterised as a form of positive action where it 
places an obligation on employers to take account of a protected characteristic by taking 
certain reasonable steps, short of imposing a disproportionate burden or an undue 
hardship, to allow disabled employees and job applicants equal opportunities. Support 
for this conceptualisation of reasonable accommodation can be located in the 
literature. 111 For example, Karlan and Rutherglen note an equivalence in reasonable 
accommodation and positive action: " [r]easonable accommodation is affirmative action 
in the sense it requires an employer to take account of an individual's disabilities and to 
provide special treatment to him for that reason". 112 However, the same commentators 
see reasonable accommodation operating along the lines of hard preferences when they 
state that it confers a right upon a disabled individual to "insist upon discrimination in 
their favour'' and this is described as a distinct form of afftiiDative action. 113 Similarly, 
109 On this analysis, it remains arguable that some measures adopted by way of reasonable 
accommodation could fall within traditionally softer forms of positive action, such as, for 
example, McCrudden's first category of"identification and removal of discriminatory practices". 
110 See J. Cooper, Comment, "Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable 
Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act" ( 1991) 139 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1423, 1431. 
111 See P .S. Miller, "Disability Civil Rights and a New Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century: 
The Expansion of Civil Rights Beyond Race, Gender and Age" (I 989) 1 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Labour and Employment Law 51 1. 
112 P. Karlan and G. Rutherglen, "Disabilities, Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation" 
(1996) 46 Duke Law Journal I p.9. 
113 Ibid. 
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Schwab and Willborn argue that the ADA's reasonable accommodation duty contains 
hard preferences which require employers to engage in affirmative action. 114 The 
substance of their argument is dealt with more extensively below. At this stage, it 
suffices to state that the articulation of the accommodation duty moves beyond the 
negative duty of discrimination law orthodoxy, which prohibits decision-makers from 
taking into account specific characteristics such as race or gender. It is also beyond the 
remit of traditional indirect discrimination precepts, as it is concerned with the 
exclusionary effect of omissions on the part of an employer115 as opposed to the 
disparate impact of particular practices or provisions. In this sense, both reasonable 
accommodation and positive action share a vision of equality that calls for the 
differential treatment of subordinated individuals and groups. However, that vision is 
implemented rather differently and, in practice, it responds differently to the experiences 
of exclusion suffered by disabled people. 11 6 However, viewing reasonable 
accommodation as positive action on Karlan and Rutherglen's theory involves 
characterising reasonable accommodation as "special" treatment. This is an assessment 
which is closely linked with traditional medical models of disability and impairment. 117 
This view is rejected because of an understanding of the functions of the reasonable 
accommodation duty as informed by the minority group model of disability, and is 
discussed below. 
Notwithstanding the differences that will be drawn below between the two 
concepts, there is one point at which the synthesis between reasonable accommodation 
and the traditional meaning of positive action becomes less easy to challenge. This is 
where reassignment to a vacant position is the fom1 of reasonable accommodation at 
issue. 11 8 This fonn of reasonable accommodation is expressly set out in the EEOC 
regulations accompanying the ADA, but it remains unreferenced under Irish and 
114 S Schwab and S. Will born, supra n.89 p.9. 
115 See J. Baker et at. supra n.6 p.128. The failure of an employer to provide child-care facilities 
on site could not, therefore, be actionable on current indirect discrimination principles. 
116 See infra for development 
117 The reason we view accommodation requests from disabled people as a request for "special" 
or "extra" benefits is based on dominant understandings that existing workplace structures 
provide the appropriate baseline for what employers should provide. M. Crossley, "Reasonable 
Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project" Working Paper available 
at htm://www.law.ufl.edu/ facultv p.34 Recently published at (2004) 35 Rutgers Law Journal 
861. 
118 See Stephen F. Befort and T. Holmes Donesky, "Reassignment under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affinnative Action or Both?" (2000) 57 
Washington and Lee Law Review 1045, 1092. ("The similarities between reasonable 
accommodation and affirmative action are most acute when the accommodation in question is 
reassignment.") 
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European legislation. Reassignment to a vacant position is argued to form a preference 
in respect of which class status, such as disability, serves as a preferential basis for 
selecting an individual to fill a position.119 However, as was discussed in chapter five, 
reassignment as a form of reasonable accommodation under the ADA is closely 
controlled.120 It is expressly stipulated to be the reasonable accommodation of last 
resort. Moreover, the EEOC regulations state that reassignment to a vacant position is 
onJy available to a disabled employee and not to an applicant seeking a job.121 The 
federal courts remain divided on whether the ADA's inclusion of reassignment in its list 
of possible accommodations requires an employer to reassign a disabled employee even 
where a better qualified employee or applicant seeks the position.122 If the ADA were 
interpreted to mandate the preference of a disabled employee over a better-qualified 
applicant for the vacant position, then the reassignment function would appear to 
operate preferentially along the lines of traditional preference-based positive action 
programmes. This form of reasonable accommodation is predicated upon the 
integrative argument for positive action programmes. Its purpose is to allow for the 
retention of a disabled individual within the workplace, which is better served by 
allowing a newly disabled employee to be accommodated by way of reassignment as 
opposed to forcing that individual to re-enter the labour market as a job-seeker.123 This 
form of reasonable accommodation as positive action would appear to be within the 
boundaries of a proportionality enquiry, such as that formulated by the Advocate 
General in the ECJ decision in Badeck124• The act, if reasonable, in favour of the 
disabled individual would not place excessive burdens on individuals outside of the 
target group- it is only available to employees and not job applicants- and the social 
reality of the widespread nature of discrimination and exclusion endured by disabled 
119 Ibid. 
12° Compare Aka v Washington Hospital Center 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) with Smith v 
Midland Brake, Inc 180 F.3d 1154 (lOth Circuit. 1999). Though in the UK context, see the 
House of Lords decision in Archibald v Fife [2004] ICR 954, where it was held that the duty to 
make reasonable adjustments under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 could require a 
disabled person to be treated more favourably than a non-disabled person in the context of the 
~ecific adjustment at issue, that of"transferring to fill an existing vacancy''. 
1 1 29 C.F.R. app s. l630.2 (o) (July, 2003 ed.) 
122 This point was not addressed in the context of the Supreme Court decision in Barnett which 
discussed the interaction between the reasonable accommodation of reassignment and seniority 
systems. See US Ainvays v Barnett 535 U.S. 391 (2002), 122 S. Ct. 1516 discussed in chapter 
five. 
123 Crossley argues that the integrative argument supports a redistributive policy to maximize the 
employment of people with disabilities and as such keeps the purposes of reassignment within 
the anti-discrimination structure of the ADA, if uncomfortably so. M. Crossley, supra n.ll7 
~.88 
24 Badeck v Hessen Case C- 158/97 [2000] ECR 1- 1875. 
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people provides support for its use. It is submitted that this is the only aspect to the 
reasonable accommodation duty of the ADA that falls within target-based measures 
aimed at expressly increasing the relative representation of disabled people in workplace 
structures. As chapter five pointed out, Ireland's EEA is comparatively silent on the 
fonns of accommodations which would be reasonable for an employer to make. There 
are no supporting regulations which specify whether reassignment to a vacant position 
is thought to be within the statutory concept. 
The interesting point, in the US context, is that this positive aspect to the ADA 
was never articulated by Congress when the Bill was progressing. In the justifications 
advanced by Congress for enacting the ADA, nowhere, either in the preamble or in the 
accompanying Congressional history, does the ADA speak of granting preferences to 
disabled individuals. Indeed, Befort and Holmes state that it would have been ironic if 
the language of the ADA appealed to affirmative action policy, as the ADA's 
introduction came at a point where judicial, legislative and public opinion was retreating 
from the legitimacy of affirmative action policies in the race and gender contexts. 125 
Differences between Reasonable Accommodation and Positive Action: 
Barrier Removal versus Preferential Treatment 
Despite the parallels discussed above, it is argued here that there are sufficient 
distinctions between the reasonable accommodation mandate and positive action 
programmes which consolidate the need for both practical and political reasons to 
uphold the boundary between the two. It is argued that the text, practicalities and policy 
underpinning the ADA and the EEA support the view that reasonable accommodation 
should not be equated with, or reduced to, preference-based positive action, specifically 
positive action programmes which are quota- based and which alter entry standards for 
members of targeted groups. 126 
The first difference between reasonable accommodation and positive action lies 
in their respective regulatory characters. Simply put, reasonable accommodation is a 
mandatory duty under the ADA and the EEA. Failure to provide a reasonable 
accommodation is stipulated (or interpreted, in the Irish context) as amounting to 
125 S. Befort and T. Holmes Donesky, supra n.118 p. 1081. 
126 The basis for maintaining this distinction is multi-faceted. First, it distinguishes reasonable 
accommodation from positive action in order to protect the former from the discourse of 
illegitimacy that surrounds positive action. Secondly, the distinction isolates the limits of the 
reasonable accommodation duty as compared to preferential based positive action programs. 
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discrimination and is a legally-enforceable individual right. 127 Conversely, the language 
and text of positive action at EU and domestic level (the ADA contains no affirmative 
action provisions) is permissive and facilitative: employers and Member States are 
given the freedom to allow for or to adopt positive action measures in favour of disabled 
people under Article 7. Where initiatives are pursued, then any purported action must be 
designed to alleviate the effects of disadvantage or to create facilities to promote the 
integration of disabled people into employment. 128 Positive action purports to go further 
towards dismantling barriers faced by disabled individuals by allowing set-asides, 
targets and quotas in favour of the disabled. 
This difference is further crystallised by the operational context of the two 
concepts. Positive action programmes are generally employer- or state-driven plans 
adopted in reaction to an assessment of the position of disadvantaged groups within a 
particular sector or workplace. Employers typically establish targets and goals through a 
statistical comparison of their workforce with the relevant labour market. 129 
Consequently, hiring and recruitment policies are altered until the target is met. 130 The 
reasonable accommodation duty is, on the other band, a reactive duty which arises on an 
individual case-by-case basis - either because an existing employee becomes disabled or 
because an employer is faced with the prospect of a disabled person applying for a 
position. It retains an individual focus and does not involve setting targets in response to 
an assessment of a workplace which shows evidence of disadvantage, segregation and 
exclusion. To be successful, it relies upon an interactive process between an employer 
and a single individual. What is determinative is that the individual is able to perform 
the "essential functions" (ADA) or the "duties"(EEA) attached to a position - this means 
that he or she must be qualified for the position.131 One must then assess whether a 
127 Section I 02(b ) , 5(A) and (B) ADA. 
128 See the text to section 33 ofthe EEA as amended set out above. Of course, this latter aspect to 
the Irish positive action provisions demonstrates that measures falling short of the hard 
preferences can fall under one of the first two characterisations of positive action drawn by 
McCrudden. And in this sense, then certain measures undertaken by way of a reasonable 
accommodation in favour of one individual could operate more broadly in favour of the 
integration of other, similarly situated disabled individuals, for example, the insertion of ramps in 
favour of those who mobilise by way of wheels. However, this discussion here is on the basis of 
an understanding of positive action in its strongest sense. 
129 See Befort and Holmes Donesky supra n. l l8 p.l 082. 
130 Examples include the plans laid out in the public sector in Ireland, discussed above, and also 
the public sector hiring plans which were the subject ofECJ discussion in Marschall and 
Abrahamsson discussed above. 
131 Title I of the ADA extends statutory protection from discrimination only to qualified 
individuals with a disability. If the person concerned is not "qualified" in the particular sense 
required by the statute, she loses her non-discrimination protection. EEOC regulations defme 
"qualification standards" to mean "the personal and professional attributes including the skill, 
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'reasonable' accommodation would enable the individual to become qualified132 and if 
so whether its provision would be a proportionate burden (EEA) or an allowable 
hardship for the employer to bear (ADA). 
As bas been pointed out above, the traditional justification for positive 
programmes in the race context was the need to counter the lingering effects of past 
discrimination. The accommodation duty under the ADA, according to Crossley, does 
not require evidence of past discrimination by the employer. 133 The purpose of the 
accommodation mandate is to remove barriers and to alter policies that currently impede 
the proper inclusion of disabled people within the labour market. In the context of 
reasonable accommodation under the ADA, the duty does not operate to alter or adjust 
an employer's job standards. Rather, the reasonable accommodation mandate requires 
employers to permit qualified disabled individuals to utilise non-conventional means of 
perfomung job functions. Thus, the duty does not operate to alter or adjust an 
employer's job standards, apart from discounting the effect of an individual's inability 
to perform non-essential job functions. 134 This dialogue which the ADA's reasonable 
accommodation duty prompts is intended to identify both the essential functions of the 
position and the particular needs oftbe disabled person in question. 135 This dialogue 
"does not guarantee an accommodation in favour of a disabled worker"136 and neither 
does the accommodation itself, if provided, guarantee an applicant a particular position. 
Where there is a more qualified individual without a disability, there is nothing in either 
the ADA or the EEA that says that the hiring decision must go to the disabled 
experience, education, physical, medical, safety and other requirements established by a covered 
entity as requirements which an individual must meet in order to be eligible for the position held 
or desired." 29 C.f.R. § 1630.2(q). -As noted above, while the demand for higher qualifications 
(unrelated to job performance) could be a form of indirect discrimination, (see A. McColgan, 
supra n.22) section 36 of the EEA exempts qualification standards "generally accepted in the 
State" from the scope of the reasonable accommodation duty and the indirect discrimination 
P:rinciple. 
32 See chapter five for discussion on the diverging interpretations to the "reasonableness" of the 
accommodation matrix. 
133 M. Crossley, supra n.ll7 p. 32. This is, of course, a specifically American take on the 
operation of affirmative action. In the employment context, the criteria utilised to support 
voluntary affirmative action plans no longer include proof of the existence of past intentional 
discrimination. See United Steelworkers v Weber 443 U.S. 193 (1979) and Johnson v 
Transportation Agency480 U.S. 616 (1987) for judicial opinion on the extent of affirmative 
action plans in private employment in the United States. 
134 See discussion of this important limb of the reasonable accommodation duty in chapter five. 
135 Whether this dialogue actually takes place in the real world in an entirely different question. 
136S. Befort and T. Holmes Donesky, supra n.ll8 p.l 083. Of course, the applicant may not be 
qualified in the sense required by the statute, or the particular accommodation may fall foul of 
the standard of undue hardship (US) or disproportionate burden (Ireland). Alternatively, its 
provision may not be viewed as within the band of 'reasonableness'. 
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individual. 137 On this point, reassignment to a vacant position, the one construction of 
reasonable accommodation that falls within a traditional hard preference category, is not 
available to job applicants. Crucially, if an employer fails to provide an accommodation 
or engage with the request, the only recourse left open to the individual is the pursuit of 
compensation through the adjudication system. 138 So while there may be a positive duty 
to engage in reasonable accommodation, in a large number of cases it is conceptualised 
and remedied as a negative right. 139 In this sense, the reasonable accommodation duty 
may not positively increase the representation of disabled people across a workplace or 
sector. While it is true that a positive action programme does not guarantee any 
particular individual any automatic preference or result, 140 what it does aspire towards is 
a form of preferential treatment for the group to which the individual belong. In this 
way, the pervasiveness of attitudes and stereotypical assumptions about the working 
capacity of disabled people can be challenged through the positive inclusion of disabled 
people within working structures. In this sense, then, positive action programmes are 
said to provide a "systemic" as opposed to an individual remedy for the exclusion 
endured by members of the historically-disadvantaged group. 141 
The inapplicability of reassignment at the application stage underscores another 
significant distinction between reasonable accommodation and traditional affirmative 
action programmes. In the United States, reassignment to a vacant position operates 
only as a post-hire mechanism through which an employer may retain the services of a 
current employee with a disability. It will only be required if, in the circumstances, it 
137 See below for discussion of the narrow form of hard preferences available in hiring to 
disabled applicants seeking accommodations. 
138 Other forms of redress available under the EEA include reinstatement and reengagement 
orders (s. 82(2)(a)) and a more open ended order that a "a person or persons specified ... take a 
[specific] course of action": s. 82( 1 )(3) See s. 82 and s. 83 of the EEA. The former actions have 
been rarely ordered and an example of a course of action ordered under the latter include a 
requirement for an employer to undertake equality training. 
139 Waddington argues that Article 5 of the Framework Directive clearly establishes a positive 
duty on employers to make a reasonable accommodation and that consequently, individuals 
should be able to enforce a right to benefit from an accommodation. While in certain cases, 
individuals employees have been able to extract an adjustment from an employer, such as a piece 
of equipment or an alteration in work practices, the vast majority of the cases under the EEA 
have been remedied in the traditional negative manner. L. Waddington, Implementing and 
lnte1preting the Reasonable Accommodation Provisions of the Framework Employment 
Directive: Learningji·om Experience and Achieving Best Practice (EU Network of Experts on 
Disability Discrimination, 2004) p. 44. 
140 Positive action programs themselves are not without limitations. In particular, they are prone 
to an attack of being over-inclusive and under-inclusive in their impact and effect on both the 
target group and the non-protected group. 
141 S. Leiter and W. Leiter, Affirmative Action in Antidiscrimination Law and Policy: An 
Overview and Synthesis (2002). Their thesis is that systemic bias against protected groups 
justifies a remedy that goes beyond compensating individuals for their injuries. At p.53. 
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would be a reasonable accommodation and if it would not impose any undue hardship 
or disproportionate burden. No other employee loses employment as a result of this job 
transfer.142 By way of contrast, court-ordered positive action programmes in the United 
States generally operate as a pre-hire formula that reserves employment opportunities 
for one group of applicants, and this is perceived to be at the expense of another group 
of applicants. The inapplicability of reassignment at the hiring stage - the point at which 
conventional positive action programs are most pervasive - further diminishes the 
similarities between reasonable accommodation and positive action. 
Beyond Equality of Opportunity: Reasonable Accommodation and 
Hard Preferences 
The conceptualisation of the ADA's reasonable accommodation mandate in preferential 
terms has been advocated in the academic literature which pursues an economic analysis 
of US civil rights law. Adopting an economic framework for analysing the ADA, 
Schwab and Willbom have argued that the reasonable accommodation mandate 
provides disabled people with both bard and soft preferences in the workplace. 143 
As the statute was conceived in order to reverse the status quo and to bring 
disabled people into the economic and social mainstream of American life, they see the 
ADA's clear purpose as "requir[ing] employers to treat individuals with disabilities 
more favourably than they had been treated prior to the Act". 144 However, the adoption 
of the language of preferential treatment in this sense seems to be erroneous, 
particularly in light of the purposes of the ADA. Where, prior to the ADA, disabled 
individuals have suffered less favourable treatment as compared with workers of equal 
merit, it seems a stretch to equate the removal of that discriminatory disadvantage with 
the preferential treatment of disabled people. Schwab and Will born state that "[b ]ecause 
individuals with disabilities were treated less favourably than others before the ADA 
treating them the same as others now is a preference, albeit a soft preference because 
disabled individuals are not treated more favourably than others; instead they are merely 
142 Though see the discussion of the Barnett decision in chapter five. Of course, difficulties may 
arise if a number of disabled employees were to seek reassignment to the vacant position and it 
remains the case that an applicant for employment may lose out in this situation. 
143 S. Schwab and S. Willbom "Reasonable Accommodation ofWorkplace Disabilities" (2001) 
Cornell Working Paper Series. Available at 
http://www.law.eomell.edu/leda/search/seriesbyauthor Accessed December 4, 2002. 
144 Ibid. p.8. 
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treated the same" .145 This last statement, I believe, exposes the dangers of loose 
assignment of the label "preferential treatment". Treating disabled people with non-
functional limitations the same as other applicants, by excluding any decisions taken on 
the grounds of their disability motivated by animus, myths or stereotypes, is one of the 
functions of the direct discrimination (disparate treatment) provision. Yet, labelling this 
statutory stipulation as providing preferences to disabled people is both misleading and 
ultimately harmful to the disability agenda because of the liberal assumptions which 
persist around issues of preferential treatment in antidiscrimination law. 
Schwab and Will born's second interpretation of the ADA presents more of a 
challenge to advocates who view reasonable accommodation as no more than a tool for 
levelling the playing field so as to allow disabled workers enjoy equal employment 
opportunities. They argue that, at certain points, the ADA mandates hard preferences in 
favour of disabled people. The point at which the preference in favour of disabled 
individuals operates, according to this view, is where the costs involved in hiring a 
disabled person are greater than the costs of hiring a non-disabled person because of the 
costs of an accommodation, or where the disabled applicant is less productive because 
he cannot perform non-essential job functions. In these two situations, the employer 
would violate the ADA by refusing to hire. The accommodation matrix requires the 
employer to ignore the costs of the accommodation and any productivity measured 
through the performance of non-essential job functions unless the accommodation is 
unreasonable or would impose an undue hardship. 146 However, the operation of the 
ADA in such preferential terms is not wholly equivalent to the forms of hard 
preferences which operate in quota-based positive action programmes. As Schwab and 
Willborn show, the ADA mandates hard preferences for disabled persons who are more 
costly but just as productive as non-disabled workers. The ADA does not mandate a 
hard preference for disabled persons who are no more costly but less productive than 
other workers. They illustrate this point with the following example: 
145 Ibid. 
146 Schwab and Willbom, supra n.89 p.20. 
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D1 has the same productivity as C (a non-disabled comparator) but requires an 
accommodation of$2 per hour. The ADA creates a hard preference for Dl 
because it requires the employer to treat C and D 1 as equal even though C has a 
wage-cost advantage. 
Compare then D2 to Dl . D2 costs no more than the comparator, but C produces 
20% more (this could arise with a disability that reduces productivity and has no 
satisfactory accommodation) Employer is indifferent to both Dl and D2 and 
would prefer C. 
The ADA treats D1 and 02 very differently and gives a hard preference to Dl 
by requiring the employer to ignore the accommodation cost and to treat D I and 
C the same. (i.e. denying D 1 employment would ostensibly be based on the 
need to pay for the accommodation and would be contrary to s .12112(b )(5)(b) 
ADA) 
The ADA gives no hard preference to 02 and would let the employer choose C 
instead. (D2 cannot avail of an appropriate accommodation that would increase 
his productivity, and thus, the employer is entitled to choose the most qualified 
individual for the job ). 147 
Under the ADA, the employer can consider the productivity and qualifications of a 
disabled applicant and other applicants only with reference to their essential functions. 
An individual with a disability must be treated as equal to another worker if both can 
perform the essential functions of the job equally, even if the other worker can make an 
additional contribution to productivity by performing non-essential functions. In 
Ireland, this preference may not exist because, as was pointed out in chapter five, the 
employer could be entitled to insist on the performance of all the duties and not merely 
the essential functions attached to the position. 148 Therefore, where an individual under 
the Irish legislation remains less productive across all the functions of the job following 
the provision of a reasonable accommodation, then the employer is legitimately entitled 
to prefer the more productive applicant. Thus, the point in the US context is that where 
a disabled individual remains " 1 0 per cent less productive in the essential functions of a 
job", the employer need not accommodate, even though the employer must 
accommodate an equally productive worker with 10 per cent greater costs. 149 
When all this is translated into the practicalities of real-world hiring decisions, 
the actual strength of the bard preference granted to disabled applicants becomes 
147 As P.O. Blanck states, the ADA "does not require the employer to hire or retain a qualified 
individual with a covered disability regardless of the need for accommodation, over an equally or 
more qualified individual without the disability." P.O. Blanck, text ton. 165 infra. Similarly, 
Ireland's EEA states that an employer need not employ or retain any person who is not 
competent and fully capable of undertaking the duties attached to a position. 
148 My emphasis. 
149 Schwab and Willbom, supra n. 89 p. 22. 
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difficult to assess because of the uncertainties surrounding the substantive reasonable 
accommodation duty. 150 The preferential-basis analysis of reasonable accommodation, 
outlined above, is not as persuasive as one might think, particularly if one subscribes to 
the minority group model's rationale for the accommodation duty, which concentrates 
on the removal of socially-imposed barriers to the proper employment of disabled 
people. Schwab and Willbom's analysis is predicated on the common understanding of 
disability as an individual problem of the person which imposes costs on external agents 
who bear no responsibility for the exclusion endured by disabled people. 151 However, if 
one views the costs involved as ones that remove the socially-constructed barriers to the 
employment of disabled people, then the cost allowance preference in favour of disabled 
people need not necessarily be viewed in preferential terms. If the reasonable 
accommodation duty is to have any true bite, then the additional cost of removing 
socially-constructed barriers to the employment of disabled people can be more properly 
rationalised as a formulation of an equality of opportunity policy in the specific context 
of disability. This is because it requires employers to discount the costs of an 
accommodation when assessing the capacities and capabilities of a disabled person for 
the position. In this sense, employers properly bear some of the costs of the removal of 
disadvantageous structures, provided that the cost is not disproportionate. The proper 
point, it is submitted, at which a hard-preference analysis of reasonable accommodation 
should arise would be if it were interpreted to require that an employer must prefer a 
disabled applicant who is accommodated, but who still has a reduced productivity over 
a more qualified non-disabled applicant. On the analysis above, this is something which 
the ADA does not require. 
Adopting an equality-of-results analysis, there remain many points at which the 
reasonable accommodation duty will fail to assist disabled people to more 
proportionately achieve positions within the existing labour market. One such point is 
where a disabled person needs an extra-reasonable accommodation to perform a 
ISO Outstanding questions such as when must the extra cost of an accommodation be ignored, 
when does a job function contribute so little to productivity that it is non-essential and must be 
ignored are difficult to assess. All of these questions are fact specific and can turn on the 
interpretation given to the central term of reasonableness. However, as chapter five discussed in 
detail, there is no senled mechanism for ascertaining the reasonableness of an accommodation. 
An employer must provide a reasonable accommodation, but not an unreasonable one. An 
employer need not provide even a reasonable accommodation if it would impose an undue 
hardship or disproportionate burden. 
lSI The substantive reformulation of equality, discussed below, rejects as misleading the 
aspirations of individualism. Fredman argues that all those who benefit from an existing 
structure of disadvantage should be prepared to bear part of the remedial costs. S. Fredman, 
supra n.l9 p.l29. 
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position ' s essential functions: these individuals are outside of the statute's protection. 
Other problems of the reasonable accommodation mandate include its failure to deal 
with those with reduced capacities and capabilities, i.e. the disadvantages that accrue 
from functional impairments which are not accommodated. Schwab and Willbom point 
out that given the uncertainty surrounding the reasonableness limb of the 
accommodation duty, the reality is that many disabled people will try and settle for less 
desirable jobs which require lesser accommodations. 152 If this hypothesis is correct, it 
explains many of the statistical surveys which demonstrate the generally low costs of 
accommodations: as individuals seek accommodations which are inexpensive, or 
individuals seek less generous accommodations than the law requires. The problem with 
this situation, in reality, is that requests for low-cost accommodations, combined with 
the economically-rational employer's desire for low accommodation costs, threatens the 
ADA's goal of providing fair employment opportunities. In this sense, full 
accommodation would assist disabled individuals into better-suited jobs, but as chapter 
three discussed, there are still constitutional barriers to placing the costs of full 
accommodations on employers. 153 
Reasonable Accommodation as Equality of Opportunity? 
Chapter two pointed out the very general distinction made by legal commentators 
between formal equality and substantive equality. Since fonnal equality emphasises 
sameness, symmetry and similarity, it is at once clear that the concept of reasonable 
accommodation falls into a substantive formulation of equality because of its concern 
for and attention to difference. However, as chapter two argued, the adoption and use of 
the substantive equality term within existing anti-discrimination legislation is 
overstated. Consequently, the question remains as to whether reasonable 
accommodation represents a truly substantive equality norm aimed at tackling the 
underlying creation and legitimation of exclusionary structures, or whether it merely 
pursues a weaker distributive goal more like equality of opportunity. 
In the US context, conceptualisations of reasonable accommodation are caught 
between a rock and a hard place. The narrow underpinning of the constitutional equality 
guarantee in the US has meant that there bas been a practical need to argue that the 
ADA's reasonable accommodation duty falls squarely within an equality of opportunity 
152 S. Schwab and S. Willbom, supra n. 89 p. 47. 
153 This could be someway achieved through the introduction of a rule which allowed disabled 
people themselves to pay for some of their accommodation costs. 
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fonnula. 154 While this argument seeks to cement the foundations of the reasonable 
accommodation duty, it also exposes the reality that equality of opportunity 
fonnulatioos in the disability context signjficantly reduce the chance of achieving the 
political ambitions of the minority group model. Indeed, it reinforces the social model's 
critique of the minority group model's reliance on legal fonnulations of liberal ideals.155 
These ideas are developed below. 
Despite the real signjficance of the extension of the non-discrimination structure 
to disabled people, when the reasonable accommodation duty is broken down into its 
constituent parts and analysed within the confines of non-discrimination law and its 
enforcement system, its initial expansiveness appears compromised. Yet there remains 
considerable division among commentators with regard to its place within non-
discrimination and equality theory. One approach, central to the minority group model 
of disability, has been to view the failure to accommodate the disadvantage endured by 
disabled people as a plain denial of equal employment opportunities. In other words, 
reasonable accommodation is simply part and parcel of meaningful non-
discrimination.156 The statutory structure of the ADA, which specifies that 
discrimination is a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability, makes this clear.157 Moreover, the preamble to the 
ADA states, with considerable clarity, that the purpose of the ADA is to provide clear, 
strong, consistent and enforceable standards addressing discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities, and it states that its provisions are designed to provide 
equality of opportunity for disabled people.158 
154 See generally chapter three and A. Mayerson and S. Yee, "The ADA and Models of Equality" 
Paper presented at International Disability Law and Policy Symposium: From Principles to 
Practice October 22-26 2000. Available at http://www.dredf.org/svmposium/mayerson.html . 
Doctrinally, this argument has been made by many commentators, particularly Jells, who places 
reasonable accommodation in the same category as indirect discrimination. See C. Jells, 
"Antidiscrimination and Accommodation (2001) 115 Harvard Law Review 642. 
ISS See generally, P. Handley, " 'Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place': Anti-discrimination 
Legislation in the Liberal State and the Fate of the Australian Disability Discrimination Act" 
(200 I) 36 Australian Journal of Political Science 515. 
1s6 A. Mayerson and S. Yee, supra n.154 p.2. 
157 To recap, the ADA defines "discrimination" as 
(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of 
an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee 
unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship 
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered 
entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the 
employee or applicant. 42 U.S.C. Section 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B). 
ISS 42 U.S.C. S. 1210 I. 
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One of the ADA's drafters, Arlene Mayerson, recently commented that "[w]e 
were insistent that reasonable accommodation was not affirmative action ... [W]e 
conceptualised equal protection as equal opportunity, which by necessity required 
affirmative steps to eliminate barriers to participation."159 Thus, reasonable 
accommodation merely formulises and activates the principle of equality of opportunity 
in the specific context of disability and it does so by paying attention to the difference of 
disability consequent upon the effects of socially-constructed barriers. It does so by 
taking cognisance of the construction of disability as understood in terms of the 
minority group model, which was discussed in chapter one. On this view, 
accommodation duties are not conceptualised as providing special treatment for 
disabled people, but rather they remove discriminatory barriers that prevent disabled 
people from participating in social structures which have been constructed in an 
exclusionary manner. Advocates of this view of reasonable accommodation have 
pointed out that the insistence on characterising accommodations for disabled people as 
special treatment fails to appreciate how existing workplace structures already 
accommodate the needs of, and indeed give an advantage to, non-disabled 
individuals. 160 Support for this view of reasonable accommodation is widespread in the 
US literature, particularly among advocates heavily involved in drafting the ADA. For 
example, Burgdorf rejects any characterisation of reasonable accommodation as 
"special treatment" for disabled people. 161 Diller similarly views reasonable 
accommodation not in terms of providing any advantage for disabled people, but rather 
as a means of equalising the playing field so that disabled people are not disadvantaged 
by the fact that the workplace ignores their needs. 162 Similarly, Whittle describes the 
Framework Directive as a measure to improve the employment opportunities for 
disabled people, but it does not "provide people with disabilities ... with any special 
advantages ... [nor] does [it] intend to help an individual with a disability get a job 
simply because they have an impairment.". 163 According to Whittle, the Directive 
operates within a system of meritocracy, a system that will still demand that the most 
159 A. Mayerson and S. Yee, supra n.l54 p.2. The constitutional reasons for conceptualising 
reasonable accommodation in this manner were discussed in chapter three. 
160 SeeM. Crossley, supra n.ll7. 
161 See R.L. Burgdorf," 'Substantially Limited' Protection From Disability Discrimination: The 
Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability" (1997) 42 
Villanova Law Review 509, 529-32 for discussions of how accommodations in favour of disabled 
people are simply an extension of the accommodations routinely granted by employers to all 
employees as a matter of course. 
162 M. Diller, "Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model" (2000) 21 Berkeley 
Journal of Employment and Labor Law 19. 
163 R. Whitle, supra n.78 p.305. 
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qualified and suitable person gets the job. What it does seek to do, however, is to inject 
into this system the principle of equal treatment, albeit with the principle specifically 
tailored to the disability context. 164 
On this analysis, when a disabled individual requests an accommodation, he or 
she is requesting what non-disabled employees receive as a matter of course: the tools 
that will enable them to perform the requirements of the job. Thus, it is based on the 
interpretation of equality of opportunity which requires that disabled individuals are 
considered in a manner which does not unduly disadvantage them because of an 
interaction between their impairment and the working environment that can be 
remedied. The request for a modification of the physical environment or a physical 
feature or policy of the workplace in order to allow an individual with a disability to 
perform a job does not, of itself, provide the disabled person with any advantage over a 
non-disabled individual who is capable of performing the job without an 
accommodation. 165 Crossley argues that where an accommodation removes a barrier to a 
disabled employee's ability to competent job performance, this accommodation would 
not generally benefit a non-disabled worker precisely for the reason that the barrier does 
not exist for the non-disabled worker. 166 Of course, this generalisation does not hold true 
in every case, particularly where a disabled employee obtains modifications in a work 
schedule, or workplace practices, that a non-disabled employee might covet or find 
beneficial. 167 Crossley's response is that although a non-disabled employee might find 
an accommodation beneficial, the accommodation would not be necessary in order to 
allow the non-disabled worker to successfully perform the job's functions. 168 In any 
event, it is worth recalling that the accommodation need only be a reasonable one169 
and, as Tucker has pointed out, optimal accommodations may not serve to put the 
164 Ibid. pp. 304-305. Though admittedly Whittle does not engage with the meaning of these 
labels he ascribes to the disability provisions of the Directive. 
165 As Blanck states, the ADA "does not require the employer to hire or retain a qualified 
individual with a covered disability regardless of the need for accommodation, over an equally or 
more qualified individual without the disability." P. D. Blanck, "The Economics of the 
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Part I - Workplace 
Accommodations" (1997) 46 DePaul Law Review 877, 894. This position has been confumed by 
the Court of Appeals jurisprudence 
166 M.Crossley, supra n.ll7 p.87. For example common accommodations such as making 
alterations to existing facilities or providing assistive devices or personnel would not be of any 
benefit to non-disabled people. Rather, they may be of some convenience to non-disabled 
workers. For example, the introduction of certain facilities on particular lower floors. 
167 For example, through the removal of non-essential job functions. This does not generally 
require existing employees to be overburdened. 
168 M. Crossley, supra n. 117. pp.30-31. 
169 See chapter five for discussion of the competing approaches to the criterion of 
"reasonableness" and its relationship to undue hardship or disproportionate burdens. 
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disabled worker in an equivalent position to non-disabled colleagues.170 This 
interpretation equates with the theory of disability underpinning the minority group 
model of disability. This model conceptualises the accommodation mandates as a means 
of levelling the playing field or clearing it of barriers between employees in a particular 
setting. 
Reasonable Accommodation: Beyond Equality of Opportunity? 
The question now arises as to whether the duty to provide reasonable accommodation 
moves beyond the weaker, distributive goal of equality of opportunity that was 
discussed in chapter two. Linked to this is the question of whether reasonable 
accommodation requires equality of results, or whether it moves towards a 
reformulation of structures in a manner not unlike more substantive duties which 
actively promote equality. Chapter two detailed how the equality of results requirement 
can be met in different ways. Fredman points out that an equality of results theory can 
be used in at least three different ways. 171 The first approach is individual: it considers 
whether the apparently equal treatment has had a detrimental impact on an individual 
because of some protected ground. The aim, on this example, is not equality of results 
but merely a remedy for the individual. Reasonable accommodation would clearly fall 
within this conceptualisation of results, but it is the manner in which the wrong is 
remedied that detracts from a more substantive characterisation. The second approach 
sees equality of results used to focus on the results to the group. However, the approach 
is for diagnostic purposes only in that it "demonstrates the existence of obstacles to 
entry rather than prescribing an outcome pattem."172 On this view, reasonable 
accommodation, in conjunction with the indirect discrimination principle, could be 
utilised to demonstrate the obstacles to entry for groups of disabled people in the 
mainstream labour market. However, as chapter two noted, the interaction between 
reasonable accommodation and indirect discrimination is compromised under the 
Framework Directive. In addition, omissions on the part of an employer may not fall 
within the indirect discrimination formula and, in any event, establishing indirect 
170 B. Poitras Tucker, "The ADA's Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights 
Paradigm" 62 Ohio State Law Journa/335 , 347. Tucker goes on to point out that an 
accommodation granted in the form ofTDD technology does not granted her any preference or 
advantage over her colleagues, in fact, her ability to communicate retains limitations even with 
the use ofTDD technology. 
171 S. Fredman,supran.19p.ll. 
172 S. Fredman, supra n. 19 p.l2. 
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discrimination does not necessarily result in a removal of entry obstacles. In particular, 
section 36 of the EEA expressly deems qualification standards to be immune from the 
scope of the indirect discrimination principle and the reasonable accommodation 
duty. 173 Thus, it cannot always uncover the obstacles to entry. The third and strongest 
meaning of equality of results, and the sense in which it is relied on in this thesis, is that 
of equal outcome. This would demand that the proportion of traditionally disadvantaged 
groups - such as women or minorities - in a category should reflect their proportions in 
the workforce or the population as a whole. It is difficult to isolate how the 
individualised duty to make reasonable accommodation operating within employment 
discrimination law can be characterised within this understanding of equality of results. 
Factors which must be considered in any analysis of the conceptualisation of equality 
pursued by disability discrimination law include the extent to which the system as a 
whole perpetuates the individualist orthodoxy of anti-discrimination law. This 
individualist slant is continued with the reasonable accommodation duty, because at its 
core it is specifically formulated as an individual duty. The ADA and EEA duties do not 
encapsulate a group dimension to reasonable accommodation. Thus, the duty does not 
actively target the increased participation of disabled people in employment structures, 
which reflects their proportions in a population or community more generally. In order 
for reasonable accommodation to fall within this understanding of equality of results, 
there would need to be a greater link between the positive duty to engage in reasonable 
accommodation and positive action programs. 174 The link between reasonable 
accommodation and positive action is not specifically established in the Irish or 
European legislation - on the contrary, they are conceptual1y and practically kept 
apart.175 On this analysis, while employers are required to act positively towards 
disability when making a reasonable accommodation, it pursues the equality of 
opportunity rationale by removing certain socially-constructed barriers in the specific 
context of disability. Once these barriers are removed, individuals are considered on 
their merits. This can be contrasted with the aims of strong positive action programmes 
which recognise how the enduring nature of disadvantage affects the accumulation of 
"merit". 
173 See discussion in chapter two. 
174 See section IS of the South African Employment Equity Act which expressly links reasonable 
accommodation to positive action programs. 
175 Both the Framework Directive and the EEA as amended do not enunciate on the relationship 
between reasonable accommodation and positive action, but it seems implicit in the wording that 
the two kinds of instruments are regarded as distinct. L. Waddington, supra n. 139 p.31. 
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The minority group model, which locates reasonable accommodation within the 
existing matrix of antidiscrimination regulation and within the narrow distributive goal 
of equality of opportunity, immediately raises obvious questions about the limitations of 
such an approach in the context of tackling the pervasive disadvantage endured by 
disabled people. Because the ADA and EEA keep within the traditional prohibitions on 
discrimination, and because they remain premised on a liberal individualistic model of 
enforcement, this system is embedded with limitations which militate against more 
substantive equality ideals. Thus, any analysis of reasonable accommodation within the 
existing antidiscrimination matrix needs to be tempered with an understanding that, as a 
tool, reasonable accommodation can only tackle some of the disadvantages endured by 
disabled people. In other words, it is necessary to understand what it is that 
antidiscrimination measures cannot do. To this end, antidiscrimination law needs to be 
supplemented with measures which go beyond the narrow conceptualisation of 
reasonable accommodation under both the ADA and the EEA. 
Rethinking Substantive Equality in the Disability Context 
The discussion here explains bow the simple pursuit of equality of results theory in 
itself may be misleading and ultimately unhelpful. 176 The problem with an equality of 
results view of antidiscrimination regulation is the precedence accorded to the existing 
institutional structure. Monitoring results and outcomes does not necessitate any 
fundamental re-examination of the structures that perpetuate the inequalities that 
produce discrimination. It does little to alter the underlying causes of unequal patterns. 
While positive action programmes explicitly aim to restructure the make-up of a 
particular grade or sector, they can be subject to legal challenges, as has been the case in 
the gender context. Certainly, such programmes have their uses, such as seeking to 
alleviate blatant racial and sex imbalances across employment sectors, certain 
workplaces or educational institutions. Yet, a change in the colour or gender 
composition of a grade, workplace or sector, consequent upon a positive action 
programme, while useful, may reflect only an increasingly successful assirnilationist 
policy. 177 Thus, traditional constructs of legal positive action programmes focus on 
176 S. Fredman, supra n.19 p.l3. 
177 Ibid. It also leads to what is known as the creamy top effect. This is where positive action 
programs assists the most advantaged members of disadvantaged groups who find it easier to 
make the fit with the dominant practices of society. This point is particularly salient in the 
context of disability. 
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distributing positions among members of different groups. These programmes are 
ultimately limited by the assumptions made about institutional organisations that 
underline all discussions of equal opportunity: that the hierarchical division of labour is 
a given and that distribution is rightly made according to the neutral criterion of 
merit. 178 Yet, the pervasive exclusion of disabled people from mainstream structures is 
symptomatic of the operation of the existing market and liberal system. Non-
discrimination precepts and positive action programmes simply adopt different ways of 
assuaging the symptoms. Even where the programmes survive judicial scrutiny, positive 
action programs require continuous remedial efforts since the structure remains 
untouched. 179 In addition, positive action programmes tend to benefit the most 
privileged members of the disadvantaged group. 180 
Many of these points can be raised with regard to the reasonable 
accommodation duty. Reasonable accommodation practices in tbe disability context 
require adjustments in workplace practices and environments in order to allow disabled 
people proper opportunities to access the existing labour market. As discussed above, it 
does not radically alter the standards of the workplace. So, where disabled people fail to 
meet those standards -because accommodations are unreasonable, too costly, or 
disproportionate - they then legitimately bear the cost of non-participation. This 
conception of reasonable accommodation works on the basis of adjustments to 
dominant social norms that are deemed manageable and reasonable concessions from 
the way things are normally done. Thus, the predominant legal interpretation of 
reasonable accommodation in the ADA and EEA places it within a weak distributive 
setting that makes concessions to the disadvantaged group on the terms of the 
advantaged. The limitations inherent in this interpretation of the reasonable 
accommodation duty were raised by disabled feminists before the Canadian Supreme 
Court in the course of their argument in favour of a revised understanding of the 
equality guarantee in section 15 ofthe Canadian Charter: 
"Equality under section 15 entails much more than simply "accommodating" 
persons with disabilities into existing societal norms and structures leaving 
unscrutinized those norms and structures themselves. Substantive equality 
challenges the very existence of mainstream structural and institutional barriers, 
including the socially constructed notions of disability which inform them. For 
178 1. M. Young, supra n.27 pp.200-206. 
179 As Fraser comments, they can "mark the most disadvantaged class as inherently deficient and 
insatiable, as always needing more and more". N. Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical 
Reflections on the Post-Socialist Condition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) p.25. 
Cited in J. Baker et al. supra n.l15 p.132. 
180 S.Fredmansupran.l9p.l52. 
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persons with disabilities, equality means the right to participate in an inclusive 
society. It does not mean merely the right to ~articipate in a mainstream society 
through the adoption of non-disabled norms. 1 1 
As tills extract highlights, the policy of the minority group analysis of disability, 
which has formulated remedies against disability disadvantage within the existing 
conceptualisations of individual non-discrimination rights, has problematic 
implications. The non-discrimination approach, including the reasonable 
accommodation duty, depends upon the identification and categorisation of a discrete 
group of individuals labelled as "disabled". This bas meant that, despite their best 
efforts, the minority group analysis has returned to the medical model of disability as a 
fixed and individual problem. This paradox, coupled with the associated problems of the 
model's over-reliance on legal norms, forms the basis of the critique of the minority 
group analysis within disability studies. This universalist view, developed by US 
sociologist Irving Zola, shares many characteristics of the social model analysis of 
disability that was introduced in chapter one. The universalist view moves away from 
the protected class approach, and seeks to classify disability as fluid and continuous: 
"Disability is not a human attribute that demarks one portion of humanity from 
another; it is an infinitely various but universal feature of the human condition. 
No human has a complete repertoire of abilities." 182 
The idea, therefore, is that disability should not be viewed as a human attribute that 
separates one portion of the community from another, but rather as an infinitely various 
but universal feature of the human condition. Universalist policy seeks to demystify the 
" specialness" of disability, seeks to respect difference and calls for a widened range of 
what is perceived as normal. 183 The policy response demanded by a universalist analysis 
is for ustice in the distribution of resources and opportunities. This is contingent upon 
universal access and universal design in the built environment, in housing, in the 
181 Factum of the Intervenors, Disabled Women's Network Canada and Women's Legal 
Education and Action Fund in the Supreme Court of Canada, Eldridge v British Columbia (1997) 
218 N.R. 161. Cited in M. H. Rioux and C. L. Frazee, "The Canadian Framework for Disability 
Rights" in M. Jones and L.A. Basser Marks (eds.) Disability, Divers-ability and Legal Change 
(KJuwer International, 1999) 171, pp.l78-179. 
182 J. Bickenbach et al. "Models of disablement, universalism and the international classification 
of disabilities and handicaps" (1999) 48 Social Science and Medicine 1173, 1175. 
183 This is contrary to the process of normalisation which seeks to rehabilitate disabled people in 
order to ensure a better fit between the individual and the existing services and institutions, 
which are designed around an average or normal individual. 
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workplace and in transportation policies. 184 In this sense, the provision for "special" 
needs and "special attention" that special categories require, means that disability policy 
becomes not merely a minority issue but a policy for all. 
Traditional proponents of the universalist analysis have tended to eschew anti-
discrimination, rights-based resolutions. They argue that disability is not genuinely a 
discrimination issue. 185 This argument is based on the reality that the condition of 
inequality that disabled people face does not always fit into the mould of 
antidiscrimination law and regulation. The many barriers faced by disabled people-
exclusionary physical environments, reduced training programmes, inadequate and 
confusing income supports, policy neglect, minimal political clout - do not appear, it is 
argued, resolvable within the orthodox antidiscrimination setting. Bickenbach queries 
how socially-created disadvantage associated with disability can be tackled within an 
equality and non-discrimination framework, given their impact both on and beyond the 
employment context.186 However, the minority model's criticism of universalism ' s 
rejection of disability as a genuine discrimination issue is, as Fredman points out, 
reflective of"the tendency ... to portray different models as conflicting and mutually 
exclusive". 187 It is also predicated on a narrow and negative-freedom based model of 
discrimination law and it fails to realise that the equality law agenda is moving, albeit 
slowly and imperfectly, in substantive directions, and it may yet achieve a symmetry 
between equality prescriptions based on positive visions of freedom and universalist 
principles. On this point, Fredman has recently argued that more expansive legal 
disability equality norms can be fruitfully informed by the universal view of disabiUty 
because "[t]he policy prescriptions of the universalist model in fact converge strikingly 
with [emerging] notions of substantive equality ... ". 188 
Examples of an amelioration of the individualist dimension of the reasonable 
accommodation duty can be seen by the attempts of some jurisdictions, such as Canada 
and South Africa, to emphasise the group dimension to the accommodation duty and to 
extend the accommodation duty to embrace all groups of discrimination. The 
interpretation pressed upon the Canadian Supreme Court by a group of disabled 
184 This equates with Fredman's description of substantive equality which rejects abstract views 
of justice and instead, insists that justice is only meaningful in its interaction with society. S. 
Fredman, supra n.l9 p.l28. 
185 J. Bickenbacb, "Minority Rights or Universal Participation: The Politics of Disablement" in 
M. Jones and L.A. Basser Marks (eds.) Disability, Divers-ability and Legal Change (Kluwer, 
1999) 101 , pp. 106-108. 
186 Ibid. 
187 S. Fredman, supra n.4 p.218. 
188 Ibid. p.208. 
256 
feminists in the Eldridge189 decision, noted above, did not succeed. However, there are 
signs of more expansive formulations of accommodation mandates which move further 
towards addressing the unequal burden of existing structures. For example, the 
Canadian Supreme Court decision of Meiorin 190 evidences a more integrated approach 
to systemic discrimination. It does so through a revised interpretation of the positive 
right to be accommodated. Whereas the conventional approach to accommodation 
mandates requires adjustment to existing workplace norms in order to allow an 
individual to reach the standard set by others, the Court held in this decision that the 
validity of the standard itself must be scrutinized in detail. 191 This decision therefore 
requires employers to identify and implement alternative approaches that do not have 
discriminatory effects. This ultimately impacts on all individuals as opposed to a 
protected, "special" class, and it reflects universalist principles. Since this analysis looks 
akin to the remit of the indirect discrimination principle, it might be asked why indirect 
discrimination is not proving more useful in these situations? Indirect discrimination 
purports to remove apparently neutral barriers which, in fact, function to exclude greater 
proportions of disadvantaged groups. However, as chapter two indicated, the indirect 
discrimination principle loses much of its bite when it comes to application by the court. 
It remains heavily reliant on an individual litigant arguing that the practice in question 
meets the contested elements of the definition. In addition. even if the applicant 
successfully overcomes these barriers, the exclusionary practice remains capable of 
employer-based justifications. Moreover, as chapter two pointed out, the interaction 
between indirect discrimination and reasonable accommodation in the Framework 
Directive is problematic. 
More developed applications of the reasonable accommodation duty can also be 
seen in South African employment equity legislation. Under section 15, certain 
employers are required to take affirmative action, which is expressly related to the duty 
to make reasonable accommodation for the needs of women, blacks and disabled 
people. 192 Where accommodation mandates become available to all employees, this 
assists in deconstructing the "specialness" of disability policy. The synthesis between 
positive action and accommodation mandates in this way avoids the problem of 
189 Eldridge v British Columbia (1997) 3 SR 624. 
190 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia 
Government and Service Employees Union [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3. 
191 This decision clearly makes the link between reasonable accommodation duties and indirect 
discrimination. The Canadian decision of Eldridge v British Columbia (1997) 3 SCR 624 
characterised disparate impact discrimination as the major form of disability discrimination. 
192 Employment Equity Act 1998 s 15(2)(c). 
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individualisation, which always besets the operation of indirect discrimination and 
reasonable accommodation in isolation. Equality objectives here are not dependent on 
litigation by individual victims, nor is it necessary to prove the existence of 
exclusionary rules with disadvantageous impacts}93 Section 15 is prompted by the 
patterns of under representation of the disadvantaged groups across particular sectors. 
Towards a New Synthesis 
The developing analysis surrounding accommodation mandates in other jurisdictions 
bas some equivocation with Fredman's reformulation of substantive equality. 194 This 
exercise requires a refashioning of the equality nonn so that it appeals to the concept of 
social diversity in a way that is more broadly conceived. In this sense, the expanded 
equality norm does not view disability in difference terms -as a special class requiring 
special treatment within the existing system - but rather views the experience of 
disability as a normal aspect of life that can affect any person. This reformulation of 
substantive equality in the disability context can be aligned, according to Fredman, with 
the universalist analysis of disability. 195 This could mean that equality Jaw would still 
refer to social groups, but the groups would be conceived of in structural rather than in 
purely cultural or identity terms. 196 This links with DeGener's argument, discussed in 
chapter four, that the definition of disability in disability discrimination Jaw should not 
describe the group protected under the law, but rather define the act declared prohibited 
- thus, the term of preference would be disability-based rather than based on the 
disabled person.197 This would allow the focus to shift away from the minutiae which 
dominate certain legislative definitions of disability and move towards a focus on the 
relative disadvantage consequent upon being treated as a member of a particular group. 
Substantive equality, understood in this way, moves significantly beyond the minority 
group model of disability underpinning antidiscrimination precepts, and it requires that 
193 S. Fredman, supra n.l9 p.l52. 
194 This reformulation of substantive equality takes place in the specific context of disability. 
More generally, I perceive that the general aspects ofFredman's reformulation amount to a 
reclamation of the substantive equality term from imprecise application to traditional tools of 
antidiscrimination regulation, which, I have argued, are better conceptualised with an equal 
ofsportunities formula. 
1 5 See I. K. Zola, ''Toward the Necessary Universalizing of a Disability Policy (1989) 67 The 
Milbank Quarterly 401. "Substantive equality encapsulates the universalist analysis, according to 
which the aim is not different or special treatment, but universal access to all activities". 
196 I. M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p.82. 
197 T. DeGener, Definition of Disability (EU Networks on Disability Discrimination, August 
2004) p.ll. 
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social institutions and practices be restructured to reflect the widened norm.198 While it 
could be argued that reasonable accommodation is predicated upon this view of equality 
in both the ADA and EEA, reasonable accommodation is more limited than either the 
positive duty to promote equality, introduced below, or the more expansive 
interpretations of generalised accommodation duties in Canada and South Afiica.199 
To this end, the reformulated substantive equality norm put forward by 
Fredman draws on universalist policy and requires a positive duty to promote 
equality.200 This could be supplemented by a positive right to be accommodated which 
would exercisable by all employees. Public sector equality duties have been 
implemented in Northern Ireland and have recently been formulated in the disability 
context in the rest of the United Kingdom. 201 Baker et al detail aspects of an "equality of 
condition" as one that operates, in the employment context, in a way that is predicated 
upon a positive duty to promote equality. They advocate the tailoring of these duties in 
order to fit the specific context of workplace equality. Laws based on this formulation of 
equality start from the premise that the disproportionate representation of traditionally 
more advantaged groups in grades, sectors and workplaces provides evidence of 
institutional bias.202 This approach implies a radical departure from the established 
structure of discrinlination law, which does not change institutions, but gives 
compensation retrospectively to an individual who has been "wronged" on proof of the 
"fault" of another.203 Rules or practices that have originally been orientated to benefit 
members of particular groups would be reassessed, and this would then prompt a rethink 
about traditional, non-neutral merit standards, such as educational qualifications or 
length of service. Chapter five already discussed how the reasonable accommodation 
duty failed to assist the complainant in the Irish decision of Gorry v Office of the Civil 
Service and Local Appointments 204• Despite passing the competency tests for 
appointment to the Civil Service, this disabled claimant was deemed ineligible for 
appointment because of the absence of the required formal qualification (a pass mark in 
Leaving Certificate English) which was generally accepted as necessary for certain 
198 S Fredman, supra n.l3 p.214 
199 Ibid. pp.213-214. 
200 See C. O 'Cinneide, "A New Generation of Equality Legislation? Positive Duties and 
Disability Rights" in A. Lawson and C. Gooding (eds.) Disability Rights in Europe: From 
Theory to Practice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005) p.219. 
201 See section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the recently introduced Disability 
Discrimination Act 2005. 
202 J. Baker et al. supra n.6 p.l35. 
203 S. Fredman, supra n.4 p.214. 
204 DEC - E2005- 038. 
259 
types of employment in the State.205 The non-neutral application of generally accepted 
merit criteria was sharply exposed in this context, yet the existing antidiscrimination 
structure was powerless to intervene. An example of a statutory provision which seeks 
to reformulate existing norms in the light of untapped evidence of bias is set out in 
section 20 of the South African Employment Equity Act 1998. This provides that a 
person may be suitably qualified for a job as a result of a combination of factors. These 
factors can include "learning by doing and life learning" and the "capacity to acquire, 
within a reasonable time, the ability to do the job". 
At the level of individual employers, legislation supporting the reformulation of 
the equality norm to include obligations to promote equality could be developed out of 
existing models. Equality audits, action plans and pay equity schemes already form part 
of the anti-discrimination package in somejurisdictions.206 The advantage ofthese tools 
is that they apply prospectively and not just against individual employers who are found 
to be in default.207 Their weakness lies in the required commitment to their execution 
and implementation, at least in some jurisdictions. The major deficit to these 
programmes, however, is not only the lack of political will to ensure their 
implementation but also - as is the case with many mainstreaming initiatives - the 
democratic deficit which persists in the formulation of the plans? 08 Truly transformative 
plans require the effective participation of traditional outgroups, as opposed to the 
simple transposition of norms and solutions formulated by bureaucrats. 
The implementation of these plans promoting a revised understanding of 
equality needs to be based on an understanding of equality that is concerned not with 
measuring outcomes for groups but rather with "enabling individuals to make real 
choices between real options".209 Real choices between real options can only derive 
from a change in the practices that perpetuate the unequal relations with groups. For 
205 Section 36 of the EEA as amended is not subject to the operation of the duty to make 
reasonable accommodation. 
206 Equality action plans and reviews are specifically provided for in Ireland's EEA. To date, 
these tools have been under-utilised, though in 2003, the Equality Authority invited 5 employers 
to undertake an equality review. 
207 J. Baker eta!. supra n.6 p.l36. 
208 The key to mainstreaming equality into public policy has been the early and advanced 
involvement of representatives oftarget groups and the challenge to adequately resource and 
enable this form of participation. Research carried out on the operation ofmainstreaming 
initiatives demonstrates that the needs and experiences of affected groups have generally been 
mediated by professionals in statutory agencies. S. Nott, "Accentuating the Positive: Alternative 
Strategies for Promoting Gender Equality'' in F. Beveridge, S. Nott and K. Stephen, Making 
Women Count: Integrating Gender into Law and Policy Making (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) 
~.247. 
09 J. Baker et al, supra n.6 p.l36 
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example, the prevention of exploitative work contracts and oppressive work 
environments could be an integral component of substantive equality. It would require 
that all those who benefit from structures of disadvantage should bear some 
responsibility in the cost of altering such structures. This could also further Fredman's 
reformulation of substantive equality by protecting one of its key values, namely the 
individual's dignity.210 The focus on choice recognises that key components to the 
structural system bear more heavily on members of certain groups. This can deconstruct 
the existing assumptions that the depressed situations of disadvantaged groups can be 
attributed to moral weakness, individual choices or faults. As Baker points out, this 
revision of equality "emphasizes the influence of social factors on people's choices and 
actions and so implies that practices should be examined for how they systematically 
shape the choices of members of different groups."211 For example, decisions made by 
some disabled people not to enter the labour market have been reduced to personal, 
natural or inevitable reasons, including individual impairments, which, it has been 
argued, have no equality implications.212 However, several inter-related factors can 
prompt this decision. Existing job structures may present barriers to entry which the 
individual may not be willing to force by way of reasonable accommodation requests. 
Because the social situation of many disabled people is frequently depressed in terms of 
income and education, many are likely to be risk-averse and the prospect of taking 
action against employers may not seem a realistic option. The forces of past 
discrimination against disabled people, in the form of negative barriers and attitude, 
may have impacted on disabled people's accumulation of labour market capital and 
contributed to their exclusion from the networks that produce the capital that contributes 
to success. The existence of more covert barriers, which nonetheless place considerable 
personal costs on disabled people, can neither be discounted. The facilitation of real 
choice through promoting participation is central to the substantive values of the 
reformulation of equality. 
In particular, participation cannot be confined to workplace participation, but 
should refer to an active contribution to the life of the community. The emphasis on 
participation draws attention to the narrow construction of labour and to the exclusion 
and devaluation of the non-monetary aspect of labour. This point will be revisited in the 
context of the concluding chapter. Genuine fears exist within the disability community 
as to whether the concentration on increasing the inclusion of disabled people into the 
210 S. Fredman, The Future of Equality in Great Britain (Manchester: EOC, 2002). 
211 J. Baker et al, supra n. 6 p.l36. 
212 Ibid. 
261 
labour market is both a pretext for cutting social security benefits and a means of 
continuing the subordination of alternative forms of labour and participation. In this 
sense, the promotion of the positive equality duty across all policies and across all levels 
of institutions is key. In turn, this depends upon the proper participation of members of 
disadvantaged groups in the process of altering discriminatory institutional and 
organisational structures. However, the participative group-approach requires a 
recognition that disadvantaged groups have different perspectives and values, and that 
the groups themselves are not homogenous.213 This is particularly pertinent in the 
disability context: there is a sense that the disability equality agenda has excessively 
focused both on employment issues and on certain impairment groups who have found 
it easiest to assimilate into existing standards and take advantage of accommodation 
mandates. While the participatory model is not yet fully developed, and is not without 
its problems, it is said to "increase the likelihood that strategies will succeed as well as 
democratising the very process of equality".214 However, participation cannot become 
an end in itself. The danger is that participation is seen as a procedural right and that 
institutions which satisfy this process are in compliance. The point is that the 
requirement of participation is ongoing, and a part of the process: it demands continual 
diagnosis, responses, monitoring and modifications. Hence, it is the outcome of 
participatory processes that matters. 
The second limb of the reformulated substantive equality norm is the link 
between the equality agenda and social rights.215 This approach again has links with the 
universalist analysis of disability, as social rights are accorded to all those who can 
make use of them. In particular, it links the notion of choices with the core value of 
participation in society. Participation also suggests inclusion in, and access to, major 
social institutions, particularly decision-making bodies. Social rights, then, operates 
hand in hand with the positive duty to promote equality because, as Fredman points out, 
it would require social and economic programs to be reoriented to facilitate participation 
and choice.216 
The best current example of how a substantive conception of equality based on 
social rights has operated in the context of disability is the Canadian decision in 
213 C. O'Cinneide, "Making Use of Positive Equality Duties: The UK Experience" in C. Costello 
and E. Barry (eds.) Equality in Diversity : The New Equality Directives (Dublin: Irish Centre for 
European Law, 2003) 75 p.87 
2 14 S. Fredman, supra n.4 p.215. 
215 S.Fredman, supra n.13 p.215. 
216 Ibid. 
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Eldridge v British Columbia.217 The case concerned a claim that the failure to provide 
sign-language interpreters in hospitals infringed the rights of deaf people. It was held 
that the equality guarantee of the Canadian Charter included a duty to ensure that 
disadvantaged groups benefit equally from services offered generally: 
"To argue that governments should be entitled to provide benefits to the general 
population without ensuring that disadvantaged members of society have the 
resources to take full advantage of those benefits bespeaks a thin and 
impoverished vision of section 15(1)." 
In this sense, reorientating substantive equality with social rights reduces the traditional 
tension between social welfare and non-discrimination.218 Neither can be viewed as 
providing privileges for disabled people. Rather, they are conceptualisations of rights 
which place duties on states to ensure that all citizens, and not just a protected class, 
derive benefits from those rights. Thus, the values of participation and choice, which are 
inherent to a substantive notion of equality, would go beyond negative, non-
discrimination duties and move towards placing positive duties on states to facilitate 
choice and participation. Indeed, one of the key components to substantive equality is 
the rejection of the putative neutral state which sits apart from society. The state plays a 
key role in the distribution of societal benefits and cannot, therefore, be truly neutral.219 
A substantive view of equality views the state as having a duty to positively correct the 
results of such discrimination.220 This could, under a positive duty analysis, mandate the 
greater subsidisation of mainstream workplaces for disabled people. 
In the two jurisdictions considered in this thesis, there are markedly different 
rates of advancement towards the extension of the equality law agenda. In the United 
States, the ADA remains the zenith of the disability movement's political achievements. 
Despite the inclusion of political rhetoric which emphasises the political and social 
aspects of disability, the statute retains the traditional civil rights model to disability 
discrimination and includes a limiting, medical model of disability. Further limitations 
endure in the form of a narrow constitutional equality guarantee, which does not 
specifically endorse transfonnative or substantive equality objectives. In Ireland, the 
discrimination legislative structure is peppered with tools such as equality action plans 
217 [1 997] 3 S.C.R. 624. 
218 See L. Waddington and M. Diller, "Tensions and Coherence in Disability Policy: The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Social Welfare and Civil Rights Models of Disability in American, 
European and International Employment Law". Paper presented at International Disability Law 
and Policy Symposium, October 22-26, 2000. 
2 19 SeeS. Fredman, supra n.l9 p.l29. 
22° Constitutional difficulties to any formulation of substantive equality in the US and Ireland can 
be seen from the narrative in chapter three. 
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and equality audits which could usefuUy advance the negative non-discrimination 
agenda. However, these remain acutely under-utilised. While the positive equality duty 
agenda attracted considerable momentum in the late 1990s and early 2000s, following 
the developments in the equality agenda in Northern Ireland, the subsequent political 
and policy commitments are devoid of a statutory footing.221 In Ireland, the traditional 
cluster of social rights - rights to adequate income, health-care and housing - are 
relegated to Article 45 (the Directive Principles of Social Policy) and do not fall within 
the remit of the courts. However, Ireland's place within the European Union may allow 
it to benefit from the "contribution ... at the level of ideas and values" of the European 
Social Charter to the interpretation and development of the disability equality norm.222 
While the European Social Charter is beyond the scope of this work, it is a useful peg 
on which to hang the reformulated equality norm. It provides that every individual has 
the right to independence, social integration and participation.223 A review of the case-
law of the European Committee of Social Rights indicates that it has taken a useful 
approach to the role of the equality norm in the socio-economic sphere with respect to 
disability.224 In this sense, it brings social rights back to their "well-spring" in equality-
they do not exist for their own sake, but rather they demonstrate the material basis for 
positive freedom, which includes participation and the idea of belonging for all 
individuals. While Quinn cautions that "it would be a mistake to telescope the value of 
the Charter into an analysis of the outcomes it could drive ... ", he pointed out that its 
value resides in "how effectively it can become an expositor of social values".225 The 
impact may be slowly taking effect. While not containing any express positive duties to 
promote equality, there has been a recent formulation of disability-based social rights 
221 SeeS. Mullally, "Mainstreaming Equality in Ireland: A Fair and Inclusive Accommodation?" 
(2001) Legal Studies 99 and S. Mullally and 0 . Smith, Equality Proofing (Dublin: Government 
Stationery Office, 2000). 
222 G. Quinn, "The European Social Charter and EU Anti-discrimination Law in the Field of 
Disability: Two Gravitational Fields with One Common Purpose" in G. de Burca and B De Witte 
(eds.) Social Rights in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 279, 303. 
223 European Social Charter, para 15 Q 36. 
224 In particular in its understanding of the meaning of disability and its commitment to the 
reasonable accommodation duty. See the collective complaint taken before the Committee of 
Autisme - Europe v France {decision available on t11e social charter website) which was a 
complaint that France had not satisfactorily implemented the education provisions of the Charter 
(as Revised) due to the low rates of integration or targeted provision for the educational rights of 
children and adults with autism. This collective complaint mechanism usefully offsets the 
individualism of anti-discrimination law. There are at least eight collective European-level 
disability non-governmental organisations listed as entitled to bring collective complaints before 
the Committee. See G. Quinn, supra n.222 p. 223- 229 for discussion. 
225 G. Quinn, supra n.222 p.303. 
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under the Disabilities Act 2005?26 This statute remains, however, beyond the scope of 
this work. 
Conclusion 
While the reasonable accommodation mandate in both the ADA and EEA places a 
positive duty on employers, this chapter has placed it within an equality of opportunity 
framework. It has done so because of the continued operation of a number of 
interrelated limitations which beset workplace antidiscrimination Jaws. The substantive 
content of this positive development is undermined by the fact that it is simply "grafted 
onto" the negative model of non-discrimination. At the same time, placing reasonable 
accommodation within the equal opportunities framework is a means of safeguarding its 
legitimacy, particularly in the US context. Further, the positive action programme at EU 
and Irish level is voluntary and, in this sense, it does not pursue substantive equality 
objectives. 
There have been considerable attempts in the US academic literature to dispel 
the presumed links between reasonable accommodation and affirmative action. These 
attempts have been made in order to keep the reasonable accommodation mandate 
fumJy within the architecture of traditional anti-discrimination law. The distinction has 
been similarly drawn at EU level. This is in order to embed the reasonable 
accommodation duty within the existing antidiscrimination paradigm so as to safeguard 
its political and moral legitimacy and to protect it from public and judicial backlash.227 
Conceptualising reasonable accommodation within an equality of opportunity format 
could, it has been argued, help improve judicial attitudes towards the ADA generally. It 
could assist dispel the reductionist approach to ADA adjudication, as is reflected in the 
constricted interpretation of the definition of disability and in the interpretation of the 
'reasonableness' of accommodations. Where courts see the accommodation duty as 
granting extra or "special" benefits, as opposed to a means of protecting individuals 
against discrimination, these reductionist interpretations appear unsurprising. The claim 
of special rights and special treatment is rhetorically powerful because its tars anti-
discrimination law with the brush of preferences. This leads easily to the conclusion that 
226 This Act provides a statutory entitlement to a health and needs based assessment for disabled 
people. It fonnalises the preparation of public sector plans to meet the needs as measured. It 
has, however, been subject to considerable criticism, in particular, with regard to its truncated 
enforcement provisions. 
227 See M. Diller, "Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model" (2000) 21 Berkeley 
Journal of Employment and Labor Law 19. 
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such treatment discriminates against those who do not receive it, and that they are 
antithetical to the primacy of equal treatment. Different commentators have taken 
different approaches to safeguarding the traditional view of the accommodation 
mandate. Some commentators doctrinally draw comparisons between reasonable 
accommodation and existing antidiscrimination regulation in terms of operation, effect 
and costs. For example, Jolls doctrinally links the duty to make reasonable 
accommodation with the disparate impact (indirect discrimination) principle by arguing 
that the former is just an extension of the latter in terms of costs and effects. 
Consequently, on this analysis, the reasonable accommodation mandate fits firmly 
within existing orthodoxy.228 More recently, Crossely has argued for a similar view of 
reasonable accommodation. However, her discussion is based on a conceptual analysis 
of reasonable accommodation utilising the social construction of disability proposed by 
the minority group model.229 
In this thesis, I conclude and agree with the placement of the reasonable 
accommodation mandate within the traditional antidiscrimination analysis - but this is 
not done in an attempt to extol the virtues of this resolution. Rather, this approach has 
allowed me to challenge the assumption that reasonable accommodation operating 
within the ADA and the EEA's anti-discrimination structure represents a truly 
substantive form of equality regulation that goes beyond existing non-discrimination 
precepts. I do this by concentrating on a combination of forces, some of which already 
affect orthodox antidiscrimination regulation, while others remain the sole preserve of 
the disability regime. These include the pre-existing limitations that affect tackling 
systemic inequalities through an individualised, negative-enforcement regime. While it 
is a reality that many disabled people will need more than the ADA's protections 
against discrimination in order to truly share in the rewards of social life, there are many 
individuals who could benefit from the forms of protection envisaged by the ADA and 
the EEA, but who depend on the law being enforced as it is written in order to do so.230 
Unfortunately, experience demonstrates that this has not happened. The social situation 
of many disabled people is often depressed, in terms of access to resources, education 
and employment. In this light, the burden of individual enforcement appears particularly 
228 See C. Jolls, supra n.154. 
229 M. Crossley, supra n.117 p.90. 
23° Case law statistics provide an (imperfect) indication on the operation of the disability 
discrimination statute is working. The majority of claims under the ADA are discharge cases-
something like 51.6%; this supports the point that people are more likely to be concerned over 
the loss of something they have than the failure to get something they want. See H. Friendly, 
"Some Kind of Hearing" 123 Pennsylvania Law Review 1267, 1296. 
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heavy. In the United States, in particular, the ADA bas been described as a "windfall for 
defendant employers" because the burden of proof placed on individuals with 
disabilities is so onerous.231 Moreover, empirical research demonstrates that the 
reasonable accommodation duty is not achieving some of the forward-looking goals set 
out in the grand purpose sections of the ADA which, inter alia, refer to the goals of 
economic independence and integration into workplace environments. The vast 
proportion of claimants in disability cases are from discharge cases - not failure-to-hire 
cases - which indicates that disabled people are not getting through the door of 
opportunity putatively built into the antidiscrimination regulation. Indeed, large 
numbers of cases have been taken by employees with back impairments and mental 
impairments. Since the manifestations of these impairments can often be hidden, the 
indications are that these individuals are "outed" after they have been hired. 
Consequently, the non-discrimination structure appears not to be tackling the 
stereotypes and prejudices that prevents the hiring of disabled people in the first place. 
In Ireland, a statistical assessment of the employment equality cases demonstrates that 
the majority of claims are from employees and not from individuals seeking 
employment. 232 
Any assessment of reasonable accommodation's potential also requires 
accepting the reality of what reasonable accommodation cannot or will not achieve. 
Reasonable accommodation cannot compensate for many functional impairments which 
disabled people have. Reasonable accommodation has done little to tackle the endemic 
poor participation rates of those with mental impairments, whether those are individuals 
with mental illnesses or those labelled with learning difficulties. There are individuals 
who will remain less competitive than non-disabled employees even with a reasonable 
accommodation. Many individuals may simply find themselves with the "choice" to sue 
for monetary damages for breach of a duty to provide a reasonable accommodation for 
failure to allow them demonstrate their productivity - thus, they get trapped in a cycle of 
exclusion created by the persistence of negative attitudes and exclusionary forces. 
While the minority group model of disability rejects this formulation of 
reasonable accommodation as special treatment - arguing that it is simply a tool which 
applies the equal opportunity principle in the context of disability- this argument is, by 
23 1 SeeR. Colker, "The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants" (1999) 34 
Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review 99. 
232 In 2003 , twenty five cases concerned access to employment as opposed to sixty seven cases 
concerning disability discrimination in employment. Equality Authority, Annuct! Report 2003 
(Dublin: Government Stationery Office, 2004). 
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its very nature, self-limiting. It places undue faith on the ability of the existing structure, 
including the legal system, to remedy the pervasive nature of disability-based 
disadvantage. Day and Brodsky have eloquently decried the accommodation duty as 
being overly assimilationist: it can legitimise and perpetuate structural discrimination, 
because it does not 
challenge the imbalances of power, or the discourse of dominance, such as 
racism, able-bodyism and sexism, which result in a society being designed well 
for some and not for others. It allows those who consider themselves "normal" 
to continue to construct institutions and relations in their image, as long as 
others, when they challenge this construction are 'accom.modated'.233 
This individualised, assimilationist approach to accommodation was highlighted 
in the Canadian Supreme Court by McLachlin J. The learned judge noted that it does 
not address the need for the transformation of society, nor does it "challenge deep-
seated beliefs about the intrinsic superiority of such characteristics as mobility and 
sightedness".234 In particular, where the minority group interpretation of disability and 
the reasonable accommodation duty remain unsupported by the equality guarantees of 
constitutional texts, then its useful features - including its asymmetry and its positive 
approach - remain in fundamental dispute with the dominant visions of equality as being 
the right to formal equal treatment.235 
In light of the limitations to reasonable accommodation uncovered above, and 
in light of the low-take up of positive action measures, this chapter recommended that 
the equality agenda cannot remain limited to the nadir of reasonable accommodation 
within a negative, non-discrimination model. It referenced some ad hoc amendments to 
the ADA and EEA which could usefully remedy their existing, protective structures. 
However, the minority group analysis of disability civil rights needs to be supplemented 
and expanded by emerging understandings: both by the synthesis between anti-
discrimination and social rights, and by the developing promotion of positive equality 
duties. Ultimately, the programme for development in these directions seems more 
likely in the Irish context, given Ireland's membership of the European Union and given 
the fact that public policy bas already advanced considerably towards fourth-
generational positive duties.236 
233 S. Day and G. Brodsky, "The Duty to Accommodate: Who Will Benefit?" (1996) 75 
Canadian Bar Review 433, 462. 
234 McLachlin J . in British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v 
BCGSEU [ 1999] 3 SCR 3 (usually referred to as the Meiorin case) at para.41. 
235 J. Baker et al, supra n.6 p.131. 




This thesis has concentrated on how two jurisdictions have implemented legal 
protections against disability discrimination in employment. It drew first on the 
Americans with Disabilities Act 1990, which was the pioneering model for disability 
discrimination legislation worldwide, and then considered how Ireland's Employment 
Equality legislation, as supported by the European Union's Framework Directive, 
compares and contrasts with the American model. The thesis has questioned the 
transfonnative potential of these examples of disability discrimination law and has paid 
particular regard to the duty of reasonable accommodation. The discussion centred on 
concepts of disability and concepts of discrimination and took place on a number of 
levels and across a number of disciplines, including constitutional discourse, theories of 
equality, disability discourse and issues of enforcement. Central to the discussion has 
been a consideration of anti-discrimination law's most expansive equality norm: the 
duty to make reasonable accommodation. It has been argued that the traditional limits of 
the non-discrimination system will persist, unless the non-discrimination norm, 
including the accommodation duty, is "flanked" by more expansive equality measures. 1 
Taking this perspective, the discussion moves towards a conclusion that questions the 
continued effectiveness of the American model at a time when other jurisdictions are 
seeking to advance on their approaches to disability-based inequality. While sharing 
some, though not all, of the ADA's limitations, Ireland's equality landscape is perhaps 
entering a more positive era, partly because of developments at the level of the 
European Union. 
Contesting Disability and Disabled Status 
It is critical to address different approaches to the meaning and understanding of 
disability in any discussion on the improved operation of disability discrimination law. 
The opening chapter of this thesis provided an historical account of modern 
society's initial understanding of the disability category: disability was understood in 
terms of making a legitimate distinction between those unable to work and those who 
1 G. Quinn, ''The European Social Charter and EU Anti-Discrimination Law in the Field of 
Disability: Two Gravitational Fields with One Common Purpose" in G. DeBurca and B. 
DeWitte, Social Rights in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 279 p.280. 
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were simply refusing to do so. It also traced the consequent stigmatisation of impaired 
bodies and modes of atypicaJ functioning. With the demise of roles once usefully filled 
by disabled people, and with the establishment of a parallel track of segregated service 
provision, social structures were designed, developed and expanded with scant regard 
for a large section of society. This prompted widespread institutional discrimination -
that is, discrimination that is designed into the structures of an institution, as opposed to 
discrimination stemming purely from the actions of individuals in isolation. Institutional 
discrimination has played a key role in perpetuating structural disadvantage. While the 
range of social supports for disabled people serves a useful and indispensable function, 
there is little doubt that such supports can also compound the isolation of disabled 
people and reduce their range of choice.2 The legacy of segregation still exists in the 
disability context. The individual deficit construct of disability is deeply embedded 
within the institutional fabric of mainstream society. In particular, the equation of 
disability with non-participation in work has been hugely difficult to break. 
As chapter one reported, the exhaustive nature of this view of disability has 
been challenged by both the minority group model of disability and by social model 
theorising around disability. Both of these perspectives shift attention away from 
impaired bodies and towards the contributing impact of the external environment. A 
principal aim of the social movement of disability has been to displace the dominance of 
the medical or individual model of disability. It also envisages a substantive 
reconstruction of the structures of society so that these do not in themselves disable 
people.3 The critical difference between the two models is that the minority group model 
places faith in the legal process, through the guarantee of equal rights, to eradicate the 
discrimination endured by disabled people. However, while civil rights agitation by the 
disability movement helped to prompt the ADA, advocates never predicated the state of 
disarray over the meaning of disability that has been created by the federal judiciary. 
Social model theorists, on the other hand, argue that the experience of disablement 
imposed upon individuals with impairments cannot be tackled within a framework of 
equal rights in an inherently unequal society. The social model contends that the 
minority group model, despite its successes, misconceives the nature of disability, and 
2 G. Quinn, ibid. p.282. 
3 See V. Finklestein, "The Social Model of Disability Repossessed" Paper delivered at 
Manchester Coalition ofDisabled People December l , 2001. Available at Centre for Disability 
Studies Resources Web page:< http://www.leeds.ac.ukldisability-
studies/archivcuklarchframe.htm > p.S. 
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that this is reflected in the key aspects to the statutory protection.4 Indeed, the 
proponents of the minority group model underestimated the structural barriers that 
militate against the acceptance of disability as an exclusionary state imposed by society 
on people with impairments.5 Many judicial interpretations continue to adhere to the 
ideology of the medical and 'tragic' model of disability. For example, when canons of 
statutory interpretation adhere to plain, ordinary meanings of terms and words in a 
statute's application, then the common ideology of disability and its meaning in society 
will dominate. As Parmet points out, in the US, federal judges have exhibited a 
preference for textualism as the dominant method of statutory interpretation for ADA 
cases. Textualism relies heavily on plain meanings and understandings of terms in a 
way that bring the interpreter back to the colloquial - and often stereotypical - meaning 
of the words. This approach makes it difficult to implement truly transformative 
legislation without first transforming wider perceptions of disability.6 These traditional 
understandings of disability in social policy are predicated upon the existence of a 
narrow class in need of social assistance because of a personal inability to provide for 
their needs though the primary distributive system. This view of a closed and special 
class does not sit easily with the reality of discrimination, which does not respect such 
tightly-drawn boundaries. Therefore, the US defmition, originally thought 
unproblematic, has had its statutory language hijacked by the federal judiciary 
expressing welfarist and administrative concems.7 These concerns- described as the 
"fear of falsification" - are that only those "truly disabled" ought to fall within the 
legislation's protection. As a result, the process has been reduced to a medical, fact-
specific enquiry that focuses on the substantial limits of the individual's impairment on 
specific "major life activities".8 The effect is that the individual's "abnormality" takes 
on the central focus, rather than the focus switching to structure of the institution or to 
4 See J. Bickenbach, "Minority Rights or Universal Participation: The Politics of Disablement'' in 
M. Jones and L.A. Baser-Marks (eds.) Disability, Divers-ability and Legal Change (Kluwer Law 
International, 2000) p.l 0 I. 
5 See C. Donoghue, "Challenging the Authority of the Medical Definition of Disability: an 
analysis of the resistance to the social constructionist paradigm" (2003) 18 Disability & Society 
199. 
6 See W.E. Parmet, "Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the 
Meaning of Disability" (2000) 21 Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law 53, 55. 
7 As chapter four reported, the ADA definition of disability was borrowed from the earlier 
Rehabilitation Act 1973. Congress bad no reason to be concerned about the definition because 
the courts had read the definition in a broad and inclusive manner. 
8 See section 3(2)(a)-c) ADA. Protection is also extended to those who are regarded as having 
such an impairment or those with a record of such an impairment. In both of these cases, the 
impairment must have been one which substantially limits one or more of the listed major life 
activities. 
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the social response to the impairment. If the individual is insufficiently limited in 
respect of a major life activity, she is disentitled to the statute's non-discrimination 
protection. The inherent contradiction between the legislation's triggering criteria and 
its overall objectives is stark. People with hidden impairments and non-functional 
impairments can endure the consequences of stigma, prejudice and discriminatory 
exclusion from workplace opportunities to much the same extent as those with more 
visible impairments. 9 
Ireland 's EEA diverges from the ADA with regard to this aspect of the 
statutory scheme. Although initially denounced by the disability lobby, the impairment-
based definition has, in practice, not presented barriers to the everyday operation of the 
statute.10 The advantage to the EEA definition is that it is impairment-related and it is 
not predicated upon the severity of a condition. Like the ADA, it also covers past and 
imputed impairments, though it is easier to fall within these provisions under the EEA 
because of the absence of a functional limitation test. The EEA also extends 
discrimination protection to individuals who associate with disabled individuals. The 
disability movement still has reservations over the impairment-based definition because 
of its perceived sole focus on the characteristics of the individual, as opposed to the 
social construction of disablement. However, chapter four pointed out that 
discrimination law needs to defme both discrimination (the treatment) and disability (the 
characteristic). In this sense, it was recognised that whether discrimination law pursues 
a medical or social approach to disability-based exclusion does not entirely rest upon its 
definition of disability, but on its overall capacity to offset the creation and perpetuation 
of socially-constructed disablement. However, where the strategy for inclusion rests 
solely on a negative, individualised non-discrimination regime, the social model critique 
on equal rights retains its relevance. Chapter six demonstrated that the equality agenda 
in Europe is moving towards more robust fom1s oflegally-inspired measures that 
expand the role and utility ofthe non-discrimination norm. Meanwhile, in the context of 
the internal operation of the non-discrimination system, the disability movement ' s 
concerns over the disability defmition might be assuaged somewhat by the approach 
formulated by Degener. She has argued that the definition of disability should not be 
9 S. Bagenstos, " Subordination, Stigma, and Disability" (2000) 86 Virginia Law Review 397 
p.463 describes the process of"churning" of people with hidden disabilities. Churning occurs 
when employees with hidden conditions experience repeated cycles of being hired by unknowing 
employers, discharged when their conditions are discovered, and then hired again by different, 
unknowing employers. 
10 The definition of disability is set out in section 2(1) of the EEA as amended and was discussed 
in chapter four. 
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concerned with defining the protected group but should help define the act prohibited. 
On this point, she advocates utilising the term "disability- based" instead of"disabled 
person", as this resets the focus to the treatment as opposed to the characteristics of the 
individual. 11 
Ironically, the putative breadth of the Irish definition of disability was 
implicated in the Irish Supreme Court's constitutional denouncement of the reasonable 
accommodation duty, as discussed in chapter three. The Court reasoned that the wide 
defmition of disability would make it impossible to estimate the likely cost to employers 
of the reasonable accommodation duty. 12 It was argued that the Court's reasoning 
rested on a misunderstanding of the purpose and function of the reasonable 
accommodation duty. While the traditional symmetry of gender and race discrimination 
protection does not extend to the disability ground, there remains a distinction between 
the operation of the prohibition on direct discrimination and the duty to make reasonable 
accommodation. Every individual with an impairment-based condition is capable of 
experiencing less favourable treatment in the form of direct discrimination, just as every 
man or woman can suffer from the impact of gender-based stigmas or stereotyping. 
However, unlike the direct discrimination prohibition, not every impairment or 
condition will trigger the duty to make reasonable accommodation. Moreover, the duty 
to make reasonable accommodation is itself subject to numerous statutory limits, which 
guard against the imposition of excessive costs. Consequently, emphasising the width of 
the definition of disability to prove an excessive reach of the accommodation duty is 
misconceived. 
However, there is one point at which the definition of disability might be 
revisited in the Irish context- that is in relation to the types of disability-related 
conditions which could usefully be the subject of positive action programmes. On this 
point, one ofthe concerns of the disability movement with regard to the disability non-
discrimination provisions is an assumed lack of inclusiveness in their protections. There 
is a sense in the disability community that the legislation is of greater benefit to certain 
impairment groups - for example, those with mild impairments that attract 
comparatively less stigma, or those with late-onset physical or sensory impairrnents. 13 
11 T. DeGener, Definition of Disability (EU Network of Experts on Disability Discrimination, 
2004) p.ll 
12 Re Article 26 of the Constitution and the Employment Equality Bill [1997] 2 IR 321, 368. 
13 "A strategy founded on anti-discrimination law favours intelligent people with late onset 
mobility or sensory impairments .... The ADA does not secure the promise of protecting people 
with unpopular mental disabilities to the same degree as it does those with physical disabilities. 
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The burden of exclusion can appear to be heightened for individuals with more 
severely-limiting impairments or certain mental impairments or those with learning 
disabilities}4 While positive action iilltiatives are voluntary under Ireland 's EEA and the 
Framework Directive, it is argued here that they could be tailored towards categories of 
conditions that endure disproportionate levels of exclusion from workplace structures 
due to stigma. Applying these initiatives to those impairments which are 
disproportionately associated with states of disadvantage, subordination and stigma 
would provide one method of line-drawing that might ensure better protection for the 
targeted class. 
Equal Treatment and Direct Discrimination 
Chapter two drew attention to some of the limitations which attach to formal 
conceptions of equality. In particular, it considered the equal treatment principle, which 
is pursued at the anti-discrimination level through the prohibition against direct 
discrimination. Direct discrimination is often overlooked in the disability context due to 
the focus directed at the reasonable accommodation duty. However, the direct 
discrimination principle retains an important role - it recognises that disabled people can 
be subject to bias, stereotyping and prejudice and treated less favourably than non-
disabled individuals in otherwise similar circumstances because of the assumed effects 
of their disability. 15 In other words, such individuals become no more than the sum of 
their impairment, and they endure less favourable treatment because of that impairment, 
even where that impairment has little or no functional impact on an individual' s life 
experiences or his or her capacity for the position in question. In addition, individuals 
with asymptomatic conditions routinely endure less favourable treatment on the grounds 
of their condition. Consequently, an important aspect of the non-discrimination 
architecture remains the prohibition on direct discrimination. Notwithstanding this, 
some of the traditional limitations to the individualised, negative-enforcement regime of 
non-discrimination law were raised. It was argued that these difficulties are exacerbated 
The largest class of complainants under the ADA employment provisions have been people with 
lower back pain." I. Bickenbach, supra n.4 pp. l07-l08. 
14 See D. Fleischer Zames and F. Zames, The Disability Rights Movement: From Charity to 
Confrontation (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 200 l ). 
15 See J. Mosoff, "Is the Human Rights Paradigm "Able" to Include Disability: Who's In? Who 
Wins What? Why?" (2000) 26 Queen 's Law Journa/225. This author's research demonstrates 
that many disability cases are direct discrimination cases. Thus, the dynamics of disability 
discrimination do not always differ significantly from other forms of discrimination. 
274 
in the disability context for a number of reasons. Many individuals with hidden 
impairments have been taught to compensate for their impairments to avoid or minimise 
the experience of discrimination. The pursuit of a disability discrimination claim in part 
involves focus and attention being directed to a condition or experience that many 
individuals have learned to deny or reject. Many who experience disability 
discrimination may fail to pursue formal redress for fear of drawing undue attention and 
stigma to something which society still perceives negatively. Indeed, ADA 
commentators have noted the endemic nature of discriminatory practices against 
individuals with so-called hidden disabilities. In such cases, individuals have been 
employed, their impairment has subsequently been discovered, and they have been 
discharged. This phenomenon of"chuming" occurs when employees with hidden 
conditions experience repeated cycles of being hired by unknowing employers and 
discharged when their conditions are discovered, and then hired again by different, 
unknowing employers. 16 The other reason why the individualised enforcement route 
bears so heavily on disabled people is because of the vulnerable position they occupy. 
Non-discrimination precepts are not equitably enforced. Differences in access to 
resources greatly affect the ability of individuals to pursue a breach of their individual 
rights. For many, this aspect, coupled with the pervasive need to downplay the impact of 
an impairment, can militate against adequate enforcement of equality rights. Under the 
EEA, there is scope for the statutory promotion body, the Equality Authority, to enforce 
discrimination cases on behalf of complainants.17 Resource implications, however, tend 
to compromise the effectiveness of this option. The Equality Authority is responsible 
for representing the nine protected grounds under the equality legislation, not just the 
disability ground. Priority tends to be accorded to individuals with cases that present 
novel facts or important points of law. With regard to individual enforcement, the 
recurring point is that this system does not adequately tackle the source of the 
discrimination. 18 Time and again, similar cases make their way through the equality 
tribunals and the courts, which indicates the weakness of the legislation's prophylactic 
effect. For every individual who pursues a discrimination case, there are many who 
simply lack the resources to do so. The social situation of many disabled people is 
16 S. Bagnestos, supra n.9 p.463. 
17 Section 85 of the EEA as amended. 
18 However, the success of the law cannot be determined by the number of legal cases brought 
under it, but by the rate of compliance. As Sayee points out, we judge the effectives of laws 
against burglary not by the numbers convicted, but by the rise or fall of burglaries. L. Sayee, 
"Beyond Good Intentions: Making Antidiscrimination Strategies Work" (2003) 18 Disability and 
Society 625, 631. 
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frequently unenviable in terms of income and employment opportunities. It is 
reasonable to suggest, therefore, that many disabled people are likely to be extremely 
risk-averse in situations of high uncertainty, and that the choice to take discriminators to 
court will, for many, represent no choice at all. 
Indirect Discrimination 
Indirect discrimination has always been held up as a more transformative equality tool. 
It has been described as pursuing the wider goal of equality of opportunity as opposed to 
taking a narrow focus on equal treatment. It moves beyond the formality of equal 
treatment through its recognition of the unequal impact of supposedly neutral practices 
on different groups. It is concerned with the exclusionary outcomes of neutral practices 
that remain unchallenged. However, chapter two pointed out some of the weaknesses of 
the EEA's indirect disability discrimination provision. While the constituent parts 
needed to raise a successful indirect discrimination claim have been simplified 
following the Equality Act's transposition of the terms of the Fran1ework Directive, 19 
the transformative capacity of indirect discrimination remains open to challenge. It has 
been suggested that indirect discrimination principles can promote better practice 
among employers and that it can make them identify and remove exclusionary barriers 
in advance.20 In turn, this proactive act has a beneficial impact on members of the 
disadvantaged group. In this sense, the group-based dimension of indirect 
discrimination is thought to be an advance on the reactive, individualised approach 
central to the reasonable accommodation duty. However, this concern for the structural 
impact of practices on groups is compromised by the anti-discrimination enforcement 
system. The potency of indirect discrimination is overstated: as Ellis comments, it does 
not proactively dismantle obstacles or change stereotyped roles? 1 The indirect 
discrimination principle' s effective operation depends upon the actions of an individual 
complainant. It also depends upon the isolation of a practice, provision or criteria - in 
this sense, it is not concerned with omissions, or with a failure to act.22 While the latter 
may be captured by the reasonable accommodation duty, the relationship between these 
two provisions in the Framework Directive further undermines the group dimension to 
19See chapter two for discussion. 
20 Submission cited in B. Hepple, M. Coussey and T. Choudhbury, Equality: A New Framework 
- Report of the Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK AntiDiscrimination Legislation 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) p.31 . 
21 E. Ellis, EU Antidiscrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p.ll5. 
22 J. Baker et al. Equality From The01y to Action (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2004) p.128. 
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indirect discrimination. Under Article 2(2)(b) of the Framework Directive, an employer 
is entitled to maintain the prima facie exclusionary provision - and is not required to 
justify it - if, with respect to a single disabled individual, a reasonable accommodation 
could eliminate the disadvantage that that particular individual faces. While tbis aspect 
ofthe Directive does not appear to have been transposed into Ireland's EEA, some 
uncertainty remains as to the relationship between indirect discrimination, the 
justification defence and the duty to make reasonable accommodation. Moreover, the 
ability of the EEA' s indirect discrimination and reasonable accommodation principles to 
challenge the effects of traditional job qualification standards are compromised by 
section 36. As was seen in the Gorr/3 decision, discussed in chapter two, Section 36 
insulates job qualifications "generally recognised in the State" from the scope of the 
reasonable accommodation duty and the indirect discrimination principle. The purpose 
of section 36 is to allow employers and professions to insist on relevant qualification 
standards in line with their respective professions and occupations. Presumably, the 
point of the section is to avoid the "blind bus driver" scenario - however, it was argued 
that the provision is over-inclusive. There are sufficient statutory safeguards in place to 
avoid arguments of this type.24 Section 36 reduces the potency of the indirect 
discrimination principle and the accommodation mandate in terms of their ability to 
unpack and challenge the impact of excessive and unnecessary job qualifications for 
particular positions. This was clearly demonstrated on the facts of Gony itself. 
Disabling Discourse: Judicial Approaches in the Supreme Courts 
The reasonable accommodation duty is core to the operation of the disability equality 
framework and it was discussed in this thesis on a number of levels. The purpose of the 
duty is to provide for adjustments to workplace practices and structures to allow an 
individual with a disability to compete for, take up, or advance in employment. 
The discussion of the reception accorded to reasonable accommodation on the 
constitutional plane in both the US and Ireland demonstrates bow pervasive the 
individual, personal-problem conception of disability remains within legal structures. In 
addition, the formal nature of both the US and Irish constitutional equality guarantees 
23 DEC - E2005 -038. 
24 Specifically, the cumulative impact of section 16 of the EEA. 
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was exposed following a comparison with the more expansive, substantive-equality 
norm under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
When the initial Employment Equality Bill 1996 was referred to the Supreme 
Court under Article 26, the Court ruled that the cost of disability accommodations 
would amount to an unconstitutional interference with an employer's right to earn a 
livelihood?5 The constitutional attack on the reasonable accommodation duty came 
from the more substantive right to private property. There was no little or no discussion 
as to what a workable concept of equality might involve in the context of disability. The 
equality guarantee in Article 40.1 was simply not factored into the reasoning process of 
the Supreme Court. The Court failed to uncover in a balanced manner the point and 
reach of the accommodation mandate. It continued to perpetuate the dominant view of 
disability as a medical and personal tragedy. The Court's preoccupation with the costs 
of including disabled people was influenced by the exclusionary, one-dimensional view 
of disability that is a legacy of the welfare state. Consequently, any movement towards 
their (re)integration inevitably raises issues of the costs of inclusion and whether those 
costs could legitimately be placed on employers?6 However, pregnancy discrimination 
protection,27 along with more traditional forms of discrimination protection such as 
indirect discrimination, not to mention minimum wage directions, all carry considerable 
and equivalent resource burdens for employers.28 Private property implications have not 
arisen in these instances, indicating that attitudinal barriers regarding the "proper place" 
of disabled individuals might well extend to the highest judiciary. What the Supreme 
Court refused to face up to is the cost of exclusion from mainstream activity tbat is 
25 Re Article 26 Of the Constitution and the Employment Equality Billl996 (1997) 2 IR 321. 
26 But as Fredman has argued, responsibility for correcting disadvantage under substantive 
fonnulation of equality , should not rest solely with those to whom "fault'' can be attributed. To 
do so would overlook the structural nature of discrimination. Thus, aU those who benefit from 
the existing structure of disadvantage should be expected to bear part of the costs of the remedy. 
Consequently, a community or workplace structure based on disability discrimination has 
conferred benefits on the dominant group as a whole. Thus, employers should be required to 
bear part of the costs of correction, subject to a proportionality enquiry. SeeS. Fredman, 
Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 129. 
27 It has been argued that maternity leave can be described as a fonn of' reasonable 
accommodation' on the gender ground as it responds appropriately to the fact of gender 
difference. See G. Quinn, "The European Social Charter and EU Anti-discrimination Law in the 
Field of Disability: Two Gravitational Fields with One Common Purpose" in G. De Burca and B. 
DeWitte, Social Rights in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 279, p.304. 
28 See C. lolls, "Antidiscrimination and Accommodation" (200 1) 115 Harvard Law Review 642. 
Jells thesis is that aspects of indirect discrimination law are in fact aspects of accommodation 
law. She describes several types of cases where the indirect discrimination principle requires 
employers to bear special costs to respond to the needs of an identifiable group of employees. At 
pp.62-64. See also S. Rabin-Margalioth, "Antidiscrimination, Accommodation and Universal 
Mandates - Aren' t They all the Same?" (2003) 24 Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor 
Law 111. 
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wholly shouldered by disabled people: in short, the refusal to place any associated costs 
on employers does not mean the costs disappear. The cost of alleviating discrimination 
visited upon disabled individuals could not properly be borne by employers, and thus 
legitimately rested with disabled individuals, precisely because of their disability. Thus, 
where disability is viewed as an issue of individual "misfortune" rather than the product 
of social forces, the disabled individual has no claim of right to social remediation: any 
benefits society bestows can be viewed as charitable, or as a "special" response to their 
individual situation?9 
Similar attitudes can be found among members of the US federal judiciary. 
Here, the constitutional assault on the enforcement of the reasonable accommodation 
duty came from the interaction between the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the State Sovereign Immunity Clause of the Eleventh Amendment.30 In 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garrett31 , the Supreme Court held that 
the states as public employers could not be subject to private suits for monetary 
damages for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under Title I of the ADA. 
Under the constitutional test required to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity, 
Congress's action in enacting the ADA can only extend to a proper enforcement of the 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment -it cannot create new rights under the 
guarantee.32 The Garrett Court remarkably decided that since there was no history of 
unconstitutional discrimination against disabled people, Congress did not, therefore, act 
to remedy any constitutional violation. It had overstepped its authority by creating new 
rights within the Equal Protection Clause in favour of disabled people. However, the 
ADA requires employers to "make existing facilities used by employees readily 
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities". 33 The preservation of financial 
resources that comes with hiring employees who do not require accommodations meant 
that the remedy of public employees to sue for damages under the reasonable 
accommodation provision of the ADA had to be removed. In particular, the decision 
illustrates the formal nature of the US constitutional equal protection guarantee: it is a 
guarantee which is, in the disability context, concerned only with intentional, animus-
based discrimination, and not with the by-products of institutional, systemic and 
29 M. Crossley, "The Disability Kaleidoscope" (1999) 74 Notre Dame Law Review 621 , pp.651-
52. 
30 See chapter three. 
31 53 I U.S. 356 (200 1). 
32 Congress can only act to prevent the violation of rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It does not have the power to create new rights. 
33 Ibid at 372. 
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structural inequality. Disabled state employees were denied their right to sue for failure 
to make a workplace accommodation because their impairment deems them 
dissimilarly-situated and disentitled to equal treatment in accordance with their 
differences. 
An example of a shift at the level of constitutional discourse in the approach to 
disability was considered in chapter three. Canadian equality jurisprudence is contextual 
and effects-based, and it bas begun to recognise the link between disadvantage and 
discrimination. While its analysis of the accommodation duty in decisions such as 
Eldridge34 and Eaton35 have moved beyond the personal-limitation model of disability 
endorsed by the US federal judiciary, chapter three raised an emerging concern with the 
accommodation mandate. This concern has been central to social model thinking around 
disability - that the accommodation mandate is predicated on uncomplicated and 
manageable concessions to the workplace to allow for the increased participation of a 
number of disabled individuals. This point gradually developed in the context of the 
assessment of the core components of the accommodation duty in chapter five. 
The Practicalities of Reasonable Accommodation 
lo chapter five, the practical operation of the reasonable accommodation duty at the 
statutory level was considered in order to fully understand its reach. A procedural yet 
practically significant point is the contrast between the detail of the ADA's statutory 
text and regulatory guidance on reasonable accommodation and the incredibly sparse 
approach under the EEA. While tbis was remedied somewhat following the introduction 
of the Equality Act 2004, wbich implemented the Framework Directive, there still exists 
some uncertainty with regard to the scope of the Irish duty. For example, it is unclear 
whether the EEA duty extends to reassigning a disabled individual to a vacant position. 
Also discussed at this point were the different approaches to important operational terms 
such as the "reasonableness" of an accommodation. lo the US, judicial interpretation of 
the "reasonableness" term varies widely at the level of the federal appeals courts.36 
Some disability commentators, who were originally involved in its drafting, have argued 
34 Eldridge v British Columbia (1997) 3 SCR 624. 
35 Eaton v Brant County Education Board ( 1997) I SCR 241. 
36 See chapter five. 
280 
that the federal judiciary has ignored the original intent behind the "reasonable" 
appendage to the accommodation duty.37 The reasonable accommodation provision was 
intended to be a term of art. The idea was that a reasonable accommodation was one 
which would enable the individual to perform the "essential functions" of the position. 
In other words, it was to allow a disabled individual to demonstrate competence and 
capability for the job' s essential functions. However, despite the existence of the undue 
hardship duty, an independent standard of reasonableness has begun to creep into the 
reasonable accommodation mandate.38 The Supreme Court's view is that ADA plaintiffs 
must show that a requested accommodation "seems reasonable on its face, i.e., 
ordinarily or in the run of cases."39 This is, as Waddington points out, a worrying 
development in that it allows employers to interject their own view of what is 
reasonable and gives them further scope to challenge accommodations that may not be 
unworkable or unduly burdensome.40 
Chapter five also considered the practical application of the accommodation 
duty. Under the ADA, it only extends to qualified individuals who can perform the 
"essential functions" of the job, while any non-essential duties must be discounted in 
assessing the employee's capability. However, under Ireland's EEA, an important 
loophole remains because of the omission of the "essential functions" aspect. Despite 
much prompting, the Equality Act 2004 did not fill this gap by making the critical 
distinction between the "essential functions" and the "non-essential functions" of a 
job.41 Under section 16, employers are entitled to demand competence and capability for 
all the duties attached to the position. As chapter five pointed out, there may be a 
critical difference between the provision of a reasonable accommodation which allows 
an applicant to carry out the "essential" duties of a position and an accommodation 
which would still not enable the applicant to perform "all" the duties of the position. 
The statute should be amended in order to prevent any undermining of the 
37 See A. Mayerson and S. Yee, "The ADA and Models of Equality" Paper presented at 
International Disability Law and Policy Symposium: From Principles to Practice October 22-26 
2000. Available at http://www.dredf.org/symposium/mayerson.html . 
38 US Ai1ways v Barnett 535 U.S. 391 , discussed in chapter five. 
39 Ibid.400-40 1. 
40 L. Waddington, Implementing and Interpreting the Reasonable Accommodation Provision of 
the Framework Employment Directive: Learning from Experience and Achieving Best Practice 
(EU Network of Experts on Disability Discrimination, 2004) 
41 See Recital 17 of the Framework Directive and G. Quinn and S. Quinlivan, "Disability 
Discrimination: The Need to amend the Employment Equality Act 1998 in light of the EU 
Framework Directive on Employment" in C. Costello and E. Barry, Equality in Diversity: The 
New Equality Directives (Dublin: Irish Centre for European Law 2003) 213, pp.219-220. 
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accommodation duty's reach. Arguably, this may be required in order to be in proper 
compliance with the Directive. 
Conceptualising Reasonable Accommodation 
This led to a discussion of the accommodation duty in the context of prevailing equality 
theories. This was developed, first, through comparing reasonable accommodation with 
traditional, more robust interventions into inequality, such as positive action programs. 
It was argued that while reasonable accommodation moves beyond formal equality 
because of its attention to difference, it represents an incomplete move towards the 
reformulated substantive equality norm discussed in the latter part of chapter six. This in 
part stems from its place within the current non-discrimination framework and its 
inability to capture the structural creation of disablement. To safeguard its legitimacy in 
US jurisprudence, it has been imperative for the minority group model to place the 
reasonable accommodation duty within a narrower equality of opportunity framework. 
This is because US constitutional jurisprudence is hostile to measures which 
compromise the sanctity and neutrality of the equal treatment principle. Consequently, 
the narrower conceptions of equality have played a prominent role in the legal system 
which can remain untouched by the understandings and developments of other 
discourses. As Collins usefully points out, a legal system which has achieved autonomy 
from the political and economic systems still has its independent demands, which 
include the general preservation of its system. 42 Collins continues that formal equality 
maxims represent fundamental operational principles of these legal systems.43 
Consequently, when political goals have to be incorporated into law, the legal system 
must accommodate them within its own operational principles.44 The compromise 
between the legal system's commitment to equal treatment and equality discourse's 
wider formulations has been the equality of opportunity principle. Chapter two placed 
indirect discrimination within an equality of opportunity framework. While the 
discussion in chapter six did attempt to formulise reasonable accommodation in terms of 
the wider equality-of-results formula, reasonable accommodation was demonstrated to 
have fallen short. Indeed, on this point, some commentators have suggested that in our 
conceptualisation of the ADA within the anti-discrimination project, it is necessary to 
give considerable thought to what the reasonable accommodation duty is not. In this 
42 H. Collins, "Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion" (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 16. 
43 Ibid. 
44 See A. Mayerson and S. Yee, supra n.3 7. 
282 
sense, a long and sobering look at its metes and bounds can reveal the hyperbole 
attached to the concept. Where the reasonable accommodation duty is formulised in 
terms of eliminating discrimination against disabled people, and even where 
discrimination is conceived of more widely in terms of socially-created barriers, it will 
not necessarily provide total assistance to disabled people. The duty does not 
compensate for functional limitations, the accommodations need only be reasonable, 
and the employer defence of undue hardship extends beyond pecuniary considerations. 
Moreover, where the accommodation duty is reduced to a negative right enforced by 
way of compensation for a failure to make it, the non-discrimination matrix fails to 
tackle the stereotyping which surrounds disabled people and perpetuates their exclusion. 
However, this point may be overstated, particularly if one takes account of the 
procedural aspect to the accommodation duty, as discussed in chapter five. The forced 
interaction between the employee and employer in terms of considering a reasonable 
accommodation could be a way of challenging employer ignorance and the exclusion of 
disabled people. As Schwab and Willborn argue, procedural discussions may eventually 
contribute to the ADA's goal of changing employer preferences, as the discussion may 
educate employers of the positive potential of individuals with disabilities.45 The 
effectiveness of this, however, may be a long-term goal and it should be subject to 
empirical enquiry. 
The ADA and EEA's reasonable accommodation duty, while progressive, fails 
to embrace a truly substantive vision of equality. In light of social model thinking on 
disability, the discussion of the transfonnative potential of reasonable accommodation 
was questioned because of judicial statements made in a jurisdiction that boasts one of 
the most advanced equality guarantees of western democracies. The statement by 
Sopinka J. in the Canadian Supreme Court decision of Eaton46 was affmned with 
approval by the La Forest J in Eldridge47 and it illustrates tltis critique of the duty 
succinctly. While the statement places reasonable accommodation at the core of the 
equality ideal in the disability context, it paradoxically represents the social model's 
discontent with the equality principle in a legal context: 
Exclusion from the mainstream of society results from the construction of a 
society based solely on "mainstream" attributes to which disabled persons will 
never be able to gain access. Whether it is the impossibility of success at a 
45 S. Schwab and S. Willbom "Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities" (2001) 
Cornell Working Paper Series. Available at 
http://wW\v.law.eomell.edu/leda/searcb/seriesbvautl1or Accessed December 4, 2002. 
46 [1997] I SCR 241. 
47 Eldridge v British Columbia ( 1997) 218 N.R. 161. 
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written test for a blind person, or the need for ramp access to a library, the 
discrimination does not lies in the attribution of untrue characteristics to the 
disabled individual. The blind person cannot see and the person in a wheelchair 
needs a ramp. Rather, is the failure to make reasonable accommodation to fine-
tune society so that its structures and assumptions do not result in the relegation 
and banishment of disabled people from participation, which results in 
discrimination against them. 48 
From a social model perspective, these passages contain problematic assumptions.49 
Whereas Justice Sopinka identified the context for disability discrimination as " the 
construction of a society based on mainstream attributes", he did not suggest the need 
for a fundamental rethinking of that norm. Instead, "fine-tuning" and accommodation 
after the fact were identified as appropriate responses. 5° In the words of Martha Minow, 
Justice Sopinka treats the mainstream attributes as the "unproblematic background" 
rather than conceiving of"current institutional arrangements as a conceivable source of 
the problem". 51 Pothier's analysis of this approach is starkly revealing, as the 
accommodation of disabled people becomes an end in itself, rather than as a means to 
the end of inequality.52 It is premised on the continued dominance of able-bodied design 
and able-bodied norms, with tinkering and concessions available through the 
accommodation duty where they are reasonable. Provision for the difference of 
disability should not be dependent upon the construction and perpetuation of a hierarchy 
between normal and abnormal difference. In this sense, the hierarchy suggests that 
certain deviations from the norm are acceptable through the modest tool of 
accommodation. This leaves vulnerable those whose differences are more than a little 
different. Disability discrimination case-law confin11S this analysis.53 
Consequently, it has been argued that more robust measures beyond the 
individualised accommodation duty are required in order to tackle the exclusion of 
disabled people from working structures. Weber argues that increasing the presence of 
people with disabilities within mainstream structures benefits society as a whole, as 
society's exposure to individuals who do not confonn to the nonn is crucial in 
48 Ibid. pp.226-228. 
49 D. Pothier, "Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General): How the Deaf Were Heard in 
the Supreme Court of Canada" (1997-1998) 9 National Joumal of Constitutional Law 263, 
p.271. 
50 Ibid. 
51 M. Minow, Making all the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law (Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 1990) p.l12. Cited in D. Pothier, ibid. p. 217. 
52 D. Pothier, supra n.49 p. 272. 
53 R. Colker, "The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants" (1999) 34 
Harvard Civil Rights- Civil Liberties Review 99. 
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displacing myths about disabled people. 54 Where the invisibility of disabled people is 
challenged, more realistic attitudes about disabled people can be fostered. Chapter six 
discussed bow movements in this direction, encapsulated by the positive action 
provisions within the Irish non-discrimination framework, have been extremely limited. 
However, the ADA contains no positive action provisions at all.55 The utility of positive 
action at national level is generally compromised by the voluntary nature of the 
statutory provisions. Even the State, as a public sector employer, has demonstrated a 
wavering ability to commit to its target of an employment rate of 3 per cent across the 
public sector, and research on the policy's implementation demonstrated public sector 
confusion on the relationship between positive action and the principle of equal 
treatment. 56 Further, the discussion began to question the focus which an equality-of-
results theory attracts, particularly in terms of its transformative potential. Positive 
action within an equality-of-results theory can sometimes be crudely reduced to a 
numbers game. 57 While the increased representation of individuals from traditionally 
disadvantaged groups represents a move forward, it can again divert attention away 
from the exclusionary structure that perpetuates the disadvantage in the ftrst place. 
Deconstructing the hierarchy of difference involves a systemic as opposed to an 
individualised, ad-hoc response. Embracing difference and expanding participation 
requires efforts beyond the current non-discrimination protection, as "an anti-
discrimination strategy does not provide adequate guidance in developing cost-effective, 
politically defendable policies that meet the employment and other needs of people with 
disabilities". 58 However, it was suggested in chapter six that the role of equality and 
non-discrimination legal precepts should not be quickly dismissed by the various strands 
of the disability movement. While the social model decries the minority group model's 
focus on equality rights, chapter six argued that it would be unwise to simply dismiss 
the current discrimination system to its own self-limiting paradigm. This is because 
emerging developments in the legal use of the equality principle, particularly in 
European countries, view equality not simply in terms of difference. Tentative steps in 
54 M. Weber, "Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy for 
People with Disabilities (1998) 46 Buffalo Law Review 123 (Obtained through Westlaw, no page 
numbers available). 
55 There are some affirmative action provisions- contract compliance and action plans in the 
context of federal contracts under the Rehabilitation Act 1973. 
56 Discussed in chapter six. 
51 Ibid. 
58 K. Schriner and R. K. Scotch, "Disability and institutional change: A human variation 
perspective on overcoming oppression" (200 l) 12 Journal of Disability Policy Studies 100. 
(Article obtained through ProQuest, no page numbers available). 
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this direction have been taken under the banner of the so-called "fourth generational" 
equality initiatives, such as the public sector duty to promote equality and the proofmg 
of policies for equality impacts.59 Others see the non-discrimination norm as a bridge 
between civil rights and freedom-enhancing social rights. 
Final Remarks 
This work borrowed from social model theorising around disability to challenge 
orthodox legal discourse on disability and disability discrimination under the ADA and 
Ireland 's EEA. 
It welcomes the extension of the non-discrimination nonn to disabled people 
but argues that some internal aspects of the system need addressing. It further argues 
that equality ambitions in the context of disability cannot be limited to this particular 
paradigm. Thus, current structures of anti-discrimination law cannot be the sum of the 
equality agenda in the legal context. The individualised enforcement of non-
discrimination precepts - which sees the citizen as an equal actor in the judicial process, 
with the legal power to redress instances of discrimination - overlooks aspects internal 
to the legal system's structure that impact on the redress of discriminatory practices. 
Traditional concerns regarding access to justice, resources and power in the 
enforcement process impact on the operation of the structure and remain wholly outside 
of the control of the individual. Moreover, traditional discrimination theory and law has 
done little to challenge the internal workings of this system. When expressed in ordinary 
language, the aims of reasonable accommodation make it clear that it requires 
employers to think about ways in which their practices and procedures are exclusionary 
of an entire category of people and the means by which such practices could be 
rethought to take account of the different ways disabled people have of performing 
tasks. However, the doctrinal make-up of the accommodation duty prioritises the 
existing structures as generally unproblematic except in isolated cases where 
manageable accommodations are required. Yet, labour is still divided hierarchically: 
many positions are overvalued, others are comparatively and continually devalued, 
leaving some people barely rewarded and, where competition is stiff, others not 
rewarded at all. Equal opportunity and equality of results are limited because of the 
piecemeal (re)distribution of these scarce positions and wider questions, surrounding the 
59 For example, see s.75 Northern Ireland Act 1998. On the proofing procedure, seeS. Mullally 
and 0. Smith, Equality Proofing (Dublin: Government Stationery Office, 2000). 
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injustice in the definition ofthe positions, admission to them and what it takes to be 
qualified for a position60 are routinely ignored. The individualism of non-discrimination 
can be offset with fully- resourced and commission-based enforcement, but also through 
a better emphasis on the preventative aspect of discrimination law. On the latter point, 
there is recent evidence of an increased consciousness-raising and education on the 
suitability and viability of disabled people for employment under the EEA. To this end, 
Equality Officers and Equality Mediation Officers have made use of their powers to 
order respondent employers appearing before the Equality Tribunal to undertake 
disability equality training, and a number of disability consultancy firms have been 
established to fill this niche.61 
Beyond Work: Equality as Belonging 
In the disability context, the policy behind the discrimination norm recognises that there 
are members of the disability community who could be working but who are excluded 
by prejudice or because the structure of the market is antithetical to their operational 
capacity. To a certain extent, the forces of the system can be altered to accommodate 
them. The rules then operate clearly in favour of disabled people who possess no or few 
functional impairments, but suffer the effects of discriminatory animus and exclusionary 
bias. While not regaling against those who can make the "fit" within the existing 
system, there is a view that the centrality of contributions in the workplace can have a 
particular polarising effect within the disability community. This stems from the pivotal 
place occupied by "work" within modern society. As long as this centrality persists, 
there will always be a division between those disabled people whom society or 
employers are willing to accommodate and the residuum of people who, because of the 
nature of their impairment, will remain excluded. 
While one can talk about how much effort is needed in terms of wholehearted 
commitment to barrier removal, and indeed what kind of barrier removal is required, 
when the removal of some barriers creates barriers for others, a utopian scenario where 
all disabled people have realistic chances of employment is unrealistic. The obvious 
approach would argue for, as many feminist writers have done, the displacement of 
60 I. M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990) pp.200-202. 
61 See the work carried out by \Vww.disabilityconsultancy.ie and also the grants available from 
F AS, the national training authority, to carry out disability awareness training and towards a 
strategy of retention of disabled workers. See www.fas.ie for further details. 
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certain forms of work (i.e. paid) as the central social role. Barnes has written about the 
radical reconceptualisation of work beyond the rigid waged-labour confines, an 
approach that is more than simply a reaction to or a tinkering with existing inequalities. 
Such a sea-change moves towards challenging and overturning the ideologies and 
cultural values upon which these inequalities are based.62 Barnes gives examples such as 
the introduction in Britain of The Community Care (Direct) Payments Act. Many people 
perceived as being severely impaired now employ personal assistants to do tasks that 
they cannot do themselves, and while they remain unemployed in a traditional sense, 
they are engaged in the employment of others. There is room for argument that the 
management ofthe budget and timetabling of the assistants could be reconceptualised as 
a form of work and a contribution on the part of the disabled individual. In the disability 
context, it has been accepted, then, that not every person will be able to achieve 
inclusion into the economy as presently structured. However" .. . a mature society 
[includes] everyone on the basis, not of the work they have done, but on the needs they 
have" .63 
These arguments within disability discourse have particular resonance in the 
context of the reformulated equality nom1 in chapter six, particularly with regard to the 
role of positive duties in promoting the broader values of participation and choice. This 
has emerged in the literature through a necessary link between non-discrimination and 
equality and the enjoyment of social, freedom-enhancing rights, which promote 
participation and choice.64 In the disability context, the utility of this developing synergy 
lies in bridging the traditional gap between non-discrimination rights and social 
programs, and the characterisation of the former as benefits of the political milieu. It 
would be better, perhaps, as Quinn argues, that the birth of social and economic rights in 
"the wellspring of equality" should be understood in tem1s of the equal intrinsic worth 
and dignity ofhuman beings. This would allow rights to become "means to the higher 
end of human freedom and choice".65 In this sense, the equality concept opens out to a 
wider meaning, and is not just the measurement process that inheres in an equality-of-
62 C. Barnes, "A Working Social Model? Disability and Work in the 21 sr Century" Available at 
Centre for Disability Studies Resources Web page: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-
studies/archiveuklarchframe.ht:m last accessed November 18, 2003). 
63 T. Shakespeare and N. Watson "The social model of disability: an outdate ideology?" 2 
Research in Social Science and Disability (2002) p.9-28 (also available at Centre for Disability 
Studies Resources Web page: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studieslarchiveuk/archframe.htm 
last accessed November 18, 2003). 
64 G. Quinn, supra n.l p.281. 
65 G. Quinn, supra n.l p.281. 
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outcome approach in existing institutional practices. Rather than simply measuring the 
numbers oftraditional out-groups within an existing structure, as has become a staple 
tool of employment anti-discrimination research,66 the reformulated equality norm seeks 
to create space in the mainstream through its reformulation, based on notions of choice, 
dignity, self-worth and respect. This reformulated mainstream would necessarily 
recognise that dignity deriving from participation does not inhere solely within 
standardised employment contracts, but comes from the right to belong to an inclusive 
community. In this sense, then, equality law need not be inherently antagonistic to the 
social model of disability which involves "searching for openings in the structures of 
society where [disabled people] might effectively contribute with others in the 
restructuring of society so that it is not disabling for all people".67 Here, equality law 
and theory has tentatively begun to consider a number of possible methods of moving 
beyond the traditional limits of the non-discrimination system. It must be remembered, 
though, that these will persist unless the law "can attach itself to - and help to animate -
the material basis for human freedom" in its widest sense.68 
66 See See D.C. Stapelton and R. V Burkbauser, The Decline in Employment of People with 
Disabilities: A Policy Puzzle (Kalmazoo, Michigan, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research, 2003. 
67 V. Finklestein, supra n.3 p.5. 
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